Essays on the Philosophy of Theism, 1. köideKegan Paul, Trench & Company, 1884 - 739 pages |
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Common terms and phrases
absolute act of memory action adduced admit affirm allege anti-impulsive effort antitheism antitheists argument avouchment Bain believe called Catholic causation cause certainly cognitive faculties cognizable conclusion consciousness consider conviction course Dean Mansel declare deism deny determinists distinct doctrine doubt Dublin Review essay evidence experience express fact Freewill geometrical axioms ground Hamilton Herbert Spencer human idea immediate implies indubitably infallibly inference instance intellectual intuition Intuitionist JOHN STUART MILL knowledge laws Logic maintain man's mankind mathematical axioms matter means mental Mill Mill's mind moral judgments morally evil motive of certitude necessity never objection objectivists observed ourselves pheno phenomena phenomenists philosophical pleasure position possess possible premisses principle proposition question readers reason regard reply resist rule of certitude sense spontaneous impulse stellar regions straight line strongest present desire supposed syllogism Theism theory thought tion trilaterals are triangular true trust uniformity of nature veracity whole words
Popular passages
Page 187 - Memoires," and came to the passage which relates his father's death, the distressed position of the family, and the sudden inspiration by which he, then a mere boy, felt and made them feel that he would be everything to them — would supply the place of all that they had lost.
Page 313 - But it is necessary to our using the word cause that we should believe not only that the antecedent always has been followed by the consequent, but that as long as the present constitution of things * endures it always will be so.
Page 241 - As we proceed in the formation of habits, and become accustomed to will a particular act or a particular course of conduct because it is pleasurable, we at last continue to will it without any reference to its being pleasurable.
Page 112 - I must believe this, and at the same time call this being by the names which express and affirm the highest human morality, I say in plain terms that I will not. Whatever power such a being may have over me, there is one thing which he shall not do : he shall not compel me to worship him. I will call no being good, who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my fellow-creatures ; and if such a being can sentence me to hell for not so calling him, to hell I will go.
Page 188 - A person of high intellect," he writes, " should never go into unintellectual society, unless he can enter it as an apostle ; yet he is the only person with high objects, who can ever enter it at all.
Page 187 - I was no longer hopeless : I was not a stock or a stone. I had still, it seemed, some of the material out of which all worth of character, and all capacity for happiness are made. Relieved from my ever present sense of irremediable wretchedness, I gradually found that the ordinary incidents of life could again give me some pleasure; that I could again find enjoyment, not intense, but sufficient for cheerfulness in sunshine and sky, in books, in conversation, in public affairs; and that there was,...
Page 194 - The man who left on the memory of those who witnessed his life and conversation, such an impression of his moral grandeur, that eighteen subsequent centuries have done homage to him as the Almighty in person, was ignominiously put to death, as what ? As a blasphemer.
Page 319 - But in order that any alleged fact should be contradictory to a law of causation, the allegation must be, not simply that the cause existed without being followed by the effect, for that would be no uncommon occurrence; but that this happened in the absence of any adequate counteracting cause. Now in the case of an alleged miracle, the assertion is the exact opposite of this.
Page 68 - First, that we now know it directly to be true of by far the greatest number of phenomena ; that there are none of which we know it not to be true, the utmost that can be said being, that of some we cannot positively, from direct evidence, affirm its truth...
Page 139 - By evidence is not meant any thing and every thing which produces belief. There are many things which generate belief besides evidence. A mere strong association of ideas often causes a belief so intense as to be unshakable by experience or argument. Evidence is not that which the mind does or must yield to, but that which it ought to yield to, namely, that, by yielding to which, its belief is kept conformable to fact.