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PART III. a person who is not lodging at the inn at
CAP. III. all, or is lodging there as a lodger, and not as
Duty of a lodging
a traveller and guest, the innkeeper is only responsible in the first case as a bailee, and in the second case as a lodging-house keeper. (Add. Torts, 331-2; Broom Com. 789; 1 Sm. L. C. 109.)
A lodging-house keeper is bound to take house keeper. that degree of care of his house, and of the property of his lodger in it, and to use that degree of caution in the choice of his servants, which a prudent housekeeper would ordinarily take and use. (Add. Torts, 333; Broom Com. 790.)
In actions against common carriers for refusing to carry a passenger or goods, or for delay in delivering goods, or against innkeepers for refusing to provide accommodation for a traveller, substantial damages are recoverable for the injury to the plaintiff's right; and if he has been put to expenses in consequence of the refusal or delay, all such expenses are also recoverable. And special damages may be claimed for more than ordinary injury arising from the refusal or delay, unless the plaintiff, though he knew that such injury might arise, did not warn the carrier of it. (Add. Torts, 342-3; Chit. & Tem. on Car. 56.)
OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF PRIVATE RIGHTS, AND THE REDRESS OF, AND PROTECTION FROM, PRIVATE WRONGS OR CIVIL INJURIES.
PART IV. It is a maxim that damnum absque injuria is not actionable.
Damnum absque injuria. Damnum.
Injuria sine damno.
Damnum is such a damage, whether pecuniary or perceptible, or not, as is capable, in legal contemplation, of being estimated by a jury.
Injuria is a legal wrong, that is, an act or omission of which the law takes cognisance as a wrong.
Hence the meaning of the maxim is, that loss or detriment is not a ground of action, unless it is the result of a species of wrong of which the law takes cognisance.
Nor is injuria sine damno a sufficient ground of action, if damnum be understood in the technical sense above mentioned. But if damnum be taken in the sense of an actual perceptible loss in the particular case, injuria sine damno may be a ground of action. For an action may be maintained for a legal wrong, though unaccompanied, in the parti
cular instance, with any actual perceptible PART IV. or appreciable loss or detriment.
Thus, injuria sine damno will form a ground of action when a private legal right is violated, though the violation of it be unattended with any actual perceptible or appreciable loss or detriment in the particular case. (See Broom Com. 72, and cases given 82-90.)
The result is, that there are moral wrongs for which the law gives no legal remedy, though they cause great loss or detriment; and, on the other hand, there are legal wrongs for which the law does give a legal remedy, though there be only a violation of a private right, without actual loss or detriment in the particular case.
Some rights are founded in contract; Division of others are independent of contract.
And wrongs, into
those foun. ded in con
some wrongs consist of a violation of con- tract, and
tract, express or implied; others are infringe- pendent of ments of rights, or violations of duty, independent of contract. The latter are termed torts. (Broom Com. 633, 652-3, 826-8.)
The same transaction may be a breach Transactions of contract, a tort, and a crime. And ac- tortious, and
which have a contractive, a
cordingly, when it does not amount to a aspect. felony, redress may be obtained, first, by an
ART IV. action ex contractu, when it may be viewed as a breach of contract; or, secondly, by an action ex delicto, when it may be viewed as a tort; or, thirdly, by an indictment, when it may be viewed as a crime. In the first case the plaintiff is said to sue or recover in contract; in the second case, in tort. (See Broom Com. 652-3, 827. And see p. 282, infra.)
Every person who does a wrong, is at least consequences responsible for all the mischievous consequences that might reasonably be expected to result under ordinary circumstances from such misconduct. (Broom Com. 667.)