God, as that it occurred by a mere peril of the sea. But this does not appear to be the ground upon which the judgment proceeds, and we venture to think that the ruling of the Judge is not in accordance with the law.

The question is important, for some of the coasting lines of steamers are in the habit of carrying goods without protecting themselves by bill of lading, notice, or special contract of any kind. In the event of a loss occasioned by a peril of the sea, but not occasioned by the act of God, or by negligence (e.g., if the vessel were sunk in consequence of a collision with another vessel, solely caused by the fault of the latter), the question would be fairly raised. In such a case no doubt an attempt would be made on the part of the carrier to prove a general custom exempting carriers by sea from liability for sea peril; but we should think it would be almost impossible to prove such a custom, for why should bills of lading invariably except perils of the sea if custom invariably implies such exception?

The subject is an interesting one; and if the report of Braddell v. Howell does not disclose all the material facts of that case, the attorneys concerned in it will perhaps supply the deficiency.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF MERCANTILE
TERMS.

UPON whom does it lie to interpret the meaning of a term used in a mercantile contract? Is this the duty of our Judges, or is it a matter of evidence only? This is a question of much importance, and a question which recent decisions of our courts of appeal have put prominently forward. In order to make perfectly clear what we wish to point out, we will give the cases to which we specially refer and afterwards discuss the general question. In the case of Gray v. Carr, in the Exchequer Chamber (25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 215), the words "dead freight " and " demurrage" were discussed and defined, and in the case of Me.Lean v. Fleming, in the House of Lords (25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 317), the word "dead freight" receives an authoritative judicial interpretation at the hands of the House of Lords. Both these cases arose out of claims made by shipowners against cargo actually shipped on board their vessels for freight they would have earned if a full cargo had been shipped under the terms of the charter-parties which had been entered into. In both cases the charter-parties contained the words "the owners to have an absolute lien for freight, dead freight, and demurrage." In Gray v. Carr the charter-party stipulated that the merchant should be allowed fifty running days for loading, and ten days on demurrage over and above the said laying days at 81. per day; the ship was detained during the whole of this time, and eighteen days beyond, and the plaintiff claimed to be compensated, not only for the ten days, but for the eighteen days, and also claimed a lien under the words of the charter on the cargo actually shipped. In Gray v. Carr, Baron Cleasby, says that "demurrage has a known legal meaning, viz., the additional period during which the vessel may remain by agreement of the parties;" Baron Channell, says, "Demurrage is a sum agreed to be paid for the detention of a vessel, and the term is not applicable to the damages caused by detaining her contrary to agreement;" Baron Bramwell says, "demurrage, though sometimes used to signify any undue delay in loading, is an expression in common use to signify an agreed time, and is so used in this charter-party. Demurrage proper is contemplated by this charter, and the word, therefore, is satisfied; so that, if the plaintiff is right, demurrage' would have two meanings, viz., 'demurrage proper,' and 'damages for detention,' which may be at a greater or a less rate than the agreed demurrage." The other Judges agree that demurrage does not mean damages for detention. This question does not arise in McLean v. Fleming. With regard to "dead freight," there is considerable difference of opinion as to its meaning, not only in the two cases, but even among the Judges who decided the case of Gray v. Carr. Baron Cleasby, in his judgment in Gray v. Carr, defines "dead freight " as "an expression having a well known signification, viz., the freight which would have been payable for that part of the vessel which has not been occupied by merchandise, but ought to have been," and he arrives at the conclusion that a lien for dead freight attaches, whether the amount is liquidated or not. Mr Justice Brett, on the other hand, arrives at an exactly opposite conclusion, saying, "It seems to me that a charter-party which leaves the damages to be recovered in respect of short loading unspecified, and therefore at large, gives no claim for dead freight properly so called. Such a claim for unliquidated damages is not dead freight: (per Justices Williams and Willes in Pearson v. Goschen (17 C. B., N. S., 352.)" And this opinion is corroborated by Willes, J., in the present case. Baron Channell is of opinion that "a clause giving a lien for dead freight is wholly inapplicable to a claim for damages inrespect to the charterer's having failed to load a full cargo," and Lord Chief Baron Kelly puts the same interpretation upon the clause; Baron Bramwell holds himself bound by the decision in McLean v. Fleming. In the latter case, the Lords who heard it decided unanimously that "dead freight" did mean an unliquidated compensation for loss of freight," and that a lien may be created for it by express stipulation. Lord Chelmsford remarks, In construing the charter-party, it must be assumed that the parties understood the meaning of the terms they employed."

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Now here are two expressions which are introduced into every charter-party, and have been so introduced, we presume, for a long period of time, and yet their meaning is still the subject of litigation. The first question is, what is their meaning, and how is it to be arrived at? We should have thought that, in a mercantile contract, such as a charter-party, the meaning to be attached to such technical words was that which was put upon them by the parties entering into the contract; or, if they were words in universal use in charter-parties, the universally accepted meaning among charterers and merchants, In fact, in limiting the sense of the word demurrage," in Gray v. Carr, Baron Cleasby says, "It was said during the argument that by the understanding of shipowners and charterers it had a more extensive signification, and embraced the further period beyond the demurrage days during which the vessel was detained. If that be so, evidence that in such a document as a charter-party the word was so usually understood should have been given, and the opinion of the jury taken." It does seem a most extraordinary thing that lawyers should be called upon to say how words, used by, and having an accepted signification among mercantile men, are to be interpreted. The meaning of such words concerns mercantile men, and them only, and they are the persons to interpret them. Judges are, as a rule, extremely chary of giving judicial decisions except where they are compelled, and we are unable to see that there was, in either of the cases under discussion, any data on which to found a decision as to the meaning of these expressions. No doubt Judges have great experience acquired both whilst at the bar and on the bench, and have met in the course of their experience with many cases in which the interpretation of such mercantile terms has been required. Unfortunately, however, their experience does not always lead them to the same conclusion, as is very manifest from the difference of opinion as to the meaning of the word "dead freight;" the majority of the Exchequer Chamber hold it to be one thing, the House of Lords hold it to be another, and if the aggregate number of Judges are taken, it will be found that six judgments go one way and four the other. This in itself shows that there is something wrong in the system of such interpretation. Judges may and do differ on principles of law, but how comes it that they differ on the meaning of a word? As Lord Chelmsford says, "it must be assumed that the parties understood the meaning of the terms they employed." If they understood that meaning, they or other persons whose occupations give them similar opportunities, are the proper persons to interpret the meaning, and if there is any difference of opinion, the proper tribunal to decide the points in dispute is the jury. There are many cases in which a similar difficulty has arisen, and where it has been so settled. In the adjustment of particular average a question frequently arises as to whether a ship is to be considered on her "first voyage," so as to enable the average staters to determine how far they are to deduct the value of old but damaged materials from the price of the new supplied in the repairs of the ship. If a ship leaves her home port under a charter to sail to a foreign port and home, it is a question whether the voyage to the foreign port is her "first voyage," or the whole voyage out and home. This makes the "first voyage a technical term, which has to be interpreted, and it is so interpreted by evidence given, and by the verdict of a jury: (Fenwick v. Robinson, 3 C. & P. 323; Pirie v. Steele, 2 M. & Rob. 44.) This, we submit, is the method that should be followed with reference to the technical terms of a charterparty; if this were done we should not arrive at such extraordinary results.

THE LEGAL RESTRAINT OF DRUNKENNESS. We have made drunkenness a crime, at one time punishable by confinement in the stocks, now punishable if unaccompanied by riotous behaviour in public thoroughfares, by a fine of 58., if so accompanied, by a fine of 40s. or imprisonment for seven days. This punishment is regarded by offenders as affording practical immunity, and it is quite possible that severe penalties would be condemned as the offence against the public is small. What legislation has to direct itself to is the injurious operation of the acts of the drunkard upon himself as a member of society. The punishment of fine or imprisonment is not suited to this offence, because he is shortly free to go and commit it again. Persons confirmed in the commission of any other crime we transport, and corrupt juveniles we send to reformatories. The present problem is how to reform or restrain our drunken population.

One section of our statesmen advocate a permissive or rather a prohibitory law affecting the sale of intoxicating liquor; another section advocates the better regulation of our licensing system. Before the meeting of Parliament, it should be clearly understood how the question stands. Unfortunately, any measure to restrain excessive drinking must meet with opposition from a most powerful class, the licensed victuallers; and legisla tion must be so framed as to repress the crime of drunkenness whilst it does not interfere with the legitimate sale of liquor. To place a limit upon the number of houses for the sale of it, and upon the hours during which it may be sold, is the plain duty of the Legislature. A little work has just appeared from the hands of "Two Barristers," which looks at the question in this light: Drunkenness, as a vice," they say, "is beyond the direct control

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of the law, as much as the excessive use of tobacco or the taking of opium. But drinking houses are, not to mince matters, places for a man to go and get drunk in. As such they are as properly under the control of the law as a powder magazine. This control is best exercised by a general licensing system. To ensure, by such a system, that the retailers should be trustworthy and respectable men, and that the public-houses should never become so many in number as to cause a public nuisance, is a protection to which society is unquestionably entitled."

The point to be decided, therefore, is, whether the office of limiting the number of houses for the sale of liquor can be better entrusted to the hands of the ratepayers than to those of the magistrates uncontrolled by the ratepayers; and there is the further question of the possibility of holding a publican responsible for permitting drunkenness. As to the first point, the advocates of the Permissive Bill would place the power entirely in the hands of the ratepayers, on the petition of a certain number of whom it is proposed that the mayor or overseers should take the votes of the whole body, and ascertain their wishes as to bringing the Permissive Prohibitory Liquor Act into operation in the particular borough or parish. Now, we think it is perfectly plain that the principle of giving the power to the magistrates subject to the control of the ratepayers, which is the principle of Mr. BRUCE'S Bill, is sound; but ought the expression of the approval or disapproval of the ratepayers to be left optional? Everyone who has had any experience of the voluntary expression of public opinion knows perfectly well that a community has rarely sufficient energy to initiate a movement, and such a movement would stand a smaller chance of being initiated where there is a strong party interested in maintaining the existing state of things. By Mr. BRUCE'S Bill the ratepayers are to be taken as confirming the decision of the magistrates, either by not demanding a poll within fourteen days after notice of the proposal, or if it appear, upon a poll being demanded and taken, that the proposal has not been negatived by a majority of three-fifths of those voting on the question.

To conclude this brief notice of the subject, our readers will see the gradation of the schemes. First, giving two-thirds of the ratepayers in any district absolute power to prohibit the sale of all alcoholic liquors within it for the space of three years, after which the ratepayers may reconsider their decision. That is the Permissive Bill. Secondly, limiting the discretion of the magistrates, and fixing the proportion of population to licensed houses, with a power of veto to the ratepayers. This is Mr. BRUCK'S Bill. Then we have, thirdly, the proposals of the National Union for the Suppression of Intemperance, which held a meeting at Exeter on Wednesday, and came to two very sensible resolutions. It was resolved, "That this meeting is convinced that it is not expedient to transfer the present licensing authority, as vested in the magistrates, either to an irresponsible body of ratepayers or to an annually elected licensing board, but urges Parliament to give an increased discretionary power to the magistrates for the refusal, and at the same time to provide a safeguard against the increase of licensed houses beyond the requirements of the public by fixing a maximum number of licensed houses for each district in proportion to the population.' It was further resolved, 66 That this meeting records its belief that no measure introduced into Parliament will be deemed satisfactory which does not restrict the number of licensed houses, shorten the hours of sale, provide against adulteration, dissever music and dancing licences from other licences, and enforce more stringent police regulations."

THE PERSONAL LIABILITY OF TRUSTEES IN
BANKRUPTCY.

THE judgment of Mr. Serjt. Atkinson, the County Court Judge of Yorkshire, in the case of Re Cotton, in the Huddersfield Court (52 L. T. Rep. 180), is one of considerable importance, deciding as it does that a trustee in bankruptcy may be personally liable for costs incurred in an unsuccessful attempt to recover the assets of a bankrupt. The learned judge goes into an elaborate examination of authorities, and concludes to the effect that where there is something in the nature of a wilful default on the part of the trustee, a case of personal liability arises. But, taking the words of his Honour strictly, it would seem that if proceedings are merely illadvised, the liability attaches. The proceedings in Cotton's case, taken after a certain date, being, in the opinion of the Judge, illadvised, this ground was coupled with another, namely, the payment to the attorney of an untaxed bill of costs, in contravention of rule 114, and for these two reasons the trustee was held personally liable, as we have before stated.

We shall presently examine the authorities; but prima facie it appears to us that the principle of law upon which this judgment is based is rather strained, and certainly of doubtful expediency as regards proceedings in bankruptcy. To take the bare statement put forward by the County Court Judge of Huddersfield, that a trustee may be held liable for ill-advised proceedings, it is certainly startling. This may be easily illustrated. A debtor, being made bankrupt, a list of what is due to him is handed to his trustee, who, in the exercise of his discretion, proceeds to get in the estate. Let it be assumed that there are no assets in hand: let it be

further assumed that no assets ever come to hand. Then the proceedings of the trustee, acting for the benefit of creditors, and not of himself, prove in one or two instances ill-advised, and show even some negligence and want of care on the part of the trustee. Is it to be said that he is personally liable for the costs? In Cotton's case the costs in question were only 241.; but had they been 2401. the doctrine is the same, and a trustee might be ruined at one stroke in consequence of instituting and prosecuting some illadvised proceedings for the benefit of his bankrupt's estate. But if the law be sound, of course the consequences, whatever they may be, must follow. Carrying a principle to an extreme, however, is apt to prove it to be fallacious.

The learned Judge accepted as an analogous case that of an executor, but declared the analogy to be partial only. Why partial? The bankrupt is dead as regards his right to sue and his liability to be sued. The only distinction is that, in some cases, the payment of costs by executors is regulated by statute. Taking, however, the case upon which the learned Judge principally relied-namely, Harris v. Jones (1 Wm. Bl. 451)—what distinction does it offer as between the case of an executor and that of a trustee in bankruptcy? It is reported in the abrupt fashion of the old reports, and is to this effect. A plaintiff executor moved for leave to discontinue without payment of costs. But it appeared that one of two executors had brought the action in his own name only, when he knew that there were others subsisting, and that thereby he had wantonly put the defendant to great expense. Doubtless this precise act is not one of which a trustee could be guilty, and so far there is an absence of analogy, but the fundamental principle applies to both. And what is the F principle of Harris v. Jones? Simply that an executor, suing without his co-executor, who he knows to be in existence, and asking a favour of a court-that is, to obtain leave to discontinuemust pay for the favour, submitting, as the court said, to any terms they liked to impose. We cannot but think that if Mr. Serjt. Atkinson had looked into this case he would not have cited it as the authority upon which he rested his judgment, and, quoting Tidd's Practice in the same breath, the suggestion presents itself, that he may have taken Tidd's version of it and not Blackstone's. Should it be otherwise-should the case, as reported, be put forward to support a proposition of law fixing a trustee in bankruptcy with personal liability for costs under the circumstances of Cotton's case, we decline to accept it; and if the decision rested upon that alone, we should unhesitatingly decline also to attach any weight to it whatever.

Before going further, however, it is to be remarked that if Mr. Serjeant Atkinson be right in his reasoning, a trustee in bankruptcy would be liable for the costs of any action in which he may be unsuccessful whether the proceedings have been well or illadvised, for he deals with him as being, by virtue of the Bankruptcy Act 1869, made absolute owner of the bankrupt's estate, and liable to all the incidents of litigation as an ordinary plaintiff or defendant. And he so deals with him on the ground that third persons, strangers to the trust, cannot be affected by it. Now we conceive that if the doctrine of personal liability is to be carried out to cases where all that a trustee has been guilty of, is that his proceedings have been ill-advised, and not confined to wilful torts, it must be made all-extensive, and a trustee in bankruptcy, even though he be a defendant, will be liable to costs, and must look for indemnity to the assets of the bankrupt, which, as we have stated, may be . In addition to Harris v. Jones, Serjeant Atkinson called in aid cases of trustees in private trusts, but we do not think that any argument whatever can be founded upon them. A trustee in bankruptcy is in a totally different position to a private

trustee.

Now as to the cases of bankruptcy assignees cited by the learned Judge. We will briefly state them as we have taken them from the reports. In Re Peers the application was made under a statute (6&7 Vict. c. 73, s. 37), the case being one of a bankrupt solicitor whose bill of costs was taxed, and more than one-sixth taken off. The statute expressly says, that in such event the "assignee" (inter alios) shall pay the costs. Whitcomb v. Minchin (5 Madd. 91) is a very briefly reported case in which, under the circumstances. costs were not given against the assignees, although it is true the Vice-Chancellor stated that assignees brought before the court by supplemental bill might be made liable for the costs of the whole suit. In Williams v. Nixon (2 Bear. 472) assignees were refused their costs in certain proceedings, because on the facts it appeared that they might have made a reservation of funds out of the bankrupt's assets to meet them. Sydney v. Belcher and Isaacs (1 Moo. & Rob. 324) was a case in which express personal liability was assumed, and Lord Denman left that question to the jury. it being an action at Nisi Prius for an attorney's bill. In Ex parte Murray, Re Smith (1 Mont. & Ayr. 475) the question of personal liability was not decided. No objection was raised when the order for payment was made, and the report merely relates to enforcing the order. The Chief Judge said: "It is not now a question whether he (i.e., the assignee) should be ordered to pay the costs; he was included in the order made twelve months ago, and no steps have been since taken to rescind it." But Sir John Cross expressly says: "If the attention of the court had becu called to the point at the hearing, I for one should have been

of opinion that he (ie., the assignee) should have been protected." Beran v. Whitmore (15 C. B., N. S., 433) was a case in which the principal question related to a right to contribution. The form of retainer of the attorney, the payment of whose bill was the subject of the claimed contribution, was expressly found to be a joint retainer so as to make the official assignee personally liable for part of the costs paid by the trade assignee. As Byles, J. remarked, both had an interest in the result of the action.

We have examined all the cases cited in the judgment of the County Court Judge, and, looking at what they are, we are certainly surprised that they should have been relied upon in support of so wide a doctrine as that indicated. Logically, it is impossible to stop short at the point where proceedings are illadvised. As regards a stranger, if he succeeds, he should be entitled, if at all, under all circumstances, to get his costs from the trustee; it matters not to him, so long as he succeeds, whether the suit was ill-advisedly instituted or not. Consequently, it must be said that a trustee is personally liable to costs in all contentious proceedings under a bankruptcy, and must retain assets in his hands to meet all contingencies.

We confess that we cannot assent to this, nor do we think that anything short of a wilful personal tort ought to subject a trustee in bankruptcy to pay costs to a stranger under proceedings which he institutes or defends in his official capacity. He is bound by the Act to give security on his appointment, and if no security is given he is to be deemed personally liable to the extent of the value of the bankrupt's property in the performance of the duties of his office. Beyond that, he ought not to be held liable except in the case pointed out; and until we see some authority stronger than any which has yet been brought under our notice in support of the doctrine under discussion, we shall decline to regard it as law. To go further, and say that, because a trustee has paid a bill before taxation, he shall be liable in a wholly independent transaction, in which otherwise his liability is doubtful, is a piece of judicial ingenuity which we fail to appreciate.

NOTES ON LAW REFORM AND LEGAL EDUCATION. (BY AN AMERICAN BARRISTER.)

THE ORGANISATION OF THE PROFESSION. PASSING next to the interior of the legal education project, the most fundamental feature seems the grades of the Profession. How are the candidates for attorneys, for solicitors, for barristers, to be arranged on the scholastic forms, or distributed among the classes, or what is, perhaps, still more critical, distinguished by the honours. For it is plain the education must correspond to the organisation, and that to try to advance the one without the other would be preposterous.

To answer with any thoroughness, or prepare others for answering, we, therefore, in the first place, should determine the actual facts, with, also, the sources of that state of things, by way of explaining them. Thereafter we may proceed to the programme of the committee, and sift its merits pro and con, with due authority and intelligence.

There are, then, three or four of these sorts of agents in the English courts; namely, barristers, attorneys, solicitors, and proctors. But this is mostly a division according to the subject-matter, and so is rather a description-a thing of accident, not of essence. The proctors are affected to the courts called ecclesiastical; the solicitors are similar officials of the courts of equity; and the attorneys are proper to the courts of common or civic law. This would, too, appear to have been the order of their rise in history, although the books show nothing of it, but seem to take them for aboriginal. The proctor was evidently primary, or the genus. For the three latter have all in common the trait of caring for another's interests, debarred himself by inability, by absence, by eventuality. And this is just the import of the Latin term procurator (curator pro alio), of which our proctor is a corruption. The name solicitor has an origin substantially the same in sense, being the sort of proctor proper to care dependent on eventuality.

Next in order and degree, then, to the proctor I range the attorney, and thereafter the solicitor, as the supreme of these subforms. The two latter, if not all three, are supposed vulgarly to be convertible; no doubt because of their like relation, as above suggested, to different subjects. It is forgotten that the subjects must reflect their difference upon the agents, and make them more or less partakers of their dignity or respectability. Mr. Warton, I see, insists strenuously on this coarse confusion in his new Law Dictionary, with regard, at least, to the attorney and the solicitor. He ridicules the affectation, grown up of late years, by which a torneys assume the title of solicitor in preference. For this sentiment, however, he gives no reason or even authority. He merely sets his own instincts against the instincts of the Profession. The simple fact of such a preference, were it no graver than a whim of fashion, must none the less have a cause, and a cause of consequence in such a subject. We now accordingly detect it in the higher rank of the subject-matter. A care confided against events is of higher trust than one for mere absence; as this again must needs be higher than one for sheer inability. This last, which is the proctor's part, transacts for infancy and idiocy; the second, or the

attorney, for minds mature, but remote in place; the solicitor for both those classes, but upon a train of events, through which he rises to the dignity of being a manager, not a mere agent. So all things resting in the future, are higher than those of the past or present. In fine, equity, which is the proper subject of the solicitor, is for those reasons the species of law supreme in dignity, as resulting from and remedying the rigid rules, by rational principles; and so its officers must, down to the solicitor, partake that dignity. And if, per contra, the name attorney has fallen equally into ill odour, the fact is but a confirmation of the inferior rank in question, and its proclivity to usurpation beyond the domain of its specialty. It might be still objected, that the order seems the reverse in the compound forms named attorney- and solicitor-general, the latter being supposed to be the inferior, not the superior. The answer is, that the arrangement is political, not juridical; and the effect is one of a multitude of self-conflictions entailed upon our law, as will be noted presently, by Feudalism.

Those three sub-forms of the Profession are, therefore, of the same kind, although differing specifically in their subject matters. They are all legal factors, but of different tribunals. Their proper part is pragmatism, and not at all profession; is manual, so to speak, not mental; a thing of rule, not of reason.

The latter is the class and rank to which belongs the barrister, who is thus different in kind from the others, and not merely species. The name is borrowed in the English law from the accident of an inclosure, but which yet opposes trenchantly the barrister to the non-barrister; the men "below" the Bar, to the men above, upon, or "at" it. The barrister accordingly has, like

the lower class, its fellow species, although not recognised very formally in the law. The next of them in order seems the counsel or counsellor. He is one who imparts counsel in private to legal suitors, rather than applies it publicly or at the bar, like the barrister. He seems chiefly represented in your law by what is called conveyancing; or the management of real property in title, transfer, and other accidents. In the Roman law he answers least remotely to the jurisconsult, as the anterior jurisprudent of the same law does to the barrister. The latter officer expounds the law in its generality and by interpretation; the counsellor constructs the facts so as to meet or shun it in application. This distinction is not consciously recognised at the English bar, although instinctively referred to in the title King or Queen's counsel. For with you all things take their popular mark of dignity from royalty, alike in making up the counsel of the monarch as his coat or boots. The counsel is, however, but the second stage of the profession proper. The third and supreme term is reserved for the title advocate, which is unknown in the English law, as it had been long in the Roman also. It took rise in the latter system when, by the name of the civil law, it came to regulate the States of Europe by a sort of internationality. And nothing could attest more strikingly the supremacy of the part of advocate. ancient and indigenous equivalent was the orator. In fact, this function is not licensed like the officials of the practical order, nor admitted to the interior of the common bar, or of the Royal council. He is called (vocatus ad) not as a procurator, but protector, and to the side of those who suffer, not in their absence from whatever cause; and both because he acts directly, not for person or for property, but for the public law of justice, which is menaced in the private case. The action thus is by vocation, not by licence nor admission; and from this summit descend all those chivalries more talked than practised by the Profession.

The

The English Bar, however, does no more the one thing than the other. The advocate is known at all to it but as a general name and notion. The Scotch have received it through the French from the Civil law, and have added the Saxon surname of "Lord " to enhance the dignity. But the French themselves alone attained the complete conception, alike distinct from the civil law and the feudal, and prior to both of them. I mean the so-styled public minister ministre publique-who, ex-officio, is head of the legal profession, and has also a certain control of the courts and even of the government, because the representative of neither, but of the whole nation. This is the wide difference between your and our Attorney-General, who is the servant of the Crown or of the Union or the State impersonated. For, as by the feudal system the King or the State is master also of the courts of justice as well as of the said prosecutor, he combines the judge, the party, and the pliant accuser in the same person, and can wield them against that public which a Nation shields through the public minister. For between the State and Nation, there is still the same difference, the former tending to rule by judicature, and the nation by administration. The resorption of this supreme power into the Feudal sophistry of the rule by judges, explains exactly the inverted rank of the Solicitor and Attorney-General; which shows how deeply your institutions are still imbued with the Feudal spirit. Or should we not conclude more strictly, that it is the people or the race. The English press, with some whimsical cosmopolitans like Lord Brougham, are heard to call occasionally for a Public minister; but after a short flurry, the cry is heard no more. The reason must be that the correct notion of the public ministry has not been compassed; and this, because it lies beyond the Feudal purview of our race. The proof of this is that the Americans keep no less to their Attorney