tinction between matters of opinion and of belief, as well as between matters of opinion and of demonstration: a distinction bearing in the first case mainly upon a moral, in the second principally upon an intellectual difference, in the relation between the thing perceived and the percipient mind. He would confess, that a real dishonour is done to matters of belief when they are treated as matters of opinion. Belief seems to be something of which the law and standard are external to ourselves: opinion, something depending on what is within us for its form and colour, and therefore essentially far more liable to be affected in its formation by the unchecked irregularities of the single mind. Saint Augustine goes so far as altogether to condemn opinion as applied to religious truth. And we may find some authority for this strong statement in its analogy to the method of Scripture, which treats the nearly equivalent term afperis* (or choice as it is commonly, but in this peculiar use, inadequately rendered,) as something essentially evil. Hence, among ourselves, the same word translated into English, heresy, bears as proper to it an obnoxious sense. And it may be observed that in Scripture generally we hear much of belief, of faith, of assurance, of reception, of truth, of the understanding applied to it, of knowledge: but nothing of that form of mental assent which we call opinion, and which is, when accurately understood, one too weak to afford a stable groundwork of practice or of character.

* Tertull. de Præscript. VI.

6. But upon what strong grounds do I allege that these propositions of religion are not to be handled as mere opinions? since it is generally owned that there are some perfectly legitimate subjects of theological opinion, and since it is clear that many would regard these as among them. The answer is this: that the Church at large has, with a wonderfully consenting testimony, ever held them to be declared, either explicitly or virtually, in the Scriptures, and has embodied them in the Creeds. Nor is the case less clear, as it respects the recognition of this general sentence by the Church of England. We find them in her articles, in her sacramental services, in her offices of ordination as well as in her acceptance of the Scriptures themselves, as regarded in their Catholic interpretation. We find them in the writings of her great divines, both professed as truths, and particularly employed in the controversy with Romanism. We find this attestation, as it were, countersigned in the charges and imputations of those who, unhappily mingling with their zeal a spirit of impatience and insubordination, carried the pretext of Reformation to a work which had become one of destruction; and who, from the period of Elizabeth downwards, have reprobated the Church of England as being in these very respects Popishly affected.* True, they have been denied by individuals, and have been at some periods less vividly realised than at others in the general spirit and prac

See (inter alia) the Appendix to a Visitation Sermon entitled a 'Call to Union,' preached by Dr. Hook. Rivingtons', 1838.

tice of the members of the Church. But this is equally undeniable of other, even more vital and essential truths, as, for example, the doctrine of justification; and cannot, therefore, form a ground of legitimate objection to the present argument.

7. Lastly, it is the greatest possible error to suppose that the teaching of these doctrines in the present day is peculiar to certain pious and learned individuals in the University of Oxford, of whom it has been alleged that their reaction from the religious peculiarities of the day has engendered in them an inclination, if not to the entire scheme of Romanism, yet to Romish doctrines and practices, and a corresponding spirit. Now the reading and casual observation of any man interested in these subjects, ought to enable him sufficiently to confute such a charge. The reader will find, in an Appendix to this Chapter,* testimonies to this effect, very far, indeed, I have no doubt, from what more competent authorities could supply, but such as a very limited knowledge has enabled me to furnish from recently published works. I have cited the testimonies of several classes: first, of bishops and clergymen of the Church, taking care rigidly to exclude the name of every one connected, even by the remotest implication, with those writers at Oxford, to whom such frequent allusion has of late been made; and including none but such as are known to be eminent in station, or in ability and learning, or in zeal and

* See Appendix B.

judgment, or in most or all of these. But not contented with impartial voices, I have even looked for what some might call hostile testimony: the writings of men of eminence, well known to the world or in high official positions, who have recently published for the very purpose of discountenancing approximations to Romanism, in some cases of objecting specifically to tenets of the writers at Oxford; yet who yield a consenting witness against those who decry the notion of authority in the Church and of succession in the ministry. And I am bound to add that, so far as my own knowledge and experience go, I believe that it would be quite impossible to produce any such list of testimonies in support of the opposite opinions, or indeed any testimonies deserving the name, from writers of the Church of England. Then I have resorted to the published opinions of laymen, in order to show the acknowledgment substantially yielded to these principles in unprofessional and independent quarters; and lastly, I have cited the evidence of some few among those persons, who, like the early Puritans, are entirely agreed with us as to the fact, that the Church of England holds thus and thus; while they select for blame that in which we find food and solace, and admonition to humility and charity. The injurious effects which have followed from handing down ancient and Catholic principles as the mere opinions of a few individuals, must be the excuse for these citations; and it will be borne in mind that I adduce them, not to show that the principles are Catholic, or that

Y

they are those of the Church in England, but to prove that they are at least not peculiar to a class or school of writers. So much by way of introduction to the argument.

SECTION II.-FIRST OBJECTION.

8-10. Objection of tendency to Romanism one of equivocal merit. 11, 12. Substantially the reverse of the truth. 13-19. Grounds of sympathy with the Roman Churches. 20-28. Prospects of Romanism. 29-36. One of the causes unfavourable to it. 37-39. Its features where paramount, and in Northern Germany. 40-48. Another striking proof and cause of weakness in Romanism. 4966. Comparison of the working of the Reformation in England, and of the unreformed system in France. 67-72. Safeguards against Romanism. 73–75. Of learning from and of dealing justly by it.

8. I now come to consider the first of the three heads of charge to which I have referred; namely, that there is in Church principles a tendency to Romanism. There is an extraordinary levity in the temper with which this charge is sometimes bandied to and fro. A well-known Presbyterian clergyman,* of Edinburgh, charges an eminent lawyer, of the same communion, with holding "Popish notions" on the authority and functions of presbyteries, synods, and general assemblies, advocating for himself what are considered the most popular principles. But the eminent lawyer had been beforehand with his adver

* A Letter to John Hope, Esq., Dean of Faculty, by William Cunningham, Minister of Trinity College Parish, on the Present Claims of the Church of Scotland. Edinburgh, 1839—p. 18.