« EelmineJätka »
which he stated that in his opinion fraud had been committed in the promotion or formation of the company and also in relation to the company since the formation thereof, and that certain persons named therein were parties to such fraud.
This report was duly considered by the court, and an order made for the examination of the persons concerned, which examination was duly held. An application was afterwards made by one of such persons for an order declaring that he had been exculpated from the charges made against him in the official receiver's reports, and for an order that his costs should be paid as the court should direct. Notice of the application was served upon the official receiver, and he appeared on the hearing thereof for the purpose of contending that the applicant was exculpated from the charges made against him, and that he was not entitled to be allowed his costs. The fearned County Court judge made an order declaring that the charges had not been established against the applicant, and being of opinion that the Act contemplated that in such an event he should be entitled to recover his costs, which by reason of absence of assets could not be paid by the company, he directed that they should be borne by the official receiver personally, notwithstanding that it was in no way suggested that the official receiver had taken any step except such as he conceived a fair and honest performance of his duties required.
The Board of Trade took the view that such an order, involving as it did that an officer performing statutory duties honestly and to the best of his ability might nevertheless run the risk of being personally penalised, would seriously impair the efficient working of those provisions of the Act which were specially designed to ensure an investigation in all cases where there was reason to believe that persons concerned in the promotion or management of a company had infringed the canons of commercial morality; and accordingly I was instructed to bring an appeal on behalf of the official receiver from the learned County Court judge's direction that the official receiver should pay the costs in question. The appeal was argued before a Divisional Court consisting of Mr. Justice Darling and Mr. Justice Bucknill, and after an exhaustive examination of the provisions of the Act, and of the authorities relating to the position of the official receiver, as distinguished from that of a liquidator, the court allowed the appeal. Mr. Justice Darling held that the official receiver had merely performed duties which he was bound to perform, and that, however proper it might be to give a person who had been examined his costs out of the company's assets, it could not be right to award them against the official receiver, and his Lordship emphasised the danger of holding a public officer liable to personal penalty as being calculated to affect him in fearlessly discharging his duties. Mr. Justice Buckmill was satisfied that where, as in this case, there was no suggestion of impropriety in the conduct of the officer concerned, the court ought not to hold him liable for costs, even if there were jurisdiction to do so, as to which he gave no opinion.
An appeal was brought by the person examined from the decision of the Divisional Court, when, in addition to contending that the County Court judge was right in holding that the official receiver ought to pay the whole of the costs in question, the appellant for the first time raised the point that a distinction existed between the costs of the examination and those which related to the application for an order of exculpation. It was urged that, even if the official receiver was right in his contention that in filing his report and appearing on the examination he was acting in strict accordance with the duties imposed upon him by the Act and had no option but to take the course which he had followed, his position on the hearing of the application for an order of exculpation was different, and, as the Act made no provision for his appearance thereon, he by taking part in the application voluntarily accepted the position of a litigant, and was consequently liable to be ordered to pay the costs of that application. The Court of Appeal affirmed the view of the Divisional Court that the official receiver in presenting his report and in appearing on the examination was carrying out duties of a semi-judicial character, and that it was not competent for the court to order the official receiver to pay the costs thereof, except, possibly, where it was found that he had been guilty of misconduct. Dealing with the position of the official receiver upon the application for the order of exculpation, the Master of the Rolls held that, although the applicant had served the official receiver with notice thereof, he in that capacity was not a necessary party to it, and should not have been served, and that by appearing on the application he became a mere litigant, and liable to the same consequences as any other litigant in a proceeding before the court. The costs of the application for exculpation accordingly became a matter in which the County Court judge was entitled to exercise his discretion; and as he must be assumed to have awarded the costs against the official receiver in the exercise of that discretion, the court must hold that it could not interfere. The order of the Divisional Court was therefore varied by holding the official receiver liable for the costs of the application for an order of exculpation, but not for the costs of the examination.
Although it is perhaps unfortunate that an official receiver can be held liable for costs even to the extent referred to above, it is a matter of much less importance from a public point of view (as was pointed out by the Court of Appeal) than if it were possible to subject him to responsibility for the costs of the examination, and in any case it is satisfactory that the position of the official receiver when carrying out the difficult duty of launching charges
of fraud and conducting the examination of inculpated persons has been authoritatively defined.
It was found necessary to take proceedings in the police-court against the managing director of a company against which a compulsory winding-up order had been made, for the purpose of recovering the penalties to which he had rendered himself liable by his failure to submit to the official receiver the statutory statement as to the affairs of the company. Notwithstanding the efforts made to induce him to comply with the requirements of the Act, it was found impossible to obtain a satisfactory statement without taking proceedings, and it was only after substantial penalty had been imposed that the statement was
In accordance with directions given by the learned judges of the High Court exercising winding-up jurisdiction, the official receiver is now required to appear on every application to the court for an order staying the proceedings in a winding-up. The ground upon which such an application is usually made is that arrangements have been made to satisfy the claims of creditors, but the court also regards it as important that the official receiver shall have made an investigation into the company's affairs and the conduct of the directors before it will allow the proceedings to be stayed, and it is in order that the official receiver shall deal with this aspect of the matter that he is required to attend every such application.
Two cases arose during the period covered by this report in which the court was asked to stay the proceedings, in both of which the official receiver was in a position to state that he had satisfied himself that there were no matters relating to the promotion or formation of the company or the conduct of its business as to which further inquiry was desirable. The applications were therefore granted.
(2) Proceedings against Defaulting Liquidators.
As in previous years, much difficulty was experienced by the registrar in obtaining from liquidators of companies in course of voluntary winding-up the statutory statements as to the proceedings in and position of the liquidations, there having been no less than 239 cases referred to me for the purpose of proceedings to recover the penalties incurred. Most of the liquidators concerned furnished the required statements as a result of my correspondence with them, but it was necessary to issue thirty-two summonses in the police-court, of which eighteen were brought before the court, and fines (with costs) imposed, averaging about £7 in each case. The magistrate's decision in many cases gave the alternative of a short term of imprisonment, but this extreme course was only resorted to in one case.
(3) Cases relating to Receivers who failed to file Abstracts of their Receipts and Payments.
It would appear that the recent statutory enactment requiring a person appointed to be receiver or manager of the property of a company, under the powers contained in any instrument, to file with the Registrar of Companies every half-year, while he remains in possession, an abstract of his receipts and payments has escaped the notice of many of the persons concerned, notwithstanding the fact that default in filing the document renders the receiver or manager liable to a fine not exceeding £50. In 171 cases in which default was made in filing the abstract the Board of Trade instructed me to take proceedings for the imposition of a fine; but in practically every case it sufficed to point out to the receiver or manager what his duties now are, and the consequences which may follow from inattention to the requirements of the Act. There were, however, two cases in which summonses had to be issued, in the first of which the magistrate imposed a small fine, at the same time intimating that in future cases of default brought before the court a more substantial penalty would be inflicted. In the second case, the summons was withdrawn upon a satisfactory explanation of the delay being given.
(4) Proceedings relating to Companies not in Liquidation. During the year ending the 31st Dec. 1910 I had referred to me 1746 companies for action in respect of default in the year 1909 and, in many of the cases, the year 1908 as well, in rendering the various returns and notices required by the Companies Acts, but in twenty-nine cases only was it necessary to institute proceedings for penalties. In these twenty-nine cases, however, eighty-five informations were laid and summonses issued. The following convictions were obtained, seventy-four in all :
(i.) Twenty-five for offences against sect. 26 of the Act of 1862 (as amended by the Acts of 1900 and 1907) for failure to render the returns (Form E)-.e., the annual list of members with summaries as to capital and shares, &c. ;
(ii.) Thirty-four for similar offences against sect. 26 of the Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908;
(iii.) Three for offences against sect. 63 of the Consolidation Act-i.e., for signing the name of a company on a cheque or authorising the signing of the company's name without the word Limited";
(iv.) Ten for offences against sect. 64 of the Consolidation Acti.e., failure to hold annual general meeting; and
(v.) Two for offences against sect. 282 of the Consolidation Act-i.e., carrying on business as a limited company without being registered as such.
In the case of four of the above-mentioned summonses, two directors of a company were charged with the two offences of knowingly being parties to the failure of the company to hold, pursuant to sect. 64 of the Consolidation Act, the annual general meeting during the calendar year 1910 and of knowingly and wilfully permitting default in rendering the return (Form E), for that year, pursuant to sect. 26 of the Consolidation Act, and the court of summary jurisdiction, whilst convicting and fining the defendants for the offences against sect. 64, charged under two of the summonses, declined to do so for those against sect. 26, charged under the two other summonses, on the ground that, no meeting having been held, it was impossible to make a return in the terms of the statute-i.e., within twenty-one days succeeding the annual general meeting.
A case was, however, stated for the opinion of the High Court and came on for argument before a Divisional Court (King's Bench) consisting of the Lord Chief Justice and Justices Hamilton and Avory, on the 17th Jan. of this year, when the court, after hearing the Solicitor-General (Sir John Simon, K.U., M.P.), who appeared for the department, the respondents not being represented, upheld the contention of the appellants, the Board of Trade, that, as was decided by Lord Chief Justice Coleridge and other judges in the cases of Edmonds v. Foster and Gibson v. Barton, the provision in sect. 26 as to making a return annually is mandatory, the time up to which it is to be made being directory only, and the case was sent back to the Hertfordshire justices to convict, which they have since done, and the default was subsequently remedied.
Of the eleven charges upon which no convictions were obtained, three were dismissed upon the court being satisfied that the defaults of the responsible officials were not wilful, and, as regards the remaining eight, nine directors of a company were separately summoned for default in holding the annual general meeting, and on the conviction of one of them, who was both managing director and secretary, and upon the other eight directors undertaking to pay their shares of the penalty and costs imposed upon him, the summonses against them were not proceeded with.
R. ELLIS CUNLIFFE, Solicitor to the Board of Trade. Board of Trade, July 1911.
THE OFFICE OF LORD HIGH STEWARD.
THE London Gazette of the 29th Sept. was responsible for the following announcement : The King has been pleased, on the occasion of the approaching visit of Their Majesties to India, to appoint Colonel the Earl of Durham, K.G., to be Lord High Steward to the King. The appointment to take effect from the 9th Nov. next until the return of Their Majesties from India. The announcement was the occasion of a nine days' wonder, and some of our lay contemporaries rushed into more or less accurate disquisitions on the history of the office of Lord High Steward. It has since been made manifest that Lord Durham's prospective appointment is not that of Lord High Steward at all, but that of temporary Lord Steward of the Household, to accompany the Court to India.
Nor could it be otherwise. There is no such office known to the law as that of 'Lord High Steward to the King." There have been Lord High Stewards of England, of Great Britain, and of the United Kingdom. For the origin and early history of the office, students should refer to the late Mr. L. W. Vernon Harcourt's work, His Grace the Steward and Trial of Peers," a perfect storehouse of independent research, upsetting several hitherto received theories.
The office, it is clear, is (when called into existence) the first great office of State in the kingdom. From being hereditary in the Earldom of Leicester, and later in the Earldom and Dukedom of Lancaster, the office became merged in the Crown on the accession of Henry IV., who appointed his second son, Thomas Plantagenet, Duke of Clarence, for life. He died in 1421, and, after his death, the Stewardship of England was never again regranted, except for particular occasions.
Those occasions have been limited to the coronations of successive Sovereigns, and the trial of a peer for treason, or felony, either before the King in Parliament (i.e., the House of Lords) or before the court of the Lord High Steward.
The duty of a Lord High Steward in connection with the coronation is now confined to the carrying of St. Edward's crown in the procession. At one time, he appears to have held, or presided in, the Court of Claims. In modern days, the Court of Claims is commissioned from among the Privy Council by the Sovereign, before the Lord High Steward is appointed. At the recent coronation of Their Majesties, the Duke of Northumberland was Lord High Steward.
The judicial functions of the Lord High Steward in connection with the trial of peers have been well attested since the fifteenth century. If a peer be indicted for treason or felony, then, if Parliament is in session, the indictment is removed by certiorari to the House of Lords, before which the trial takes place. A Lord High Steward is commissioned pro hac vice, the Lord Chancellor being usually selected, though there are precedents for the appointment of a lay peer. The Lord High Steward is merely the presiding member and mouthpiece of the tribunal, and all the lords If Parliapresent are equally judges of the law and the fact. ment is not in session, a Lord High Steward is commissioned
similarly, but the trial takes place before the Lord High Steward's Court. In this court the Lord High Steward sits as sole judge, with not less than twelve peers summoned by him as Lords-Triers. These Lords-Triers are in the position of a jury, and the verdict of a majority (which must consist of twelve at least) is conclusive on the question of guilt.
The last case of a trial before the Lord High Steward's Court was that of Lord Delamere for treason in 1686. Lord Chancellor Jeffreys was Lord High Steward, and thirty peers were summoned by him as Lords-Triers, of whom twenty-seven appeared and took part, including the Lord High Treasurer, the Lord President of the Council, and others holding high office: (see State Trials, vol. 11, p. 510). Upon the trial of a peer for treason, or misprision, it is now enacted by the Treason Act 1695 that all the peers shall be summoned.
The following list shows the successive Lord High Stewards appointed for judicial purposes since the Revolution of 1688 :
The letters patent (after reciting the indictment) constitute the Lord High Steward in the following words: And for that the office of High Steward of Great Britain and Ireland, whose presence is required upon this occasion, is now vacant, as We are informed, We, very much confiding in your fidelity, prudence, provident circumspection, and industry, Have for this cause ordained and constituted you Steward of Our said United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland to bear, execute, and exercise for this time the said office with all things due and belonging to the same office in this behalf." The words in italics show the temporary nature of the appointment.
The two occasions on which the Lord Chancellor (or Lord Keeper) was not appointed Lord High Steward are easily explained. At the date of Lord Mohun's trial in 1693, the Great Seal was in commission, and there was no legal peer in the House. Consequently, the Lord President of the Council was selected. On the occasion of Lord Cardigan's trial in 1841, Lord Cottenham, the Lord Chancellor, was ill, and Lord Denman, the Lord Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench, was selected by Lord Melbourne. Before the Union, there was a separate office of Loru High Steward or Ireland. The last revival of the office in Ireland was in 1798, when the Earl of Clare, Lord Chancellor of Ireland, presided, as Lord High Steward, at the trial of the Earl of Kingston for murder, before the Irish House of Lords.
A Lord High Steward shares with archbishops and dukes the style of "His Grace." His rank is even higher. From the reading to the dissolving of his commission, he is the first subject of the realm, taking precedence of Princes of the Blood Royal. This appears from the elaborate reports of the processions between the House of Lords and Westminster Hall: (see State Trials, passim).
How far the privileges of the peerage, and with them the judicial character of the Lord High Steward, will survive the substitution for the House of Lords of "a Second Chamber constituted on a popular instead of hereditary basis" (preamble to the Parliament Act 1911), is a speculative problem for the politician rather than for the lawyer.
THE LAWYER IN POLITICS.
(From the Canadian Law Times.)
ON the 12th June Governor Woodrow Wilson delivered the following address before the Kentucky Bar Association at Lexington, Kentucky :
The lawyer is, by every definition, an expert in the law, and society lives by law. Without it, its life is vague, inchoate, disordered, vexed with a hopeless instability. At every turn of its experience society tries to express its life, therefore, in law-to make the rules of its action universal and imperative. This is the whole process of politics. Politics is the struggle for law, for an institutional expression of the changing life of society.
Of course, this is the deeper view of politics. It is not the view of the mere party man or of the professional politician. He thinks chiefly, no doubt, of the offices and their emoluments, of the tenure of power, of the choice of policy from day to day in the administration of the various departments of government; of the hundred advantages, both personal and partisan, which can be obtained in a successful contest for the control of the instru
ments of politics; but even he cannot escape the deeper view at
The lawyer, therefore, has always been indispensable, whetner he merely guided the leaders or was himself the leader, and nowhere has the lawyer played a more important part in ponics than in England and America, where the rules of law have always been the chief instruments of contest and regulation, of liberty and efficient organisation, and the chief means of lifting society from one stage to the next of its slow development.
The lawyer's ideal part in this unending struggle is easy to conceive. There is long experience stored up in the story of law. He, above all other men, should have a quick perception of what is feasible, of the new things that will fit into the old, of the experiences which should be heeded, the wrongs that should be remedied, and the rights that should be more completely realised.
He knows what forces gather and work their will in the field of industry, of commerce, of all enterprise. He, if any man, knows where justice breaks down, where law needs amplification or amendment or radical change, what the alterations are that must be effected before the right will come into action easy and certainly and with genuine energy. He should at every turn be the mediator between society and the individual, between groups of men, between all contending and contesting interests. He should show how differences are to be moderated and antagonisms adjusted and society given peace and ease of movement.
It is a hard thing to exact of him, no doubt, that he should have a non-professional attitude toward law, that he should be more constantly conscious of his duties as a citizen than of his interests as a practitioner, but nothing less than that will fit him to play the really great rôle intended for his profession in the great plot of affairs. He must breed himself in the true philosophy of his calling. It is his duty to see from the point of view of all sorts and conditions of men, of the men whom he is not directly serving as well as of those whom he is directly serving.
This is a matter of character, of disposition and of training outside the schools of law, in the broader schools of duty and of citizenship and of patriotism. It is a great conception when once a lawyer has filled himself with it. It lifts him oftentimes to a very high place of vision and of inspiration. It makes of him the custodian of the honour and integrity of a great social order, an instrument of humanity, because an instrument of justice and fair dealing and of all those right adjustments of life that make the world fit to live in.
If I contrast with this ideal conception of the function of the lawyer in society what I may be excused for calling his actual role in the struggle for law and progress and the renovation of affairs, I hope that I will not be interpreted as suggesting a view of our great profession which is in anywise touched with cynicism or even with the spirit of harsh criticism. The facts do not justity a cynical view of the Profession or even a fear that it may be permanently losing the spirit which has ruled the action of the greater members of the Bar and of the immortal judges, who have presided at the birth and given strength and fibre to the growth and liberty of human right. I wish to submit what I have to say in all fairness and without colour even of discouragement.
The truth is that the technical training of the modern American lawyer, his professional prepossessions and his business involve. ments, impose limitations upon him and subject him to temptations which seriously stand in the way of his rendering the ideal service to society which is demanded by the true standards and canons of his profession. Modern business, in particular, with its huge and complicated processes, has tended to subordinate him, to make of him a servant, an instrument instead of a free adviser and a master of justice.
Moreover, the prepossessions of the modern lawyer are all in favour of his close identification with his clients. The lawyer deems himself in conscience bound to be contentious, to manœuvre for every advantage, to contribute to his clients' benefit his skill in a difficult and hazardous game. He seldom thinks of himself as the advocate of society. His very professional loyalty begets in him the feeling that he is the advocate now of this, now of that, and again of another special individual interest.
It is evident what must happen in such circumstances. The Bench must be filled from the Bar, and it is growing increasingly difficult to supply the Bench with disinterested, unspoiled lawyers, capable of being the free instruments of society, the friends and guides of statesmen, the interpreters of the common life of the people, the mediators of the great process by which justice is led from one enlightenment and liberalisation to another.
For the notable, I had almost said fundamental, circumstance of our political life is that our courts are, under our constitutional system, the means of our political development. Every change in our law, every modification of political practice, must sooner or later pass under their scrutiny. We can go only as fast as the legal habit of mind of our lawyers will permit. Our politics are bound up in the mental character and attitude and in the intel lectual vigour and vision of our lawyers. Ours is so intensely
and characteristically a legal polity that our politics depend upon
The second and more fundamental immediate test of the Frofession is its attitude toward the regulation of modern business, particularly of the powers and action of modern corporations. It is absolutely necessary that society should command its instruments and not be dominated by them. The lawyer, not the layman, has the best access to the means by which the reforms of our economic life can be best and most fairly accomplished. Never before in our history did those who guide affairs more seriously need the assitance of those who can really claim an expert familiarity with the legal processes by which reforms may be effectually accomplished. It is in this matter more than in any other that our profession may now be said to be on trial. It will gain or lose the confidence of the country as it proves equal to the test or unequal.
As one looks about him at the infinite complexities of the modern problems of life, at the great tasks to be accomplished by law, at the issues of life and happiness and prosperity involved, one cannot but realise how much depends upon the part the lawyer has to play in the future politics of the country. If he will not assume the role of patriot, and of statesman; if he will not lend all his learning to the service of the common life of the country; if he will not open his sympathies to common man and enlist his enthusiasm in those policies which will bring regeneration to the business of the country, less expert hands than his must attempt the difficult and perilous business. It will be clumsily done. It will be done at the risk of reaction against law ftself. It will be done perhaps with brutal disregard of the niceties of justice, with clumsiness instead of with skill.
The tendencies of the Profession, therefore, its sympathies, its inclinations, its prepossessions, its training, its point of view, its motives, are part of the stuff and substance of the destiny of the country.
THE NEW BOARDING-OUT ORDER BY THE LOCAL
THE President of the Local Government Board has issued a
With regard to the appointment of the committee, boards of guardians are given a wide discretion. They may appoint a committee consisting wholly of members of their board. or one consisting partly of members and partly of other persons, or, if they prefer it, they may make an agreement with an entirely independent committee.
The order is accompanied by a circular letter in which the Local Government Board explain the general principles on which the regulations are based, and the reasons for requiring the strict observance of such regulations.
Mr. Burns has devoted considerable attention to this branch of Poor Law administration, and it will be remembered that he recently appointed as additional inspectors of boarded-out children four ladies who, apart from their other qualifications, are also trained nurses.
As showing the number of children to whom the new order will apply, it may be stated that on the 1st Jan. there were 9669 children boarded-out by boards of guardians at the cost of the poor rates. Of these, 7675 were placed within the union to which they were chargeable, while the remaining 1994 were boarded-out beyond the union. On the date named there were also 895 children in receipt of outdoor relief who were not living with their parents.
APPOINTMENTS UNDER THE JOINT STOCK
NOTICES OF APPEARANCE AT HEARING MUST REACH THE SOLICITORS BY 6 P.M. ON THE
CENTRAL KOOTENAY LAND AND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by Nov. 28, to G. H. Johnson, 62, New Broad-st. CHARLES WIBER AND CO. LIMITED, Shooter's Hill-grdns, Westmount-rd, and Well Hall-rd, Eltham, and Belsize-rd, N.W.-Creditors to send in, by Nov. 7, to F. W. Davis, 95-97, Finsbury-pave, E.C. ECKERSALL AND ROTHWELL LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by Oct. 31, to G. A. Duckworth, 7, St. James'-st, Accrington.
E.C. CATERING COMPANY LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard Oct. 24, at Royal Courts of Justice. M. R. C. Scott, 35, New Broadst, E.C., sol. for pets. Notices of appearance by Oct. 23. NORTHAMPTONSHIRE BUILDERS INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED.Creditors to send in, by Oct. 21, to T. J. Morgan, Silver-st, Wellingborough. Morgan and George, Wellingborough, sols. to liquidator. F AND E. DAVEY LIMITED, Elmer-av, Southend-on-Sea.-Creditors to send in, by Nov. 7, to F. W. Davis, 95-97, Finsbury-pave, E.C. FREDERICK C. GLENISTER AND CO. LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard Oct. 24, at Royal Courts of Justice. Indermaur and Brown, 22, Chancery-la, W.C., sols. for pets. Notices of appearance by Oct. 23.
KOSMO LUBRIC OIL COMPANY LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard Oct. 26, at Stalybridge County Court, at 12. Pearson, Parker, and Co., Manchester, sols. for pets. Notices of appearance by
NORTH CERRO MURIANO COPPER MINES LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by
PANDAN (JOHORE) RUBBER ESTATES LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by
SEA VIEW ASSEMBLY ROOMS LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by Oct. 27, to
CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY.
BOULNOIS (Edmund), Baker-st, and Farnham Common. Nov. 16; C. P.
CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35.
LAST DAY OF CLAIM AND TO WHOM PARTICULARS TO BE SENT. ALDOUS (Mary Ann), Bermondsey. Nov. 4; G. G. Gros, practising as Edward Le Voi and Co., 16, St. Helen's-pl, E.C. ARCHBOLD (Joseph Armstrong), Alnmouth. Nov. 13; W. T. Hindmarsh and Hardy, Alnwick. Nov. 25; Burn and Berridge, 11, Old
ABRAHAMS (Hyam), Finchley. Broad-st, E.C.
ANDERTON (Samuel), Sparkhill and Birmingham. Nov. 1; Lee, Musgrove, and Co., Birmingham.
ANDERSON (Robert Shand), Belsize-rd, N.W.; Billiter-st, E.C.; and Woodhouse, Dumfries. Nov. 25; Cochran and Macpherson, Aberdeen. ARCHER (Cecil Radcliffe), Minehead. Dec. 4; Watts, Woollcombe, and Watts, Newton Abbot.
BROODBANK (Caleb), Folkestone. Nov. 21; H. B. Bradley and Hulme, Folkestone.
BINGHAM (John), East Dulwich. Nov. 3; W. Fox, at the offices of Lewis Stroud, 268-271, Birkbeck Bank-chmbrs, 329, High Holborn, W.C. BRINDLE (John William Mackreth), Urmston. Nov. 18; C. Preston and Son, Manchester.
BIRD (Elizabeth Mary), Dawlish. Nov. 12; H. A. Graham and Wigley, 23, King-st, Cheapside.
BEST (Raymond Robert), Cardiff. Nov. 14; W. P. Annear, jun., Cardiff. BOLD (Mary Elizabeth), Cheetham. Nov. 12; S. Ross, Belfast.
BISCOE (Henry Stafford Tyndale), Kidlington. Nov. 20; Nicholson, Graham, and Jones, 24, Coleman-st, E.C.
BEANES (Edward), Paddock Wood. Nov. 16; Routh, Stacey, and Castle, 14, Southampton-st, Bloomsbury, W.C.
CRABBE (John Francis Gwynne), Abergavenny. Nov. 17; G. David and
CHADWICK (Edwin), Stalybridge. Nov. 30; J. W. Simister, Stalybridge.
CHRISTIE (William Henin), St. Leonards-on-Sea Nov. 14; Young, Coles, and Langdon, Hastings.
COLLING (Joseph Wakeford), Bird-st, Oxford-st, and Kew. Dec. 1; Collins and Co., 238, Edgware-rd.
CHURCHILL (Felicia), Wimbledon. Nov. 30; Lowndes and Son, 15,
Cox (William), Yeovil. Nov. 13; Watts, Watts, and Henley, Yeovil.
FOWLER (Elizabeth), Chorlton-on-Medlock. Nov. 15; W. Thomson, Manchester.
FORBES (Mary, otherwise Mary Stewart), Lower Belgrave-st. Nov. 15; Satchell, Chapple, and Son, 36, King-st, Cheapside, E.C.
FITTON (Clara), Newcastle-upon-Tvne. Nov. 30; Lowndes and Son, 15, George-st, Mansion House, E.C.
GRANT (Stephen, jun), Twickenham. Nov. 30; W. H. and A G. Herbert, 10, Cork-st, Burlington-grdns, W.
HALL (Anne Sophia), Middleton. Jan. 1; J. D. Whitehead and Son, Pickering.
HARRIS (Mary), Goonvrea, St. Agnes. Nov. 14; C. Hancock, Truro. HARRIS (Henry). Acock's Green, Yardley. Nov. 14; Lea and Lea, 13, Old Jewry-chmbrs, Old Jewry, E.C.
HINDLEY (John), Heaton Moor. Nov. 30; Thistlethwaite and Brownsword, Manchester.
HALL (Ebenezer), Abbeydale Park, Dronfield. Dec. 31; the executors, at the offices of H. and A. Maxfield, Sheffield.
HOBBS (Edward William), Pimlico. Nov. 17; Yeilding and Co., 18, Vincent-sq, Westminster, S.W.
HIBBERT (Nancy), Hindley Green. Nov. 8; Marsh, Son, and Calvert,
HENTSCH (Alfred William), Wimbledon, and New Compton-st, W.C.
HUGGON (Mary), Carlisle. Oct. 27; Wannop and Westmorland, Carlisle.
JONES (George), Lozells, Birmingham. Nov. 4; Cottrell and Son, Birmingham.
JAY (Alfred), New Cross. Nov. 14; H. C. Wright, 8, Queen-st, Cheapside, E.C.
JACKSON (John), Sevenoaks. Oct. 28; Neve and Peach, Tonbridge.
KENWORTHY (Arthur), Olveston. Nov. 27; Burges and Sloan, Bristol. KNAGGS (Samuel), Huddersfield. Nov. 4; Laycock, Dyson, and Laycock, Huddersfield.
KIGHTLY (Harry), Clapham. Nov. 9; Simpson, Palmer, and Winder, 1,
LESSER (Lesser), Hyde Park, and New Bond-st. Nov. 20; A., E., and
LANARK (Phoebe), Shepherd's Bush.
Smith, 44, Hammersmith-rd, W.
Loy (Samuel Harding), Pickering. Jan. 1; J. D. Whitehead and Son, Pickering.
MURRAY (Patrick John), Egremont. Nov. 17; A. Wilson and Cowie, Liverpool.
MILLER (Mark), Bolton. Nov. 10; Holden and Holden, Bolton. MACDONNELL (Elizabeth Ann), Upper Holloway. Dec. 10; Cutler and Allingham, 15, Duke-st, St. James's, S.W.
NOTTING (William), Enfield. Nov. 14; Edwards, Heron, and Co., 24, Lawrence-la, Cheapside, E.C.
NORBURY (John), Gordon-sq. Nov. 23; Farrer and Co., 66, Lincoln's-innflds, W.C.
POPPY (William Edwards). Dalston. Nov. 18; C. and S. Harrison and
PHILPIN (Arthur James), Woodykiln, Herbrandston.
Nov. 20; Eaton
POUTZ (James), Pau, France. Nov. 30; Hepburn, Son, and Cutcliffe, Bird in Hand-ct, Cheapside, E.C.
PRESTON (Harriett Cosby), Bulmer. Nov. 30; S. Ridge, Malton, Yorks. PEEKE (George), Lee. Nov. 25; A. Carter and Co., Bedford-row House, Theobald's-rd, W.C.
REID (James), Canterbury. Nov. 25; J. W. Reid, 16, King-st, Cheapside, E.C.
RYLEY (Reginald), Crosby-bldgs, Crosby-sq, and Oxted. Nov. 25; Paines and Co., 14, St. Helen's-pl, E.C.
RIDDELL (Sarah), North Hylton. Oct. 28; P. C. Crow, Sunderland.
ROBINSON (George), Rotherham, Dec. 1; Oxley and Coward, Rotherham.
RAGG (Helen), Claxton. Dec. 1; J. Watkinson, York.
SUTCH (Henry Utting), Woolwich. Nov. 11; K. Bayly, "Grecian Chambers," 19, Devereux-ct, Strand, W.C.
SUTCLIFFE (John), Oldham. Nov. 21; A. E. Smith, Oldham.
STOWELL (James), Bayswater. Nov. 9; Welman and Sons, 768, Westbourne-gr, Bayswater, W.
SEMPLE (Agnes Mary Wilson), Bloomsbury. Nov. 13; Lee and Pembertons, 44, Lincoln's-inn-fids, W.C.
THURSTON (Alfred Penrose), Hornsey.
Nov. 30; R. J. Sheehy, 80,
TILLOTT (John Buckenham), Norwich, Oct. 25; R. C. Butler, at the offices of Mills and Reeve, Norwich. THOMSON (Samuel Irwin), Heaton Moor and Manchester. Nov. 25; Shuttleworth and Haworth, Duchy-chmbrs, Clarence-st, Manchester, or the sols., Boote, Edgar, Grace, and Rylands, Manchester. VICKERS (William Howarth), Didsbury. Nov. 30; Diggles and Ogden, Manchester.
WATSON (Margaret Anne), Bolton. Nov. 9; Warren and Warren, 4, Broad-st-pl, E.C.
WERNER (Hildegard), Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Nov. 15; H. Soden Bird and Sons, Newcastle-upon-Tyne.
WARDELL (John), Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Nov. 20; Denison and Slater, Newcastle-upon-Tyne.
WHITE (Thomas), Hastings. Nov. 15; F. W. Morgan, Hastings.
NOTES AND QUERIES.
This column is intended for the use of members of the Legal Profession, and therefore queries from lay correspondents cannot be inserted. Under no circumstances are editorial replies undertaken.
None are inserted unless the name and address of the writer are sent, not necessarily for publication, but as a guarantee of bona fides.
Queries. 38. INSOLVENT TRADER-DEATH-DEED OF ASSIGNMENT EXECUTOR.-Will some reader kindly give me some information on the following small, though interesting, point: When a trader dies insolvent, it is sometimes decided that his executor or administrator shall not himself deal with the estate, but make a deed of assignment, for the benefit of all the creditors, to a trustee. When the deed is drawn, I presume the executor will be of the first part; trustee of second part; and creditors of third part. I want to know, when setting out the parties, exactly how the executor is described, and whether, when signing the document, he adds any words which show he is only signing in a representative capacity. I may say I have looked in several books of precedents, but I have never found a form for the above. I have also often looked for a ARA. precedent of a deed of reassignment, but without success.
THE opening meeting of the present session of the Medico-Legal Society was held on Tuesday at 11, Chandos-street, Cavendishsquare, W., the president, Sir John Tweedy, LL.D., taking the chair. Among the members of the Legal Profession present were Lord Russell, Messrs. M. Wimpfheimer, LL.B., Blackwell, G. C. Gardiner, A. M. M. Forbes, and Roland Burrows and J. Howell Evans, hon. secretaries.
A RECENT MURDER TRIAL.
Mr. Roland Burrows, M.A., LL.D. (Inner Temple) read a paper entitled Note on a Recent Murder Trial." He said that, on seeing the announcement, some of the members had come to the conclusion that he was going to speak of the Crippen trial. But that was not so. In the case to which he was about to refer the prisoner was acquitted of murder, and he was desirous, therefore, of not advertising his name. It was a technical matter, dealing with the form of an inquisition. There were some proposals before the society with regard to the Crippen case, and Dr. Brend might be able early next year, at a private meeting of the society, to read a paper dealing with some of the points arising in that case, in order that the society might not be altogether disappointed as to a discussion of the problems which arose under it. The case to which he (Mr. Burrows) was referring was tried at the Old Bailey, and the counsel for the defence had assisted him in preparing this note. It was a trial at the last session of the Central Criminal Court, and it had excited discussion for reasons both popular and technical. Popular interest was aroused by the protest made by Mr. Blake Odgers, jun., who was counsel for the defence, at the prisoner being tried for murder on the coroner's inquisition after the grand jury had thrown out the bill for murder and found an indictment for manslaughter. At first sight this did seem a hardship, but when it was reflected that a coroner and his jury and also an experienced police magistrate, after careful inquiry, had decided that there was a case fit to be tried, it would appear that the grand jury-a body of laymen who sat in private without opportunity of expert advice in the room, and who usually worked in a hurry was somewhat rash in taking upon themselves the responsibility of overruling the decision of the magistrate. Counsel, of course, did not make the protest as a reason in law why the man should not be tried, but he attacked the inquisition itself on three points, which he (Mr. Burrows) asked the society to consider in detail. An objection to an indictment or inquisition on the ground that it was bad on the face of it was inade by a motion to quash it before the prisoner's plea had been taken. Such objections were now comparatively so rare that we were apt to forget that our legal procedure was still technical and full of traps for the unwary. The first point raised on the motion was that the deputy coroner who had held the inquest had signed the inquisition in his own name, adding the words " deputy coroner," instead of signing the name of the coroner and adding the words "by his deputy," as was stated to be the correct method in R. v. Perkin (1835, 7 Q. B. 165). There was also a very ord case to the effect that a deputy must sign the name of the person for whom he acted, and if he signed his own name the instrument was wholly void. The Coroners Act 1892, s. 1 (5), if anything, supported the view. Its words, so far as material, were: "A deputy of a coroner shall be deemed to be that coroner." All this pointed to the conclusion that the signature was not strictly in the proper form. The judge, however, had no difficulty in holding that the signature was valid. He gave no specific reason, but pointed out that the full description of the coroner and his deputy was set out in the caption-i.e., the commencement of the inquisition. Counsel next took two points on the names of the jury. In the formal inquisition the caption recited that certain named individuals, who formed the jury, had been sworn and had viewed the body, and at the end the jury authenticated the inquisition by signing and sealing the same. In the inquisition in question two names were set out as John Thomas Blomberg and Charles Brunin. The signatures at the end were John Blomberg and Charles Bruin. inquisition upon which a trial was to take place it was essential that the caption should set out the names of the jurors, and that the jurors should execute the instrument. The case of Blomberg might perhaps be explained on the rule that a man might sign his usual signature, but this would not cover the case of Brunin. The judge suggested, indeed, that the point merely turned on a misplaced dot of an "i," but, if he might respectfully say so, he (Mr. Burrows) was unable to agree, and he had had the advantage of carefully examining the inquisition. Putting this on one side, what was the position where the names did really differ? The inquisition was a document of record; it spoke for itself, and stated that one man was sworn and viewed the body and another man authenticated the verdict. Surely, therefore, the inquisition must be bad. It could not be amended, for the names of the jurors were material, and, moreover, which was the court to amend, the name in the caption or the signature? The judge overruled the objection. If he (Mr. Burrows) was correct, his main reason was that there was no reason to doubt that the juror named was the person who signed, which hardly seemed conclusive, for there was no evidence either way. However this might be, the case suggested that the scrupulous care necessary in securing accuracy might be relaxed somewhat. Surely nowadays the necessity for
the jury's signature had gone, and at most the inquisition should be authenticated only by the coroner-possibly also by the foreman. A discussion took place, and
Mr. Burrows, in replying, said that the man was acquitted of murder and found guilty of manslaughter. The grand jury were, therefore, proved to have been right, and no prosecution for murder ought to have been instituted.
Mr Walter Asten read a paper on this subject, in the course of which he spoke of the trouble it gave to all the parties in cases under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The symptoms presented were well known, but experience of claims arising under the Act undoubtedly demanded the necessity for greater exactness and classification, if that were possible. After referring to the case of Eaves v. Blaenclydach Colliery Company Limited (1909) 2 Q. B. 73), where the Master of the Rolls said, "It seems to me entirely a fallacy to say that a man's right to compensation ceases when the muscular mischief is ended, but the nervous or hysterical effects remain," he said that that was a very important pronouncement, and clearly the Master of the Rolls intended the term "traumatic neurasthenia to cover the whole multitude of nervous affections of a functional order. It would appear that some reasonably approximate differentiation between the three states-traumatic neurasthenia, traumatic hysteria, and purposeful malingeringshould be secured. He asked whether in the purely hysterical case it was just that a workman should receive compensation for an incapacity which was brought about by his own persuasion and auto-suggestion? Provision for contracting out, with proper safeguards, was most necessary, unless it was desired to place a premium on malingering. There was an unfortunate vicious triangle of irresponsibility evidenced by the Act-the workman felt provided for in the event of an accident, the employer was secured by his insurance office, and the insurance company was no loser, provided its liabilities were not under-estimated by the actuary. He suggested that some of the items which would offer an interesting expression of views in connection with the matter were: (1) As to whether there should be better classification of functional diseases. (2) In cases where proof existed of predisposition to nervous disease, or incapacity arising from auto-suggestion, should there not be a modification of the employer's liability? (3) Should sect. 15 of the Act be amended so as to permit reference to the medical referee on the application of one of the parties, instead of both? (4) What should be considered "reasonable refusal to undergo operation when advised? (5) Question of contracting out. (6) Treatment by 'suggestion." The society would certainly accomplish a useful purpose if it were instrumental in bringing about amendments of the Act which would make it more uniform and less complex in its administration.
LEGAL MUSICAL SOCIETY.
THE annual meeting of the Legal Musical Society was held in the Lecture Room, Inner Temple, on Friday, the 13th inst., Mr. Frank Beard, the president, taking the chair. The annual report stated that the society had now a membership of 762. The total receipts for the year were £343 17s. 1d., and there remained a balance in hand of £52 13s. 9d. The committee had been able to make a number of grants in the relief of distress, and had given assistance in every application that had been received by them. It was gratifying to know that one of the persons so relieved had been able later on to repay to the society the grant which had been made to him. Under the by-laws, seven members of the committee retired in rotation, two of whom did not offer themselves for re-election. The other retiring members were elected as follows: Messrs. E. Bradley, H. W. Lane, A. E. Moorman, W. H. Smeed, and E. W. Smith. Messrs. J. W. Honess and W. Manley were newly elected. Messrs. Richard Newman and F. Goss were re-elected auditors. On the motion of the president, the rules were altered so as to admit of the appointment of a paid secretary. He said that Mr. Frank N. Headicar had acted as honorary secretary for the past nine years and he was retiring from the position. The society, which, he believed, was the largest musical society in the kingdom, had grown so greatly that it had become necessary to employ a paid secretary. A hearty vote of thanks was passed to Mr. Headicar on his retirement. The committee have arranged for concerts to be held in the Grand Hall of the Freemasons' Tavern on the following dates : Friday, the 10th Nov.; Friday, the 8th Dec. (ladies' night); Friday, the 12th Jan. 1912; Friday, the 9th Feb.; Friday, the 22nd March (ladies' night); and Friday, the 26th April.