residence had been inaccurately described; but Attorney for plaintiff, Robert Ponclue. UNCLAIMED STOCK AND DIVIDENDS IN THE Shearman Shenton, Rectory-place, Woolwich, gentleman, KILVERT (Maria), widow, and KILVERT (Frances Maria), spinster, both of Worcester. 15001. New Three per Cent Annuities. Claimants. Alfred Catchmayd Hooper and HAYWARD (Mary Ann), Nottingham-place, Marylebone, Middlesex, spinster. 5001. Reduced Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant Ann Mary Charlotte Holder, wife of Rev. Thomas Littleton Wheeler. Thomas Holder the younger. APPOINTMENTS UNDER THE JOINT-STOCK WINDING-UP ACTS. IMPERIAL ANGLO-GERMAN BANK.-Petition for winding-up, to be heard Jan. 12, before V.C. M. LA MANCHA IRRIGATION AND LAND COMPANY (LIMITED).Creditors to send in by Jan. 31 their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any) to Richard Wyatt, 61. Moorgate-street, E.C., the official liquidator of the said company, Feb. 20, at twelve o'clock, at the chambers of V.C. M., is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims. CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY. GENTEL (Wm.) Lincoln and Gunthorpe, Notts, maltster and UPHAM (Samuel), Morning lane, Hackney, Middlesex. pool District, Municipal-buildings, Dale-street, Liverpool. Feb. 13; at the said office, at ten o'clock. April 6; Wynne and Son, 46, Lincoln's-inn-fields, W.C. VAN PRAAGH (Moses, trading and known as Morris Van Edge, Chester. Jan. 30; Cunliffe and Leaf, solicitors, THE BENCH AND THE BAR. SMITH (Henry A.), Esq., Warleigh-house, Southsea, South- for Dungarvan, from 1865 to 1868, and in that THE NEW IRISH SOLICITOR-GENERAL. Saunders's News Letter announces that Mr. Palles, Q.C., is to succeed Mr. Dowse as Solicitor-General for Ireland. The other Dublin papers have not Saunders, but two of them say that the announcecontradicted this early information given by ment is premature. We extract the following article on the judicial appointments from our contemporary, the Saunders, whose statements are usually very reliable: "The vacancy in the Court of Queen's Bench, caused by the lamented death of Mr. Justice George, has been filled, as we anticipated, by the appointment of the Attorney-General as one of the judges of that court. We believe that the Bar and the public generally will be gratified at the elevation of Mr. Barry, whose high professional abilities and personal character eminently qualify him for the important and dignified position which he has been called upon to fill. Mr. Barry sat in the House of Commons, as member NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. What notice of Clerk of the Peace. J. Torkington. also, that the representations of H. after the v. Hitchman, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 666. Cr. Cas. Res.) INDECENT ASSAULT-EVIDENCE-CONTRADICbeing consent on the part of the prosecutrix, she TION OF PROSECUTRIX.-On the trial of an indictment for an indecent assault, the defence denied on cross-examination having had intercourse with S. Held that S. could not be called to contradict her upon this answer. This rule applies to cases of rape, attempts to commit a rape, and indecent assaults, in the nature of attempts to commit a rape: (Reg v. Holmes, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 669. Cr. Cas. Res.) CITY OF LONDON IMPROVEMENT ACT-NOTICE frauds charged were admissible in evidence: (Reg. TO TREAT- COMPENSATION - JURISDICTION TIME FOR WHICH INTEREST TO BE CALCULATED. months' notice, as required by the City Improve -The corporation had given the plaintiff six ment Act, of their intention to take his premises, and the notice to quit also included a notice to treat. The plaintiff was entitled to the residue of an unexpired term of a lease at this time, but at the time of the expiration of the six months' notice his interest would be for less than a year. If the plaintiff's interest was greater than that for his compensation was to be assessed under the 1st a year he was entitled to go before a jury; if not, section of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act. Held that, from the date of the notice, the corporation could not refuse to proceed with the purchase, and that the period from which the plainof determining what compensation was to be paid tiff's interest was to be calculated, for the purpose him, was from the date of service of the notice, from which time the lands were bound, and not from the expiration of such notice: (Tyson v. The Lord Mayor of London, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 640. CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35. Last day of Claim, and to whom Particulars to be sent. ATKINS (Jane), 18, Trinity-place, Windsor, Berks. Jan. 31; F. L. Soames, solicitor, 10, New-inn, Strand, W.C. BELL (John S,), Dacre Banks, Dacre, near Ripley, Yorks, flax spinner. March 4: S. C. F. and C. A. Powell, solicitors, Castle-yard, Knaresborough. BLOMEFIELD (Lieut.-Col. Geo), Necton-hall, Norfolk. Feb. 9; Carthew and Girling, solicitors, East Dereham, Norfolk BROWN (Robert A.). The Chelsea Pensioner," 1 and 2, Queen's-road, West Chelsea, Middlesex, licensed victualler. Feb. 1; Lewis and Watson, solicitors, 89, Gracechurch CARR (Robert), Moral Hirst, Rothbury, Northumberland, yeoman. Feb. 1: Benjamin Woodman, solicitor, Morpeth. COOPER (Wm.), High Littleton House, High Littleton, Somerset. March 1; Thomas and Hollams, solicitors, Mincing-lane, E.C. CURSHAM (Geo.), Esq., M.D., 55, Victoria-street, Westminster, Middlesex. Feb. 12; J. H. Devonshire, solicitor, 1, C. P.) Frederick's-place, Old Jewry, E.C. DRIVER (Mary A.), 4, Highbury-park, Highbury, Middlesex. street, E.C. street, E.C. music. April 8: Rixon and Son, solicitors, 52, Gracechurch--S. and H. were jointly indicted on counts for LAKE (John), Doncaster, plumber and glazier. Feb. 16; Robinson and Son, solicitors, Blackburn. tors, 70, Basinghall-street, E.C. PARTON (Charlotte), Jarratt's-lane, Wellington, Salop. Swithin's-lane, E.C. false pretences, and a general count for conspiracy. CAMBRIDGE DIVISION PETTY SESSIONS. (Before C. R. PEMBERTON, Esq., Lieut.-CoL. At a special sessions held in the year 1869, under the provisions of 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, s. 4, in and for the said division and county, the licence of the White Hart, an old licensed house situate at Waterbeach, within the said division and county, was transferred to one John Handley, the then tenant of the house. On the 27th Aug. 1870, at the general annual licensing meeting then held, the licence of the White Hart was renewed to the said John Handley, such renewed licence to come into force on the 11th Oct. 1870, and expire on the 10th Dec. 1871. At the general annual licensing meeting held on to the justices for a renewal of the licence of the the 26th Aug. last, the said John Handley applied White Hart. Complaints having been made agains him that he allowed drunkenness in his house, and evidence having been given and the parties heard, licence of the house. the justices refused to renew to Handley the At the adjourned general licensing meeting held on the 23rd Sept., Handley applied to the justices to reconsider their decision, but they, not being the justices present at the general annual licensing meeting, declined to do so. Mr. Chivers, the brewer and lessee of the house from Mr. Mason, the owner, and who supplied the house with beer, then applied to have the licence indorsed to him, under sect. 6, to hold open the house until the next special sessions, when he undertook to obtain a good tenant, to whom, if the justices made no objection, he proposed to have the licence transferred. The justices refused this application also. Handley then gave notice of appeal to the quarter sessions, under sect. 27; and, on the 20th Oct. last the appeal was heard by the court of quarter sessions, and dismissed with costs. Handley immediately yielded up the possession to Jacob Stonebridge, and he (Stonebridge) having given the notices required by the 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, s. 14, on the 2nd Dec. last, applied to the justices to transfer the licence to him. By 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, s. 14, "If any licensed person die, &c., or if such person or his represen tative shall remove from or yield up possession of the licensed house, it shall be lawful for the justices at a special sessions held under the Act to grant a licence for such house to the heirs, &c., or to any new tenant or occupier of any house having become so unoccupied." At the special sessions held on the 2nd instant it was contended that Stonebridge was in a position to apply under sect. 14 of the Act, inasmuch as for the purposes of the Act Handley, at the time he delivered or yielded up possession of the house to Stonebridge, must be considered a licensed person within the meaning of the section, because the appeal was pending, and the decision of the justices in quarter sessions assembled had not been given; and it was further contended that inasmuch as he (Handley) could even now apply to the Court of Queen's Bench for a mandamus, that therefore the licence could not be said to be forfeited until the decision of the final court to which he could go had been obtained. And it was further contended that this application was expressly provided for by sub-sect. of sect. 1 of 34 & 35 Vict. c. 81, which enacts that the justices at the general annual licensing meeting or special sessions shall not grant otherwise than by way of renewal or in pursuance of the provision of sect. 14 of the Licensing Act 1828, any new licence under that Act. By this latter provision it was contended that the justices would, in their discretion, be empowered to grant Stonebridge's application even as a new licence, for the Legislature did not intend to abolish existing licences, but simply to prevent houses not already licensed to obtain that privilege, and that by acceding to the application, no fresh licence would in fact be granted. The case of Reg. v. Justices of Middlesex, quoted infra, was relied upon by the applicant. The special sessions held on the 2nd Dec. was the first special sessions to which Stonebridge could apply after the appeal was heard and the possession of the house yielded up to him by Handley. The doubt in the magistrates' minds, however, was whether at the time Handley yielded up the possesion of the house to Stonebridge he (Handley) was a licensed person within the meaning of sect. 14 of 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, so as to give the justices power to grant a licence to Stonebridge under that section. Counsel is referred to Reg. v. Justices of Middlesex (40 L. J. Rep. N. S. 14, M. C.). There the holder of a certificate for a licence to sell beer to be consumed on the premises assigned the licensed premises and removed from and yielded up possession of them on the 14th Feb. The next ensuing general annual licensing meeting was held on the 6th March. The old tenant applied for a renewal of such certificate, and was refused. The new tenant did not apply at that meeting, but gave the requisite notices and applied for a certificate at the special licensing sessions held under Geo. 4, c. 61, s. 14, on the 12th April, and it was held he was entitled to such certificate at the special sessions. It is to be observed, however, that at the time the holder of the certificate in the above case 2. Whether the justices had power under that sec- considerations, they found that the population of tion to grant a fresh licence to Stonebridge. the parish in which this house was situate was 3. And generally and fully upon the case. Handley yielded up the possession of the house to houses. The Government said they considered Answers 1 and 2. I am of opinion that at the time1400, and there were seventeen or eighteen publicStonebridge he was not a licensed person within the one house to a thousand of the population all that meaning of the Act 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, s. 14, and that there- was required, and he need hardly say that the fore the justices had not power under that section to magistrates had been forced to the conclusion grant a fresh licence to Stonebridge. The licence that, so far as the public were concerned, this granted to him in Aug. 1870 expired on the 10th Oct. 1871, and although he obtained a permit from the exhouse was not needed. With regard to the other cise enabling him to continue to carry on the business point, the Suspensory Act stated the determinaof a liceused victualler until the appeal was deter- tion of the Government-and he (Mr. Cooper) mined, he was after the 10th Oct. not a person licensed knew that the Government was strong enough to under the 9th Geo. 4, c. 61. do anything-to restrict the sale of intoxicating liquors. Therefore, under both these new considerations, the Bench, disclaiming any personal feeling whatever, had come to the determination to adhere to their former decision, and refuse the licence. possession of the house to Stonebridge until after his I gather from the case that Handley did not yield up appeal had been dismissed; but if he did in fact yield up possession before that time, 1 do not think that sect. 1 of 34 & 35 Vict. c. 18 has the effect of keeping the licence alive after it had in fact expired. In point of law, the licence when granted is to be have been granted. In Reg. v. Justices of Middlesex, as deemed to have been granted when it ought in fact to pointed out in the case, possession of the premises was yielded up while the licence existed, and the only question there was whether the new tenant ought to have applied at the General Annual Licensing Meeting, or at the special sessions under the 14th section, and the notices to apply at the General Annual Licensing Meetcourt held that as he could not give the necessary ing, he was entitled to apply at the first special sessions held after that time under the 14th section. In the case cited, the application by the old tenant, who had gone out of possession, was a mere nullity. In this case, however, the application was by the tenant in possession, and was a refusal on the merits. If the justices are desirous of granting the licence to Stonebridge-if they have the legal power so to dothey might state that, in giving their decision, they considered him to be a person of good character, and that they were willing to grant a licence to him under the 14th section if that section was applicable to the present only on the ground of want of jurisdiction. This would case, and that the refusal was not on the merits but enable him to take further proceedings if he were advised to do so. HENRY BODKIN POLAND, Dec. 14th, 1871. 5, Paper Buildings, Temple. J. W. Cooper, barrister (instructed by E. Wayman), appeared on behalf of the appicant, and on Saturday last, after the receipt of counsel's opinion, Major Pemberton delivered the judgment of the magistrates as follows:-He expressed his regret that the Rev. John Thornhill was unable to be present. He had been absent when this case was discussed at great length, and he (Major Pemberton) would very much rather that the decision should have been delivered by him. He thought it right, in justice to the Bench, consider ing the great amount of discussion and litigation that had taken place on this case to state rather fully the facts, and he remarked first that their proceedings were from year to year uniformly and invariably guided by the evideuce of their sworn officers, and they granted or refused licences on such evidence, in which they had every confidence. He might say, then, that the Bench regretted that there had been allegations made in this evidence had been got up in spite to carry out some vindictive feeling. That the court utterly repudiated. They were perfectly certain that was untrue as regarded the officer Ash, who had proved himself a painstaking and honest officer. J. W. Cooper begged to remind Major Pemberton that Ash did not give evidence in the case at all. It was the officer Martin. Major PEMBERTON apologised for his mistake, and resumed: Upon the evidence brought before the Bench the licence was refused on the 26th Ang. last, and on the 23rd Sept. following Mr. Handley applied for a reconsideration of the case. That was gone into and rejected, and upon that he appealed to the Quarter Sessions. The appeal costs, upon which Handley retired from his came off in due course, and was dismissed with position, and the magistrates were asked to grant a transfer to a man named Stonebridge, who ap. peared to be a man of good character. This application was made under the 14th section of 9 Geo. 4, c. 61. At the special sessions it was contended yielded up the possession of the premises to the that the new man, Stonebridge, was in possession, new tenant he was without doubt a licensed per- and that therefore he ought to be considered in son under a licence actually in force. At the the light of a man still in possession of the licence. time, however, Handley yielded up possession to It was also urged that as they had the power of Stonebridge his licence had actually expired on going to the Queen's Bench to apply for mandathe previous 10th Oct., unless, by construction of law, inasmuch as an appeal was pending and the consider that the licence was still in existence. mus, there were grounds for the magistrates to final decision of the court not obtained, the licence That was their position up to the last meeting, was held, and, so to speak, kept alive pendente and in consequence of what was then stated, the lite, and in fact a provisional licence was granted Bench decided that they were not prepared to act by the Inland Revenue-not by the justices-in the matter without being fortified by the opinion until the determination of the appeal, which did of counsel. That opinion had been stated; but not expire until the interest was assigned to Stone before reading it he might remark that the Bench bridge. had no personal feeling in the matter; they only wished to act in a strictly right and legal manner. He said that with that opinion of counsel before them, they could not but feel that they had two fresh elements to consider before arriving at their decision. First, the question of the necessity for this house, according to the population; secondly, the Suspensory Act, and the knowledge of the tendency-not also of the Government but also of Parliament-to restrict as much as possible the liquor trade. With reference to the first of these It may be observed that by the 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, the justices issue a licence in the first instance, but under the Beerhouse Acts (32 & 33 Vict. c. 27, and 33 & 34 Vict. c. 29), they issue a certificate authorising the grant of a licence by the revenue. Counsel will please advise the justices. The following is the copy of opinion 1. Whether at the time Handley yielded up the possession of the house to Stonebridge he was a licensed person within the meaning of the 2 Geo. 4, c. 61, s. 14, and if so, J. W. Cooper wished to offer an on observation or two on the case. This was a case which contained a very important element of licensing law, and he might tell the justices, for their information, that at the last quarter sessions for the Isle of Ely, held at Wisbech a few days ago, he appeared for the appellant in two cases of a somewhat similar character. The court refused the appeal, but gave every facility to the appellant to move the court above on points of law. It appeared to him that it was undoubtedly the desire of the Legislature to diminish the public houses, but, at the same time, another intention existed in their minds-to do so without destroying the vested interest and rights in such houses. It did appear to him that this element ought to be at the ground of all decisions of magistrates as to the refusal of licences. He did not wish to say one word against this court, or say that they were wrong upon the facts, nor would he impute any ill-feeling on the part of the police. He contended that the person was licensed, and when the licence was refused to the person applying, the Legislature did not desire that the house should be without a licence altogether. He would ask the Bench to carry out the suggestion of Mr. Poland, as contained in the last paragraph of his opinion (which the learned counsel read, as above). He went on to refer to the grounds stated by the chairman, and whilst expressing his non-intention to dispute any of their facts, reminded the Bench of what, perhaps, they were as well aware of as himself, namely, that Waterbeach was a very straggling parish, and when that was the case the test of population was an illusive one. He asked the magistrates to do what they could to enable him to proceed further. They were about having a consultation in London upon this case and the others to which he had referred, as to the advisability of going to the Court of Queen's Bench for a mandamus, so that they might have an authoritative decision from the judges, of this very important point in licensing law. He strongly urged the magistrates to say that if they had the jurisdiction, they were satisfied that Stonebridge's character was good, and they would have granted the licence. He did not say positively that anything more would be heard of the case, but if they expressed their willingness to grant the licence if they possessed the legal power, the Court of Queen's Bench could issue a mandamus. Major PEMBERTON said that virtually the magistrates did not make the legal points at all the ground of their decision. So far as he knew, there existed in the minds of the Bench no such intention as that suggested by the last paragraph of Mr. Poland's opinion. Their hands were tied down to the consideration of the facts, and were to be governed by facts that were patent to all the world. J. W. Cooper respectfully asked whether he might state to the Court of Queen's Bench, that if that court decided that the magistrates possessed the power they would reconsider their decision? Major PEMBERTON declined to absolutely pledge the magistrates to that, but concluded by telling Mr. Cooper that when he had obtained from the Court of Queen's Bench their decision in his favour on the point of law, he might come to I hope. J. W. Cooper.-And then you'll grant the licence, that court again. COMPANY LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. ADVANCE TO DIRECTORS FOR THE PURPOSE OF RIGGING THE MARKET-NOTICE.-In Nov. 1865, the directors of the M. Company obtained an advance of 10,000l. from the directors of the C. Company. The money was nominally required to pay for work done under a contract, but really it was intended to be applied, and was applied, in purchasing the shares of the M. Company, in order to give them a colourable value. According to the Articles of Association of the M. Company, the directors were forbidden to apply any money of the company in purchasing their own shares. The M. company was an em nation from the C. Company, and in Nov. 1865, it was to the advantage of the latter that the shares of the former should bear a high value. Two of the directors of the, M. Company were also directors of the C. Company, and the same solicitors acted for both companies. Held, under the above circumstances, that the C. Company was affected with full notice both of the constitution of the M. Company, and of the purposes to which the money was to be applied. A claim, therefore, for the amount of the advance carried in by the C. Company in the winding-up of the M. Company, was disallowed with costs. The decision in Zulueta's claim on appeal (L. Rep. 5 Ch. 444; 22 L. T. Rep. N. S. 84) followed: (Re The Marseilles Extension Railway and Land Company, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 619. V.C. M.) LOAN BY DIRECTORS ULTRA VIRES-ASSENT OF SHAREHOLDERS.-The defendants, the promoters of a company, were entitled to receive a sum of money on the conclusion of a transaction with the company and one D. The directors of the company advanced the defendants a sum of 6500l. and some debenture stock in the company on the security of the money which would be due to the defendants on the conclusion of the transaction with D. The transaction went off, and the directors called upon the defendants to repay the money. The defendants being unable to pay, proposed a compromise, which the directors accepted, that they should deliver up 400 shares, which they held in the company, to be cancelled in satisfaction and discharge of their debt. At a general meeting of the company, the fact that the 400 shares had been forfeited was mentioned to the shareholders and published in a circular, and the books of the company were open for inspection, so that every shareholder had the means of inquiring into the transaction. The articles of association provided that the company should not buy or sell its own shares. In an action brought to recover the money lent, it was held, that although the directors in entering into a compromise with the defendants, had exceeded the authority given to them by the articles of association, yet that the shareholders had ratified the directors' acts by not objecting at the right time, and that they could not, after profiting by an increased dividend arising from the forfeiture of the shares, open anew transactions to which they tacitly assented. A shareholder is bound by the acts of the directors, if he had the means of knowing that they have acted beyond their authority, and he does not interfere: (Phosphate of Lime Co. v. Green, 25 L. T., Rep. N. S. 633. C. P.) RAILWAY-PURCHASE OF LAND IN SETTLEMENT-RE-INVESTMENT OF PURCHASE MONEY. -Land forming part of a settled estate was purchased by a railway company under their Parliamentary powers, and the purchase-money was paid into court under the provisions of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845. The tenant for life presented a petition asking that the money might be applied (1) in repaying a sum that he had already expended in improvements to and repairs of the mansion-house, and in erecting new farm buildings upon one of the farms belonging to the estate, the tenant of which was ready to pay a larger rent in consequence of the improvements (2) in repairing the roof of the mansion-house which was not water-tight (3) in erecting new farm buildings upon four other farms belonging to the estate (4) in pulling down a public house on the estate, and building in its place an improved house of the same kind, which it was expected would produce a much higher rental than the old one. The remaindermen consented to the proposed application No. 4, but not to the others. Held, that no part of what had already been spent by the tenant for life in repairs and improvements ought to be repaid out of the money in court, he not being entitled to create any charge on the estate for the amount which he had so expended: Held also, that the tenant for life being the proper person to keep the mansion-house in repair, even though he was not accountable for dilapidations, the proposed expenditure on repairs of the mansion house ought not to be paid out of the fund in court: Held also, that the erection of new buildings upon the estate was in substance the same thing as the purchase of buildings upon other land, and that the fund in court might be applied in paying the expense of such erection, but that it ought not to be so applied without the consent of the remaindermen. An order was accordingly made (reversing a decision of Bacon, V.C.), for the payment of the expenditure on new buildings to which the remaindermen consented, the money to be paid upon the chief clerk certify. ing the due execution of the work. When the p'tition was set down for hearing before the ViceChancellor, only the railway company were served, and they not opposing, the Vice-Chancellor made an order sanctioning all the expenditure which was asked for by the petition. Before, however, this order had been drawn up, the making of it came to the knowledge of the remaindermen, They then applied to the Vice-Chancellor to have the petition reheard in their presence. This was done, and the Vice-Chancellor made a new order, refusing to sanction any of the expenditure asked for: Held, that the railway company could only be called upon to pay the costs of one hearing before the Vice-Chancellor. A local board of health, who had taken another part of the settled estate, and whose purchase money had also been paid into court, were respondents to the same petitior, by which it was proposed also to deal with the purchase money: Held, that the costs of the one hearing before the Vice-Chancellor must be paid in moieties by the railway company and the local board: (Re Leigh's Trusts, 25 L. T. Rep. N.S. 644. L. JJ.) WINDING-UP-PROOF-BILL OF EXCHANGE.The rule in bankruptcy against double proof against one estate in respect of the same debt applies also in liquidations under the Companies Act 1862. The E. Company, at the request of the O. Company, accepted bills for them, on the O. Company undertaking to provide them with funds to meet the bills at maturity. The bills were indorsed by the O. Company, and discounted by the A. Company for value. When the bills arrived at maturity, the three companies were in liquidation, and the O. Company not having provided the E. Company with funds to meet them, the bills were dishonoured. The A. Company proved upon the bills in the winding-up of both the E. and the O. Company, receiving from the E. Company 10s. in the pound on the full amount of the bills, and receiving from the O. Company a dividend which made up 20s. in the pound on the full amount of the bills. The E. company then claimed to prove against the O. company for the whole amount of dividend which they had been compelled to pay to the A. Company: Held, that the debt arising from the indorsement of the bills by the O. Company, and that arising from their undertaking to furnish the E. Company with funds to meet the bills were substantially the same debt; and that the claim of the E. Company must, therefore, be disallowed, inasmuch as the effect of allowing it would be to allow a double proof against the estate of the O. Company in respect of the same debt. Decision of Bacon, V.C. (24 L. T. Rep. N. S. 936) reversed : (Re The Oriental Commercial Bank, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 648. L.JJ.) WINDING-UP-LIABILITY OF PAST MEMBER TO CONTRIBUTE TO COSTS. Where a past member of a company, after he had been settled on the list of contributories, and a call had been made upon him, bought up the debts in respect of which he was liable to contribute to the company: Held, that he was not liable to contribute to the costs of winding-up the company, except as to so much of such costs as were incurred in settling the B list of contributories, and that he was not even liable to contribute to those costs if the liquidator had, at the time of settling that list, sufficient money in hand to pay them: (Re Greening and Co. 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 651. V.C. B.) REMUNERATION OF MANAGER.-The manager of a company was to receive as remuneration for his services a fixed salary and a moiety of the "net profits' on all sums realised on certain contracts. Held, that the manager was entitled to a moiety of the profits on such contract, deducting only the expenses necessary on account of each contract, but not deducting any of the expense incidental to the management of the company: (Stamp's Claim, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 653. V.C. B.) AMALGAMATION-NOTICE OF ALLOTMENT.-A duly registered member of a company formed by the amalgamation of two companies, of one of which he had previously been a member, and who had consented to the amalgamation, cannot set up the validity of the amalgamation against creditors of the company. Where the manager of a company forwarded to T. notice that he was entitled to shares in the company, accompanied by a form of application for shares, and T. signed the form of application and returned it to the manager, it was Held, that T. was liable as a shareholder, notice of allotment being immaterial: (Brown and Tucker's Cases, 20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 654. V.C. B.) The ALBERT ARBITRATION.-The Review, a publication devoted to the insurance interests, publishes this month some facts arising out of the judgment delivered in December by Lord Cairns in the German policy holders' case. "The result," it says, 66 was looked forward to with much interest, as it was expected, though it could not be positively stated, that if the question of novation were decided against the German policy holders, and their claims were thus adjudged to be against the Albert company alone, no further call would require to be made upon the share holders of the Medical. Lord Cairns decided that the facts of the cases are sufficient to warrant him in inferring novation against the German policy holders. The peculiar circumstances of these cases are not a little instructive. One very acute remark of Lord Cairns deserves particular attention. A considerable correspondence took place between the officials of the German society and the officials of the Albert at the time of the transfer. This, said Lord Cairns, was like the correspondence which we usually find occurring between an insurance company and an ordinary policy holder. It was a correspondence between two experts, each of whom was thoroughly conversant with the business in hand. The German society, according to Lord Cairns, might fairly be presumed to know, much better than an ordinary policy holder would know, what must be the effect of accepting a bonus for those whose interests they represented in the correspondence. The circumstance of an ordinary policy-holder receiving a bonus from a transferee company has been decided in the Anchor case by the Lord Chancellor to be fatal to any further claim against the company with which he was originally insured. A fortiori, must such receipt be fatal when the payment of bonus was made to the skilled functionaries of another insurance company, who had shown themselves at first exceedingly chary of their confidence, and difficult to bring over. An attempt was made to explain away the unquestionable fact of the receipt of bonus by showing that the German Company had afterwards protested against and repudiated the amalgamation, but this Lord Cairns said was too late. They had done that which by itself more than outweighed a hundred proteststhey had received a bonus which came to them earlier than it would have done had they continued to be members of the old company. According, therefore, to the principles laid down in other cases, they could not blow hot and cold at the same time. They could not accept benefits to which they could only be entitled as policy-holders of one company, and still continue to be policy. holders in another. They had by their acts elected deliberately to become policy-holders of the trans feree company, and with that company they must stand or fall." REAL PROPERTY AND CONVEYANCING. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. SETTLEMENT-CONSTRUCTION.-By a marriage settlement a sum of Consols was settled in trust for the children, and issue of children, other than and except an eldest or only son, who should be entitled to the father's settled estates, provided that if the husband should die in his wife's lifetime, leaving an only child, and such child should be a son, then such only child should be entitled to the whole trust fund; but if there should be two children, or only one child of the marriage (other than an eldest or only son) who should attain the age of twenty-one or marry, in such case such two children, or such one only child (other than an eldest or only son) should not be entitled to any part of the trust fund, but it should belong absolutely to the husband, as such two children, or one only child (other than an eldest or only child) were otherwise provided for by a deed of even date, creating a charge upon the settled estates. There were two children of the marriage, a son and a daughter. The daughter married, and subsequently the son died an infant, and the daughter thereupon became entitled to the settled estates. The husband died in the lifetime of the wife. The deed creating a charge upon the settled estates was invalid. Held, that the daughter was entitled to the trust fund: (Carter v. Earl Ducie, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 656. V.C. B.) MERCANTILE LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-BROKER-BROKER MAKING HIMSELF THE PRINCIPAL-LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL TO BROKER-CONTRACT OF SALE DELIVERY OF GOODS.-Defendant employed plaintiffs, who were cotton brokers in London, to buy 500 bales of cotton for him, telling them to buy gradually at 84d., if they could not do better. Cotton could not then have been bought at 8d. Plaintiffs shortly afterwards passed to defendant &c., at Sid." This was signed by plaintiffs as a bought note, "Bought on your account 500 bales, brokers, and at the bottom of the note a charge of per cent. was made for brokerage. Before delivery of the cotton, the defendant became aware that plaintiff's had not, at the time of their passing this bought note, made any contract for him for the purchase of cotton, but that they had subse sequently bought the 500 bales, in their own name, to enable them to make delivery to him partly at 8.d., and partly at 714. per lb. Defendant would not have accepted the bought note from plaintiffs if he had known that they were thus acting as principals in the transaction. Defendant, on becoming aware of the state of circumstances, refused to accept the cotton, and this action was brought to JAN. 13, 1872.J recover damages for such non-acceptance. It was proved that there was a custom in the London cotton market that, if a broker bought for his employer of an undisclosed principal, he was liable himself upon the contract. Held that the action was not maintainable, as no contract of sale had been made between plaintiffs and defendant. Plaintiffs before the expiration of the time for the delivery of the cotton, tendered marks of cotton that was not in accordance with the terms of the contract, and, on defendant rejecting the same, they, before the expiration of the time fixed for delivery, tendered marks of cotton that was in accordance with the contract. Held, that plaintiffs had not, by the first delivery, broken the contract, so as to justify defendant in refusing to accept the cotton subsequently tendered: (Telley and another v. Shand, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 659. C. P.) HOW FRAUD OPERATES ON NEGOTI ABLE INSTRUMENTS. THE following judgment was delivered by Chief We have presented to our consideration in this Larson v. THE LAW TIMES. The court to which I belong confirmed my decision, there were cast on that case at an earlier time." And he concludes: "For these reasons, notwithstanding all the unfeigned reverence I feel for everything that fell fro:n Lord Kenyon, by whom Lawson v. Weston was decided, I cannot think that the view taken Nor is by that learned lord was a correct one." this rejection of this antecedent decision attempted, in the slightest degree, to be put upon the foundation of pre-existing authority; not a case is referred to for its justification, and although in Weston the authority of Lord Mans field, in Miller v. Ruce, was mooted, no remark is made on that circumstance. I think a perusal of the opinions in Gill y. Cubitt will satisfy anyone that it was a well understood intention to deviate from the legal rule upon this subject which had previously existed; or, if any doubt should remain, such doubt will certainly be dispelled by a reference to the case of Slater v. West (3 Carr. & Payne, 325, decided in the year 1828), in which Chief Justice Abbott (then Lord Tenterden), in laying down the doctrine that a person is not entitled to recover who takes a bill of exchange under circumstances which ought to excite suspicion in the mind of a reasonable man, says: "This I believe I was doctrine is of modern origin. the first judge who decided this point at Nisi Prius. before committing them to the jury. And it is MARITIME LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. COLLISION-MEASURE OF DAMAGES-DEMURRAGE-TIME AND RULE-PRACTICE.-In a cause of limitation of liability arising out of a collision, where, the fund in court being insufficient to satisfy the claims against it, a reference has been made to the registrar and merchants to assess the view the registrar's report and correct it, if it damages as to time and rate, the court will reshould appear that any portions of the report are ous view of the evidence. Demurrage is allowed to the owners of a ship damaged by collision founded on what the court deems to be an erronelayed for the purpose of effecting the repairs renduring the time that she has been necessarily decollision. As the master has, in some circum. dered requisite by the collision, and of transacting business unquestionably connected with the stances, the duty cast upon him of acting as agent for the cargo as well as the ship, the making a ments in a foreign port relating to the damage done to both ship and cargo is business unques protest and obtaining the necessary official docuQuære, tionably connected with the collision. Delay in their preparation caused by the dilatoriness of the foreign authorities, and by no default of the master, is chargeable to the collision. whether trans-shipment and forwarding of cargo can be said to be business connected with the col steam vessels of the ordinary class, carrying per ton on the net tonnage, per day. This estimate is arrived at by doubling the amount of the cargo, is Gd. per ton on the gross tonnage, or 9d. wages of the crew and of the cost of their proviof trade: (City of Buenos Ayres, 25 L. T. Rep. sions, so as to include both expenditure and loss N. S. 672. Adm. Ct.) lision. The usual rate of demurrage allowed to EPPS'S CHOCOLATE.-"Nous n'avons en France qu'une seule usine où la préparation du Cacao emploie un matériel et un personnel aussi considerables que ceux que nous avons vus dans l'usine de Messieurs Epps C'est une véritable curiosité dans son geure que cette (the Imperialist immense fabrique."-La Situation orgau). The wrapper of each cake of Chocolate is labelled "JAMES EPPS & Co., Homeopathic Chemists, Also, makers of Epps's Milky Chocolate London." (Chocolate and Condensed Milk). LAW STUDENTS' JOUR NAL LEGAL EDUCATION. WE extract the following from a paper read by William Alfred Jevons, at the Social Science Congress, Leeds, in October last, which has been published by Messrs. Butterworths. Having reviewed existing means of education, he says:The question before us is how far this system is satisfactory, and if not satisfactory, what should be substituted for it. The present system is sometimes defended upon the ground of its practical success, namely that it has produced eminent lawyers, and also that the end of law being the administration of justice, that that must necessarily be a good system which has produced an administration of justice so pure as that of England. The answer to this is, that, however eminent English lawyers have been and are, they would as a body have been more eminent had they been educated on a better and more enlarged system; and of how many English lawyers can it be said that their acquirements out of the range of the law of their own country, and indeed out of the range of that particular branch of the law of their own country to which they have devoted themsalves, are all that they should be, are all that a wider cultivation and a more scientific system of teaching might have made them. Whatever opinion, however, may be held as to the effect of an improved system of legal education on the highest minds amongst our lawyers, we must consider the wants not only of the leaders, but also those of the rank and file of the professsion. We have a most complicated and difficult system of law to teach and we ought to endeavour to teach it in the easiest and best manner. We may go further, and say that we have now two difficult and complicated systems of law to teach, so difficult that few but the master minds of the profession ever succeed in getting even a tolerable acquaintance with both of them. These two systems, if the recommendations of a royal commission now sitting are adopted, are about to be fused, so that both sets of rights and remedies may be recognised and administered by the same courts. This step when taken must at once make it necessary that practitioners should be acquainted with both branches of the law; therefore, even supposing the existing means of legal education to be sufficient for the instruction of lawyers who are only required to practise in one branch of the law, inasmuch as we are now about to require them to be equally well qualified in two, we ought surely to proceed, and that without delay, to lessen as much as possible all the difficulties in the way of acquiring a knowledge of of both. There is, however, another effect of our present system of teaching the law which it is necessary to consider. The student beginning to learn his profession from decided cases, and not from theoretical books or oral teaching, the first idea that he acquires, is that there is nothing fixed or certain, unless the precise point or some analogous one has been before decided. If he can find no case upon the subject before him, he is at sea. The same feeling follows him into the practice of his profession. If he has to argue a case, or afterwards, as a judge, to decide one, he argues or decides upon the authority of previous cases, and rarely upon principle. If he becomes a writer of treatises on any branch of the law, he still follows the same bent of mind, his book is in most cases very little better than a sort of index to the reports on a particular branch of law, and but seldom, and then with great caution, does he attempt to follow out any particular case, so as to show the principle involved in it, to follow out that principle to its legitimate conclusions, and to apply it to other cases not yet dealt with by the courts. If the existing cases are well arranged in the logical order of the doctrines to be deduced from them, so as to facilitate the memory in recollecting the decisions, it is as much as we are entitled to expest-to mount from the known to the unknown, is a thing seldom or never attempted. When the lawyer becomes a judge, he is, of course, occasionally obliged to trench upon new ground; but it is no disrespect to the Bench to say that the previous training their minds have gone through in the study and practice of their profession, has been such, that it would be marvellous indeed if they generally proved well qualified to deal with new cases where principle only could be their guide, or even to distinguish amongst old cases, not easily reconcilable, those which were founded on sound principle from those into which erroneous principles had crept. The consequence has been that by insensible degrees a train of successive decisions, each professing to be founded on those that have gone before it, has occasionally brought us to a result contrary, not law school or university should be differently dealt with; but being established for public objects, the public also should have some guarantee for its efficiency, and such would be best afforded by introducing into the senate, or governing body, an element of public official persons, or of Crown nominees. only to justice and public convenience, but even It is impossible to expect such persons to study In dealing with the present system of legal edu- case. All previous proposals that have been made for founding a law university have proposed that the four Inns of Court should be the nucleus of such university; but a little consideration will show that those bodies are not suited for the purpose. They are four in number, completely independent of each other, and are governed, not by boards elected by their members, but by self-appointed bodies; and, moreover, they exclude from their membership one, and that by much the most numerous, branch of the profession. Therefore, if it were to be attempted to convert the Inns of Court into such a law university as the nation requires, such great changes would have to be made in their constitution that it would be a task much more easy, as well as more simple, to create an entirely new institution for the required purpose. The first enquiry is what should be the nature and government of the university, or law school, proposed. The first point upon which it is desirable to insist is that it should be a university for the education of the whole profession in both its branches, as well colonial as English, and also as well for laymen, requiring some elementary knowledge of law, as for persons intending to be practising lawyers. There is another point, however, that must be considered in connection with that of improved facilities for legal education, namely, that of a test of the extent to which the means of education offered have been taken advantage of. The necessity of an examination test, as to the qualifications of attorneys, is admitted by the law as it stands, and as to barristers it is no less obvious. It is quite true that, as to the practising barrister, the public, when employing him as an advocate, have some guarantee for his qualifica tions in the fact that he is selected by an attorney. But the barrister has other offices besides those of adviser and advocate, for from the ranks of the Bar exclusively, are taken the judges at home and in the colonies, County Court judges, revising barristers, stipendary magistrates, and a variety of other judicial and semi-judicial officers. For the higher of these offices public opinion affords a guarantee that no one but eminent practitioners can be appointed to them, but such is not the case as to the inferior offices. The government of a university is naturally placed in the hands of those who have been taught in its schools and received its degrees, and there is no apparent reason why the proposed The proposal of the association which has been recently formed for promoting the objects advocated in this paper is, that the power of election should be conferred in suitable proportions, upon the Inns of Court, and the various incorporated law societies of attorneys in London and the provinces. To confer such power upon the Inns of Court, would however, probably, not be satis factory to the general members of the Inns, if it were to be exercised by the benchers only. Probably that objection might be met, by dividing the representatives conferred on each Inn, between the benchers and the other members of the Inn. The incorporated law societies do not include all the attorneys in England and Wales, and they do not exist in all parts of the country; but as they exist in all the considerable centres of business, and in several counties, and as they naturally include the most active and zealous members of the pro ession in each locality, they probably would give as good and fair a practical representation of the opinions and interests of that branch of the profession as could be obtained in any other way. There would however, be no insuperable difficulty in electing members, by polling the whole profession by voting papers, if the Inns of Courts and law societies were not considered to represent it fairly and adequately. The next question is, whether the instruction in the University should be compulsory or optional: that is, whether a person ought to go up for examination with a view to practice without having attended lectures in the law schools. I was at first strongly disposed to consider that it on all persons should be made compulsory intending to practice to attend in the schools, and I should still greatly desire to see such attendance for a longer or shorter time practically universal, but I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that it is not desirable, in the first instance, at all events, that such a requirement should be made. With regard to barristers, probably no great inconvenience would result from requiring their personal attendance and study at the schools, but with regard to attorneys the case is somewhat different. The great majority of attorneys reside in the provinces, and I find, on inquiry, that not more than one-third of the articled clerks comingup to London from the country to pass their examination, have spent any period of study in London prior to such examination. It would therefore, apparently, be a harsh pro ceeding to compel all country students intended for the profession of attorneys to study at the proposed schools. It is to be remembered that even if study at the law schools is not made essential, yet the test examinations will be founded on the same scheme of study as is established in the schools, so that to dispense with attendance on the lectures, will not be to dispense with the knowledge that can be most readily and easily acquired at those lectures, but simply to permit those whose means do not allow them to attend lectures in London to obtain the imprimatur of the university, if their diligence enables them to attain the same amount of knowledge in any other way. One important point to consider is, how the examinations that are to be the test of com petency to practise are to be conducted. In the proposals of the Legal Education Association, as well as in the resolution of Sir Roundell Palmer, it is assumed that these examinations are to be conducted by the same body that conducts the teaching. It does not, however, appear desirable that the teachers and the examiners should be the same persons. It is just that a teacher should be the person to test for merely academic purposes, the degree of attention which a pupil has paid to his lectures; but an examination intended to test general acquirements in a particular subject, especially where such test is needed for public purposes, should be a test of the teacher, as well as of the pupil. It would not be difficult, however, to devise a mode in which such a board of examiners as would command the confidence of the public might be appointed. The senate, or governing body of the university might properly have the appointment of part of them, subject to the condition that the examiners should none of them be professors or teachers in the schools, and the appointment of the others might be vested in the Crown. With regard to the nature and number of the examinations, there should be a first or prelimi nary examination in general knowledge, not as a |