money to the bearer on demand, and drawn upon any banker, or any person acting as a banker, who shall reside, or transact the business of a banker, within 15 miles of the place where such drafts or orders shall be issued, provided such place shall be specified in such drafts or orders; and provided the same shall bear date on or before the day on which the same shall be issued; and provided the same do not direct the payment to be made by bills or promissory notes.

The stamp duty is imposed upon the sum actually due at the time of taking the security, and not upon what may become due in future for the use of the money. Hence a promissory note for the payment of 30%. at three months after date, with interest from the date, requires a stamp applicable to a note not exceeding 30l. So where a note reserves interest from a day prior to the date, a stamp applicable to the principalt sum is sufficient. The legislature having in contemplation the mistakes which might arise in the use of stamps of an improper denomination, has by stat. 37 Geo. 3. c. 136, made provision for those mistakes; for, by the fifth section of that statute, it is enacted, that bills and notes made after the passing this act, and liable to a stamp duty by stat. 31 Geo. 3. c. 25, if stamped with a stamp of a different denomination than is required by the last-mentioned act, may, if the same be of equal or superior value to the stamp required, be stamped by the commissioners on payment of the duty and penalty; that is by sect. 6th of the 37th Geo. 3. c. 136, the penalty of forty shillings, if the bill or note is produced to the commissioners, before it is payable, and ten pounds, if so produced after it is payable. Since this statute of 37 Geo. 3, it has been determined" that a promissory note drawn before the 37th Geo. 3. c. 136, upon a receipt stamp of equal value with that required for a promissory note, is not available in law. The act of 37 G. 3. c. 136, is a clear legislative declaration, that it is not sufficient, that a certain sum of money be paid on the instruments which are the subjects of taxation, but the stamp used must be of the proper denomination. Per Sir J. Mansfield, C. J. delivering the opinion of the court in Chamberlain v. Porter, 1 Bos. & Pul. N. R. 33. By stat. 31 Geo. 3. c. 25. s. 19, bills and notes were forbidden to be stamped after they were made. This provision is still in force. Stat. 35 G. 3. c. 63. s. 14, contains a similar provision as to marine assurances.

r See stat. 9 Geo. 4. c. 49. s. 15.

s Pruessing v. Ing, 4 B. and A. 204. t Wills v. Noott, 4 Tyrw. 726.

u Chamberlain v. Porter, 1 Bos. and Pul. N. R. 30.

By stat. 43 Geo. 3. c. 127. s. 6, it is enacted that every instrument, matter, or thing, although stamped or impressed with any stamp of greater value than the stamp required by law, shall be valid and effectual, provided such stamp shall be of the denomination required by law for such instrument, &c.

An unstamped bill, or one improperly stamped, cannot be read to the jury as evidence of the contract, or any part of it, in respect of which the plaintiff sues.

Where partners resident in Ireland signed and indorsed a copper-plate impression of a bill of exchange, leaving blanks for the date, sum, time when payable, and name of the drawee, and transmitted it to B. in England for his use, who filled up the blanks and negotiated it: held that this was to be considered a bill of exchange by relation from the time of the signing and indorsing in Ireland, and consequently that an English stamp was not necessary. But a bill of exchangea drawn in England upon a person abroad, but accepted by him, payable in England, is an inland bill, and requires a stamp as such. Indorsee of a bill of exchange, against the acceptorb. It appeared at the trial, that the bill which was drawn on a proper stamp, was originally dated on the 2nd September, 1793, payable twenty-one days after date; and, while it continued in the hands of the drawer, it was altered with the consent of the acceptor, to be made payable fifty-one days after date, and afterwards with the like consent was again restored to twenty-one days after date, and the date brought forward from the 2nd to the 14th September. This last alteration was made on the 30th September, the bill being then over due according to the original tenor of it; after these alterations, it was negotiated, and came into the hands of plaintiff. Lord Kenyon, C. J. non-suited the plaintiff; and, on a motion to set aside the non-suit, the court were clearly of opinion, that the nonsuit was proper; for that, at the time when the last alteration was made, the operation of the bill, as it originally stood, was quite spent; that it was a new and distinct transaction between the parties; and that therefore there ought to have been a new stamp. The plaintiff declared as indorsee of a bill of exchange against the acceptor,

x See Farr v. Price, 1 East's R. 55, and Taylor v. Hague, 2 East's R. 414.

y Jardine v. Payne, 1 B. and Ad. 663. in effect overruling Bishop v. Chambre, 1 Danson and Lloyd, 83.

z Snaith v. Mingay, 1 M. and S. 87. recognized by Parke, J. Holdsworth v. Hunter, 10 B. and C. 456.

a Amner v. Clark, 2 Cr. M. and R.
468; 1 Gale, 191.

b Bowman v. Nichol, 5 T. R. 537.
c Cardwell v. Martin, 9 East, 190. See
also Bathe v. Taylor, 15 East, 412.
S. P.

and it appeared that the bill in question, which was drawn by Giles and Co., on the 3rd of June, 1807, payable to their own order, and accepted by the defendant at three months' date, was exchanged by him with Giles and Co. for their acceptance of a bill drawn by the defendant for the same sum at eighty-five days, payable to his order, the object being that Giles and Co. should put the defendant in cash before his acceptance became due. On the 23rd of June, before Giles and Co. or the defendant had passed the respective securities to any other person, it was agreed to procrastinate the payment of the bills by post-dating them the 23rd of June, instead of the 3rd. The court were of opinion, that the alteration rendered a new stamp necessary; observing, that the delivery of the bill by the drawer to the acceptor, and the re-delivery of it for a valuable consideration, such as the exchange of acceptances, has been held to be, since Cowley v. Dunlop, 7 T. R. 565, a negotiation of the bill; that the several drawers were mutual purchasers of each other's acceptances; and, as the alteration was made while the bill was in this course of negotiation, and after it had continued so twenty days, (during which time it was in the power of the drawer and payee to have passed it to any third person,) it was in effect drawing a new bill. So where a promissory note, payable by the defendant to the plaintiff or orderd, was originally expressed to be for value received, but the day after it had been signed and delivered by defendant to plaintiff, it was by consent of the parties altered, by the addition of the words for the goodwill of the lease and trade of Mr. F. K. deceased; it was holden, that as the alteration was material, as well because it was evidence of a fact which, if necessary to be inquired into, must otherwise have been proved by different evidence, as also because it pointed out the particular consideration for the note, and put the holder upon inquiring, whether that consideration had passed; and as such alteration was made after the note had issued, a new stamp was necessary. An alteration, made with the assent of the defendant, the acceptor, and before the bill was negotiated, has been holdene not to be a re-issuing, so as to require a fresh stamp. An objection, on the ground of the insufficiency of the stamp, cannot be taken after payment of money into court.

Omission of Date.-Regularly, every bill of exchange ought to be dated: but in the following cases, where the day of the date was omitted in the declaration, the court said they would intend the bill to bear date on the day when it was

d Knill v. Williams, 10 East, 431.

e Leykariff v. Ashford, 12 Moore, 281.

f Israel v. Benjamin, 3 Campb. 40.

made. A date is not of the substance of a deed, for if it want a date, or have a false or impossible date, as the 30th of February, yet the deed is good. Goddard's case, 2 Co. 5. a. Case on a foreign bill of exchange payable at double usance from the dates, and it was alleged that the party beyond the sea drew the bill on a certain day, and that the same was presented to and accepted by the defendant. Exception, that the date of the bill was not set forth. The court said, that they would intend the bill dated at the time of drawing it. Judgment for plaintiff. So where in the first count of the declaration it was statedh, that the defendant heretofore, to wit, on the 15th day of September, 1800, drew a bill of exchange, bearing date the day and year aforesaid, payable two months after date. The second count stated, that the defendant afterwards, to wit, on the same day and year aforesaid, drew a certain bill of exchange, payable two months after date. On writ of error, after judgment by default, it was objected, that the second count could not be sustained, because the date of the bill was not stated; that although, in De la Courtier v. Bellamy, the court held, that it might be intended that the date of the bill was the day of the drawing, yet there the day of drawing was expressly stated; whereas in this case it was to be collected only from words of reference to the first count, in which the day of drawing was laid under a "to wit." But the court were of opinion, that this case was not distinguishable from De la Courtier v. Bellamy, and that they might well intend the date to have been the day of drawing stated in the first count. The defendant, on the 4th May, 1810, drew a bill of exchange, which he dated on the 11th May, 1810, payable sixty-five days after date, and delivered it to the payee, who, after indorsing it for a valuable consideration to the plaintiff on the fifth of May, died on the same day. It was holden, that the plaintiff was entitled through this indorsement to recover against the draweri. In the case of a bill dated on a Sundayk, the court, in the absence of evidence, would not presume the acceptance to have been written on that day; and even if it had, such an act would not be an act of ordinary calling within stat. 29 Car. 2. c. 7.

Alteration of Date.-A bill of exchange was drawn on defendant on the 26th March, 1788, payable three months after

g De la Courtier v. Bellamy, 2 Show. 422.

h Hague v. French, Exchequer Cham

ber, in error, 3 Bos. and Pul. 173.

i

Giles v. Bourne, 6 M. and S. 73.
S. P. on demurrer.

Pasmore v. North, 13 East, 517.

k Legbie v. Levi, 1 Cr. and J. 180.

date to J. S. and accepted by defendant'. After acceptance, and while the bill remained in the hands of J. S. the payee, the date of the bill was altered by some person unknown, from the 26th March, 1788, to the 20th March, 1788, without the authority or privity of defendant: J. S. the payee, afterwards indorsed the bill so altered to the plaintiffs for a valuable consideration. It did not appear that plaintiffs knew of the alteration at the time when the bill was indorsed to them. Payment having been refused, plaintiffs sued the defendant as acceptor. The declaration contained two special counts, one on a bill dated the 20th March, 1788, the other on a bill dated the 26th March, 1788, and the money counts. Special verdict. The case was argued twice in B. R. after which the court (Buller, J. dissentient,) gave judgment for defendant, on the ground that the alteration of the instrument had avoided it. So if the word "date" be inserted, instead of the word "sight," Long v. Moore, Kenyon, C. J. 3 Esp. N. P. C. 155. So where a billm having been accepted generally, the drawer, without the consent of the acceptor, added the words "payable at Mr. B.'s, Chiswell Street." But a mere correction of a mistake, as by inserting the words " or order,” in furtherance of the intention of the parties, will not vitiate the bill. Kershaw v. Cox, Le Blanc, J. 3 Esp. N. P. C. 246; Brutt v. Picard, 1 R. and M. 37. S. P. So where two persons being jointly indebted to another, agreed to give him a bill of exchange, to be drawn by one of the debtors, and accepted by the other, instead of which they sent him a promissory note, made by the one and indorsed by the other, which he immediately returned to be altered into a bill of exchange, which was done accordingly: it was holden, that such alteration, only fulfilling the terms of the agreement, might be considered as the correction of a mistake, and did not render a new stamp necessary, the instrument never having been negotiated as a promissory note. Webber v. Maddocks, 3 Campb. 1. See Cole v. Parkin, 12 East, 471. So if the alteration be not in the time of payment, sum, &c. or other material part, the bill will not be affected by it. Hence, writing on the bill the place where it was to be paid, before the bill was negotiated, at the request of the payee, has been holden not to destroy the validity of the bill. Trapp v. Spearman, Kenyon, C. J. 3 Esp. N. P. C. 57. Jacobs v. Hart, 2 Stark. Ñ. P. C. 45. Lord Ellenborough, C. J. 6 M.

1 Master and others v. Miller, 4 T. R. 320, affirmed on error in Exchequer Chamber, 2 H. Bl. 141, recognized in Powel v. Divett, 15 East, 32, where Le Blanc, J. says, "that the decision

in Master v. Miller was not confined to negotiable instruments." m Cowie and another v. Halsall, 4 B. and A. 197. See also Desbrow v. Weatherley, 6 C. & P. 758.