Studies in the Philosophy of Logic and KnowledgeTimothy John Smiley, Thomas Baldwin OUP/British Academy, 2004 - 291 pages Eleven papers by distinguished British and American philosophers are brought together in this volume. Five of the contributors engage in effect in a running debate about knowledge. How does knowledge relate to evidence? How reliable need one be to have knowledge? Once sceptical doubt has been introduced is there any untainted evidence to show that it is misplaced? Does verificationism succeed in showing that scepticism is untenable? Or is there a natural propensity for belief which explains why we are not in fact sceptics? The other six tackle questions about logic and its relation to language. Can one give a 'realist' account of logical truth without supposing that logic has a subject-matter? How do theories of descriptions fare when tested by their handling of functions? How can indirect speech report someone's use of words like 'this'? Does our language count for or against adopting second-order logic? These papers, given in the British Academy Philosophical Lectures series, are all examples of recent philosophy at its best. |
Contents
Notes on Contributors | 1 |
John McDowell is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh | 5 |
Edward Craig is Knightbridge Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge | 15 |
Knowledge Truth and Reliability | 31 |
Facts and Certainty | 51 |
Three New Leaves to Turn Over | 95 |
Two Types of Naturalism | 113 |
The Theory of Descriptions | 131 |
Thomas Baldwin is Professor of Philosophy at the University of York | 140 |
A Realists Account | 163 |
Indexicals and Reported Speech | 209 |
Reporting Indexicals | 235 |
On HigherOrder Logic and Natural Language | 249 |
On Motivating HigherOrder Logic | 277 |
Sainsbury is Susan Stebbing Professor of Philosophy at | 280 |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
accept actually anaphoric antecedent appearance argued Burke's assumption claim cognitive conclusion Conservative Extension constraints defeasible descriptions doubt epistemic epistemology evidence example existential quantification experience explain expression externalist fact false first-order first-order logic follows Frege Fregean function Gareth Evans group III propositions highest common factor hypothesis idea indexical inference inner instance interpretation involve judgements kind logical constants logical truths material world mathematical meaning metaphysical naturalism minds natural language naturalist negation notion object philosophical plural quantification plural terms position possible premisses present primitively obvious principles pronoun quantification question realist reference relation requires role rules Russell's satisfaction of criteria scene-setting sceptical argument second-order logic seems semantic semantic value sense sentence singular term someone Strawson sufficient reason suggest suppose Theory of Descriptions thesis things thinker thought true truth conditions truth theory understanding utterance valid verificationist Wittgenstein words