The best plan was to bring the occupiers of those ninety-five houses forward, and throw the responsibility of the conviction upon the Bench. With respect to Mr. Gladstone's selfdenying course which he had proposed to adopt, what he (Mr. Stitt) was anxious about was this. He understood that there should be no suppression of the names or numbers brought to Bridewell on the Saturday. The extent of drunkenness in Liverpool had been unfavourably contrasted with other towns. For instance, while Liverpool had 14,000 persons taken up in a year, the magistrates pointed out instances where only 3000 or 4000 such convictions were recorded.; On examination it turned out that persons were taken to the Bridewell, incarcerated in the cells, and dismissed from these cells by the head constable or some others,no record of their having been there appearing. The rule was that wherever a man was incarcerated, a record was kept of the fact, and the result was those cases swelled the statistics. Mr. Gladstone's wish was that due publicity should be given to the numbers discharged, so that they would see the real extent of the evil, and when they knew the facts, they could the better deal with it. Mr. Raffles said, as he read the Prevention of Crime Act 1867, the slightest remaining on the premises by thieves subjected the parties to conviction. Mr. Whitty said either these ninety-five houses were culpable or not. If they were merely serving people who were entitled to refreshments, no blame could attach to them. If, on the other hand, they should be permitting persons to remain for improper purposes, the police ought to use increased vigilance in bringing them before the Bench. If they had been doing no wrong. it was wrong to have them gibbeted in the police reports; but if, on the other hand, they violated the law, it was quite right to throw the responsibility of dealing with them upon the magistrates. He thought Mr. Gladstone's a good suggestion, and he had no doubt his example would be followed. Mr. Raffles said he had noticed in the London papers two or three convictions under the Act he had mentioned, where thieves had met together for the purpose of getting a sum of money up for another thief. Mr. Clint said if the police brought up a pretty good case against one of the houses and that case was dismissed by the magistrates, or if conviction by the magistrates was followed by the case being quashed in the court above, the police were very much discouraged in bringing up another house. They were not going to waste their time uselessly and then be snubbed. Mr. Raffles said there could be no question that the magistrates were bound to act upon the evidence before them to convict. With regard to cases before the Superior Court additional evidence might be given which might alter the case. It did not follow that because the recorder quashed a case he thought the magistrates wrong. All he said was that the evidence was such that it did not convict. sessions to the clerk of the peace. If any difficulty arose, the taxing officer always had the oppor tunity of consulting the presiding judge, who had the power of allowing or disallowing any item in a bill of costs. The bill, having thus been taxed by the competent officer of the court, was presented to the county and borough treasurer, who paid the amount-and should in due course be recouped by the Treasury. But for a long time past the practice of the Treasury had been this:After these bills had been carefully taxed according to the scale laid down by the Treasury itself, borough treasurer, a subordinate officer in the and the money had been paid by the county or Treasury had been in the habit of reviewing or retaxing the bills, and striking off items according to his will or caprice. The effect of that had been that the sums were disallowed by the Treasury, and had to be paid out of the county or borough rates. So that, in point of fact, a subordinate in of reviewing costs that had been taxed by the the Treasury had arrogated to himself the power proper officer of the court on the Treasury scalehe had, in fact, assumed a power which Parlia ment alone possessed, the power to tax the ratepayers of the country; because to the extent to which he disallowed these costs he was, in reality, taxing the ratepayers. He need hardly say that this was a most undesirable and improper state of things. He used those terms with considerable confidence, because the question had been brought before the Lord Chief Justice within Mr. Gladstone said he had been promised by one the last few weeks, and he had used these words: newspaper to put the names before the public, and-"It seems to me that the acts of parties who no doubt other newspapers would follow in the act under the authority of Acts of Parliament are set aside by persons who have no authority at all to interfere in the matter. It really appears to me to be a very serious matter." After such expressions as these from the Chief Justice of England, it was quite unnecessary for him to use any words describing his opinion of the proceedings of the Treasury. He had hoped that the matter would be dealt with very shortly. Mr. Clint said he thought Mr. Gladstone's suggestion a very good one, and should be glad to take part with any number of magistrates who undertook the duty Mr. Gladstone indicated. Mr. Castellain thought it would have a good effect if the names of the drunkards were published. If a man did get drunk on a Saturday afternoon, or Sunday, he ought to remain in the place until Monday morning unless he was ill. Mr. Whitty thought if the names of the people locked up on the Sunday were published, those locked up during the week should be published also. same way. Mr. Whitty, in reference to the disorderly houses, said the very fact that the police were going to take more stringent measures showed that sufficient vigilance had not been used before. Mr. Holder thought Mr. Gladstone's suggestion might or might not be a good one. Mr. Livingston said he should be very happy to follow Mr. Gladstone in the course he proposed to pursue. other business. The meeting then terminated, there being no DARTFORD PETTY SESSIONS. H. J. Hodgson, Esq. R. H. Hurst, Esq., M.P. Saturday, Dec. 30, 1871. (Before Sir P. H. DYKE, Bart., and a full Bench.) Metropolitan Police Act-Jurisdiction of county justices sitting outside metropolitan police districts to try offences committed within such district. AT the Dartford petty sessions on Saturday last several cases were heard in which a question of jurisdiction was raised of considerable importance to justices having jurisdiction in the home counties. The offences were under the Metropolitan Police Act 1839 (2 & 3 Vict. c. 47), and were committed within the metropolitan police district, but not within any part of such district assigned to any metropolitan police court. Gibson (Dartford), for the defence.-The justices have no jurisdiction here. In summary convic tions as well as in matters to be done at special and petty sessions, their jurisdiction is wholly given to justices by statute: (Paley, 4th edit. p. 15.) The offences charged are punishable under 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, and sect. 75 of that Act defined magistrate "to mean and include every justice of the peace appointed to be a magistrate of the police courts of the metropolis," the latter part of the section which included county justices in the definition was repealed by 3 & 4 Vict. c. 84, s. 1. The power to convict given by 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, s. 76, was confined exclusively to magistrates as defined by sect. 75 of the same Act. Moreover 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, s. 18, rendered void any summons issued by a justice of Kent, "requiring any person residing within the Metropolitan Police District, to appear at any place without the said district to answer any information or complaint touching any matter arising within the said district. 21 & 22 Vict. c. 73, s. 6, provided that 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, s. 18, should not apply to "any such summons or warrant in respect of any matter arising within any part of the J. Walker. H. Salwey. J. Howard. G. S. Butler. J. J. P. Mody. R. Ransom. ......... 1 W. Winterbotham 10 days..... 14 days Statutory.... said district not assigned for the time being to any of the police courts of the metropolis," but the power thereby restored was simply a power Vict. c. 84, s. 6, enacted "That any two justices to summon, and not a power to convict. 3 & 4 of the peace having jurisdiction within the Metropolitan Police District shall have, while sitting special or petty sessions of the peace in any part publicly in the court or room used for holding of the said district within the limits of their commission, except in the divisions to be assigned to the police courts already established, all the powers, privileges, and duties which any one magistrate of the said police courts has," but in order for the justices to have jurisdiction under that section, their sessions must be holden within the Metropolitan Police District. therefore, that the justices might summon a It followed, person to appear without the district, but they could not hear and adjudicate upon the complaint. at Woolwich refused to try offenders unless they An inspector of police said the police magistrate were actually in custody. they had no jurisdiction, dismissed the cases, and The JUSTICES after deliberation decided that arrangements were made for a case to be granted for the Queen's Bench, THE TREASURY DISALLOWANCE OF PROSECUTION COSTS.-The Recorder of Exeter on Monday, in his charge to the grand jury, spoke at lengthi upon the subject of the disallowance by the Treasury of the costs incurred in criminal prosecutions at the assizes and quarter sessions. Some years since (the Recorder observed) the Legislature enacted that all costs incurred in such prosecutions should be paid by the Treasury. The mode of proceeding had been this: The bill of costs was always presented for taxation to the competent officer of the court-at assizes to the clerk of assize, and at county and borough quarter FEES IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS.-At the Bucks Quarter Sessions on Monday, his Grace the Duke of Buckingham in the chair, the above question, which is causing in a great many counties a feeling of great dissatisfaction, was brought before the court. The justices of Warwickshire have sent round to the different counties of England a circular suggesting the advisability of combined action against the Treasury owing to the apparent unjust disallowance of items previ ously allowed by taxing masters at assizes and quarter sessions for expenses, counsel's fees, &c., in criminal prosecutions. His Grace the Duke of Buckingham read an extract from a report of a case The Justices of Lancashire v. The Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, in which Cockburn, C.J. expressed a very decided opinion against these reductions by the Treasury, his language being, "that he could not himself underderstand how a person sitting somewhere upstairs in the Treasury could take upon himself to disallow certain items, previously allowed by persons on the spot, competent to know all the circumstances of the case.' On the motion of the Duke of Buckingham a committee was formed, to confer with the committee appointed in Warwickshire, to consider the subject. COMPANY LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. AGREEMENT FOR PURCHASE OF LAND-NOTICE into in Sept. 1863 between the owners of certain lands and a railway company, under which the TO TREAT-WAIVER.-By an agreement entered any additional ground for any purpose they should company purchased a certain portion of land, it was agreed that if the company should require pay for the same at a fixed rate. În May 1865 the tion, with a notice to treat under the Lands company served the owners of the lands in ques Clauses Consolidation Act, for the purchase of more land from them. Two years afterwards the Held, that the notice to treat had superseded the company entered into possession of the lands: agreement, and that the value of the lands must Lands Clauses Consolidation Act: (Kemp v. The be ascertained according to the provisions of the South-Eastern Railway Company, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 622. V.C. B.) TRANSFER OF SHARES BANKRUPTCY OF feror of shares in a company in liquidation, who, TRANSFEREE.-LIABILITY FOR CALLS.-A transby the default of the transferee to register the transfer, had been placed on the list of contributories, and compelled to pay calls, filed a bill against the administrator of the transferee, who had since died, seeking to be indemnified against the calls. To this bill the defendant pleaded a deed of inspectorship executed by the transferee three months after the order for winding-up the company: Held, that the plaintiff had no right of proof under the deed, and that it could not be pleaded as a bar to his claim. (Holmes v. Symons, 25 L. Rep. N.S. 628. V. C. W.) JAN. 6, 1872.1 MERCANTILE LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. SPECIFIC CHATTEL-SALE ON CONDITION WARRANTY. The plaintiff purchased, at the defendants' horse auction, a mare warranted to have been hunted with specified packs of hounds; and by the conditions of sale the animal, if not answering the warranty, was to be returned before the expiration of a specified time. After the purchase and payment of the price, but before removing the mare from the defendants' premises, the plaintiff was told by some persons in the sale yard that the mare had not been hunted with the particular hounds named, but he, nevertheless, without making any inquiry of the defendants in the matter, sent his groom to take her away, and whilst the groom was riding her from the defendants' to the plaintiff's stables the mare, without any negli gence or default on the part of the groom, but from her own inherent disposition, became restive and ran away, and, coming in contact with a carriage in the street, received serious injury. Having ascertained that the warranty was untrue, the plaintiff returned her to the defendants within the time limited by the conditions, and brought an action to recover back the purchase money. It was admitted by the defendants that the mare did not answer the warranty in fact: Held, by the Court of Exchequer (Kelly, C.B., and Bramwell and Cleasby, BB.), and that the mare having been bought on a special contract giving power to the purchaser to return her within a specified time, if not answering the warranty, which it was admitted she did not, the right to return her was not affected by the gossip of the sale yard, which amounted to nothing; and that as the injury to the mare occurred not from any negligence or default on the part of the plaintiff or his groom, but from an accident beyond their control, and owing to the inherent vice of the animal itself, the plaintiff was entitled to return her, although she was not in the same condition as at the time of sale: (Head v. Tattersall and another, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 631. Ex.) LAW STUDENTS' JOURNAL HILARY EDUCATIONAL TERM, 1872. PROSPECTUS of the LECTURES to be delivered, during the ensuing Educational Term, by the several Readers appointed by the Inns of Court. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND LEGAL HISTORY. The Reader on Constitutional Law and Legal History proposes to deliver, during the ensuing Educational Term, Six Public Lectures on1. Constitutional and Legal History before the Conquest. In the Elementary Private Classes, the Reader JURISPRUDENCE, CIVIL AND INTERNATIONAL The Reader on Jurisprudence, Civil and Inter. on 1. The Roman Law relating to Obligations aris. (1.) The Contract of Sale (emptio venditio). 2. The History and Present State of Inter- In his Private Class, the Reader will continue the discussion of the First Book of the Institutes of Justinian, commencing with Title 8. He will use as Text-books, Sandars' edition of the Institutes, Demangeat, Cours élémentaire de Droit Romain, and Scheurl, Lehrbuch der Institutionen. The Reader will also discuss, in the Private Classes, points of International Law relating to the Rights of Neutrals, using Wheaton's Elements of International Law as the Text-book, and referring to the works of the principal modern Jurists, the decisions of the Admiralty and Prize Courts of England and America, the Debates in Parliaunder discussion. ment, and State Papers relating to the cases The Reader will also specially discuss the Congress of Vienna, the Treaties of Paris, and the subsequent alterations of those Treaties. COMMON LAW. The Reader on Common Law proposes to deliver, during the ensuing Educational Term, Two Courses (of Six Public Lectures each) on the following Subjects: Elementary Course. 1. Simple Contracts, Express or Implied. 3. Proofs adduced and Rules of Evidence applied in Actions upon Contracts not under Seal. Advanced Course. 1. Mercantile Contracts-Written or Verbalof ordinary occurrence. 2. Torts affecting Mercantile Persons or Property. 3. Rules of Evidence applicable and Proofs admissible at the Trial of an Action between Mer. cantile Persons. With his Private Classes, the Read r will con2. Changes consequent on the Conquest. 3. Constitutional and Legal History from sider the above Subjects in detail, using the Henry II. to Edward I. 4. Magna Charta and its Confirmations. 5. Early History of the Houses of Parliament. 6. Early History of the Royal Councils and the Courts of Law. With his Private Class the Reader proposes to take the following subjects: 1. Broom's Constitutional Law, from the Banker's Case to the Case of the Seven Bishops, inclusive. 2. Hallam's Constitutional History, from the Meeting of the Long Parliament to the Revolution of 1688. EQUITY. The Reader on Equity proposes to deliver, during the ensuing Educational Term, Two Courses of each Public Lectures (there being Six Lectures in Course), on the following Subjects An Elementary Course. 1. On the Mode of taking Evidence in the Court of Chancery, and on the Hearing of a Cause. 2. On Relief in Equity against Waste. 3. On Relief against Penalties. An Advanced Course. 1. On Equitable Interference in Cases of Partnership (continued). 2. On the Equitable Presumption arising from a Step taken towards Performance of an Agreement. 3. On the Equitable Consequences of the Substantial Performance of an Agreement. 4. On the Equitable Doctrine of Satisfaction. In the Elementary Private Class, the subjects discussed will be-The Duties and Liabilities of Trustees; Trusts for the Benefit of Creditors. In the Advanced Private Class, the Lectures will comprehend-Relief against Mistake; Executory Trusts. THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, &c. The Reader on the Law of Real Property, &c., proposes to deliver, in the ensuing Educational Term, Twelve Public Lectures (there being Six Lectures in each Course) on the following Subjects:Elementary Course. following Books for reference : Elementary Class.-Broom's Commentaries on the Common Law (fourth edit.); and Selwyn's Nisi Prius (last edit.). Advanced Class.-Smith's Compendium of MerEvidence at Nisi Prius (last edit.). cantile Law (edition by Dowdeswell); and Roscoe's LAWS IN FORCE IN BRITISH INDIA. The Reader on Hindu and Mahommedan Law, and the Laws in force in British India, proposes to deliver, in the ensuing Educational Term, a Course of Six Public Lectures on the following subjects, viz. : With his Private Classes, he will discuss minutely and in detail the subjects embraced in the Public Lectures, illustrating them by works on Mahommedan Law. By Order of the Council, (Signed) EDWARD RYAN, Chairman, pro tem. Council Chamber, Lincoln's-inn, Dec. 21st, 1871. The Public Lectures on Constitutional Law and Legal History, at Lincoln's-inn Hall, on Wednes. days, 2 p.m.; the first lecture on the 17th Jan. The Private Classes on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays, at 10 a.m.; first class meets on the 18th Jan. The Public Lectures on Equity, at Lincoln's-inn Hall, on Thursdays (Elementary Lecture at 2 p.m.; Advanced Lecture at 3 p.m.); the first lecture on the 11th Jan. The Private Classes on Mondays, at 3.45 and 4.30 p.m.; Wednesdays and Fridays, at 3.15 and 4.15 p.m.; first class meets on the 12th Jan. The Public Lectures on the Law of Real ProOn the Mutual Rights of Husband and Wife as perty, &c., at Gray's-inn Hall, on Tuesdays Elementary Lecture at 2 p.m.; Advanced Lecto the Real and Personal Estate. 1 ture at 3 p.m.); the first lecture on the 16th Jan. The Private Classes on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, at 11.45 a.m. and 12.45 p.m.; first class meets on the 17th Jan. The Public Lectures on Jurisprudence, Civil, and International Law, at the Middle Temple Hall, on Fridays, at 2 p.m.; the first lecture on the 12th and Saturdays, at 3.45 p.m.; first class meets on Jan. The Private Classes on Tuesdays, Thursdays, the 13th Jan. The Public Lectures on the Common Law, at the Inner Temple Hall, on Mondays (Elementary Lecture at 2 p.m.; Advanced Lecture at 3 p.m.); the first lecture on 15th Jan. The Private Classes on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays, at 11.45 a.m., and 12.45 p.m.; first class meets on the 16th Jan. The Public Lectures on Hindu, Mahommedan Law, and the Laws of India, at the Middle Temple Hall, on Saturdays, at 10.45 a.m.; the first lecture on the 13th Jan. The Private Classes on Mondays, 15th Jan. Wednesdays, and Fridays, at 10 a.m.; first class, The Educational Term commences on the 11th The First Public Lecture of this Course will be Jan., and ends on the 30th March. delivered by the Reader on Equity, on Thursday, the 11th Jan. at 2 p.m. The first meeting of each private class will take place on the usual morning or evening of meeting Students who have been unable to attend a after the first public lecture on the same subject. lecture or class of either of the Readers, and desire dispensation as a qualification for call to the Bar, should make application, with an explanation of the delivery of the last public lecture of the the cause of such absence, in writing, to the Reader, during the course, or immediately after course; and the Reader's report thereon, together Council of Legal Education, who alone have the power of granting dispensation. with the application, will be forwarded to the The Council have resolved that in no case shall students be allowed to change from the elementary to the advanced courses of lectures and classes, or vice versa, while qualifying for call to the Bar, or for the examination on the subjects of the lectures and classes. GENTLEMEN WHO PASSED THE FINAL MICHAELMAS TERM 1871. Baker, Frederick Arnold. Bell, Herbert Booth. Boden, George Mosley. LL.B. Greaves, John Brook. Gwyther, Julian. Nalder, Geo. Bellamy. Rawson, Benjamin Curren. Ticehurst, Frederic. COUNTY COURTS. BIRKENHEAD COUNTY COURT. Tuesday, Dec. 19. (Before W. J. HARDEN, Esq., Judge.) COMPLIMENTS TO THE JUDGE. Anderson, as the senior advocate present in court, said it was his pleasing duty, on behalf of the Profession, of wishing his Honour the compliments of the season, or in common parlance, A merry Christmas and a happy New Year." During the last twelve months not a single cloud had passed over the horizon of the court. On the contrary, everything had been sunshine. It was the sincere wish of the legal gentlemen, as well as of the suitors, that his Honour might continue for many years to adjudicate in that court, as he hitherto had done, in an impartial, fair, and honourable manner. His HONOUR, in acknowledging the compliment, remarked that it was now nearly a quarter of a century since he began to preside over that court, and from first to last his duties had been a labour of love to him. The position he occupied was one which enabled a judge to do a great deal of good, if he acted with discretion and fairness; and he had always endeavoured to do his best to act up to the imaginary pattern of excellence which Mr. Anderson, in his compliments had attributed to him. His Honour then acknowledged the valuable assistance he had at all times received from the legal gentlemen who practised before him, and said that for years there had not been even an approximation to asperity exhibited in the court. He felt deeply indebted for the assistance he had obtained. With regard to the suitors, the moment the decision of the court was given they seemed to bow to it, and he never heard a word of disrespect from a disappointed suitor. He was not vain enough to think that his decisions were always right. He might make a number of mistakes, but they were leniently dealt with, and they managed to get on without anything unpleasant occurring. He reciprocated the good feeling which had been exhibited towards him by wishing them all "a merry Christmas and a happy new year." His Honour concluded by referring to the great services which were rendered to him by the officials of the court, whose conduct, he said, was beyond all praise. They were exceedingly fortunate in having such a staff of officials, and he wished all County Courts in the country were supplied with such an efficient staff of officers as they had in Birkenhead. (Applause.) BIRMINGHAM COUNTY COURT. (Before R. G. WELFORD, Esq., Judge.) BRADDELL V. HOWELL. The liability of common carriers. HIS HONOUR delivered judgment in this cause.The plaintiff sued the defendant, a common carrier, for the value of goods consigned to Belfast, which were lost at sea. That was the extent of the evidence adduced by the plaintiff. In order to prove the loss of the goods the plaintiff produced a letter from the defendant, dated 19th Aug. 1871, in which he said, referring to the goods from Mr. Riseker, "The package went down in Dec. 1868, in the ship which was lost, and called the Prince Alfred." This proved at once the loss of the package and the manner in which it was losti. e., by the ship having gone down. Now, it was clear that where a common carrier was prevented from fulfilling his contract by the perils of the sea or of navigation, that was an answer to an action for damages for a breach of his contract. Here, as the evidence stood, the breach of contract for which the plaintiff sued, was, according to his own evidence, caused by the peril of the sea, and the plaintiff could not recover. If the plaintiff thought he could prove negligence, he might have an adjournment for the purpose. Fitter, appeared for the plaintiff; and Fallows, in the absence of Rowlands, for the defendant. An adjournment was granted until the 28th Jan. WORTH V. HARPER. An auctioneer's liability. HIS HONOUR gave judgment in this cause. The plaintiff in this case sued the defendant, an auctioneer, for 91., paid to him for lot 15, described "in the catalogue as about five tons broken wheels," at a sale, at the Mill-street Ironworks, on the 7th Sept. last. Prior to the sale, certain conditions were read, of which the fourth, relied on by the defendant as a defence, was this: "The lots to be at the entire risk of the purchaser from the fall of the hammer, and to be removed with all faults and errors of description, by three o'clock on Saturday next, and no purchaser (under any pretence whatever) will be allowed to remove any fot until the whole amount of his or her respective purchases have been paid for." Before putting up the fifteenth lot, the defendant stated that that lot would be subject to the term that the SALISBURY COUNTY COURT. (Before T. E. P. LEFROY, Esq., Judge.) admitted liability. He did not think an actual payment necessary. A cause of action must be complete at the time of issuing a plaint, but he must rule that a liability to pay was quite sufficient to maintain an action. Supposing that a poor man, who had not the means of payment, had been damnified to a large amount. Would it be contended that he was deprived of the right of action, by reason of his not having paid the sum due ? Haines. He might give a promissory note or something else to make him liable. His HONOUR.- Unless you can show me an express authority, I shall hold that, under the circumstances, there is sufficient liability to maintain an action. I think your objection is not good in law. An acknowledged liability and a promise to pay are to my mind quite sufficient. Haines submitted that the company were merely acting as Goddard's agents in the matter; but this was disputed by Whatman, who pointed out that the beef was handed over to the company to be delivered by them. Haines said: With regard to the claim of 30s. for loss on rabbits and hares, his Honour would remember that there was a misquotation, or improper declaration on the part of Mr. Goddard. A hamper containing hares was declared by him as containing rabbits. Whatman submitted that there was no proof whatever of a misquotation on the part of Goddard. Mr. Wright, poulterer, handed him a package containing hares as well as rabbits, but did not acquaint him of the fact. Mr. Goddard declared the contents to be rabbits, and had no reason to suppose that the hamper contained anything else. Heines argued that it mattered not whether Mr. Goddard acted in ignorance or otherwise. He received the package without any declaration, and then took upon himself to declare that it contained rabbits. Under these circumstances he must be held responsible. A case was cited in support of this view, which, however, Whatman contended did not apply, and eventually His HONOUR said: In point of law, he did not think there was such a fraud on the part of Goddard as would render the contract a nullity, and release the company from their responsibility. It was an incorrect declaration, but not a false declaration within his knowledge. Haines.-It was a false declaration to his advantage. His HONOUR.-It cannot be false when he is not aware of the falsity. To prove a false declation, you must show that he knew it to be untrue at the time he made it. There may be a question whether the company may not still recover from him a higher rate of carriage. Whatman. Not on the ground that he comNon-de-mitted a fraud. Common carrier - Admitted liability - THIS case stood adjourned from the last court. Whatman appeared for the plaintiff, who is a Haines, the company's solicitor, conducted the defence. The first point raised was with reference to a quantity of beef consigned by Mr. Smith, butcher, of Salisbury, through the plaintiff, to Messrs. Bonser and Son, of London. It was stated at the last court that the meat was delivered to the Metropolitan Meat Market too late for market, in consequence of which Mr. Smith sustained a loss of 4l. 178. 6. That sum Mr. Goddard agreed to pay, but there being a running account between him and Mr. Smith, no money actually passed, and Mr. Haines argued that an admitted liability, without actual payment, was, not sufficient to maintain an action. The cause of action, it was contended, ought to have been complete at the time of issuing the plaint. On the other side it was argued by Whatman that an admitted | liability was sufficient, and that the grounds of action might be rendered complete at any time before the delivery of the verdict. His Honour took time to consider the point; and, on the case being called to-day, Whatman said it did not occur to him at the last court that the cause of action was the non-delivery of the goods and not the liability to pay. He might remark, however, that since the last court the plaintiff had actually paid Mr. Smith the 41. 17s. 6d. His HONOUR said, having looked into the question, he was inclined to think that the plaintiff could recover on an admitted liability. In an action for personal injury on a railway, a man might recover his surgeon's bill, which was an His HONOUR.-No. Whatman. But on the ground that something else besides rabbits was included in the hamper: His HONOUR.-Yes. George Oliver was called for the defence. He said he was a carman in the service of Mr. Barwick, who was employed by the South-Western Company to cart and deliver goods in London. He remembered twelve quarters of beef arriving from Salisbury on the 20th Oct. They were given to him at twenty minutes to seven in the morning, and he took them straight to the Metropolitan Market. It was very foggy, and it took fifty minutes to get to the market. He was in the market at 7.50, but the van was not wholly unloaded before 8.35. His HONOUR.-At what time did you deliver the meat at Bonser's premises? Witness: From ten to twenty minutes past eight, but I was in my place in the line of vans at the market at half-past seven. I went to Bonser's first and delivered the other goods afterwards. The meat was not wrapped up at all, and it was in very bad condition. It was wet and flabby. It was put on the cover of a hamper to carry it into the market. From the station it was carried on straw at the back of the van. It was not hanging up in the truck when it arrived at the station. His HONOUR.-Then it was in bad condition because it had been lying down in the truck? Witness: Yes. One of the legs was broken, and matter was oozing from it. The men at the market told me not to handle it; they said if I scratched my hands with the bone, it might poisou me. It was taken from the van by means of crooks. Cross-examined.-The Salisbury train was supposed to arrive about half-past four in the morning. On the morning in question it was not in before a quarter past six. He did not know that any goods were delivered from it in time for the market. He believed it was not so. Sparrow was not there at four o'clock; and it was half-past six when he left. Whatman.-If a witness has sworn that he saw five hampers of mutton which arrived by that JAN. 6, 1872.j train in the shop shortly after six, he has said that which is untrue?-Witness: It is wrong. Whatman.-What is the usual time for arriving at market?-Witness: Five o'clock. Whatman. You say the meat was not hanging up. Whose fault was that?-Witness: I don't know. I did not notice any hooks in the van. I have had to do with cattle, but am not a butcher, and am not acquainted with cattle disease. It is not usual for quarters of beef to be hung up. His HONOUR said the meat was evidently knocked about, and deteriorated in appearance by the defendants' improper treatment of it. Haines.-Will your Honour grant a case? His HONOUR.-You are entitled to it if the verdict is above 101. Whatman.-Without the money paid into court it will not be above 101. His HONOUR.-But it is a case standing on the records of the court as above 101. With regard to the value of the sheep, Whatman submitted that his client was entitled to recover the price that was current at the time in Salisbury. Mr. Day had sworn that he gave 10.1. a pound for joints all round, and that two days afterwards he gave 944. a pound for an entire carcase. His HONOUR said in the case of the rabbits, he did not think there was such a fraud as to vitiate the contract. With regard to the beef, he was of opinion that a delay of two hours was not a reasonable delivery. Every bye-law must itself be reasonable; and seeing how important it was to catch a market, he did not consider the delivery in question a reasonable one. badness of the meat he did not attach much importance to the casual observation of the men at As to the the market to the witness Oliver. As to the sheep, he thought the plaintiff was entitled to recover the full amount claimed. Haines.-Your Honour will allow me a case? His HONOUR.-Yes. You are entitled to it, but what are your grounds of appeal? Haines said he was satisfied with his Honour's finding in regard to the sheep. In the other cases, he should ground his appeal upon the fact that the plaintiff had no locus standi. His HONOUR.-I am not infallible by any means. I may be wrong; but I am pretty clear upon the subject. Haines said, then as to the question of costs. He considered himself entit ed to a fee for attending the last court, the plaintiff having taken advantage of the adjournment to introduce a lot Whatman.-No. Day and Goddard were both in the box. The adjournment was obtained at the instance of my friend, who insisted on having the of fresh evidence. man here who sold the hares and rabbits. A verdict was then entered for the plaintiff for 17. odd, and His HONOUR ordered each party to pay their own costs as regarded the first day. TUNBRIDGE WELLS COUNTY COURT. (Before J. J. LONSDALE, Esq., Judge.) Friendly society-Jurisdiction. THIS was a claim of 50. or an order to be reinstated as a member of the Southborough Friendly Society, of which the defendant is secretary. Biron (instructed by Palmer, of Tunbridge), appeared for the plaintiff. Thomas For Simpson appeared for the defen dant. Biron, in opening the case, explained that this matter came before the court on a former occasion, and up to a certain point it had been discassed; but some cases had been discovered in which it seemed doubtful whether his Honour had jurisdiction. That was Mr. Simpson's contention. Now he (Mr. Biron) submitted that his friend was not in a position to raise any objection as to his Honour's jurisdiction, because if his Honour would refer to the plaint which had been entered, and the 41st section of the Friendly Societies Act, he would find that the plaint was to the effect that the plaintiff, being a member of the Southborough Friendly Society, was, on the 29th May last, illegally expelled therefrom, and he now sought for an order to be reinstated as a member of the said society, or, in default, that the society should pay to him the sum of 50l. Therefore, that plaint was founded in tort-it complained of illegal expulsion, and that being the case he must first of all refer his Honour to the 39th section of the 19 & 20 Vict. c. 108. His HONOUR, after reading and considering this section, was of opinion that it referred not to jurisdiction simply, but to the case being tried at all in a County Court. Biron said he would now come to the main question, and referred his Honour to the case of Denton and Marshall (32 L. J., N.S., 89, Ex.); to the 41st section of the Friendly Societies Act; and to the twenty-fourth rule of the Southborough Friendly Society; and contended that the true THE LAW TIMES. interpretation of these was, that under the cir- Simpson argued that in the case of Denton and BANKRUPTCY LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. BANKRUPTCY ACT 1869, ss. 23, 31-LANDLORD TRUSTEE-INJURY INFLICTED BY DISCLAIMER BIRKENHEAD COUNTY COURT. (Before J. W. HARDEN, Esq., Judge.) Bankruptcy-Costs of abortive petition for liqui- Wheeler, instructed by Simpson and North, The debt not! The bankrunt, on the 14th March last. was served summons. 125th and 126th sections of the Bankruptcy Act 1869. The creditors' meeting was fixed for the 10th April; but, no resolutions being passed, that meeting was abortive, and the proceedings under the liquidation fell to the ground. Messrs. Evans and Lockett were the bankrupt's solicitors in this matter, and Mr. Wason now applied that their 'costs should be paid out of the estate of the bankrupt. They had been taxed by the registrar at 17. 18s. 4d. 101. had been paid Messrs. Evans and mencement of the proceedings. Lockett by bankrupt's mother-in-law at the com com Wason cited rule 292, which provides "where bankruptcy occurs pending proceedings for or towards liquidation by arrangement or position with creditors, the proper costs incurred in relation to such proceedings shall be paid by the trustee under the bankruptcy out of the debtor's estate, unless the court shall otherwise order," and sect. 11 of the Act, which defined the commencement of the bankruptcy, in support of his argument. Wheeler contended that, as the costs of the summons and of the petition had already been solicitor in the matter of the trader - debtor paid out of the estate, to burden the estate with another set of costs would be a hardship; and though the question was one entirely in the discretion of the court, he urged the judge should not, in fairness to the creditors, allow the bankrupt's solicitors the costs they asked. He further urged that the language under rule 292 of "pending proceedings" could not assist abortive and were dead, and were not the act the applicants, for those proceedings had been He produced a report of a decision of of bankruptcy on which the adjudication was made. Mr. Daniel, County Court judge of Burnley, who had allowed costs to the solicitors in liquidation, where bankruptcy had followed the petition, and which had been allowed by that judge under the rule named. He, however, differed from that judge in his conclusions, and stated the point was entirely new, and one on which no decision had as yet been made. His Honour reserved his decision. Dec. 23-His HONOUR said this was an applian abortive petition for liquidation which was not cation for the costs out of the bankrupt's estate of presented until after the insolvent had been served with a debtor s summons which terminated in bankruptcy. It was admitted that the granting or discretion means something more than arbitrary refusing costs is entirely in the discretion of the court, but I was properly reminded that "judicial will and pleasure, and ought to be exercised upon an encouragement to parties who find themselves some well-considered principle. I read rule 292 as in failing circumstances to anticipate any hostile movement of creditors, by proposing to pay them all pro reta as large a composition as the estate will admit of; for, even though the petition for that in such a case, and as a general rule, the liquidation may be fruitless, it is plainly intimative costs ought to be allowed out of the estate; whereas if it be a mere expriment to eva le the consequences of steps already taken by creditors, and if it is not successful, the costs, in the absence of something exceptional, would not as a general rule be allowed. Such would be my mode of dealing with this application if it were not that on reference to the file of proceedings, I find that there are exceptional circumstances which for a portion, at all events, of the costs of the [attempted liquidation, would seem to me to stop the creditors from objecting. solicitors who now represent the trustee and client's debt; it does not appear that they obobject to the allowance, issued the debtor's summons, with a view probably of securing their jected to the proposed proceedings by liquidation instead of bankruptcy. Their acquiescence may be inferred from the fact that they consented to the proceedings being twice adjourned. How much these adjournments increased the costs I do not know, but they must have added something; and as the taxed costs of the proposed The taxed costs will disposed to dissect the bill. liquidation amount only to 17. 18s. 4., be allowed, but I cannot blame the trustee for obsay nothing about the costs of this application. jecting to pay them without an order, and I shall The same DERBY COUNTY COURT. (Before G. RUSSELL, Esq., Judge.) Re MARTIN. am not Debtors' Act. Application for a criminal prosecution under the THIS case was adjourned for the personal appearance of Mr. Martin. It was an application by the secution of the debtor, under the provisions of the trustee, Mr. T. H. Harrison, for the criminal proDebtors' Act, 1869, for not disclosing in his acproperty of the value of 101. and upwards. counts the true state of his affairs, and for hiding Hertall appeared for the trustee, and Briggs for Mr. Martin. Charles Martin filed his petition under the Liquidation Clauses of the Bankruptcy Act 1869, and made a statement of his accounts, in which he swore that he had no property whatever in hand. The meeting of creditors was held at the office of Mr. Briggs on Nov. 14. When examined by Mr. Leech, Martin disclosed that he had only 601. in the world, and that he could not get it under three days, as it was 300 miles away from Derby. This upon his oath he again and again asserted, but it was intimated to Mr. Harrison while in the meeting that the money was hidden away in the house of Martin, and he accordingly went off with Mr. Coulson and Mr. Gell to the house; they demanded of Mrs. Martin the money which they said was there somewhere, and, after a few minutes' quibbling, Mrs. Martin got a candle and took Mr. Harrison into the cellar, and there, under a heap of coals, wrapped up in a canvas bag, in its turn enclosed in a piece of lead, he discovered 821. On the following day a further search was made in the house, where under a quantity of coals, a number of valuable books were found, which, from their damp state, had evidently been hidden away for some time. It was also subsequently found that part of the property which had been taken possession of by Mr. Harrison, and included in the inventory which he made of the debtor's effects, had been removed to five different houses in the neighbourhood. Upon this the committee of inspection instructed Mr. Harrison, the trustree of Martin's estate, to apply to the Judge for an order to prosecute. His HONOUR, after hearing Mr. Briggs on the part of Martin, and Mr. Hextall, on the part of the trustee, said it was admitted unhesitatingly, that the debtor had concealed his property, and had committed a fraudulent act. For Martin it was contended that his intention in doing so was not to defraud his creditors, but he could only judge of the fact itself and whether it was a case in which it was reasonable to believe a jury would convict. He certainly did so consider it, and he should therefore order the trustee to prosecute Charles Martin under sub-sect. 4 of the Fraudulent Debtors Act. HUDDERSFIELD BANKRUPTCY COURT. between the trustee and Wilde and Sykes were settled, and nothing remained but for the trustee, on the part of the bankrupt mortgagor, to give up possession of the mortgaged property. At the end of May the mortgagees applied to the court for an order compelling the trustee to give up the key of the premises, which had been withheld. Upon this, Cotton applied to the court for an order for further particulars, which order was dismissed, and he was condemned in the costs of the application. It is admitted that Cotton acted under the direction of the committee of inspection and their solicitor, and that all the steps were taken by their instruction and with their assent. At this time the costs incurred and which form the subject of the present inquiry, were 131. 1s. 6d. in the case of Drake, and 341. 10s. in that of Wilde and Sykes; no question, however, arises upon Drake's costs, which have been since paid. To defray these sums Cotton had at that time only 17. in hand. A change of solicitor took place at this period, Mr. Barker being appointed to act for the trustee in lieu of Mr. Mosley. An execution was issued against the goods of Cotton by Milnes, the solicitor of Wilde and Sykes, for their costs, and there being some difficulty in the way of a levy, the court was applied to for a committal, but by consent the question of liability was gone into, and the learned judge, Mr. Stansfeld, on that occasion, held that the trustee was personally liable for those costs. An affidavit before the court, made by Cotton, states that he has now only 11. 7s. of the bankrupt's estate in hand, while the execution issued for the recovery of the costs due to the execution creditors-Wilde and Sykes-arising from the various orders amounts to 24t. 15s. 2d. It appears from the counter affidavit made by Wilde and Sykes, that on examining the accounts it was found that 401. had been paid by Cotton to Mosley on account of an unascertained bill of costs. It was urged in argument by Mr. Barker, on behalf of the trustee, that acting in a representative capacity, and under the directions of the Committee of Inspection, that he was not personally liable. That in the various applications made by Cotton in this case to the court, it was not in a hostile spirit, and that in all he did he was acting under the instruction and advice of the solicitor, Mr. Mosley, and the Committee of Inspection. The court's attention was called by Mr. Cottingham on the other side to the fact that independentThe representative character of a trustee in bankly, as he contended, of the trustee being personally ruptcy does not exempt him from being liable liable for costs as between himself and third parties personally to pay costs. whom he had brought into court in invitum, that there had been laches on his part in dealing with the bankrupt's property, and that by paying 401. to the solicitor to the bankruptcy upon an account upon'un taxed bill of costs, he could be heard to say that he has no estate, such statement being in contravention of the General Rule 114 in Bankruptcy, which states "that a trustee shall not be allowed in his accounts any sum paid by him to his attorney for his bill of costs unless the same shall have been duly taxed." Upon this state of facts, I am called upon to say whether the trustee is liable personally for the costs incurred in these proceedings, and after considering the authorities cited in the arguments addressed to me, I have arrived at the conclusion that there is no special right in a trustee in bankruptcy as between himself and a third person such person not standing in the relation of cestui que trust that exempts him from personal liability to pay costs in any legal proceeding in which he is unsuccessful. And that as between strangers and the trustee, he is on no better footing than an ordinary plaintiff or defendaut, for the circumstances of the trust cannot be allowed to affect the interests of a third person. "The transmutation to a trustee being the same in its consequences as the transmutation of a possession without a trust, it conveys to the trustee the legal burthens, and it invests the trustee with the legal privileges": (Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Eden 251), per Lord Northington and in the case of a sale of lands, the trustee, like any ordinary vendor is bound to make the purchaser a good title. If the sale be unconditional, and the title prove bad, the purchaser in a suit for specific performance would be allowed his costs against the trustee (Coop, 40), though the trustee, where his conduct was excusable, might charge them upon the trust estate under the head of expenses: (Lewin on Trusts, 4th edit. 299; Hill v. Magan, 2 Moll. Ir. Ch. R. 460; Elseg v. Lutyens, 8 Hare, 164.) Under the 20th, 22nd, and 25th sections of the Bankruptcy Act 1869, the trustee acquires, for the purposes of the trust, the complete possession of the bankrupt's estate, with power to deal with it as if he were the absolute owner, and is clothed with the fullest powers" to bring or defend any action, suit, or other legal proceeding relating to it." It may be observed that the statute contains provisions which gives the court and the creditors for whom he acts the means of stringent control in cases in which his dealings with the property is inconsistent with the faithful and honest discharge of his duty; but for all the purposes of suing and being sued he alone is the person who can be plaintiff or de In this case, which had been several times before the court, Barker (solicitor), appeared for the trustee. Cottingham (barrister), for the mortgage credi tors. The substance of the facts and arguments will be found set forth in the following judgment. His HONOUR.-In this case I am asked to stay proceedings in an execution issued against Mr. Cotton, the trustee, in this case, for costs alleged to be due to Messrs. Wilde and Sykes, calling upon the trustee personally to pay the costs arising out of an unsuccessful application to the court, made against the mortgagees of a part of the bankrupt's property. The facts, shortly stated, were that the adjudication took place on the 11th Feb. 1871, and on the 27th Cotton was appointed the trustee with a remuneration fixed at 5 per cent. On inquiry it was found that the bankrupt had mortgaged a part of his property to Messrs. Wilde and Sykes, and that he had also further charged the property with a second mortgage to his father-in-law, Zachariah Drake. On the 17th March the first mortgagee applied to the court, stating that the time for paying the mortgage. money had expired, and that the property would be advertised for sale. On the same day, the 17th March, Cotton applied to the court to restrain the sale, and an order was made to that effect. On the 13th April he again applied to the court, requiring the attendance of the first and second mortgagees, for the purpose of inquiry. After witnesses had been examined, the further hearing was adjourned to the 28th April, but in the meantime Cotton did not feel in a position to proceed, and the registrar on that date made an order that due notice should be given that all further inquiries as to the mortgagees were abandoned. At this time the committee of inspection had appointed Mr. Mosley their solicitor. On the 29th April, Cotton applied for an order compelling White and Sykes, the first mortgagees, to give up their mortgage deed on being paid the sum due upon it. The application was dismissed, and it was ordered that the trustee pay to Wilde and Sykes the costs incident to the application. On the 5th May the court further ordered that, as the order of the 17th March was still subsisting, such order should be discharged, but that the question of costs should be adjourned until the 10th of that month. On the hearing it was ordered that the costs of the orders of the 17th March and the 5th May be paid by the mortgagees Wilde and Sykes. Up to this date, therefore, all questions as to costs : fendant. Before bringing an action, therefore, or defending a suit, or entering into any other legal proceeding, it is incumbent upon him, for his own protection, to satisfy himself that he has assets in his hands to meet the emergency of defeat, and in all cases when in proceedings in which he anticipates that his costs may be disallowed, it is his duty to make a reservation out of the assets to meet them: (Williams v. Nixon, 2 Beav. 477.) I find decisions under the former Bankruptcy Acts in which official assignees have been thus made personally liable to costs. I Sydney v. Belcher (2 Moo. & Rob. 324) the official assignee was held personally liable to the costs of defending an action brought against him, and the creditors' assignee, he having joined in retaining the attorney, and where an official assignee was included in an order for the payment of costs, such order might be enforced against him alone: (Ex parte Murray, re Smith, 1 Mon. & Ayr. 475.) This principle of making a party standing in the position of a trustee personally liable has received the fullest conȧrmation in the case of Beavan v. Whitmore (15 C. B., N. S., 433; 19 C. B., N. S., 783, Ex. Ch.) There an official assignee of a district court of bankruptcy, having given his assent to the bringing of an action in his name, jointly with that of the trade assignee, for the recovery of part of the bankrupt's estate, and the action proving unsuccessful, the trade assignee, having paid the costs, was held entitled to sue the official assignee for contribution. So also it has been held that assignees who were brought before the court by a supplemental bill, might be made liable to the costs of the whole suit when they improperly resisted the plaintiff's demand. Whit comb v. Minchin, 5 Madd. 91, and the assignees of a bankrupt in Re Peers 21, Beav. 520, were held personally liable for the cost of taxation of a bill of costs delivered by them where more than onesixth was taken off. In all cases in which the trustee is acting honestly and within his powers in instituting legal proceedings for the benefit of the estate, his relief for being made personally liable will be found in such estate recouping him for the sum or sums which he has been made to pay, or has advanced for that purpose, or if there is no fund in hand for such a purpose, in his obtaining an indemnity from the creditors. The Bankruptcy Act, 1869, s. 13, contains, for the protection of the trustee, large powers enabling him to apply to the court after the presentation of a petition against the debtor to restrain further proceedings in any pending action, suit, execution, or other legal process against the debtor, or the court may allow such proceedings, whether in progress at the commencement of the bankruptcy or commenced during its continuance, to proceed upon such terms as it shall think just. The trustee also, under sect. 26, has the fullest power, with the consent of the court, of disclaiming all land burdened with onerous covenants, unmarketable shares, unprofitable contracts, or of any unsaleable property; in fact all those dealings by the bankrupt with property, which is burdened with obligations likely to lead to extensive and uncertain litigation. It was very much urged upon my attention by Mr. Barker, in the course of his able argument for Mr. Cotton, that there was a close analogy between the case of an executor and a trustee in bankruptcy; and that an executor, but for the statute which gives them, was, on account of his representative character, never liable for costs; but I am of opinion that it is a partial analogy only. Before the statute 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, executors and administrators were not liable to costs when a nonsuit or a verdict went against them in cases where the action was brought upon a contract entered into by the testator or intestate, or for a wrong done in his lifetime-Jones v. Williams (6 M. & S. 178); Barnard v. Higdon (3 B. & Ald. 213), and the reason was said to be that the 23 Hen. 8, c. 15, s. 1, by which costs were first given to defendants, was confined to wrongs done to and contracts made with the plaintiffs. But before the former statute it was held that where an executor or adminis. trator had knowingly brought a wrong action against, or otherwise being guilty of, a wilful default, he should pay costs upon a discontinuance: (Harris v. Jones, 1 W. Bl. 451, Tidd 979, 9th edit.). He is liable also independently of the statute upon judgment of non pros: (2 C. & M. 403). So executors or administrators have always been held liable to costs upon interlocutory proceedings: (Tidd, 979, 9th edit.) It appears to me also, that after the order in this case, made on the 10th May, when the contested matters between the trustees and the mortgagees had been finally settled, and no claim for costs existed on either side, and nothing remained to be done but to give up such possession of the property as the trustee representing the bankrupt mortgagor had, that the subsequent proceedings by which the mortga gees were compelled to apply to the Court were ill advised, and came within the case of Harris v. Jones, just cited, in which it was held that an executor was, before the passing of the 4 Will. 4, c. 42, |