day Bow, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Friday Bradford (Yorks), Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday (J.S.), and Friday, at 10 Brentford, Friday (J.S.), at 10 Bridgend, Thursday and Friday Brighton, Thursday (R. By) and Friday (J.S. at 11.30), at 10 Bristol, Monday, Tuesday, Wed nesday, and Thursday, at 10; Friday (By), at 11 Burnley, Friday (R. By), at 10.30 Cambridge, Tuesday, at 11; Wednesday, at 10 Clacton-on-Sea, Friday, at 10.30 Clerkenwell, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday Colchester, Wednesday, at 10 Derby, Wednesday, at 10; Thursday (J.S. & AO.), at 10.30 Dereham, Tuesday, at 10 Durham, Tuesday (R. By) Eastbourne, Tuesday (R. By), at 2.30 East Stonehouse, Monday, Tuesday, and Friday, at 10 Edmonton, Thursday, at 10 Gainsborough, Wednesday, at 10 Grantham, Friday, at 10.30 Halifax, Monday (J.S. at 9.30), Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, at 9.30 Halstead, Monday, at 12 Hanley, Wednesday and Thursday, at 9.30 Harwich, Thursday, at 12 Hastings, Monday Hayward's Heath, Thursday Holywell, Tuesday Huddersfield, Friday Hythe, Monday, at 12 Ilkeston, Tuesday, at 10; Friday Leicester, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, at 10; Saturday, at 9.30 Lichfield, Tuesday (J.S.) Liverpool, Monday. (By at 11. Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday (B., A., & W.C.), at 10 Llanelly, Monday and Tuesday, at 10 Llangollen, Monday Manchester, Monday, Tuesday, Nantwich, Saturday, at 10 Newbury, Wednesday (R. By at 2), at 10 Newcastle-under-Lyme, at 9.30 Tuesday, Southwark, Monday, Tuesday, and Sunderland, Thursday (R. By) Tavistock, Saturday, at 10 Tredegar, Tuesday and Wednesday, Wakefield, Tuesday, at 10 Westbromwich, Friday (J.S.) Wolverhampton, Monday (J.S.) Woodbridge, Monday, at 11.15 Other sittings are specially fixed if necessary. RECENT DECISION. OWNERS OF STEAMSHIP LORD ANTRIM v. MACAULEY. Employer and Workman-Medical Referee-Quasi-judicial Functions. Ar the Cardiff County Court, on the 12th inst., this case was heard before His Honour Judge Hill Kelly, which involved the status of applicants and the functions of the official medical referee. The case was originally heard at the December court. Albert Parsons, instructed by Maclean and Hancock, for the employers; Ivor Bowen, instructed by Sidney Jenkins, for the defendant. Parsons stated that Macauley, a fireman, fell down the hold and hurt his ankle on the high seas, and this was an application of the employers for suspension of weekly payments of 13s. 9d. upon the ground that the workman refused to submit to a medical examination. The application raised an exceedingly important point, not only in that case, but possibly in many similar cases-the point whether a workman was justified in refusing to undergo a medical examination at the request of his employer on the ground that the medical man selected had already acted as medical referee at an earlier stage in connection with the same accident. The medical referee (Dr. Cyri Lewis) reported that Macauley was fit for light work, and in a month or two would be able to resume duty as a fireman. The employers thought it desirable to reopen the question when the month or two had elapsed, and to reconsider the question of the man's capacity. The respondent consented to examination by the medical referee in his private capacity on one occasion, though subsequently, when the émployers desired another examination (again by the same medical gentleman), the workman, acting apparently upon the advice of his Bolicitor (Sidney Jenkins), refused to be further examined upon the ground that the employers had no right to call upon him to go to one who bad already been engaged as an official of the court. In_reply to Mr. W. R. Hawkins (secretary to the Shipping Federation, Cardiff Exchange), Sidney Jenkins, writing on the 17th Feb., said he knew of no authority, with the exception of an order from His Honour the judge, by which his client could be asked to be examined by the medical referee; and in further correspondence he (Sidney Jenkins) definitely declined to advise his client to submit himself to Dr. Cyril Lewis for examination, “having regard to the fact that that gentleman had already acted as medical referee when the matter was referred to him by His Honour the judge of the court." Sidney Jenkins was perfectly correct, as there was no authority. Bowen It was discovered by Mr. Sidney Jenkins that Dr. Cyril Lewis made a private report as medical practitioner to the le eration. Parsons conceded that the strong point against him was that the course pursued by his client might have the effect of impeding or interfering with the machinery of the Act. He appreciated the difficulty, but, on the other hand, one must draw the line somewhere. Bowen suggested that the conduct of the medical referee in acting at one time as medical referee and at another time as a paid servant was wholly indefensible, tending to impede the proper administration of the Act. So far as the solicitors (Maclean and Hancock) were concerned, he was sure they were not parties to the transaction, and had nothing to do with the correspondence conducted in so high-handed a manner by the secretary to the Federation. It was, he thought, admitted that Macauley offered on more than one occasion to submit himself to any properly qualified medical man other than the one who, as referee, acted in a quasi-judicial capacity. HIS HONOUR: The contrary is not suggested. Bowen agreed that there was no authority upon the point, and no rules passed by the judges, "though," he added, “I suppose there will be after this." Parsons: As a matter of practice, this kind of proceeding has been resorted to in some of the London districts so far without objection. Bowen We have no evidence of that. His HONOUR: I have never heard of it. I remember when the unusual course was taken in the City of London Court of swearing the medical referee as a witness the Master of the Rolls describing it as an amazing course, and one which he hoped would not be followed again. Bowen said he was present in the Court of Appeal when severe comments were passed upon the conduct of a medical referee. The conduct indicated in the correspondence was really intolerable, and if the man had not consulted a solicitor he might have suffered great injustice. The attempt was totally inconsistent with the scheme of the Act, and an improper exercise of authority. His HONOUR was entirely of Bowen's opinion, and laid it down that the medical referee, once appointed, became for the purpose of any cage an officer of the court with!,quasi-judicial functions to perform. He must hold a perfectly even scale, without prejudice to one side or the other, and, it a matter came to be reviewed and the question of a man's capacity arose, in order that the court might have a proper and satisfactory report, the medical referee must be available as a perfectly impartial person. Application dismissed with costs. GENERAL INTELLIGENCE. THE ETHICS OF ADVOCACY IN AN UNJUST CAUSE. (Continued from page 42.) "It is a popular but gross mistake," says Chief Justice Gibson (Rush v. Cavenaugh, 2 Pa. St. 187.)" to suppose that a lawyer owes no fidelity to anyone except his client; and that the latter is the keeper of his professional conscience. He is expressly bound by his official oath to behave himself in his office of attorney with all due fidelity to the court as well as the client; and he violates it when he consciously presses for an unjust judgment.. The high and honourable office of a counsel would be degraded to that of a mercenary were he compelled to do the biddings of his client against the dictates of his conscience." A well-known writer on legal topics has said: "A determination. . . on the part of an advocate to devote himself at all hazards to the rescue of his client at the expense of the law, and, it may be, of truth, can have no vindication from the assumption that it is required by the principle of fidelity. It is rather subversive of that principle rightly understood. The lawyer's duty to his client is to be honest, faithful, skilful, and diligent, and he owes and can justly give him nothing more": (Dos Passos, the American Lawyer). Perhaps no clearer statement of an advocate's duty can be found than that given in an address by W. R. Curran (Illinois Law Review, May, 1908), on the Data of Professional Ethics, in which he said: "It is not the duty of counsel to clear guilty persons; but it is their duty to see that no one presumed to be innocent shall be robbed of the cloak of that presumption by a judgment of guilty except by due process of law, and to secure for that person on his trial the benefit of every safeguard that the law affords. Any less service than this on behalf of counsel makes him recreant to his duty; more than is, is beyond the scope of his duty. Within the narrow boundaries of this field must the advocate's battles be fought and the victory won or lost, and he is a good soldier who swings an unbroken blade above a clean shield." But all this does not mean that a belief in his client's guilt should render the advocate lukewarm in his defence. As an eminent advocate has eloquently said: "It is the privilege, it is the obligation, of those who have to defend a client on a trial for his life, to exert every force, and to call forth every resource, that zeal, and genius, and sagacity can suggest. It is an indulgence in favour of life-it has the sanction of usage-it has the permission of humanity; and the man who should I inger one single step behind the most advanced limit of that privilege and should fail to exercise every talent that heaven had given him, in that defence, would be guilty of a mean desertion of his duty, and an abandonment of his client": (John P. Curran, Trial of Sir Henry Hayes, for abduction of Miss Pike, Cork, April 16th, 1801). However much of a handicap on the zeal of an advocate, the deepening of a mere belief in his client's guilt into a moral conviction, even where the effect of the client's own admission, does not diminish his obligation. Here the interest of society which requires the punishment of the guilty is merged in the larger interest which demands that no one shall be punished whose guilt is not established by competent and sufficient evidence, before the proper tribunal, and under a duly formu. lated charge. As Blackstone says: "Let the circumstances against the prisoner be ever so atrocious, it is still the duty of the advocate to see that his client is convicted according to those rules and forms which the wisdom of the Legislature has established as the best protection and security of the subject." A celebrated English advocate, Charles Phillips, was, in 1840, employed, together with a Mr. Clarkson, in the defence of Courvoisier, a Swiss valet, who was convicted and executed for the murder of his master. The evidence against the prisoner, who stoutly declared himself to be innocent, was wholly circumstantial; and his counsel were proceeding to conduct his defence upon the theory that he was the victim of an attempt to divert suspicion from the true perpetrator of the crime. On the morning of the second day of the trial, Courvoisier, staggered by the production of an unexpected witness, sent for his counsel and confessed to them that he was in fact the murderer. Phillips, in the statement published in reply to an attack upon his conduct upon this occasion, says: When I could speak, which was not immediately, I said: 'Of course, then, you are going to plead guilty? "No, sir,' was the reply; I expect you to defend me to the utmost.' We returned to our seats. My position at this moment was, I believe, without parallel in the annals of the profession. I at once came to the resolution of abandoning the case, and so I told my colleague. He strongly and urgently remonstrated against it, but in vain. At last he suggested our obtaining the opinion of the learned judge who was not trying the cause upon what he considered to be the professional etiquette under circumstances so embarrassing. In this I very willingly acquiesced. We obtained an interview, when Mr. Baron Parke requested to know distinctly whether the prisoner insisted on my defending him; and, on hearing that he did, said I was bound to do so, and to use all fair arguments arising on the evidence. I therefore retained the breif; and I contend for it, that every argument I used was a fair commentary on the evidence, though undoubtedly as strong as I could make them. I believe there is no difference of opinion now in the profession that this course was right. It was not till after eight hours of my public exertion before the jury that the prisoner confessed; and to have abandoned him then would have been virtually surrendering him to death." It has herein before been suggested that a conviction or actual knowledge of his client's guilt may impose a severe handicap upon the zeal and earnestness of a conscientious advocate; and where he feels that he must inevitably betray such conviction, to the prejudice of the cause of his client, his duty to the latter will require him, wherever such action may be taken without too evident an abandonment of the cause, to turn over to another the active conduct of the case. It is related of Abraham Lincoln that sometimes after entering upon a criminal case the conviction that his client was guilty would affect him with a sort of panic. On one occasion he turned suddenly to his associate and said: "Swett, the man is guilty, you defend him, I can't," and so gave up his share of a large fee. At another time when he was engaged with Judge S. C. Parks in defending a man accused of larceny, he said: "If you can say anything for the man, do it, I can't; if I attempt to the jury will see I think he is guilty and convict him": (From a sketch of Abraham Lincoln, by William Elleroy Curtis). The application of the general principles with which the present discussion has up to this point been concerned, to the details of profes sional conduct, must give rise to many nice questions of casuistry upon which the most honourable men may honestly differ. The limits of this article permit only brief notice of a few of the more salient. Thus, no matter how strong his conviction of his client's guilt, it is plainly the duty of counsel to demur to an indictment of doubtful sufficiency; and to fail to do so would be to betray the trust confided to him. He is likewise bound to take advantage of every question of law arising upon or after the trial. The biographer of William Green says with reference to his employment to make application for a writ of error in behalf of John Brown after the latter's conviction: "With no hesitating blade Mr. Green cut the Gordian knot of an ethical question, which has not yet ceased to disturb the hesitating consciences of less profoundly convicted practitioners of the law-the question of whether the lawyer, who is fully assured of the guilt of his client, should yet exhaust all the weapons in the armoury of defence in his behalf. No doubt entered Mr. Green's mind for a moment as to where his duty lay; and with a moral courage of the loftiest type, he permitted no thought of how the inflamed public opinion of the people among whom he lived might regard his espousal of the cause of the convicted leader. His duty lay clear and shining before him; and he performed it with as much zeal as if he had believed him innocent, and doubtless with as much ability as he had ever shown in any cause of whose entire righteousness he was convinced": (Sketch of William Green, by Armistead Churchill Gordon). In dealing with the facts, it is the duty of the advocate to guard with unremitting vigilance against the admission of any evidence which does not measure up to the standard of those legal rules which, "made to exclude all but the best kinds of proof, are in their very nature nothing else than merely artificial safeguards against the miscarriage of justice.' In seeking to rebut the evidence against the defendant he may bring out or establish such facts as may tend to explain such evidence upon some hypothesis other than that of the guilt of his client, and may attack the credibility of any witness whom he honestly believes to be unworthy of credence. But the ethical obligations which bound his duty in this respect, and which are indeed no other than should govern his defence, of the innocent, require that he shall not seek to cast suspicion on those whom he knows to be guiltless, nor damage the character of witnesses whom he knows to be telling the truth. He is bound to take advantage of any insufficiency of evidence; and the obligation which is upon him to do nothing inconsistent with his representative capacity precludes him from supplying any deficiency. With reference to this point Dr. Rogers says: It is always the duty of the prosecution, who have undertaken the burden of proof, to make out their case; and to suggest that it is the duty of a defending counsel to help them to do so in the interests of abstract justice, is not only wholly to misconceive the function of an advocate, but to advance a theory that is not likely to find support outside the jurisdiction of the courts of Utopia." It seems also, although it may be admitted to be a matter of some nicety, that an advocate is warranted in setting up the defence of justification or irresponsibility, although such a plea may not appear to him to be well founded. It is a duty incumbent upon him in his representative capacity to say whatever can be said in extenuation, and to leave the responsibility for the acceptance or rejection of such plea with the jury, where it belongs. 66 But it is in submitting the case to the jury that advocacy is most likely to exceed its proper bounds. Here, indeed, in the phrase of the Persian poet, a hair divides the false and true. An advocate may, in the words of Baron Parke herein before quoted, use all fair arguments arising on the evidence." That is, he may expose weak and enlarge upon favourable evidence, and may advance any hypothesis which will tend to explain the case made against his client, always keeping in mind the qualification above noted that he is not to cast suspicion upon anyone known by him to be in fact innocent. On the other hand, he may neither distort the facts, misrepresent the law, nor indulge in fallacious reasoning. The advance in ethical conceptions in this regard is marked, and may be measured by contrasting the views expressed by lawyers of modern times with those of ancient writers. Thus, Cicero makes the distinction that it is the duty of the judge to pursue the truth, but it is permitted to an advocate to urge what has only the semblance of it. He says he would not have ventured himself to have advanced this (especially when he was writing upon philosophy) if it had not also been the opinion of the gravest of the Stoics, Panatius: (Cicero, de Off. lib. 2, c. 14). 66 Baron Puffendorf in his Law of Nature, a book the perusal of which was once accounted a necessary part of the education of a gentleman, in a chapter entitled "Of Speech, and the Obligation which attends it," says: But in Criminal Cases, where the Dispute regards only the Punishment, we judge it ought to be farther consider'd, whether the Council be assign'd by the Publick Authority, or by the particular Appointment of the Prisoner. If by the former, it doth not seem allowable for them to make use of feign'd Arguments and false Colours; since the Design of the Court in deputing them, was only that they might wipe off any Calumny thrown upon the Prisoner, and take care that he suffer no Injustice. Which End is sufficiently answer'd by a bare Refutation of the Proofs offer'd by the Accuser. But he whom the Prisoner particularly chooseth and retains to plead in his behalf, since he only acts as his Client's Interpreter, may, in our Judgment, lawfully use the same Method of Defence which the Prisoner might have used, had he answer'd for himself. 'He is under a very great mistake,' says Tully, 'that fancies he hath got our real Opinion and Authority for all that he meets with in our Judiciary Orations. Whatever we delivered on those Subjects is to be ascribed to the Causes, and to the Times, and not to the Man, or to the Pleader.' And in his Second Book of Offices, he maintains, sometimes to defend a guilty Person, is not contrary to any Duty of Religion. Nor is Justice is any great danger of suffering_by_this Permission: For, since the Judge is supposed fully to understand the Law, the Advocate by producing false Laws or false Authorities, is not likely to prevail to any purpose: and he is never credit'd upon his bare Assertion, but is obliged to produce sufficient proof. And therefore, if a guilty Person do by this means sometimes escape unpunished, the Fault is not to be charged on the Advocate, or on the Prisoner, but on the Judge, who had not the wisdom to distinguish between Right and Wrong" (Kennet's Translation, bk. 4, chap. 1, par. 21). A different conception of an advocate's duty is that entertained by David Hoffman, a member of the Baltimore Bar in the first half of the nineteenth century, renowned for his professional integrity, who among a set of resolutions framed by him for adoption by his students on admission to the Bar included the following: When femployed to defend those charged with crimes of the deepest dye, and the evidence. against them, whether legal or moral, be such as to leave no just doubt of their guilt, I shall not hold myself privileged, much less obliged, to use my endeavours to arrest or to impede the course of justice, by special resorts to ingenuity, to the artifices of eloquence, to appeals to the morbid and fleeting sympathies of weak juries, or of temporising courts, to my own personal weight of character-nor finally, to any of the overweening influences I may possess from popular manners, eminent talents, exalted learning, &c. Persons of atrocious character, who have . violated the laws of God and man, are entitled to no such special exertions from any member of our pure and honourable profession ; and, indeed, to no intervention beyond securing to them a fair and dispassionate investigation of the facts of their cause, and the due application of the law. All that goes beyond this, either in manner or substance, is unprofessional, and proceeds, either from a mistaken view of the relation of client and counsel, or from some unworthy and selfish motive which sets a higher value on professional display and success than on truth and justice, and the substantial interests of the community. Such an inordinate ambition I shall ever regard as a most dangerous perversion of talents, and a shameful abuse of an exalted station. The parricide, the gratuitous murderer, or other perpetrator of like revolting crimes, has surely no claim on the commanding talents of a profession whose object and pride should be the suppression of all vice by the vindication and enforcement of the laws. Those, therefore, who wrest their proud knowledge from its legitimate purposes to pollute the streams of justice and to screen such foul offenders from merited penalties, should be regarded by all (and certainly shall by me) as ministers at a holy altar full of high pretension and apparent sanctity but inwardly base, unworthy, and hypocritical-dangerous in the precise ratio of their commanding talents and exalted learning.' Luther Martin's conception of the duty which a lawyer owes to his client, disclosed in his argument on the impeachment of Judge Chase was, says Judge A. M. Gould," that when counsel have done all that can be done to insure a fair trial for a client, if according to the clear, undoubted evidence, the latter is guilty, it is the duty of counsel to submit his client's case to the decision of the jury without any attempt to mislead them, and this whether counsel is appointed by the court or retained by the criminal." Mr. Martin said: "The duty of a lawyer is, most certainly, in every case to exert himself in procuring justice to be done to his client, but not to support him in injustice." Without going so far as to say it is not an uncommon, it may safely be said that it is not an unknown practice in our courts for an advocate to assert his belief in the innocence of his client, or in the justice of his cause. Notwithstanding that among the offenders in this respect may be found such eminent names as those of Brougham, Campbell, and Erskine, a sounder view condemns this practice as in any case transcending the proper bounds of advocacy, and, where contrary to the advocate's personal beliefs, as violative of ethical obligations. This practice is condemned by Quintilian, although upon the grounds of expediency: "They likewise are arrogant who are peremptory in asserting the goodness of their cause and that if it were not such they would not have undertaken it. The judges, indeed, cannot bear to hear one presume to exercise their function": (Quint. Inst. bk. xi., chap. 1, sect. 3). It is not his business to represent his client as innocent-it is sufficient that the law so presumes him. The advocate's personal opinion forms no part of his client's case; and if he makes it such he speaks for himself, and not in his representative capacity. The impropriety of the assertion of a belief in the justice of his client's cause where such belief is honestly entertained arises from the fact that a contrary inference would inevitably be drawn wherever such belief is not expressed; while if he asserts a belief contrary to his personal convictions he justly incurs the reproach of prostituting his own character for the sake of his fee. It is not necessary to consider in connection with this subject practices which savour of fraud and chicanery, such as suppression of evidence and connivance at perjury.. Such practices cannot be sanctioned in the most honourable cause-much less in an unjust one. The moral character of the advocate is not merged in that of his client; and the arms which he wields are, in the phrase of Sir Alexander Cockburn, to be the arms of the warrior and not of the assassin. The sentiment of the Bar upon this phase of the question needs no vindication. The following language, taken from the code of ethics adopted by the Alabama Bar Association, has its counterpart in every other code indorsed by the Profession: "It is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the law which creates it. The attorney's office does not destroy the man's accountability to the Creator, or loosen the duty of obedience to law and the obligation to his neighbour; and it does not permit, much less demand, violation of law, or any manner of fraud or chicanery, for the client's sake." "A lawyer who invents or manufactures defences for prisoners," says the code of ethics of the San Francisco Bar Association, or who procures their acquittal by the practice of any manner of deceit, cajolery, wilful distortion, or misrepresentation of facts, or any other means not within the spirit as well as the letter of the law, is to be reckoned as an enemy to society and more dangerous than the criminal himself; while successes at the Bar won by such methods can never be the basis of desirable professional reputations, but, on the contrary, are badges of infamy." 66 The whole matter may be summarised by saying that the ethical obligation of an advocate in an unjust cause is neither more nor less than rests upon him in the advocacy of any cause. "There is," said Sir James Hannen (Smith v. Smith, 7 P. Div. 89), an honourable way of defending the worst of cases. In so doing the advocate should remember the advice of Lord Eldon, that in cases of doubt and difficulty, Quod dubitas ne feceris, is a good rule of conduct: (Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 19 Ves. Jr. 267). The lawyer's greatest danger arises from his bias in favour of the cause which he represents. He should guard against excess of zeal, and in the glow of partisanship should not forge that he owes other duties than that to his client. He must make no distinction between his personal and his professional conscience; and in following its dictates should take care not to incur the charge, which an eminent man of letters is reported to have made against a famous English statesman, that the conscience which should have been his monitor had become his accomplice. INNS OF COURT MISSION. ANNUAL MEETING. THE annual meeting of the Incorporated Inns of Court Mission was held on Wednesday at the premises of the mission, Drury-lane, Lord Halsbury presiding. Among those present were Lady Halsbury, Mr. Justice Darling, Sir Gainsford Bruce, Lady Bruce, Mr. Cecil Chapman, Mr. A. G. Rickards, K.C., Master Wilberforce, Master Macnamara, Mr. Registrar Hope, Colonel Stuart Sankey, L.C.C., Messrs. Boydell Houghton, H. C. Gutteridge, H. C. A. Bingley (hon. treasurer), Douglas Pennant, C. E. Malden, the Rev. John Harrington (Warden) and Mrs. Harrington, and Messrs. F. Shewell Cooper and C Douglas Pennant (hon. secs.). The report stated that the income of the mission from subscriptions and donations during the past year was £916, a somewhat larger sum than that of the preceding year, mainly due to an exceptional increase in the Temple Church special offertory. The council required an increase in subscriptions and donations to enable them to write off a sum of £41, the balance of payment for some special repairs which became necessary, and to provide a fund for meeting repairs and depreciation, for which at present there was no provision, and the council urged the necessity of making the income of the mission a least £1000 per annum. Lord Halsbury said that the mission was founded in the Inne Temple Hall in the year 1892, and it had been an undoubted success. The council were very anxious to provide for what might prove to be a rainy day, and they were very desirous that the income should be increased. In the year 1908 the mission had an income of £876; in 1909 it fell to £336; and in 1910 it rose to £916. He believed that everybody who knew the mission would regard it as a very serious misfortune if its income were to decrea e. Th.se who knew what its work was recognised how much it lightened the cares of the people living in the neighbourhood in which it was situated, and they knew the necessity that existed for such an institution. The work done by the mission was not wholly charitable, nor was it wholly religious; some of its work was the providing of beneficial and proper amusement, and altogether it was one of those very useful institutions which recognised the necessity for that kind of association which was opposed to the association which was calculated to deprave. Under these circumstances, he would ask Mr. Justice Darling to move a resolution which had for its object the increasing of the funds of the mission. Mr. Justice Darling moved: “That this meeting desires to recom. mend the mission to the continued and increased support of the members of the Inns of Court and their friends." He observed that the institution was called a "mission," and he was afraid that possibly some people might think that it was a mission of the ordinary type; but it was not, strictly speaking, a religious mission. Religion was connected with it, of course; but its main object was to induce in people as to whom very little trouble was taken and who perhaps had no one very near who was capable of taking trouble-to induce in those people the habits of civilisation and decency, and to make them good and respectable citizens. It encouraged its members in active bodily sports as well as in mental exercises. It maintained a cricket club, and boxing and so on was taught, and it also encouraged debates upon various subjects, which debates were conducted under the superintendence of members of the Inns of Court. It also encouraged such games as billiards, in which Lord Alverstone greatly interested himself in connection with the mission; and such games, as promoted by the institution, could do no harm whatever. One might say that the institution was practically for the purpose of keeping people out of mischief and of giving them a taste for amusing themselves without doing anyone any harm. They also learned a great deal by discussing rationally the mattere, political and social, which were brought before them at the debates, and that there were two sides to a question, whatever side one might feel inclined to take in the first instance. Those who were associated in the society were firmly convinced that it had done a great deal of good, and that it was capable of doing a great deal more. Some people thought that there was no necessity or, at any rate, less necessity than there formerly was for the institution, because since it was founded the character of the neighbourhood had very much altered. No doubt, when Clare Market existed there was a more numerous, rough and lawless population, but he was told by those who knew far more about the mission than he that the number of those who availed themselves of its benefits was not less than before. They might not come from the immediate district, but they came from no great way off, and they were the class of persons who were desirous of getting the advantages the mission afforded. He was sure that those who were connected with the mission were right in saying that its sphere of usefulness had not diminished by the fact that Clare Market, in its old form, no longer existed. Mr. Boydell Houghton seconded the motion, which was unanimously agreed to. The Rev. John Harrington (Warden) moved a vote of thanks to Lord Halsbury and to Mr. Justice Darling. He said that to Lord Halebury the mission owed its initiation to a considerable extent. Lord Halsbury had used the right phrase when he said that the mission had lightened the cares of the people who lived in the neighbourhood. Only those who had known the neighbourhood for some years knew to how great an extent that was true. He thought that the greatest compliment that could be paid to the mission was to instance the effect it had had upon the neighbourhood in general. It had become a household word. The members came to the mission as boys, and they kept up their membership when they became men. It was surprising how steady, in spite of the fluctuating population, the membership remained. Not only did the mission lighten the cares of the people of the neighbourhood, but, as Mr. Justice Darling had said, it kept men out of mischief. It was sometimes said against the mission that its work was altogether social, and that there was very little, if any, religion. In the very narrowest sense of the word the mission was not religious. It was quite undenominational; it received people of any religion and of no religion, and tried to turn out good, honest men and decent citizens. The mission believed in the sane mind in the sound body, and he did not think it could be said to be in any way wanting in religious teaching, judged by that standard. There were nearly 500 members, of all denominations and creeds. Drury-lane was a stronghold of the Roman Catholics, and many of the mission's best members were of that faith. It would never do to proselytise in any way, and the mission really afforded a splendid example of how men of all creeds and denominations could meet and work together. The members of the Bar who came to the mission night after night. or several times a week, knew the ral and lasting good it was doing. The mission needed all the support it could get from the members of the Bar. It also needed funds, for as the work increased it would naturally cost more. There ought never to be an income smaller than a thousand or even twelve hundred a year, if the work was to be properly carried on. This was the largest working men's club, by a long way, in the whole of London. It did not advertise or give glowing reports of its work, and it did not appeal in the Prees for financial or any other assistance, so that its work was not known or acknowledged as it ought to be; but he was quite sure it would compare favourably with that of any similar body. Mr. Cecil Chapman seconded the motion, and Lord Halsbury briefly returned thanks. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION. THE State Department at Washington issued the following statement on Wednesday, says Reuter:— "The State Department has completed the draft of a general arbitration treaty, which has been approved by the President. It will be submitted to the French and British Ambassadors as a formula upon which this Government is now willing to enter into negotiations, using this tentative draft as a basis. This draft is not the result of negotiations with any particular country, but represents what this Government believes to be a sound basis for negotiations for the extension of the scope of its arbitration treaties. It has been sent to the French and British Ambassadors, because they indicated the desire of their countries to discuss the subject of a general treaty of arbitration which would include all differences which might arise with this country. The general features of the draft are these: "It expands the scope of our existing general arbitration agree. melts, by eliminating the exceptions contained in the existing onesquestions of vital interest and national honour. "It is proposed that all differences that are internationally judicable shall be submitted to The Hague Tribunal, unless by special agreement to some other tribunal, created or selected. "It provides that any differences which either country thinks not internationally judiciable shall be referred to a commission of inquiry, with power to make recommendations for their settlement. This commission shall be made up of nationals of the two Governments who are members of The Hague Court. Should the commission decide that the differences should be submitted to arbitration, this decision shall be binding, and such arbitration shall be conducted under terms of submission subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. "Before arbitration is resorted to, even in cases where both countries agree that the difference is one susceptible of an arbitral decision, a commission of inquiry shall investigate the difference with a view to recommending a settlement that will preclude the necessity of arbitration action. The findings of such a commission shall not have the effect of an arbitral award, and the commission, at the request of either Government, shall delay its findings for one year to give an opportunity for diplomatic settlement. "Other features of the draft deal mainly with the machinery for the commission and other essential details." BUCKLEY AND BENT LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by June 24, to J. F. and M. G. Buckley, The Nook, Greenfield, Oidham. Sale and Co., Manchester, sols. for liquidators. BRISTOL CLAY TOBACCO PIPE MANUFACTURERS LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by May 22, to W. L. Bate, Carlton-chmbrs, Bristol. Lawrence, Williams, and Watts, Bristol, sols. for liquidator. B.U.R.T. COMPANY LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard May 23, at Royal Courts of Justice. Hand and Gartside, Manchester, sols. to pets. Notices of appearance by May 22. BRISTOL COLISEUM LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard May 26. at Bristol County Court, at 12. E. J. White, Bath, sol. for pets. Notices of appearance by May 25. BIPSINE LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard May 30, at Royal Courts of Justice. Pritchard, Englefield, and Co., Painters' Hall, Little Trinity-la, E.C., sols. for pet. Notices of appearance by May 29. CAVE RIMS LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by June 20, to W. R. Pike, 55A, Algiers-rd, Lewisham, S.E. CENTRAL AUSTRALIAN EXPLORATION SYNDICATE LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by June 3, to O. E. Yeo, 19, Great Winchester-st, E.C. GLEBE SYNDICATE LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by June 30, to W. L. Waite, 24, Coleman-st. HERBERT CALVERT LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by June 10, to J. H. Hanson, 11, Cloth Hall-st, Huddersfield. J. G. CHILDS AND CO. LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard May 30, at Royal Courts of Justice. Billing, Thompson, and Co., 20, Essex-st, Strand, W.C., agents for W. Waldron, Brierley Hill Staffs, sol. for pets. Notices of appearance by May 29, to Billing, Thompson, and Co. JOWERS AND NORTHAM LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by May 20, to J. FRANCIS AND CO. LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard May 30, SEACROFT, SCARBOROUGH, LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard May 22, at Leeds County Court, at 10.30. Birdsall and Cross, Scarborough, sols. to pets. Notices of appearance by 1, on May 20. THE HUT LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard May 30, at Royal Courts of Justice. Harold Mayhew and Darling, 15, Abchurch-la, E.C., sols. for pets. Notices of appearance by May 29. ULUNDI GOLD MINING COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, at once, to A. Bagley, 712, Salisbury House, London-wall, E.C. WOLVERHAMPTON EMPIRE PALACE COMPANY LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard May 23, at Royal Courts of Justice. Ward, Bowie, and Co., 7, King-st.. Cheapside, E.C., agents for Cochrane and Co., Birmingham, sols. for pets. Notices of appearance by May 22. CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY. COXWELL (William), Totton and Southampton. June 8; H. K. Pope, of Coxwell and Pope, sols., Southampton. June 15; the Master, at chambers of Warrington and Parker, JJ., at 12. GORDON (Col. James Redmond Patrick, C.B.), Brompton-rd. July 15; A. J. Carruthers, sol., 6, Quality-ct, Chancery-la, W.C. July 27; Judge in Chambers, Room 706, Royal Courts of Justice, at 11.30. HILL (John George), Green Lanes, Wood Green. June 19; J. B. Roberts, sol.. 36. Basinghall-st, E.C. June 27; the Master, at chambers of Neville, J., at 11.30. IND (Edward), Great Warley. June 17; A. E. Shuter, of Dawes and Sons, sols., 2, Birchin-la, Lombard-st, E.C. June 20; Joyce, J., at 12.30. SHAW (Edwin), Kidderminster. June 16; T. F. Bache, of W. Bache and Sons, sols.. West Bromwich. June 28; Eve, J., at 12. TINNISWOOD (George), Shepperton-on-Thames. June 13: W. C. Greency, of W. C. Greenop and Co., sols., 19, Cullum-st. June 20; Eve, J., at 12. CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. a 35. LAST DAY OF CLAIM AND TO WHOM PARTICULARS TO BE SEXT. ARCHER (Samuel Henry), Folkestone. June 20; Pritchard, Englefield, and Co., Painters' Hall, Little Trinity-la, E.C. BAYLEY (Sophia), Barnet. June 17; Corbin, Greener, and Cook, 52, Bedford-row, W.C. BALDWIN (John), Erdington. June 20; W. Baldwin, Colleybatch, Tenbury, and J. Constance, Rupert-st, Birmingham, or their sols., Walker and Meek, Birmingham. BETTY (John Quick), Saltash. June 30; Ginn and Porter, Plymouth. BURMAN (Samuel), Redland. June 6; A. E. Barker, Bristol. BARKER (Robinson), Shipley. June 21; W. Barker, 34, Scarborough-rd, BRUCE (Ann), Huncote. June 12; G. Stevenson and Son, Leicester. BURTON (Helena), Barnton, Kent's Bank. June 30; A. Milne, Kendal. CLARK (William Thomas Marston), Twickenham. June 17; Sheard, Breach, and Wace, 2, Clement's-inn, W.C. COLBORNE (Prothesa Fisher), Brixton. June 17; East and Smith, Birmingham. CATTELL (Elizabeth), Regent's Park. June 1; Ingpen and Armitage, 4, COLTON (Annie), Colwyn Bay. May 31; A. F. Brookes, Colwyn Bay. DES GRAZ (Constance), Wimbledon. June 21; Robins, Hay. Waters, and EDWARDS (Horace), Norwich. July 6; D. Havers, Norwich. EDMUNDS (John), Pontsticell. May 30; Gardners and Heywood, Aber gavenny. ELKIN (Angela Rachel), Paddington. June 12; Elkin and Henriques, 3, FEATHERSTONE (William), Colwyn Bay and Abergele. June 15; E. A. GOODE (William), Holloway. June 12; J. Arnatt, 31, John-st, Bedfordrow, W.C. GOODLIFFE (Caroline), Worthing. June 13; Verrall and Sons, Worthing. GLADING (Lieut. Tom), Devonport. July 1; T. H. Gill, Devonport. GOODBY (Arthur), Croydon. June 24; Paines, Blyth, and Huxtable, 14, St. Helen's-pl, E.C. GLOVER (William), Coppull. July 10; Graham and Unsworth, Wigan. GLEN (William Kidston), Parkstone, Dorset, and Bombay. June 17; Banks and Macfie, Manchester. GAGGS (Hannah Furniss), Whitby. June 30; England and Son, Goole. HARDING (William), Guildford. June 30; W. H. Dale, 18, Finsbury-cir, E.C. HUNTER (John Young), Sneinton. June 9; C. Cheesman, Nottingham. HARDY (Martha Booth), West Didsbury. June 8; Minor and Co., Manchester. HARDY (Anne Richardson), Chorlton-cum-Hardy. June 8; Minor and Co., Manchester. HEASMAN (Alfred), East Grinstead and Rowfant Worth. June 17; Pearless, Sons, and De Rougemont, East Grinstead. HARRISON (Holroyd), Halifax. June 1; Moore and Shepherd, Halifax. HOLGATE (John), Sawley. June 30; J. C. Waddington, Burnley. HALES (Frederick), Sheffield. June 30; Clegg and Sons, Sheffield. HAY (Thomas), Beckenham. June 26; Robins, Hay, Waters, and Hay, 9, Lincoln's-inn-flds, W.C. HAIGH (James), Ashenhurst. May 31; Armitage, Sykes, and Hinchcliffe, Huddersfield. HOOPER (Mary Ann), Highleadon. June 30; G. R. Bonnor, Gloucester. INGHAM (James), Bradford. June 5; H. Farrar and Co., Bradford. JOHNSON (Edward Horace), Hethersett. June 1; Mills and Reeve, Norwich. JEFFERIES (Frank), Cardiff and Bristol. June 10; J. W. Ward, Bristol. KING (Mary Emma), Upper Holloway. June 13; G. H. Barber and Son, Founders' Hall, 13, St. Swithin's-la, E.C. KAYE (George), Crosland Moor. May 31; Armitage, Sykes, and Hinchcliffe, Huddersfield. LAMB (Edward), Wandsworth Common. June 16; W. J. and E. H. Tremellen, Birkbeck Bank-chmbrs, Holborn. LOOK (Lucy Harriett), Camberley. June 13; G. H. Barber and Son, Founders' Hall, 13, St. Swithin's-la, E.C. LAVERS (Nathaniel Wood), Long Ditton and Bloomsbury. June 10; H. Lavers-Smith, 6, King's Bench-walk, Temple. LONG (George Manhood), Rivenhall, Witham. June 23; Anning and Co., 78. Cheapside, E.C. LOVELL Rebecca), Banbury. June 24; Fairfax and Barfield, Banbury. MADDISON (Caroline), Barnsley. June 30; H. Horsfield, Barnsley. MAW (Mary Ann), Wheatley. June 12; G. W. Andrews, Doncaster. MONTAGUE (Clara), Folkestone. June 19; Latchams and Montague, NEWMAN (Edith Amy), Chelsea. June 8; Thorowgood, Tabor, and Hardcastle, 11, Copthall-ct, E.C. O'KELLY (George John), Bournemouth. June 24; Mead and Sons, 116, Jermyn-st, St. James's, Westminster, S.W. PROFFIT (John Edwin), Church Stretton. June 13; Sprott and Morris, Shrewsbury. PIGOT (Hugh Flamsteed), Coppice Lunatic Hospital, Nottingham. July 16; E. L. Baylis, Cheltenham. PASSEY (Ann), Ladywood. June 12; Beale and Co., Birmingham. PAGE (Frederic), Abercregan, Llangollen. June 16; James, James, and Hatch, Wrexham. PAIN (Rev. Philip), Hove. June 10; S. M. L. Taylor and W. Margetts, at the office of Howlett and Clarke, Brighton. PACKE (Sarah Martha), Hyde Park. July 1; Meredith, Mills, and Clark, 8. New-sq, Lincoln's-inn. POWLES (Thomas Yardley), Liverpool. June 23; Toulmin, Ward, and Co., Liverpool. ROBERTS (John), Chorlton. June 12; James, James, and Hatch, Wrexham. RATTENBURY (James), Handsworth and Birmingham. June 24; Cottrell and Son, Birmingham. RYAN (Fanny), South Croydon. June 24; Bramsdon and Childs, Portsmouth. RAY (Catherine), Hampstead. June 17; Fraser and Woodgate, Wisbech. RANDALL (Joseph Sutton), Whitstable, or RANDALL (Eliza). June 20; Rowe (Helen), Peny-y-bont, St. Asaph. June 30; Gair and Roberts, Liverpool. SHAW (John Patterson), Birmingham. June 10; Rooke and Bradley, Birmingham. SYKES (Sarah), Church Fenton. May 31; Armitage, Sykes, and Hinchcliffe, Huddersfield. SPENCER (Joseph), Huddersfield. May 31; Armitage, Sykes, and Hinchcliffe, Huddersfield. STANGER (James), Hythe. June 12; Kingsford, Drake, and Coke, Hythe. SMITH (Thomas), Skipton. June 2; Brown, Charlesworth, and Wood, Skipton. SMITH (Alfred Augustus), Bournemouth. July 8; Bedell and Driver, Manchester. STEED (John), Devonport. July 1; T. H. Gill, Devonport. SMITH (George Henry), Devonport. July 1; T. H. Gill, Devonport. SPENCER (John), Handsworth. June 30; Tippetts, 11, Maiden-la, Queen st. STEER (Sarah Eleanor), Sheffield. June 10; Webster and Styring, Shef TAYLOR (John), Gravelly Hill. June 30; T. Haynes Duffell, Birmingham. Voss (Joseph), Misterton. June 15; Watson and Son, Lutterworth. WEESTER (William John), Kingston-upon-Hull. July 1; Dent and Scruton, York. WHITWELL (George Coates), Eaglescliffe. May 31; Lucas, Hutchinson, and Meek, Darlington. WIDDOWSON (Alfred John), Chorlton-cum-Hardy. July 12; R. Higham and Co., Manchester. WYATT (Rev. Henry Drayton), Aldershot. July 1; Foster and Wells, WADE (John William), Farsley. June 10; Simpson, Thomas, and Curtis, WELLS (Elizabeth), Hampton Wick. June 12; H. Fawssett, Howard WOOD (William Alliott), Hawk Green, Marple. June 30; Diggles and Ogden, Manchester. WOOD (Clara Finetta), 43, Harley-st, W. June 21; S. E. Preston, 17, Coleman-st, E.C. WHEATLEY (Joseph) Earlsdown, Dallington. June 13; O. H. Swann, Heathfield. WEBB (Charles Frere), Cley-next-Sea. June 12; J. A. Kingdon, Basingstoke. WILLIAMS (Sarah), Goldsithney. June 7; B. B. Bennetts, Penzance. THE PLEASURE CRUISES OF THE P. & O. COMPANY are now well known, but attention may be drawn to the series to be carried out this summer by their new ss. Mantua, a vessel of 11,500 tons. This series will consist of four cruises, beginning with the departure of the Mantua from London on the 20th inst. for a twenty-three days trip to Lisbon, the Azores, Madeira, Canary Islands, &c., at a minimum fare of twenty guineas. In the ordinary course of events no better season could be chosen for a run over the broad Atlantic than the months of May and June, for then one may feel assured of comparatively quiet weather. In connection with this trip the P. & O. Company have issued a well-illustrated descriptive programme. Already warrant holders to H.M. the King, the Yost Typewriter Company Limited have been appointed typewriter manufacturers to Her Majesty the Queen. LAW SOCIETIES SOLICITORS' BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION. THE President of the Law Society (Mr. H. J. Johnson) occupied the chair at the fifty-first anniversary festival of this association, which was held at the Law Society's Hall, Chancery-lane, on Wednesday. Among those present were Lord Mersey of Toxteth, Mr. Justice Eve, Messrs. P. Ogden Lawrence, K.C., R. Younger, K.C., R. R. Ellett, W. J. Humfrys (Vice-President Law Society), Maurice A. Tweedie (Chairman, Board of Directors), K. E. Peck (President Plymouth Law Society), H. G. Vassall (President Bristol Law Society), E. Clark (President Newcastle-on-Tyne Law Society), F. F. Smith_(President Rochester Law Society), F. C. E. Jessop (President Herts Law Society), G. H. Charlesworth (President Manchester Law Society), A. Pope (President Dorset Law Society), B. A. Shires (President Leicester Law Society). A. Davenport, K W. Tweedie, T. Rawle, R. A. Pinsent, John Hollams, E. F. Turner, F. Marshall, F. G. Cord well, and Bourchier F. Hawksley. After the loyal toasts, Mr. R. R. Ellett (Cirencester) proposed the toast of "The Bench and the Legal Profession," observing that the country looked to the Bench to protect the individual rights and liberties of His Majesty's subjects. There had been instances recently where the great public departments and the powerful local authorities had been restrained by the Bench from overstepping the mark and encroaching upon the rights and privileges of individuals, and he was sure those present would wish to express their gratitude to the Bench for that firm stand they had made, which was sɔ necessary in the resent day and required as much courage as in the past to withstand the aspirations of Parliament and the King. There was evidence |