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The best plan was to bring the occupiers of those ninety-five houses forward, and throw the responsibility of the conviction upon the Bench. With respect to Mr. Gladstone's selfdenying course which he had proposed to adopt, what he (Mr. Stitt) was anxious about was this. He understood that there should be no suppression of the names or numbers brought to Bridewell on the Saturday. The extent of drunkenness in Liverpool had been unfavourably contrasted with other towns. For instance, while Liverpool had 14,000 persons taken up in a year, the magistrates pointed out instances where only 3000 or 4000 such convictions were recorded. On examination it turned out that persons were taken to the Bridewell, incarcerated in the cells, and dismissed from these cells by the head constable or some others,no record of their having been there appearing. The rule was that wherever a man was incarcerated, a record was kept of the fact, and the result was those cases swelled the statistics. Mr. Gladstone's wish was that due publicity should be given to the numbers discharged, so that they would see the real extent of the evil, and when they knew the facts, they could the better deal with it.

Mr. Raffles said, as he read the Prevention of Crime Act 1867, the slightest remaining on the premises by thieves subjected the parties to conviction.

Mr. Whitty said either these ninety-five houses were culpable or not. If they were merely serving people who were entitled to refreshments, no blame could attach to them. If, on the other hand, they should be permitting persons to remain for improper purposes, the police ought to use increased vigilance in bringing them before the Bench. If they had been doing no wrong. it was wrong to have them gibbeted in the police reports; but if, on the other hand, they violated the law, it was quite right to throw the responsibility of dealing with them upon the magistrates. He thought Mr. Gladstone's a good suggestion, and he had no doubt his example would be followed.

Mr. Raffles said he had noticed in the London papers two or three convictions under the Act he had mentioned, where thieves had met together

for the purpose of getting a sum of money up for another thief. Mr. Clint said if the police brought up a pretty good case against one of the houses and that case was dismissed by the magistrates, or if conviction by the magistrates was followed by the case being quashed in the court above, the police were very much discouraged in bringing up another house. They were not going to waste their time uselessly and then be snubbed.

Mr. Raffles said there could be no question that the magistrates were bound to act upon the evidence before them to convict. With regard to cases before the Superior Court additional evidence might be given which might alter the case. It did not follow that because the recorder quashed a case he thought the magistrates wrong. All he said was that the evidence was such that it did not convict.

sessions to the clerk of the peace. If any difficulty arose, the taxing officer always had the opportunity of consulting the presiding judge, who had the power of allowing or disallowing any item in a bill of costs. The bill, having thus been taxed by the competent officer of the court, was presented to the county and borough treasurer, who paid the amount-and should in due course be recouped by the Treasury. But for a long time past the practice of the Treasury had been this:After these bills had been carefully taxed according to the scale laid down by the Treasury itself, and the money had been paid by the county or borough treasurer, a subordinate officer in the Treasury had been in the habit of reviewing or retaxing the bills, and striking off items according to his will or caprice. The effect of that had been that the sums were disallowed by the Treasury, and had to be paid out of the county or borough rates. So that, in point of fact, a subordinate in the Treasury had arrogated to himself the power of reviewing costs that had been taxed by the proper officer of the court on the Treasury scalehe had, in fact, assumed a power which Parlia ment alone possessed, the power to tax the rate. payers of the country; because to the extent to which he disallowed these costs he was, in reality, taxing the ratepayers. He need hardly say that this was a most undesirable and improper state of things. He used those terms with considerable confidence, because the question had been brought before the Lord Chief Justice within Mr. Gladstone said he had been promised by one the last few weeks, and he had used these words: newspaper to put the names before the public, and-"It seems to me that the acts of parties who no doubt other newspapers would follow in the act under the authority of Acts of Parliament are set aside by persons who have no authority at all to interfere in the matter. It really appears to me to be a very serious matter." After such expressions as these from the Chief Justice of England, it was quite unnecessary for him to use any words describing his opinion of the proceedings of the Treasury. He had hoped that the matter would be dealt with very shortly.

Mr. Clint said he thought Mr. Gladstone's suggestion a very good one, and should be glad to take part with any number of magistrates who undertook the duty Mr. Gladstone indicated. Mr. Castellain thought it would have a good effect if the names of the drunkards were published. If a man did get drunk on a Saturday afternoon, or Sunday, he ought to remain in the place until Monday morning unless he was ill.

Mr. Whitty thought if the names of the people locked up on the Sunday were published, those locked up during the week should be published also.

same way.

Mr. Whitty, in reference to the disorderly houses, said the very fact that the police were going to take more stringent measures showed that sufficient vigilance had not been used before. Mr. Holder thought Mr. Gladstone's suggestion might or might not be a good one.

Mr. Livingston said he should be very happy to follow Mr. Gladstone in the course he proposed to pursue.

The meeting then terminated, there being no other business.

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AT the Dartford petty sessions on Saturday last several cases were heard in which a question of jurisdiction was raised of considerable importance to justices having jurisdiction in the home counties. The offences were under the Metropolitan Police Act 1839 (2 & 3 Vict. c. 47), and were committed within the metropolitan police district, but not within any part of such district assigned to any metropolitan police court.

Gibson (Dartford), for the defence.-The justices have no jurisdiction here. In summary convic tions as well as in matters to be done at special and petty sessions, their jurisdiction is wholly given to justices by statute: (Paley, 4th edit. p. 15.) The offences charged are punishable under 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, and sect. 75 of that Act defined magistrate "to mean and include every justice of the peace appointed to be a magistrate of the police courts of the metropolis," the latter part of the section which included county justices in the definition was repealed by 3 & 4 Vict. c. 84, s. 1. The power to convict given by 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, s. 76, was confined exclusively to magistrates as defined by sect. 75 of the same Act. Moreover 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, s. 18, rendered void any summons issued by a justice of Kent, "requiring any person residing within the Metropolitan Police District, to appear at any place without the said district to answer any information or complaint touching any matter arising within the said district. 21 & 22 Vict. c. 73, s. 6, provided that 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, s. 18, should not apply to "any such summons or warrant in respect of any matter arising within any part of the

Statutory. 10 days 14 days Statutory..

J. Walker.
F. W. Jones.
W. S. Smith.
T. G. Archer.
H. Salwey.

G. S. Butler.
J. J. P. Mody.
R. Ransom.
W. Winterbotham

said district not assigned for the time being to any of the police courts of the metropolis," but the power thereby restored was simply a power to summon, and not a power to convict. 3 & 4 of the peace having jurisdiction within the MetroVict. c. 84, s. 6, enacted That any two justices politan Police District shall have, while sitting publicly in the court or room used for holding special or petty sessions of the peace in any part of the said district within the limits of their commission, except in the divisions to be assigned to the police courts already established, all the powers, privileges, and duties which any one magistrate of the said police courts has," but in order for the justices to have jurisdiction under that section, their sessions must be holden within the Metropolitan Police District. It followed, therefore, that the justices might summon a person to appear without the district, but they could not hear and adjudicate upon the complaint. An inspector of police said the police magistrate at Woolwich refused to try offenders unless they were actually in custody.

The JUSTICES after deliberation decided that they had no jurisdiction, dismissed the cases, and arrangements were made for a case to be granted for the Queen's Bench,

THE TREASURY DISALLOWANCE OF PROSECUTION COSTS.-The Recorder of Exeter on Monday, upon the subject of the disallowance by the in his charge to the grand jury, spoke at lengthi Treasury of the costs incurred in criminal prosecutions at the assizes and quarter sessions. Some years since (the Recorder observed) the Legislature enacted that all costs incurred in such prosecutions should be paid by the Treasury. The mode of proceeding had been this: The bill of costs was always presented for taxation to the competent officer of the court-at assizes to the clerk of assize, and at county and borough quarter

FEES IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS.-At the Bucks Quarter Sessions on Monday, his Grace the Duke of Buckingham in the chair, the above question, which is causing in a great many counties a feeling of great dissatisfaction, was brought before the court. The justices of Warwickshire have sent round to the different counties of England a circular suggesting the advisability of combined action against the Treasury owing to the apparent unjust disallowance of items previ ously allowed by taxing masters at assizes and quarter sessions for expenses, counsel's fees, &c., in criminal prosecutions. His Grace the Duke of Buckingham read an extract from a report of a case The Justices of Lancashire v. The Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, in which Cockburn, C.J. expressed a very decided opinion against these reductions by the Treasury, his language being, "that he could not himself underderstand how a person sitting somewhere upstairs in the Treasury could take upon himself to disallow certain items, previously allowed by persons on the spot, competent to know all the circumstances of the case.' On the motion of the Duke of Buckingham a committee was formed, to confer with the committee appointed in Warwickshire, to consider the subject.

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COMPANY LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. AGREEMENT FOR PURCHASE OF LAND-NOTICE into in Sept. 1863 between the owners of certain TO TREAT-WAIVER.-By an agreement entered lands and a railway company, under which the company purchased a certain portion of land, it any additional ground for any purpose they should was agreed that if the company should require pay for the same at a fixed rate. In May 1865 the company served the owners of the lands in ques tion, with a notice to treat under the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, for the purchase of more land from them. Two years afterwards the company entered into possession of the lands: Held, that the notice to treat had superseded the agreement, and that the value of the lands must be ascertained according to the provisions of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act: (Kemp v. The South-Eastern Railway Company, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 622. V.C. B.)

TRANSFER OF SHARES BANKRUPTCY OF TRANSFEREE.-LIABILITY FOR CALLS.-A trans. feror of shares in a company in liquidation, who, by the default of the transferee to register the tories, and compelled to pay calls, filed a bill transfer, had been placed on the list of contribuagainst the administrator of the transferee, who had since died, seeking to be indemnified against the calls. To this bill the defendant pleaded a deed of inspectorship executed by the transferee three months after the order for winding-up the company: Held, that the plaintiff had no right of proof under the deed, and that it could not be pleaded as a bar to his claim. (Holmes v. Symons, 25 L. Rep. N.S. 628. V. C. W.)

JAN. 6, 1872.1

MERCANTILE LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. SPECIFIC CHATTEL-SALE ON CONDITION WARRANTY. The plaintiff purchased, at the defendants' horse auction, a mare warranted to have been hunted with specified packs of hounds; and by the conditions of sale the animal, if not answering the warranty, was to be returned before the expiration of a specified time. After the purchase and payment of the price, but before removing the mare from the defendants' premises, the plaintiff was told by some persons in the sale yard that the mare had not been hunted with the parti cular hounds named, but he, nevertheless, without making any inquiry of the defendants in the matter, sent his groom to take her away, and whilst the groom was riding her from the defendants' to the plaintiff's stables the mare, without any negli gence or default on the part of the groom, but from her own inherent disposition, became restive and ran away, and, coming in contact with a carriage in the street, received serious injury. Having ascertained that the warranty was untrue, the plaintiff returned her to the defendants within the time limited by the conditions, and brought an action to recover back the purchase money. It was admitted by the defendants that the mare did not answer the warranty in fact: Held, by the Court of Exchequer (Kelly, C.B., and Bramwell and Cleasby, BB.), and that the mare having been bought on a special contract giving power to the purchaser to return her within a specified time, if not answering the warranty, which it was admitted she did not, the right to return her was not affected by the gossip of the sale yard, which amounted to nothing; and that as the injury to the mare occurred not from any negligence or default on the part of the plaintiff or his groom, but from an accident beyond their control, and owing to the inherent vice of the animal itself, the plaintiff was entitled to return her, although she was not in the same condition as at the time of sale: (Head v. Tattersall and another, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 631. Ex.)

LAW STUDENTS' JOURNAL

HILARY EDUCATIONAL TERM, 1872. PROSPECTUS of the LECTURES to be delivered, during the ensuing Educational Term, by the several Readers appointed by the Inns of Court.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND LEGAL HISTORY. The Reader on Constitutional Law and Legal History proposes to deliver, during the ensuing Educational Term, Six Public Lectures on1. Constitutional and Legal History before the Conquest.

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In the Elementary Private Classes, the Reader will continue his Course of Real Property Law, using the work of Mr. Joshua Williams as a Textbook; and in his Advanced Private Classes, he will take the Construction of Wills as the subject for discussion, using Mr. Hawkins's Treatise as

the Text-Book.

JURISPRUDENCE, CIVIL AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW.

The Reader on Jurisprudence, Civil and Inter.
national Law, proposes to deliver, during the
ensuing Educational Term, Six Public Lectures

on

1. The Roman Law relating to Obligations aris-
ing from Contract, contrasted with the French
and English Law on the same head.

(1.) The Contract of Sale (emptio venditio).
(2.) The Contract of Letting on Hire (locatio
conductio).

2. The History and Present State of Inter-
national Law relating to Blockade.

In his Private Class, the Reader will continue the discussion of the First Book of the Institutes of Justinian, commencing with Title 8. He will use as Text-books, Sandars' edition of the Institutes, Demangeat, Cours élémentaire de Droit Romain, and Scheurl, Lehrbuch der Institutionen. The Reader will also discuss, in the Private Classes, points of International Law relating to the Rights of Neutrals, using Wheaton's Elements of International Law as the Text-book, and referring to the works of the principal modern Jurists, the decisions of the Admiralty and Prize Courts of England and America, the Debates in Parliament, and State Papers relating to the cases

under discussion.

The Reader will also specially discuss the Congress of Vienna, the Treaties of Paris, and the subsequent alterations of those Treaties.

COMMON LAW.

The Reader on Common Law proposes to deliver, during the ensuing Educational Term, Two Courses (of Six Public Lectures each) on the following Subjects

-

Elementary Course.

1. Simple Contracts, Express or Implied. 2. The Contract of Bailment.

3. Proofs adduced and Rules of Evidence applied Advanced Course. in Actions upon Contracts not under Seal.

1. Mercantile Contracts-Written or Verbal of ordinary occurrence.

2. Torts affecting Mercantile Persons or Property.

3. Rules of Evidence applicable and Proofs admissible at the Trial of an Action between Mer. cantile Persons.

With his Private Classes, the Read r will con

2. Changes consequent on the Conquest. 3. Constitutional and Legal History from sider the above Subjects in detail, using the Henry II. to Edward I.

4. Magna Charta and its Confirmations. 5. Early History of the Houses of Parliament. 6. Early History of the Royal Councils and the Courts of Law.

With his Private Class the Reader proposes to take the following subjects:

1. Broom's Constitutional Law, from the Banker's Case to the Case of the Seven Bishops, inclusive.

2. Hallam's Constitutional History, from the Meeting of the Long Parliament to the Revolution of 1688.

EQUITY.

The Reader on Equity proposes to deliver, during the ensuing Educational Term, Two Courses of each Public Lectures (there being Six Lectures in Course), on the following Subjects

An Elementary Course.

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1. On the Mode of taking Evidence in the Court of Chancery, and on the Hearing of a Cause. 2. On Relief in Equity against Waste. 3. On Relief against Penalties.

An Advanced Course.

1. On Equitable Interference in Cases of Partnership (continued).

2. On the Equitable Presumption arising from a Step taken towards Performance of an Agreement. 3. On the Equitable Consequences of the Substantial Performance of an Agreement.

4. On the Equitable Doctrine of Satisfaction. In the Elementary Private Class, the subjects discussed will be-The Duties and Liabilities of Trustees; Trusts for the Benefit of Creditors. In the Advanced Private Class, the Lectures will comprehend-Relief against Mistake; Executory

Trusts.

THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, &c. The Reader on the Law of Real Property, &c., proposes to deliver, in the ensuing Educational Term, Twelve Public Lectures (there being Six Lectures in each Course) on the following Subjects:

Elementary Course.

following Books for reference :

Elementary Class.-Broom's Commentaries on the Common Law (fourth edit.); and Selwyn's Nisi Prius (last edit.).

Advanced Class.-Smith's Compendium of Mercantile Law (edition by Dowdeswell); and Roscoe's Evidence at Nisi Prius (last edit.).

LAWS IN FORCE IN BRITISH INDIA.

The Reader on Hindu and Mahommedan Law, and the Laws in force in British India, proposes to deliver, in the ensuing Educational Term, a Course of Six Public Lectures on the following subjects, viz. :

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With his Private Classes, he will discuss minutely and in detail the subjects embraced in the Public Lectures, illustrating them by works on Mahommedan Law.

By Order of the Council,
EDWARD RYAN,
(Signed)
Chairman, pro tem.
Council Chamber, Lincoln's-inn,
Dec. 21st, 1871.

The Public Lectures on Constitutional Law and Legal History, at Lincoln's-inn Hall, on Wednes. days, 2 p.m.; the first lecture on the 17th Jan. The Private Classes on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays, at 10 a.m.; first class meets on the 18th Jan.

The Public Lectures on Equity, at Lincoln's-inn Hall, on Thursdays (Elementary Lecture at 2 p.m.; Advanced Lecture at 3 p.m.); the first lecture on the 11th Jan. The Private Classes on Mondays, at 3.45 and 4.30 p.m.; Wednesdays and Fridays, at 3.15 and 4.15 p.m.; first class meets on the

12th Jan.

The Public Lectures on the Law of Real ProOn the Mutual Rights of Husband and Wife as perty, &c., at Gray's-inn Hall, on Tuesdays Elementary Lecture at 2 p.m.; Advanced Lecto the Real and Personal Estate.

ture at 3 p.m.); the first lecture on the 16th Jan. The Private Classes on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, at 11.45 a.m. and 12.45 p.m.; first class meets on the 17th Jan.

The Public Lectures on Jurisprudence, Civil, and International Law, at the Middle Temple Hall, on Jan. The Private Classes on Tuesdays, Thursdays, Fridays, at 2 p.m.; the first lecture on the 12th and Saturdays, at 3.45 p.m.; first class meets on the 13th Jan.

The Public Lectures on the Common Law, at the Inner Temple Hall, on Mondays (Elementary Lecture at 2 p.m.; Advanced Lecture at 3 p.m.); the first lecture on 15th Jan. The Private Classes on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays, at 11.45 a.m., and 12.45 p.m.; first class meets on the 16th Jan.

The Public Lectures on Hindu, Mahommedan Law, and the Laws of India, at the Middle Temple on the 13th Jan. The Private Classes on Mondays, Hall, on Saturdays, at 10.45 a.m.; the first lecture 15th Jan. Wednesdays, and Fridays, at 10 a.m.; first class,

The Educational Term commences on the 11th The First Public Lecture of this Course will be Jan., and ends on the 30th March. delivered by the Reader on Equity, on Thursday, the 11th Jan. at 2 p.m.

The first meeting of each private class will take place on the usual morning or evening of meeting Students who have been unable to attend a after the first public lecture on the same subject. lecture or class of either of the Readers, and desire dispensation as a qualification for call to the Bar, should make application, with an explanation of Reader, during the course, or immediately after the delivery of the last public lecture of the the cause of such absence, in writing, to the course; and the Reader's report thereon, together Council of Legal Education, who alone have the power of granting dispensation. with the application, will be forwarded to the

The Council have resolved that in no case shall students be allowed to change from the elementary to the advanced courses of lectures and classes, or vice versa, while qualifying for call to the Bar, or for the examination on the subjects of the lectures and classes.

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Baker, Frederick Arnold., Nurse, Bernard.
Avory, Henry Kemp.
Baker, George.
Barker, W. R. Edmund.
Bartlett, Onesimus Smart.
Baty, Isaac J.

Bell, Herbert Booth.
Bell, Matthew.
Beyfus, Alfred.
Boden, George Mosley.
Bond, Edmund Lowry.
Binney, Arthur J.

Behrend, Samuel Hesse.

Bradshaw, Robert B. D.
Braithwaite, Stephen N.
Bremner, Rupert Stanley.
Burton, James Keighley.
Cadge, Edward.
Burd, Edmund Pearse.
Cama, Jemsetjee C.
Capes, John F. Joseph.
Chapman, Sidney.
Church, William.
Cumminga, James John.
Cunliffe, Robert Ellis.
Cutliffe, George, jun.
Dawson, James William.
Dean, Charles Frederick.
Draper, Hastings Carter.
Ellison, George Henry.
Evans, Frank.
Farmery, George Couttas.
Field, Henry.
Fortescue, John Smyth.
Graham, Robert Philip.
Goode, Henry Thomas.
Grain, Henry, B. A. and

Boyce, Hubert Edward.

LL.B.

Greaves, John Brook. Greaves, William. Gwyther, Julian. Hamel, Lancel Victor. Haynes, E. Child, B.A. Haynes, John. Henderson, William. Hobson, Frederick George. Hogarth, Leonard E. L. Huish, Francis Darwin. Holland, William Tew. Johnson, Henry Fielder. Jones, John Edward. Kennedy, Edward. Khan, Mirza Hoosein. Kinch, William. Killey, Zaccheus Roberts. Landon, Edward Palmer. Lay, George William. Mann, Frederick James. May, Henry Parrott. Marsh, William. Mellor, Robert. Masser, Sylvester Richard. Miller, John, jun. Mowle, Edward Worsfield. Murphy, Francis.

Oatway, Lewis John.
Osborn, Richard Robinson.
Paitson, John Lawrence.
Palmer, Thomas.

Parkes, John Wood.
Peile, Arthur Edward.
Peterson, E. W. Illtyd.
Pocock, Noel Lewis.
Price, Kichard.

Rawson, Benjamin Curren.
Rawson, John.
Kayson, Ziba.
Redpath, Wm. Lyme.
Rhodes, Godfrey.
Richardson, William E.
Rhodes, John Charles.
Roberts, Edward Philip.
Roberts, Richard.
Rooke, Ernest Wallace.
Rowland, F. Arthur Alex.
Rowlatt, George.
Saunders, Herbert.
Shires, Benjamin Arthur.
Smith, George Edwin.
Sowton, James Wynne.
Springthorpe, John T.
Stananought, Joseph.
Steinberg, G. Herbert.
Stephenson, Alfred.
Stevens, Charles Edward.
Style, Sydney.
Tatham, Algernon.
Taylor, George Bernard.
Taylor, Thomas Edward.
Taynton, Thomas C. R.

Ticehurst, Frederic.
Tickle, Japeth.
Tiddeman, Henry Thomas.
Tidswell, Alfred Phillips.
Tilley, James.
Travers, Francis.
Turberville, David Bevan.
Turner, Edward Francis.
Turner, Walter.
Upton, F. Archer, B.A.
Walker, Frederick.
Wall, William Henry.
Watson, George Newby.
Watts, Francis.
Weatherhead, Samuel.
Weed, William.
Westwood, Edward, jun.
Westmacott, George F.
Williams, J. Mason, LL.B.
Whitehead, Walter.
Wilson, Charles.
Witherington, Duncan H.
Wood, Frederick.

Terrell, Francis Arnold H.

Wood, William.
Woodward, Thomas F.
Wright, James Thomas.
Yetts, Charles Muskett.

COUNTY COURTS. BIRKENHEAD COUNTY COURT. Tuesday, Dec. 19.

(Before W. J. HARDEN, Esq., Judge.)

COMPLIMENTS TO THE JUDGE. Anderson, as the senior advocate present in court, said it was his pleasing duty, on behalf of the Profession, of wishing his Honour the compliments of the season, or in common parlance, A merry Christmas and a happy New Year." During the last twelve months not a single cloud had passed over the horizon of the court. On the contrary, everything had been sunshine. It was the sincere wish of the legal gentlemen, as well as of the suitors, that his Honour might continue for many years to adjudicate in that court, as he hitherto had done, in an impartial, fair, and honourable manner.

His HONOUR, in acknowledging the compliment, remarked that it was now nearly a quarter of a century since he began to preside over that court, and from first to last his duties had been a labour of love to him. The position he occupied was one which enabled a judge to do a great deal of good, if he acted with discretion and fairness; and he had always endeavoured to do his best to act up to the imaginary pattern of excellence which Mr. Anderson, in his compliments had attributed to him. His Honour then acknowledged the valuable assistance he had at all times received from the legal gentlemen who ractised before him, and said that for years there had not been even an approximation to asperity exhibited in the court. He felt deeply indebted for the assistance he had obtained. With regard to the suitors, the moment the decision of the court was given they seemed to bow to it, and he never heard a word of disrespect from a disappointed suitor. He was not vain enough to think that his decisions were always right. He might make a number of mistakes, but they were leniently dealt with, and they managed to get on without anything unpleasant occurring. He reciprocated the good feeling which had been exhibited towards him by wishing them all "a merry Christmas and a happy new year." His Honour concluded by referring to the great services which were rendered to him by the officials of the court, whose conduct, he said, was beyond all praise. They were exceedingly fortunate in having such a staff of officials, and he wished all County Courts in the country were supplied with such an efficient staff of officers as they had in Birkenhead. (Applause.)

BIRMINGHAM COUNTY COURT. (Before R. G. WELFORD, Esq., Judge.) BRADDELL V. HOWELL.

The liability of common carriers. HIS HONOUR delivered judgment in this cause.The plaintiff sued the defendant, a common carrier, for the value of goods consigned to Belfast, which were lost at sea. That was the extent of the evidence adduced by the plaintiff. In order to prove the loss of the goods the plaintiff produced a letter from the defendant, dated 19th Aug. 1871, in which he said, referring to the goods from Mr. Riseker, "The package went down in Dec. 1868, in the ship which was lost, and called the Prince Alfred." This proved at once the loss of the package and the manner in which it was losti. e., by the ship having gone down. Now, it was clear that where a common carrier was prevented from fulfilling his contract by the perils of the sea or of navigation, that was an answer to an action for damages for a breach of his contract. Here, as the evidence stood, the breach of contract for which the plaintiff sued, was, according to his own evidence, caused by the peril of the sea, and the plaintiff could not recover. If the plaintiff thought he could prove negligence, he might have an adjournment for the purpose.

Fitter, appeared for the plaintiff; and Fallows, in the absence of Rowlands, for the defendant.

An adjournment was granted until the 28th

Jan.

The

WORTH V. HARPER. An auctioneer's liability. HIS HONOUR gave judgment in this cause. plaintiff in this case sued the defendant, an auctioneer, for 91., paid to him for lot 15, described "in the catalogue as about five tons broken wheels," at a sale, at the Mill-street Ironworks, on the 7th Sept. last. Prior to the sale, certain conditions were read, of which the fourth, relied on by the defendant as a defence, was this: The lots to be at the entire risk of the purchaser from the fall of the hammer, and to be removed with all faults and errors of description, by three o'clock on Saturday next, and no purchaser (under any pretence whatever) will be allowed to remove any lot until the whole amount of his or her respective purchases have been paid for." Before putting up the fifteenth lot, the defendant stated that

that lot would be subject to the term that the
wheels should not be removed until the same had
been inspected at an inquest (then about to be
held) by the coroner. The plaintiff having had
this lot knocked down to him for 91., paid the
money to the defendant, and took his written
receipt. The plaintiff deposed that after the sale,
and when he paid his money, the following con-
versation took place: "I asked when I could have
it?" To which the defendant replied, "At the
inquest." On several subsequent occasions the
plaintiff applied for his lot, and was always
told that it was to be retained for the in-
quest, and ultimately that it had been seized
and sold by the landlord for rent. To this
two grounds of defence were offered: (1.) That
the 4th condition of sale constituted a written
contract between the parties which could not be
varied by parol, and consequently that whatever
the defendant might have said on putting up the
fifteenth lot, was of no avail, and could not be
adduced in evidence by the plaintiff. That might
be so, but here the contract dependent on the con-
ditions was fully performed when the plaintiff
paid for his purchased lot, and asked when he
could take it away. Then the defendant, acting
on his verbal notice in the auction room, told the
plaintiff that he could not remove it until after
the inquest. This was a new and verbal contract,
by which the defendant agreed to deliver the lot
after the inquest. This he never did, and con-
sequently was liable to repay the money he had
received from the plaintiff. Then (2) it was said
the defendant sold as agent for one Preston, and
that before this action was brought he had paid
over the money to Preston, his principal. It was,
however, clear that when an agent contracted for
the performance of a particular duty-as, in this
case, the delivery of the lot after the inquest-
without any qualification of his liability, he was
personally responsible for the fulfilment of the act
undertaken to be done, although he was known to
be acting only as an agent for some third party
(Read v. Draper, 30 L. J. 268, Ex.). In such a case
the agent, in order to exempt himself, must ex-
pressly stipulate that he was not to incur any
personal liability. No such stipulation was made
by the defendant in this case, and if he had in fact
paid over to his principal the sum he had received
for lot fifteen, and which he really held as a stake-
holder until his contract to deliver it to the
plaintiff had been performed, he had done so to
his own wrong, and he still remained liable to the
plaintiff, for whom there must be a verdict for 9.,
with costs.

SALISBURY COUNTY COURT.
Wednesday, Dec. 13.

(Before T. E. P. LEFROY, Esq., Judge.)
GODDARD V. THE LONDON AND SOUTH-WESTERN
RAILWAY COMPANY.

--

admitted liability. He did not think an actual
payment necessary. A cause of action must be
complete at the time of issuing a plaint, but he
must rule that a liability to pay was quite
sufficient to maintain an
action. Supposing
that a poor man, who had not the means of pay-
ment, had been damnified to a large amount.
Would it be contended that he was deprived of
the right of action, by reason of his not having
paid the sum due ?"

Haines.-He might give a promissory note or something else to make him liable.

His HONOUR.- Unless you can show me an express authority, I shall hold that, under the circumstances, there is sufficient liability to maintain an action. I think your objection is not good in law. An acknowledged liability and a promise to pay are to my mind quite sufficient.

Haines submitted that the company were merely acting as Goddard's agents in the matter; but this was disputed by Whatman, who pointed out that the beef was handed over to the company to be delivered by them.

Haines said: With regard to the claim of 30s. for loss on rabbits and hares, his Honour would remember that there was a misquotation, or improper declaration on the part of Mr. Goddard. A hamper containing hares was declared by him as containing rabbits.

Whatman submitted that there was no proof whatever of a misquotation on the part of Goddard. Mr. Wright, poulterer, handed him a package containing hares as well as rabbits, but did not acquaint him of the fact. Mr. Goddard declared the contents to be rabbits, and had no reason to suppose that the hamper contained anything else.

Heines argued that it mattered not whether Mr. Goddard acted in ignorance or otherwise. He received the package without any declaration, and then took upon himself to declare that it contained rabbits. Under these circumstances he must be held responsible.

A case was cited in support of this view, which, however, Whatman contended did not apply, and eventually

His HONOUR said: In point of law, he did not think there was such a fraud on the part of Goddard as would render the contract a nullity, and release the company from their responsibility. It was an incorrect declaration, but not a false declaration within his knowledge.

Haines. It was a false declaration to his advantage.

His HONOUR.-It cannot be false when he is not aware of the falsity. To prove a false declation, you must show that he knew it to be untrue at the time he made it. There may be a question whether the company may not still recover from him a higher rate of carriage.

Whatman.-Not on the ground that he com

His HONOUR.-No.
Whatman. But on the ground that something
else besides rabbits was included in the hamper:
His HONOUR.-Yes.

Common carrier · ·Admitted liability — Non-de-mitted a fraud.
livery to consignee - Non-payment of loss by
consignor before plaint-Right of action-Erro
neous declaration by sender - Deterioration of
goods in hand of carriers-Costs.
THIS case stood adjourned from the last court.
It was an action to recover losses on certain beef,
mutton, rabbits, and hares which had been en-
trusted to the company for conveyance either from
Salisbury to London, or from London to Salisbury,
and which it was alleged they failed to deliver in
proper course.

Whatman appeared for the plaintiff, who is a
carrier in Salisbury.

Haines, the company's solicitor, conducted the defence.

The first point raised was with reference to a quantity of beef consigned by Mr. Smith, butcher, of Salisbury, through the plaintiff, to Messrs. Bonser and Son, of London. It was stated at the last court that the meat was delivered to the Metropolitan Meat Market too late for market, in consequence of which Mr. Smith sustained a loss of 41. 17s. 6d. That sum Mr. Goddard agreed to pay, but there being a running account between him and Mr. Smith, no money actually passed, and Mr. Haines argued that an admitted liability, without actual payment, was, not sufficient to maintain an action. The cause of action, it was contended, ought to have been complete at the time of issuing the plaint. On the other side it was argued by Whatman that an admitted; liability was sufficient, and that the grounds of action might be rendered complete at any time before the delivery of the verdict. His Honour took time to consider the point; and, on the case being called to-day, Whatman said it did not occur to him at the last court that the cause of action was the non-delivery of the goods and not the liability to pay. He might remark, however, that since the last court the plaintiff had actually paid Mr. Smith the 4. 17s. 6d.

His HONOUR said, having looked into the question, he was inclined to think that the plaintiff could recover on an admitted liability. In an action for personal injury on a railway, a man might recover his surgeon's bill, which was an

George Oliver was called for the defence. He said he was a carman in the service of Mr. Barwick, who was employed by the South-Western Company to cart and deliver goods in London. He remembered twelve quarters of beef arriving from Salisbury on the 20th Oct. They were given to him at twenty minutes to seven in the morning, and he took them straight to the Metropolitan Market. It was very foggy, and it took fifty minutes to get to the market. He was in the market at 7.50, but the van was not wholly unloaded before 8.35.

His HONOUR.-At what time did you deliver the meat at Bonser's premises?

Witness: From ten to twenty minutes past eight, but I was in my place in the line of vans at the market at half-past seven. I went to Bonser's first and delivered the other goods afterwards. The meat was not wrapped up at all, and it was in very bad condition. It was wet and flabby. It was put on the cover of a hamper to carry it into the market. From the station it was carried on straw at the back of the van. It was not hanging up in the truck when it arrived at the station. His HONOUR.-Then it was in bad condition because it had been lying down in the truck

Witness: Yes. One of the legs was broken, and matter was oozing from it. The men at the market told me not to handle it; they said if I scratched my hands with the bone, it might poison It was taken from the van by means of

ine.

crooks.

Cross-examined.-The Salisbury train was supposed to arrive about half-past four in the morning. On the morning in question it was not in before a quarter past six. He did not know that any goods were delivered from it in time for the market. He believed it was not so. Sparrow was not there at four o'clock; and it was half-past six when he left.

Whatman.-If a witness has sworn that he saw five hampers of mutton which arrived by that

JAN. 6, 1872.j

train in the shop shortly after six, he has said that which is untrue ?-Witness: It is wrong. Whatman.-What is the usual time for arriving at market?-Witness: Five o'clock. Whatman. You say the meat was not hanging up. Whose fault was that?-Witness: I don't I know. I did not notice any hooks in the van. have had to do with cattle, but am not a butcher, and am not acquainted with cattle disease. It is not usual for quarters of beef to be hung up.

His HONOUR said the meat was evidently knocked about, and deteriorated in appearance by the defendants' improper treatment of it. Haines.-Will your Honour grant a case? His HONOUR.-You are entitled to it if the verdict is above 102.

Whatman.-Without the money paid into court it will not be above 101.

His HONOUR.-But it is a case standing on the records of the court as above 101.

With regard to the value of the sheep, Whatman submitted that his client was entitled to recover the price that was current at the time in Salisbury. Mr. Day had sworn that he gave 10. a pound for joints all round, and that two days afterwards he gave 94d. a pound for an entire carcase.

His HONOUR said in the case of the rabbits, he did not think there was such a fraud as to vitiate the contract. With regard to the beef, he was of opinion that a delay of two hours was not a reasonable delivery. Every bye-law must itself be reasonable; and seeing how important it was to catch a market, he did not consider the deAs to the livery in question a reasonable one. badness of the meat he did not attach much importance to the casual observation of the men at the market to the witness Oliver. As to the sheep, he thought the plaintiff was entitled to recover the

fall amount claimed.

Haines.-Your Honour will allow me a case? His HONOUR.-Yes. You are entitled to it, but what are your grounds of appeal? Haines said he was satisfied with his Honour's finding in regard to the sheep. In the other cases, he should ground his appeal upon the fact that the plaintiff had no locus standi.

His HONOUR.-I am not infallible by any means. I may be wrong; but I am pretty clear upon the

subject.

Haines said, then as to the question of costs. He considered himself entit ed to a fee for attending the last court, the plaintiff having taken advantage of the adjournment to introduce a lot Whatman.-No. Day and Goddard were both in the box. The adjournment was obtained at the instance of my friend, who insisted on having the

of fresh evidence.

man here who sold the hares and rabbits.

A verdict was then entered for the plaintiff for 171, odd, and

His HONOUR ordered each party to pay their own costs as regarded the first day.

TUNBRIDGE WELLS COUNTY COURT.
Thursday, Dec. 14.

(Before J. J. LONSDALE, Esq., Judge.)
CHAPMAN V. WALLIS.

Friendly society-Jurisdiction.
THIS was a claim of 501. or an order to be rein-
stated as a member of the Southborough Friendly
Society, of which the defendant is secretary.
Biron (instructed by Palmer, of Tunbridge),
appeared for the plaintiff.

Thomas Fox Simpson appeared for the defen

dant.

THE LAW TIMES.

interpretation of these was, that under the cir-
cumstances of this case the court had the power
to grant relief. He further referred his Honour
to the case of Ex parte Woolridge (31 L. J. 122,
Q. B.), which was an application for a mandamus
against the Royal Nelson Lodge of Odd Fellows to
reinstate one George Woolridge as a member of
the order; also to Hull v. Macfarlane (27 L. J.
41, C. P.), showing that the plaintiff was a party
instructed, and that where the case had not been
properly considered and inquired into, the court
had jurisdiction.

Simpson argued that in the case of Denton and
Marshall, which was later than that of Woolridge,
it was held that where the rules of the society
provided for the decision of disputes in a mode
therein prescribed, then the County Court Judge
had no jurisdiction. And this was perfectly obvi-
ous, because the intention of the Legislature was
that these societies should have self-government.
After replying to the learned counsel's remarks as
to the case of Woolridge, Mr. Simpson contended
that plaintiff, having been heard by the committee
and expelled, he was no longer an interested party,
and that his Honour had no jurisdiction.
His HONOUR said he should act upon that case,
and would now hear the facts.

BANKRUPTCY LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS.
DEMURRER-CREDITORS' DEED-PARTIES-AL-
LEGATION-CONVICTION OF FELONY-REGISTRA-
TION IN BANKRUPTCY-LAPSE OF TIME-A bill
filed in 1871 alleged that, previously to a debtor's
conviction for felony, by an indenture made in 1862
between himself of the first part, a trustee of the
second part, and the several other persons whose
names and seals were, or were intended to be,
thereunto subscribed and set, being respectively
creditors of the debtor of the third part. the debtor
assigned all his personal estate and effects to the
trustee upon trust in favour of his creditors; and
that the said indenture was duly executed by the
debtor and the trustee, and registered under the
194th section of the Bankruptcy Act 1861; and
the bill prayed for a declaration that the defen-
dant, who had, in 1858, purchased a house in trust
for the debtor, was a trustee of the house in
question for the trustee of the deed. On demurrer,
for want of equity and of parties: Held (reversing

the order of the Master of the Rolls), that al-
though there was no sufficient allegation in the
bill that the deed was executed by any creditor,
still it did allego an assignment to the plaintiff,
and that enabled him to sue third persons who
had the property in their possession, and there was
enough on the bill to require an answer. A trustee
may sue to recover the fund for the benefit of all
persons interesed in the trust without making his
cestuis que trust parties: (Glegg v. Rees, 25 L. T.
Rep. N. S. 612. L. C.)

125th and 126th sections of the Bankruptcy Act 1869. The creditors' meeting was fixed for the 10th April; but, no resolutions being passed, that meeting was abortive, and the proceedings under the liquidation fell to the ground. Messrs. Evans and Lockett were the bankrupt's solicitors in this matter, and Mr. Wason now applied that their 'costs should be paid out of the estate of the bankrupt. They had been taxed by the registrar at 171. 18s. 4d. 101. had been paid Messrs. Evans and mencement of the proceedings. Lockett by bankrupt's mother-in-law at the com

com

Wason cited rule 292, which provides "where bankruptcy occurs pending proceedings for or towards liquidation by arrangement or position with creditors, the proper costs incurred in relation to such proceedings shall be paid by the trustee under the bankruptcy out of the debtor's estate, unless the court shall otherwise order," and sect. 11 of the Act, which defined the commencement of the bankruptcy, in support of his argument.

Wheeler contended that, as the costs of the summons and of the petition had already been solicitor in the matter of the trader - debtor paid out of the estate, to burden the estate with another set of costs would be a hardship; and though the question was one entirely in the discretion of the court, he urged the judge should not, in fairness to the creditors, allow the bankrupt's solicitors the costs they asked. He further urged that the language under rule 292 of pending proceedings" could not assist the applicants, for those proceedings had been abortive and were dead, and were not the act He produced a report of a decision of of bankruptcy on which the adjudication was Mr. Daniel, County Court judge of Burnley, who had allowed costs to the solicitors in liquidation, where bankruptcy had followed the petition, and which had been allowed by that judge under the rule named. He, however, differed from that judge in his conclusions, and stated the point was entirely new, and one on which no decision had as yet been made.

made.

His Honour reserved his decision.

Dec. 28.-His HONOUR said this was an appli

an abortive petition for liquidation which was not cation for the costs out of the bankrupt's estate of presented until after the insolvent had been served

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with a debtor s summons which terminated in bankcourt, but I was properly reminded that judicial ruptcy. It was admitted that the granting or discretion means something more than arbitrary refusing costs is entirely in the discretion of the an encouragement to parties who find themselves will and pleasure, and ought to be exercised upon in failing circumstances to anticipate any hostile some well-considered principle. I read rule 292 as movement of creditors, by proposing to pay them all pro rata as large a composition as the estate will admit of; for, even though the petition for that in such a case, and as a general rule, the liquidation may be fruitless, it is plainly intimative whereas if it be a mere expriment to evade costs ought to be allowed out of the estate; the consequences of steps already taken by creditors, and if it is not successful, the costs, in the absence of something exceptional, would not as a general rule be allowed. Such would be my mode of dealing with this application if it were not that on reference to the file of proceedings, I find that there are exceptional circumstances which for a portion, at all events, of the costs of the [attempted liquidation, would seem to me to stop the creditors from objecting. The same solicitors who now represent the trustee and client's debt; it does not appear that they obobject to the allowance, issued the debtor's sum mons, with a view probably of securing their Company;jected to the proposed proceedings by liquidation

BY

BANKRUPTCY Act 1869, ss. 23, 31-LANDLORD
DISCLAIMER OF LEASE
AND TENANT
TRUSTEE-INJURY INFLICTED BY DISCLAIMER
-LESSOR'S RIGHT OF PROOF.-The trustee of a
bankrupt's estate disclaimed, under the 23rd sec-
tion of the Bankruptcy Act 1869, an agreement
entered into by the bankrupt, prior to his
bankruptcy, to take a lease of certain shops for a
term of years. Held, that the lessor was entitled
under the 23rd section of the Act, to prove against
the bankrupt's estate for the difference between
the rent reserved by the agreement, and the
present letting value of the premises for the
residue of the term. The general purview and
object of the Bankruptcy Act 1869 considered:
(Ex parte The Llynvi Coal and Iron
Re Hide, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 609. L. JJ.)

BIRKENHEAD COUNTY COURT.
Tuesday, Dec. 19.

(Before J. W. HARDEN, Esq., Judge.)
Re ARTHUR JUKES.

Biron, in opening the case, explained that this matter came before the court on a former occasion, and up to a certain point it had been discussed; but some cases had been discovered in which it seemed doubtful whether his Honour had jurisdiction. That was Mr. Simpson's contention. Now he (Mr. Biron) submitted that his friend was not in a position to raise any objection as to his Honour's jurisdiction, because if his Honour would refer to the plaint which had been entered, dation-Commencement of bankruptcy. and the 41st section of the Friendly Societies Act, Bankruptcy-Costs of abortive petition for liquihe would find that the plaint was to the effect that Wason, instructed by Evans and Locket, ap. the plaintiff, being a member of the Southborough Friendly Society, was, on the 29th May last, ille-peared on their behalf to apply for an order for gally expelled therefrom, and he now sought for an order to be reinstated as a member of the said society, or, in default, that the society should pay to him the sum of 50. Therefore, that plaint was founded in tort-it complained of illegal expulsion, and that being the case he must first of all refer his Honour to the 33th section of the 19 & 20 Vict.

c. 108.

His HONOUR, after reading and considering this section, was of opinion that it referred not to jurisdiction simply, but to the case being tried at all in a County Court.

Biron said he would now come to the main question, and referred his Honour to the case of Denton and Marshall (32 L. J., N.S., 89, Ex.); to the 41st section of the Friendly Societies Act; and to the twenty-fourth rule of the Southborough Friendly Society; and contended that the true

costs out of the estate, under circumstances some-
what novel.

Wheeler, instructed by Simpson and North,
solicitors for the trustee, Mr. William Mead, of
Liverpool, resisted the application.

summons.

The bankrupt, on the 14th March last, was served with a debtor's summons at the suit of the Ditton Brook Iron Company (Limited). The debt not being disputed, a bankruptcy petition was filed on the 22nd March, the alleged act of bankruptcy The hearing of the petition was fixed being the nonpayment of the debt in the debtor's for the 1st April, and, after adjournments, an adjudication was made on the 15th April, on the alleged act of bankruptcy. Between the 14th March and the 15th April-namely, on the 20th March-the bankrupt filed a petition for liquidation by arrangement or composition under the

instead of bankruptcy. Their acquiescence may
be inferred from the fact that they consented to
How
the proceedings being twice adjourned.
much these adjournments increased the costs I
do not know, but they must have added some-
thing; and as the taxed costs of the proposed
The taxed costs will
disposed to dissect the bill.
liquidation amount only to 17. 18s. 4., I am not
be allowed, but I cannot blame the trustee for ob-
say nothing about the costs of this application.
jecting to pay them without an order, and I shall

DERBY COUNTY COURT. (Before G. RUSSELL, Esq., Judge.) Re MARTIN. Debtors' Act. Application for a criminal prosecution under the THIS case was adjourned for the personal appearance of Mr. Martin. It was an application by the secution of the debtor, under the provisions of the Debtors' Act, 1869, for not disclosing in his actrustee, Mr. T. H. Harrison, for the criminal proHextall appeared for the trustee, and Briggs counts the true state of his affairs, and for hiding property of the value of 101. and upwards. for Mr. Martin.

Charles Martin filed his petition under the

COUNTY COURTS.

BIRKENHEAD COUNTY COURT.
Tuesday, Dec. 19.

(Before W. J. HARDEN, Esq., Judge.)

that lot would be subject to the term that the wheels should not be removed until the same had been inspected at an inquest (then about to be held) by the coroner. The plaintiff having had this lot knocked down to him for 91., paid the money to the defendant, and took his written COMPLIMENTS TO THE Judge. receipt. The plaintiff deposed that after the sale, Anderson, as the senior advocate present in and when he paid his money, the following concourt, said it was his pleasing duty, on behalf of versation took place: "I asked when I could have the Profession, of wishing his Honour the compli- it?" To which the defendant replied, "At the ments of the season, or in common parlance, "Ainquest." On several subsequent occasions the merry Christmas and a happy New Year." During plaintiff applied for his lot, and was always the last twelve months not a single cloud had told that it was to be retained for the inpassed over the horizon of the court. On the quest, and ultimately that it had been seized contrary, everything had been sunshine. It was and sold by the landlord for rent. To this the sincere wish of the legal gentlemen, as well as two grounds of defence were offered: (1.) That of the suitors, that his Honour might continue for the 4th condition of sale constituted a written many years to adjudicate in that court, as he contract between the parties which could not be hitherto had done, in an impartial, fair, and varied by parol, and consequently that whatever honourable manner. the defendant might have said on putting up the fifteenth lot, was of no avail, and could not be adduced in evidence by the plaintiff. That might be so, but here the contract dependent on the conditions was fully performed when the plaintiff paid for his purchased lot, and asked when he could take it away. Then the defendant, acting on his verbal notice in the auction room, told the plaintiff that he could not remove it until after the inquest. This was a new and verbal contract, by which the defendant agreed to deliver the lot after the inquest. This he never did, and consequently was liable to repay the money he had received from the plaintiff. Then (2) it was said the defendant sold as agent for one Preston, and that before this action was brought he had paid over the money to Preston, his principal. It was, however, clear that when an agent contracted for the performance of a particular duty-as, in this case, the delivery of the lot after the inquestwithout any qualification of his liability, he was personally responsible for the fulfilment of the act undertaken to be done, although he was known to be acting only as an agent for some third party (Read v. Draper, 30 L. J. 268, Ex.). In such a case the agent, in order to exempt himself, must expressly stipulate that he was not to incur any personal liability. No such stipulation was made by the defendant in this case, and if he had in fact paid over to his principal the sum he had received for lot fifteen, and which he really held as a stake. holder until his contract to deliver it to the plaintiff had been performed, he had done so to his own wrong, and he still remained liable to the plaintiff, for whom there must be a verdict for 9., with costs.

His HONOUR, in acknowledging the compliment, remarked that it was now nearly a quarter of a century since he began to preside over that court, and from first to last his duties had been a labour of love to him. The position he occupied was one which enabled a judge to do a great deal of good, if he acted with discretion and fairness; and he had always endeavoured to do his best to act up to the imaginary pattern of excellence which Mr. Anderson, in his compliments had attributed to him. His Honour then acknowledged the valuable assistance he had at all times received from the legal gentlemen who practised before him, and said that for years there had not been even an approximation to asperity exhibited in the court. He felt deeply indebted for the assistance he had obtained. With regard to the suitors, the moment the decision of the court was given they seemed to bow to it, and he never heard a word of disrespect from a disappointed suitor. He was not vain enough to think that his decisions were always right. He might make a number of mistakes, but they were leniently dealt with, and they managed to get on without anything unpleasant occurring. He reciprocated the good feeling which had been exhibited towards him by wishing them all "a merry Christmas and a happy new year." His Honour concluded by referring to the great services which were rendered to him by the officials of the court, whose conduct, he said, was beyond all praise. They were exceedingly fortunate in having such a staff of officials, and he wished all County Courts in the country were supplied with such an efficient staff of officers as they had in Birkenhead. (Applause.)

BIRMINGHAM COUNTY COURT. (Before R. G. WELFORD, Esq., Judge.) BRADDELL V. HOWELL.

SALISBURY COUNTY COURT.
Wednesday, Dec. 13.

(Before T. E. P. LEFROY, Esq., Judge.)
GODDARD V. THE LONDON AND SOUTH-WESTERN
RAILWAY COMPANY.

admitted liability. He did not think an actual payment necessary. A cause of action must bo complete at the time of issuing a plaint, but he must rule that a liability to pay was quite sufficient to maintain an action. Supposing that a poor man, who had not the means of payment, had been damnified to a large amount. Would it be contended that he was deprived of the right of action, by reason of his not having paid the sum due?

Haines. He might give a promissory note or something else to make him liable.

His HONOUR.- Unless you can show me an express authority, I shall hold that, under the circumstances, there is sufficient liability to maintain an action. I think your objection is not good in law. An acknowledged liability and a promise to pay are to my mind quite sufficient.

Haines submitted that the company were merely acting as Goddard's agents in the matter; but this was disputed by Whatman, who pointed out that the beef was handed over to the company to be delivered by them.

Haines said: With regard to the claim of 30s. for loss on rabbits and hares, his Honour would remember that there was a misquotation, or improper declaration on the part of Mr. Goddard. A hamper containing hares was declared by him as containing rabbits.

Whatman submitted that there was no proof whatever of a misquotation on the part of Goddard. Mr. Wright, poulterer, handed him a package containing hares as well as rabbits, but did not acquaint him of the fact. Mr. Goddard declared the contents to be rabbits, and had no reason to suppose that the hamper contained anything else.

Heines argued that it mattered not whether Mr. Goddard acted in ignorance or otherwise. He received the package without any declaration, and then took upon himself to declare that it contained rabbits. Under these circumstances he must be held responsible.

A case was cited in support of this view, which, however, Whatman contended did not apply, and eventually

His HONOUR said: In point of law, he did not think there was such a fraud on the part of Goddard as would render the contract a nullity, and release the company from their responsibility. It was an incorrect declaration, but not a false declaration within his knowledge.

Haines. It was a false declaration to his advantage.

His HONOUR.-It cannot be false when he is not aware of the falsity. To prove a false declation, you must show that he knew it to be untrue at the time he made it. There may be a question whether the company may not still recover from him a higher rate of carriage.

Whatman.-Not on the ground that he com

His HONOUR.-No.

Common carrier - Admitted liability— Non-de-mitted a fraud.
livery to consignee - Non-payment of loss by
consignor before plaint-Right of action-Erro-
neous declaration by sender- Deterioration of

goods in hand of carriers-Costs.
THIS case stood adjourned from the last court.
It was an action to recover losses on certain beef,
mutton, rabbits, and hares which had been en-
trusted to the company for conveyance either from
Salisbury to London, or from London to Salisbury,
and which it was alleged they failed to deliver in

The liability of common carriers. HIS HONOUR delivered judgment in this cause.The plaintiff sued the defendant, a common carrier, for the value of goods consigned to Belfast, which were lost at sea. That was the extent of the evidence adduced by the plaintiff. In order to prove the loss of the goods the plaintiff produced a letter from the defendant, dated 19th Aug. 1871, in which he said, referring to the goods from Mr. Riseker, "The package went down in Dec. 1868, in the ship which was lost, and called the Prince Alfred." This proved at once the loss of the package and the manner in which it was lost-proper course. i. e., by the ship having gone down. Now, it was clear that where a common carrier was prevented from fulfilling his contract by the perils of the sea or of navigation, that was an answer to an action for damages for a breach of his contract. Here, as the evidence stood, the breach of contract for which the plaintiff sued, was, according to his own evidence, caused by the peril of the sea, and the plaintiff could not recover. If the plaintiff thought he could prove negligence, he might have an adjournment for the purpose.

Fitter, appeared for the plaintiff; and Fallows, in the absence of Rowlands, for the defendant.

An adjournment was granted until the 28th Jan.

WORTH V. Harper. An auctioneer's liability. HIS HONOUR gave judgment in this cause. The plaintiff in this case sued the defendant, an auctioneer, for 91., paid to him for lot 15, described "in the catalogue as about five tons broken wheels," at a sale, at the Mill-street Ironworks, on the 7th Sept. last. Prior to the sale, certain conditions were read, of which the fourth, relied on by the defendant as a defence, was this: The lots to be at the entire risk of the purchaser from the fall of the hammer, and to be removed with all faults and errors of description, by three o'clock on Saturday next, and no purchaser (under any pretence whatever) will be allowed to remove any lot until the whole amount of his or her respective purchases have been paid for." Before putting up the fifteenth lot, the defendant stated that

Whatman appeared for the plaintiff, who is a carrier in Salisbury.

Haines, the company's solicitor, conducted the defence.

The first point raised was with reference to a quantity of beef consigned by Mr. Smith, butcher, of Salisbury, through the plaintiff, to Messrs. Bonser and Son, of London. It was stated at the last court that the meat was delivered to the Metropolitan Meat Market too late for market, in consequence of which Mr. Smith sustained a loss of 41. 178. 6d. That sum Mr. Goddard agreed to pay, but there being a running account between him and Mr. Smith, no money actually passed, and Mr. Haines argued that an admitted liability, without actual payment, was not sufficient to maintain an action. The cause of action, it was contended, ought to have been complete at the time of issuing the plaint. On the other side it was argued by Whatman that an admitted liability was sufficient, and that the grounds of action might be rendered complete at any time before the delivery of the verdict. His Honour took time to consider the point; and, on the case being called to-day, Whatman said it did not occur to him at the last court that the cause of action was the non-delivery of the goods and not the liability to pay. He might remark, however, that since the last court the plaintiff had actually paid Mr. Smith the 4. 17s. 6d.

His HONOUR said, having looked into the question, he was inclined to think that the plaintiff could recover on an admitted liability. In an action for personal injury on a railway, a man might recover his surgeon's bill, which was an

Whatman. But on the ground that something else besides rabbits was included in the hamper? His HONOUR.-Yes.

George Oliver was called for the defence. He said he was a carman in the service of Mr. Barwick, who was employed by the South-Western Company to cart and deliver goods in London. He remembered twelve quarters of beef arriving from Salisbury on the 20th Oct. They were given to him at twenty minutes to seven in the morning, and he took them straight to the Metropolitan Market. It was very foggy, and it took fifty minutes to get to the market. He was in the market at 7.50, but the van was not wholly unloaded before 8.35.

His HONOUR.-At what time did you deliver the meat at Bonser's premises?

Witness: From ten to twenty minutes past eight, but I was in my place in the line of vans at the market at half-past seven. I went to Bonser's first and delivered the other goods afterwards. The meat was not wrapped up at all, and it was in very had condition. It was wet and flabby. It was put on the cover of a hamper to carry it into the market. From the station it was carried on straw at the back of the van. It was not hanging up in the truck when it arrived at the station.

His HONOUR.-Then it was in bad condition because it had been lying down in the truck?

Witness: Yes. One of the legs was broken, and matter was oozing from it. The men at the market told me not to handle it; they said if I scratched my hands with the bone, it might poisou

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