Pope's treatise on bridge architecture reviewed 144. Priestley. See Controversy. Character of 98. Psyche and other poems, by Mrs. Tighe, reviewed 377. Account of A. Scaligeriana extracts from 92. Schleusner's Lexicon 394. Semler life of (continued from vol. i.) 38, 213. His opinions on the A. Sermons. See Freeman. Silliman's sketch of the mineralogy of New Haven reviewed 344. T. Tighe (Mrs. H.) her poems reviewed 377. W. Wakefield. Extract from his evidences 326. Worcester's N. and T. pamphlets by, reviewed 165. Probability that cor- count of the pamphlets reviewed 172. Remarks on the mode of . THE MORNING INQUIRY, No. II.* An examination of the terms "The Deity of Christ." As the terms Deity and God are of synonymous import, it would be natural to suppose that by "the Deity of Christ" would be meant the God of Christ. And in an essay or sermon on "the Deity of Christ," we might reasonably expect to find something said to show what Being, Christ acknowledged as his God. On this point the scriptures would afford the most ample evidence; for they assure us that he acknowledged his "Father," as the "only true God.” He also taught that he was the only begotten son of God. This God the apostle Paul expressly styled "the GoD and FATHER of our Lord Jesus Christ." But when we look into a discourse on "the Deity of Christ," we usually find an attempt to prove that he himself is that very God, whom he acknowledged as " the only true God." As Christ was God's own and only son, and as in him the Father was ever well pleased, so God has honored him as an only son; he has given him divine titles, divine offices, divine au For the first Number, see vol. i. p. 78. thority, and divine sufficiency, and by him God has performed divine works. These effects of the Father's love are detached from their source or cause, and made the ground of arguments to prove the Son's absolute independence; and that he is, in fact, the very "living God," whom he ever loved, adored, and obeyed; yea, that he is personally and really the only true God." But notwithstanding all the labor to prove, that Christ is the selfexistent Deity, the same writers confidently affirm, that the "revealed God is three distinct persons." Let us then, before we proceed any farther, compare these two CARDINAL POINTS. In one of them it is affirmed, that the "revealed God is three distinct persons." Of course, those who deny this doctrine are considered as a sort of semi-atheists; as persons who deny the "revealed God." Yet the other cardinal point affirms, "the Deity of Christ," that he is "truly God;" yea, "God in the highest use of the term," and "the only true God." Yet he is but one person. He is, therefore, not the "revealed God;" for the "revealed God" is affirmed to be three distinct persons. With equal consistency we might affirm, that a YARD is three distinct feet; yet one of those feet is a proper yard, a yard in the highest sense of the term. But leaving this inconsistency to be reconciled by the advocates for the doctrine, we may farther examine the terms "the Deity of Christ." The doctrine of three distinct persons in one God has been, indeed, variously explained; but no explanation has yet been given, which can be reconciled to the idea of "the Deity of Christ." While one explanation makes him a mere mode of God's existence, another makes him a mere attribute, and another a mere office. Some indeed affirm of each of the three persons, that he is a distinct agent in the one God. But to be one of three agents in the one God is a very different thing from being the DEITYr in a strict and proper sense of the term. Distinct persons are distinct objects, and distinet objects, however they may be united, are capable of distinct conside ration. When distinct things are united in one object, the object is complex; and the distinct things are but parts or members of the complex object. essence. It is indeed asserted that the three distinct persons are one But what can be meant by this assertion? Is it meant that a divine person is not divine essence? If not divine essence, what is a divine person? The divine persons must be either something or nothing. If something, they must probably be some essence. If some essence, why not divine essence? But if each person be divine essence, then the persons must be distinct essences, for as persons they are distinct. If, in the one God, there be three distinct persons, is it not obvious, that neither of those persons, distinctly considered, can properly be called the DEITY, or SUPREME BEING? While that Being is supposed to consist of three distinct, coequal persons, neither of the persons can be properly considered as any thing more than a distinct portion or member of the one God; and at most, but a third part of the Supreme Being. I have ventured to use the word part, for if the unity of God does not exclude the distinction of persons, it does not exclude the distinction of parts. Is it possible to conceive of three distinct persons in one being, otherwise than as distinct members or parts of that being? If not, then he who does conceive of three distinct persons in God, does conceive of them as three distinct members or parts, whether he be willing to acknowledge it, or not. There is one point, on which information is needed from our trinitarian brethren, viz, whether they suppose, that the three persons include all that is implied in the terms the suPREME BEING, or whether they consider the Deity as an ob ject in which the three persons are united, as three distinct branches are united in one tree, The Damianists of the sixth century "distinguished the divine essence from the three persons, viz. Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. They denied that each person was God, when considered in itself and abstractedly from the other two; but they affirmed at the same time, that there was a common divinity, by the joint participation of which each person was God. They called the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost Hypostases or persons, and the Godhead common to them all substance or nature."* This sect was, by Mosheim, called a "faction," but much of the language used by trinitarians of the present age perfectly accords with the views of Damian. They speak of the Supreme Being as one proper person; they constantly use a sin→ gular pronoun as a substitute for the names of Deity; the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, they speak of as persons of the one God; one of the persons they call his Son; another his Spirit; and why might they not as properly call the other his Father? Such a manner of speaking of the one God and the three persons, most naturally suggests the idea that the ONE god is considered as an object distinct from either of the persons, and that the three persons are united to the Supreme Being as three branches to one tree, three members to one body, or three streams to one fountain. But this manner of conceiving of the "mystery" seems to imply four persons, one as supreme, and three as subordinate. The supreme Being, as such, is fairly represented as one person only, by the constant use of singular pronouns. Then we have the three coequal persons, neither of which is the Supreme Being, but only a distinct member of the Supreme Be ing. If the Supreme Being, as such, be the only proper object of worship, then neither of the persons, as a distinct person, can be an object of worship. But if each of the persons, as such, be an object of worship, then we have four objects of worship, one as supreme, and three as subordinate; or one as the head, and three as the members. As a tree with three equal branches has been supposed by. some trinitarians to be an apt illustration of the doctrine of three persons in one God, it is hoped that no blame will be attached to the introduction of the simile in this place. And if the three distinct persons be only three distinct branches of the Supreme Being, it will be impossible to tell how much, or • Mosheim, vol. ii, p. 150, |