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premises of the obnoxious persons. The word "watch" is connected with the word "beset;" either will do, "watch or beset" being the expression. Watching premises to intercept workmen, and distribute to them handbills inciting them to rebel against their employer, seems to us to be well within the law. Moreover, in such a case the act carries with it the intention. To corrupt workmen under the eyes of the master is as likely as any thing we can imagine to coerce the master, and the Act says that it is only necessary that the means should be used "with a view to coerce.'

The Trades Union Congress demand the repeal of the clauses in the Act of last session relating to coercion "in order to place trade societies on an equality with the rest of the community." The objection to this is that the rest of the community is not given to picketing and rattening, and the oppression of masters and workmen by powerful combinations must be prevented. Mr. Rupert Kettle has drafted a bill which if adopted, may give to trade societies such jurisdiction over their own members as will prevent appeals to the law, and thus the Criminal Act of last year might be in a measure dispensed with. In the meantime magistrates have a task of some difficulty in administering the law, but we cannot admit that the difficulty is by any means so great as some of our contemporaries appear to think. All that is required is a careful attention to the ordinary meaning of the words used, and the intention of Parliament.

PERSONAL LIABILITY OF EXECUTORS.

WE last week considered the question of the personal liability of bankruptcy trustees, and incidentally noticed the liability of executors. This is an important head of law, and it is somewhat unfortunate that we should have different judgments by courts of equity upon it. In Farhall v. Farhall (24 L. T. Rep. N. S. 610) a widow who was executrix with three other persons as executors, induced a bank to open an account for her, entitled "Mr. Richard Farhall's Executors' Account," and the bank honoured her cheques upon it, signed "Mary Farhall, for executors of Richard Farhall." A considerable sum was advanced in this way with which the executrix charged the estate of her testator. On a suit for administration by the infant daughter, the bank carried in their claim in respect of the advances to the widow; but the plaintiff contended that she had no right to do so, and that the overdraw at the bank was a personal liability of her own Vice-Chancellor

Bacon allowed the claim of the bank.

The Vice-Chancellor apparently rested his decision upon Ashby V. Ashby (7 B. & C. 444), which Lord Justice Mellish considered had been misunderstood by the present Lord Chancellor, when Vice-Chancellor, in the case of Haynes v. Forshaw, as well as by Vice-Chancellor Bacon in the present case. We will therefore, look at Ashby v. Ashby for ourselves. The first count of the declaration stated that the defendants, as executrix and executor, were indebted to the plaintiff in 500l. for so much money by the plaintiff paid, laid out, &c., to and for the use of the defendants, as such executrix and executor at their request, and then alleged a promise by the defendants as executrix and executor to pay the said 5001. The second count was for money had and received as executrix and executor; and the third count was on an account stated by the defendants as executrix and executor. There was a demurrer, and it was contended that there was no case in which it had been expressly decided that a count for money paid to the defendant's use as executor will charge him de bonis testatoris, and Rose v. Bowler (1 H. Bl. 109) and Powell v. Graham (7 Taunt. 581) were cited to the contrary. The count for money paid, it was said, raised a new cause of action, not existing at the time of the death of the testator, and founded on a contract made by the executrix and executor. On the other side it was contended that the plea of plene administravit might be pleaded to all the counts, and they would all warrant a judgement de bonis propriis. Lord Tenterden said that the count for money had and received being a personal charge on the executor to which plene administravit could not be pleaded, and on which the judg ment must be de bonis propriis, and the count on the account stated being of a contrary character, there was a misjoinder. All that he decided, therefore, was that the defendants could not be charged as executors on a count for money had and received. Bayley, J., stated that had the question been new, he should have thought all the counts well joined, and that the defendants were liable for money had and received as executrix and executor, but he felt himself bound by the authorities. He also expressed his view that money might be paid to the use of executors so as to charge the assets of the testator. "That imports," he said, referring to the first count, "that the plaintiff has paid it, not on the personal account of the defendants, but that he has paid it for them, because they were executor and executrix; that is, as it seems to me, in release of something which otherwise would have been a burden on the assets of the testator. I think," he added, "the plaintiff, having paid the money to the use of the defendants, as executor and executrix, has the same rights that, before such payment, belonged to the person to whom it was made, and consequently that he (the plaintiff) may charge the assets of the testator." Lord Justice Mellish holds this as meaning that

agree that

the payment must have arisen out of some contract made with the testator, referring to what Mr. Justice Bayley says subsequently, namely, that in a case of suretyship where the testator, had he been living, would have been liable to contribution, and the surviving surety pays, he has a right against the executor for money paid to his use as executor. We this makes it plain that a liability on the part of the testator on a contract made in his lifetime is contemplated as founding the right of action against the executor. The judgment of Littledale, J. was largely quoted from by Lord Justice Mellish. As to the count for money had and received, that learned Judge makes observations which clearly point to a benefit received or liability incurred by the testator. "If," he says, "the testator, in his lifetime, had been indebted to the plaintiff for money had and received to his use, there would not be any specific appropriation of the money so received to the plaintiff's use, but that money, on the death of the testator, would have gone into his general funds, and the debt must have been paid out of those funds in its regular order. But where an executor receives money to the use of a particular individual, it operates as a specific appropriation of that money belonging to the party, and he, in his individual capacity, must be liable for the money so received; it has nothing to do with the accounts of the testator."

The view taken by the Lords Justices against the liability of the testator's estate, in Farhall v. Farhall, is the more important, because the learned text-writer on the subject (Williams on Executors) distinctly encourages the idea that executors may make promises binding their testator's estate, without stating that the consideration for the promise of the executor must be a contract made with the testator, or a transaction with him. What that author says is this: "It seems to have been once considered that, whenever an action was brought against an executor or administrator, on promises said to have been made by him after the death of the testator or intestate, he was chargeable in his own right, and not in his representative capacity. The more modern authorities have, however, established that, in several instances, the executor may be sued, as executor, on a promise made by him as executor, and that a declaration founded on such a promise will charge the defendant no further than a declaration on a promise of the testator." Citing this, Lord Justice Mellish points out that every case quoted in support of the proposition, without exception lay it down as stated above, that is to say, that the consideration for the promise of the executor must have been a contract by, or transaction with, the testator. These cases the learned Lord Justice examines (see p. 686 of our Reports):-Dowse v. Core (3 Bing. 20), Powell v. Graham (7 Taunt. 581), Ashby v. Ashby (sup.), and Corner v. Shew (8 M. & S. 350).

Nothing more need be said, and we have to thank the Lords Justices for a clear exposition of the law on a point of daily importance, and we should advise our readers to lay their teaching well to heart.

LAW LIBRARY.

The Laws relating to Public Health and Local Government, including the Law relating to the Removal of Nuisances injurious to Health, the Prevention of Diseases, and Sewer Authorities, with Statutes and Cases. By W. CUNNINGHAM GLEN, Barrister-at-Law. Sixth Edition. London: Butterworth.

How much of this portly volume of 844 pages will survive the coming session of Parliament? It is said that threatened men live long, and emphatically this may be repeated of threatened laws, and consequently of threatened law books. A new code of sanitary law has been promised for a long time, and now it is confidently put forward in the prophetic programme of the work to be done by the Legislature during the present year. If it should be done, then Mr. GLEN will have wasted a great deal of the labour he has bestowed upon the production of this volume, and he will have the honour of materially assisting in his own discomfiture; for there can be no doubt that on whomsoever may devolve the task of preparing the promised new sanitary code, the framer must largely avail himself of the materials which have been here collected for him. Indeed, if the Government really designs what is predicted, they could not do better than call Mr. GLEN to their aid, and avail themselves of his extensive knowledge of this branch of the law as it is, for the construction of the law as it ought to be. Beginning as a modest little volume of pocket dimensions, in successive editions it has grown to be the big tome before us, indicating precisely the growth in public regard of the subjects to which it is devoted and proving beyond question the necessity for immediate legislation, in order to reduce to something like simplicity the multitude of enactments, often conflicting, and still more frequently incomprehensible, with which the statute book is loaded. All whose duties bring them into the practical administration of these laws, whether as magistrates, lawyers, or parish officers, will acknowledge the almost hopeless embroglio into which they are plunged by sections unintelligible, moulded by amendment Acts into yet greater unintelligibility and by unpractical directions which to enforce only increase the mischiefs they were designed to remedy.

But it is one thing to promise, another thing to attempt, and

quite a different thing to carry, a comprehensive amendment of a law so difficult in itself and affecting so many interests at so many points as is this legislation in the matter of health. To start with, there is the difficulty that the scientists and experts are not themselves agreed what ought to be done. Millions have been already expended upon arterial sewerage, with no other result than to propagate typhoid fever. Routing out cesspools, we have so befouled the rivers as to poison their waters and cause really more mischief than we have cured. The law requires the magistrates to determine what structural works they shall order to be done on the premises and at the cost of a man who has a disagreeable smell in his yard. The order is to cover the drain and pass on ats contents to his next neighbour, who in his turn becomes a muisance, is ordered to cover up and move on, and so forth, until the accumulated sewage is collected at the boundary of the magisterial authority, or at a place where it has no right to be, and the owner of which obtains an injunction, leaving the unfortunate victim in the

position of being liable to a penalty under the magistrates' order if he does not send it forwards, and imprisonment for contempt by the Court of Chancery if he does.

In this unsatisfactory state of things everybody exclaims that something must be done; but it is remarkable that as yet nobody has ventured even to suggest the outline of a practical plan for doing it. The Government is expected to accomplish what the united wisdom of the whole country has failed to devise, and as we are somewhat incredulous as to this supposed omniscience of any Government, we do not anticipate any material change in the law during the coming session.

It is enough to say that, as a well-arranged collection of the law as it is, with notes of the various decisions upon it by the courts, sensible instructions and practical forms, together with a most copious index by which this huge mass of law is rendered readily accessible, there is no book on the subject bearing any comparison with this one by Mr. GLEN.

NOTES OF THE WEEK.
COURT OF APPEAL IN CHANCERY.
Jan. 15 and 17.

(Before the LORD CHANCELLOR.) SINNETT . HERBERT. Will-Charity le gacies-Cy près-Fund standing in bank to trust account-Trusts unascertainable. MARY MORICE, spinster, by will dated the 7th April 1865, bequeathed annuities to certain persons, and charged all and singular her real estates with the payment thereof, with power to the annuitants to recover the annuities when in arrear by distress and sale, and subject to the annuities she devised her real estate to the Rev. James Hughes in fee. The testatrix also bequeathed several legacies, of which there was one of 30007. to F. R. Roberts and J. Sinnett, upon trust to be applied "in aid of an endowment for the Welsh church now in course of erection at Aberystwith," and the rest of her personal estate subject to the payment of debts and legacies, she bequeathed to F. R. Roberts and J. Sinnett "upon trust to be by them applied in aid of erecting or of endowing an additional church at Aberystwith," and appointed those gentlemen her executors. The testatrix died in 1866. It was found by the chief clerk that there was not any church answering the description of an additional church at Aberystwith being erected or being about to be erected at the time of the death of the testatrix. The question was whether the gift of the residue for the purpose of endowing a church not in existence was void under 9 Geo. 2, c. 36, as an attempt to bring fresh land into mortmain. Vice-Chancellor Bacon having held that the gift of the residue was not intended to provide an endow ament except in the event of a church being in course of erection at the death of the testatrix, and that the gift therefore failed, the defendant appealed.

The Solicitor-General (Jessel Q.C.), Amphlett, Q.C., Bristowe, Q.C., Kay, Q.C., Fallows, Speed and Hughes appeared.

The LORD CHANCELLOR varied the decree of the court below as appealed from. He directed an inquiry at chambers whether or not the funds in the hands of the trustees for the purpose of erecting an additional church at Aberystwith, or any or what part thereof, could be so laid out and employed; and subject to that inquiry, there would be a declaration that the sum of 5001., and no more might be set apart by the trustees and executors out of the impure personalty towards the aiding in erecting an additional church at Aberystwith, and the whole of the pure personalty towards the endowing of such church; without prejudice to any question which might arise, in case the inquiry should be answered in the negative. There was no reason why the next of kin should be present at that inquiry as it was only a matter between the Attorney-General and the estate. The costs of the appeal to be costs in the cause. Solicitors: E. Balden for F. R. Roberts, Aberystwith; Jones, Blaxland and Son; Raven and Bradey.

ROLLS COURT.

Dec. 5 and 7, 1871, and Jan. 11, 1872
RENNIE v. MORRIS.

Transfer of shares-Liability of jobber-Usages of
the Stock Exchange.
THIS was a suit arising out of a transaction in
the shares of Overend, Gurney, and Co., shortly

after that company suspended payment on the 11th May 1866. The plaintiff being at that time the registered owner of eighty shares, on the 14th May 1866 sold them through his brokers to the defendant who is a jobber or dealer of shares, and a member of the Stock Exchange, at 14 discount, or 5s. per share. On the name day the defendant handed to the plaintiff's brokers a ticket with the name of Robert Graham, jun., as the purchaser of thirty of these shares, and a transfer was subsequently executed to him by the plaintiff, but in consequence of the winding-up of the company, it could not be registered, and the plaintiff was settled on the list of contributories and remained liable to the company for the calls which were subsequently made. The plaintiff having been obliged to pay these calls had recourse to the purchaser, Robert Graham, jun, who turned out to be an infant, and therefore incapable of being bound by his contract. The plaintiff then filed his bill against the defendant, requiring him to take the shares and indemnify the plaintiff against the calls on the ground that he had not discharged his original liability by substituting for himself the name of a person capable of contracting according to the usages of the Stock Exchange. The principal question which arose (but which the view taken by the Master of the Rolls rendered it unnecessary to decide) was whether a jobber, who gives a name, to which no objection is taken within the ten days allowed by the rules of the Stock Exchange before the transfer is completed, is discharged from his liability if it afterwards turns out that the name given was that of a person incapable of contracting, though the jobber was not aware of it. The name of Graham was received from a Mr. Lancashire, a member of the Manchester Stock Exchange, but who, on inquiry, refused to disclose the name of the principal for whom he acted. Southgate, Q.C., and Bagshawe for the plaintiff. for the defendant. Sir R. Baggallay, Q.C., Macnamara, and Higgins

the question was whether the defendant was Lord ROMILLY, after stating the facts said, that liable according to the usages of the Stock Exchange which, when they do not contravene the law of the realm, were in his opinion the law of the court, and according to such usages interme diate dealers were, in the absence of fraud, exempt from all liability to the original seller, provided they gave all the information as to their transactions required of them, otherwise there would be action, and the usages of the Stock Exchange as many suits as there were jobbers in the transobviate this necessity. Equity likewise passes and takes hold of the person ultimately and exover the heads of innocent intermediate parties, clusively liable. The suit ought, therefore, to have been brought against Mr. Lancashire, who had refused to give up the name of the real purchaser, and the defendant could not be made liable because Mr. Lancashire had given the name of a minor as the nominee of himself or some undis closed principal, and the bill must be dismissed with costs.

Clarke.
Solicitors for the plaintiff, Ellis, Parker, and

Solicitor for the defendant, John Tucker.

Dec. 14, 1871, and Jan. 15, 1872.
COOPER. KYNOCK.

Specific performance-Remainder whether legal or equitable-Rule in Shelley's case inapplicable. THIS was a suit for specific performance of an agreement to purchase certain property which the defendant résisted, contending that the plain

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tiff could not make a good title to the premises. By a settlement made on the marriage of the plaintiff, Mrs. Cooper, her father granted the premises to A. B., to hold the same to the use of the settlor for life, remainder to the use of Mary his wife, in case she should survive him for her life, remainder, in case the plaintiff should at her death be discovert, to her use in fee, but in case she should then be a married woman (which hap pened) to the use of the said A. B., his heirs and assigns, upon trust to receive the rents and profits, and to pay the same to the plaintiff for her life for her separate use, and after the determinatica of that estate to stand seised of the premises to such uses and upon such trusts as the plaintiff should by will appoint, and in default of such appointment, to the use of the heirs and assigns of the plaintiff for ever. After the death of the plaintiff's husband she entered into an agreement with the defendant for the sale to him of the premises in fee, but on looking into the title it was objected on behalf of the defendant that it was doubtful whether the ultimate limitation to the heirs and assigns of the plaintiff was a legal or equitable interest; that, if legal, it would not come within the rule in Shelley's case, and unite with her life estate, which was clearly equitable.

Charles Hall and Whitehorne for the plaintiff. defendant. Sir R. Baggallay, Q.C. and Bedwell for the

Lord ROMILLY said the question was whether the remainder to the heirs of the plaintiff was of the same quality as the life estate given to her. As shown by the deed itself, there appeared no intention to continue the estate in the trustee after the life of the plaintiff, and in his opinion the remainder to the heirs of the plaintiff was a legal

estate.

The point was much too doubtful to compel a purchaser to accept the title, and the bill must be dismissed with costs. Solicitors: Sheffield and Sons; Budd and Son.

Dec. 16, 1871, and Jan. 15, 1872. ELSE. ELSE. Sale by the court-Conditions calculated to mis THIS was an adjourned summons raising an lead-Purchaser discharged. important question as to the practice of the of an order in the cause certain property had court on sales under its authority. In pursuance been settled by one of the conveyancers of the been sold, under conditions of sale, which had court in the ordinary way. The conditions protain deeds of lease and release, dated respectively vided that the title should commence with cer the 23rd and 24th July 1833, being conveyances such deeds as a good substantive root of title, on sale, and that the purchaser should accept and should not make any objection or requisition notwithstanding any recital or notice, or disclo in respect of any prior title or evidence of title, sure of any prior title. It appeared by the recitals in the release as if the vendor of 1833 was seised in fee simple under a devise in his favour, and the conditions of sale were settled on that understanding; but upon reference to the will it seemed extremely probable that upon the true construction of the gift he only took the fee simple contingent on his leaving issue, and, he being of advanced age and unmarried, the purchaser refused to complete, on the grounds that the con ditions did not sufficiently disclose the nature of the title, and insisting that he ought not to be compelled to accept a title which might turn out to be no title at all.

JAN. 20, 1872.1

The Solicitor-General (Jessel, Q.C.) and Begg for the purchaser.

Joshua Williams, Q.C. for the persons interested in completion of the sale.

Lord ROMILLY said that it often became the duty of the court to sell the real estate of suitors, and when this was the case it was the function of the conveyancing counsel of the court to prepare the conditions of sale, which should be such as to allow of the highest price possible being obtained, yet nothing should be inserted calculated to mislead or deceive an innocent purchaser. Having come to the conclusion that the vendor of 1838 only took a fee simple in the event of his leaving issue, the question to be decided is, whether it is open to the purchaser to insist on his objection. Without expressing any opinion as to how the court would look at the question if it arose between two strangers, but arising as it does on a sale by order of the court, he was of opinion that the objection was fatal. The purchaser must be discharged, have his deposit returned, and be paid his costs out of the fund standing to the credit of

the cause.

Solicitors, J. Elliott For; Le Riche and Son.

V.C. MALINS' COURT.

Jan. 13, 15, and 16.

Re THE IMPERIAL ANGLO-GERMAN BANK. Inchoate company-Winding-up-Debts incurred on credit of company-Liability of allottees of shares. THIS was a petition to wind-up the above company, presented by two clerks, named Matthews and Sawyer, who claimed in respect of unpaid salaries, and an advertising agent named Roberts, who claimed to be a creditor of the company for 1218. in respect of advertisements. Roberts was also an allottee of fifty shares in the company. In the beginning of 1871 a scheme was set on foot to establish a banking company to carry on business between London, Berlin, and the East; and the scheme was promoted by one Henry De Lacy O'Brien. From the prospectus, which was brought out in April 1871, it appeared that the capital of the company was to be 450,000l., in 15,000 shares of 301. each, the deposit being 11., payable on application, and 21. on allotment. The principal seat of the company was to be in Berlin, with an establishment in London, the temporary offices being at 33, Cornhill. Messrs. Apcar, Gaussen, nine other English and and Behrend, and German gentlemen were the proposed directors.

The company

was

to be established under

the German Code of Commerce, and the North German Companies Law of 1870; and the prospectus stated that, under the provisions of that law, applicants for shares could not be made liable before the incorporation of the company, and that their money must, therefore, be returned in full, if the undertaking should not be proceeded with. The prospectus also stated that one-half of the capital had already been subscribed in Germany, and 31. per share (being 10 per cent. of the nominal value required to be paid by the abovementioned law before incorporation) had been deposited at the bankers at Berlin. Subscriptions were invited for the remaining 7500 shares. The whole of these shares were allotted to applicants; and 22,5001. being the amount of the deposits, was paid into the London and County Bank, Lombardstreet. In Aug. 1871 it appeared at the meeting of shareholders in Berlin, which was required by German law to be held for the incorporation of the company, that there was not sufficient evidence that 7500 shares had been subscribed in Germany, and that there had been no bona fide The scheme payment of 10 per cent. thereon. accordingly fell through, and the company was never incorporated. To avoid attachment the deposit moneys which had been paid into the London and County Bank were transferred to Coutts's Bank in the names of Apcar, Gaussen, and Behrend, and arrangements were being made for the return of this money in full. The petition was presented on the 20th Dec., and on the 22nd Dec. an order was made, on an ex parte application by the petitioners, appointing a provisional liquidator. A motion to discharge this order as irregular, came on to be heard with the petition. It appeared that the order for the advertisements was given in May 1871, by the company's secretary, at the office in Cornhill, in the presence of O'Brien; and Roberts alleged that he gave credit to the The directors, on the other hand, alleged that it was agreed that O'Brien should bear all the preliminary expenses; that they knew nothing of Roberts; and that they were bound by the prospectus to return the deposit moneys in full. They contended, therefore, that Roberts could not claim to be paid out the fund at Coutts's bank, and no valid debt upon which a that there winding-up order could be made. Glasse, Q.C. and Chitty for the petitioners. Cotton, Q.C. and Higgins for Messrs. Apcar, Gaussen, and Behrend,

company.

was

Pearson, Q.C. and Robinson for the other directors.

THE LAW TIMES.

The VICE-CHANCELLOR held that the debts of
the petitioners were binding on those who had
associated themselves together to form the company,
and that this association was within sect. 199 of the
He accordingly made an
Companies Act 1862.
order for the compulsory winding-up of the asso-
ciation, and made no order on the motion
Solicitors, Linklaters and Co.; Argles and Raw-
lins; Rooks, Kenrick, and Harston.

V.C. BACON'S COURT.
Thursday, Jan. 11.

Re THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL RAILWAY
COMPANY; Ex parte SYKES.
Company-Power to pay calls in advance-Ad.
vance by directors for purpose of paying their
own fees-Winding-up-Contributories.
THIS was an application to settle Colonel Sykes
on the list of contributories to the above-named
company under the following circumstances:-
Colonel Sykes, who had been chairman of the board
of directors, was the holder of twenty-five shares
in the company, upon which there were 221. per
share alleged by the liquidator to be unpaid. By

Saturday, Jan. 13.

Re LADY AMHERST'S WILL.

liquidation-Forfeiture.
Will-Legacy - Forfeiture_clause - Petition for

LADY AMHERST, by her will, bequeathed 10,000.
to trustees upon trust to pay the income to
Ferdinand Byron Cary for life, with remainder as
he should by deed or will appoint, among his
children, with a proviso that if he should, at any
time, "assign over, assure, mortgage, or in any
manner incumber, or by any instrument in writing,
parol agreement, or otherwise howsoever, part
from" the interest of the trust fund, then his
interest in the same should cease and should go
over to his children as if he were actually dead.
Cary appointed the whole trust fund, subject to
By virtue of four deeds of appointment, F. B.
his life interest, to his son, B. P. Cary. On the
liquidation according to the provisions of the
17th Nov. 1870, F. B. Cary filed a petition for
Bankruptcy Act 1869. B. P. Cary now petitioned
that the trust fund be paid to him, F. B. Cary
having incurred a forfeiture by presenting the
petition for liquidation. The petition was opposed
by the creditors of F. B. Cary, on the grounds
that presenting a petition for liquidation did not
cause a forfeiture within the terms of the proviso
in the will.

De Gex and Warmington were in support of the petition.

W. Pearson was for the creditors' trustee.
The VICE-CHANCELLOR said that the moment

the petition for liquidation was presented, F. B.
was caused, and thereupon B. P. Cary became
entitled to the fund.
Cary parted with his interest, and a forfeiture

the articles of association shareholders were em-
powered to pay in advance of calls the amount of
capital for which they were liable. By another
clause the directors were empowered to set apart
and receive for their remuneration on the 1st Jan.
of every year a minimum sum of 3000l. The direc-
tors finding that the company was unable to meet
its liabilities in Oct. 1865, and during the follow-
ing year, advanced the amounts of capital unpaid
5 per cent. interest, and then immediately repaid
upon their shares, upon which they were to receive
the amount to themselves for fees due to them as
directors. The official liquidator contended that
this was an improper use to make of the power to
pay calls in advance, and that therefore Colonel
Sykes ought to be settled upon the list of contri-
butories. On behalf of the directors it was sub-
were made, was only in temporary need of money,
mitted that the company, when the advances
there being a large amount of uncalled capital,
tion of before examiner-Application refused—
company became actually insolvent. The com-
Pending motion."
and that it was not for some time after that the Practice-Witness-Application for cross-examina-
Kay, Q.C. and Bardswell appeared in support of
pany was ordered to be wound-up in Jan. 1868.
the application.

Eddis, Q.C. and Reginald Hughes for Colonel
Sykes.

The VICE-CHANCELLOR said that the directors
being trustees for the shareholders were to
cise their powers for the benefit of the company,
and not for their own benefit. They must have
known at the time these payments were made
that the company was in insolvent circumstances.
Colonel
The payments which they had made could not
As this was a representa-
be treated as in satisfaction of calls.
Sykes must therefore be placed upon the list
tive case Colonel Sykes's costs were allowed.
Solicitors for the official liquidator, Fox and
Robinson.

of contributories.

Solicitor for the petitioner, John Yarde, for
Whidborne and Tozer, Teignmouth.
Solicitors for respondents, Terrell and Chamber-
lain, for Terrell and Petherick, Exeter.

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V. C. WICKENS' COURT.
Thursday, Jan. 11.
SINGER v. AUDLEY.

THIS was a motion on behalf of the plaintiff in the above suit, that the defendant should be ordered to attend before the examiner, at his own expense, and be examined by him. The suit was instituted for an injunction to restrain the inexer-fringement of a trade mark. An interim order had been made, which was afterwards directed to stand over (as part of the case) until the hearing of the cause. Subsequently the defendant, who lived in the country, was ordered to be examined; him to town for that purpose. He was offered and he asked for 13 guineas for expenses to bring appeared before the examiner, when the matter was ordered to stand over till Dec. 22nd. In and accepted 10 guineas. On Dec. 5th last, he the interim the defendant received another 10 guineas. On the 22nd Dec. he appeared before to be sworn, on the ground that the affidavit on the examiner, and on the advice of counsel declined which he was to be cross-examined, was an affidavit on which the interim order for the injunction had been made, and no further evidence could now be taken by the plaintiff as to it. The question was whether the motion was a pending motion for the purpose of obtaining new or further evidence as

Solicitors for Colonel Sykes, Hughes, Masterman,
and Hughes.

Jan. 11 and 12.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL . THE GREAT EASTERN
RAILWAY COMPANY.

Railway Company-Construction of railway-
Power to block up streets - Interlocutory injunc
tion.

injunction to restrain the Great Eastern Railway
THIS was an application for an interlocutory
Company from permanently stopping up Sun-
street, in the city of London. By the general
in 1864, the company were authorised to stop up
powers contained in an Act of Parliament passed
were to be on a level above that of the streets, and
any streets required for their works, and the works
to be crossed by an arch 16ft. high. By a subse-
according to the deposited plans, Sun-street was
powered to make their railway and station below
quent Act passed in 1870, the company were em-
the level of the streets, and for this purpose they
contained in the Act, entitled to block up Sun-
contended that they were, by the general powers

street.

The relators (the Commissioners of
Sewers), however, contended that the general
powers of the company were restricted by the
deposited plans which they alleged were incorpo-
The Solicitor-General (Jessel Q.C) Amphlett Q.C.,
rated in the Act.
Sir Roundell Palmer, Q.C., Kay, Q.C., and Smart
and Pontifex were in support of the motion.
were for the company.

The VICE-CHANCELLOR was of opinion that the
company were not entitled to stop up Sun-street,
but even if he were not satisfied on that point,
where mischief of such importance was intended to
be done, he would always grant an injunction until
The injunction must
the hearing of the cause.
therefore be granted.
Solicitor for the relators, A. J. Baylis.¦
Solicitor for the company, W. H. Shaw.

to it.

Horton Smith for the motion.
Rigby contra.

The VICE-CHANCELLOR said that he considered

the motion was not a pending one for the pur
poses of obtaining new, or further evidence as to
and the defendant must refund the twenty guineas
it. There had been a common error on both sides,
but without costs.
to the plaintiff. The motion would be refused,

Solicitors: John Nicholas Mason; Seal for
Rawson, George, and Wade.

Re THE MEYRICKE FUND.

enforce information as to, against the bursar of Endowed Schools Act-Meyricke Fund-Motion to Jesus College, Oxford-Jurisdiction. THIS was a motion on behalf of the Endowed Schools Commissioners to commit the Bursar of called the Meyricke Fund, to the Commissioners Jesus College, Oxford, for contempt in refusing to produce documents connected with an endowment to enable them to form a scheme for its adminis tration under the Endowed Schools Act. The motion also asked that a writ of sequestration might be ordered to issue against the property and effects of the Principal, Fellows, and Scholars of the College, as being a corporate body acting or concerned in the administration of the endowment, its property and income, and in receipt and payment of the moneys thereof, and as being the depositories of the funds of the same, for the same contempt; the contempt consisting in the refusal of the said Bursar, Principal, Fellows and Scholars of the said College to comply

with the requisitions made to them by the commissioners, under the authority of the above Act, and to render accounts, statements, and answers to inquiries relating to the endowment, and property and income thereof.

Sir Roundell Palmer, Q.C. and Lindley for the motion.

Osborne Morgan, Q.C. and Greenside for the college.

The VICE-CHANCELLOR decided that the commissioners had the jurisdiction they claimed, and were entitled to the discovery. Solicitors: Farrer, Ouvry, and Co.; Frederick Clark.

Friday, Jan. 12.

Re THE BELFAST TRAMWAYS COMPANY
(LIMITED).

Company-Petition for compulsory winding-upResolution to wind-up voluntarily-Qualification of directors-Petition dismissed.

THIS was a petition by the holder of five 101. shares in the above company praying that the company might be ordered to be wound-up compulsorily. The allegations were that the company was not prosperous. The petitioner had asked for a return of his purchase money, and, that being refused, he threatened to take proceedings for a winding-up of the company. The directors proposed to convene a meeting for the purpose of passing a resolution for a voluntary winding-up, and thereupon this petition was presented. The meeting was held on the 27th Nov. 1871, and a resolution was passed as proposed by the directors. Notice of that rasolution was given to the petitioner. He, however, insisted that as one of the directors who took part at the meeting was not a shareholder, the resolution was of no effect. Karslake, Q. C. and W. W. Karslake for the petitioner.

Greene, Q. C. and Brooksbank for the company, Hume Williams, of the Common Law Bar, for other parties.

The VICE-CHANCELLOR was of opinion that there was no sufficient reason for the petition The resolution to wind-up voluntarily was a valid one, and must be acted upon. The petition must be dismissed with costs.

Solicitors: A. Pulbrook; Jacobs, North, and Vincent.

Saturday, Jan. 13.

Re BARBER. Marriage settlement-Policies settled on wifeCovenant by husband to effect others and assign them to trustees for wife-Policies effected-No assignment-Death of husband insolvent. THIS was an adjourned summons. A husband having settled certain policies of insurance on his wife, by articles of marriage, covenanted that he would within twelve months thereafter, effect further insurance or insurances on his life, and assign the same to the trustees of the articles, for the benefit of his wife. Within twelve months after the marriage he effected two insurances for 7001. and 8001. respectively. He died (insolvent) about two years after his marriage, without having assigned the two policies to the trustees. The question was whether the two policies were within the covenant.

Greene, Q.C. and Everitt for the summons.
Karslake, Q.C. and Davenport, contra.

The VICE-CHANCELLOR decided that the two policies were within the covenant, and ordered the costs of the summons to be costs in the cause. Solicitor, Harwood.

HIGGS v. DORKIS.

Practice Partition Act 1868, ss. 3 & 4-Copyholds -Married women and infant tenants in feeDecree for sale.

THIS suit was instituted by a married woman and her husband for the purpose of obtaining a decree for a partition or sale of certain copyhold lands of a moiety of which the wife was tenant in fee. The defendant, an infant, was tenant of the other moiety.

E. Cutler for the plaintiffs.
Vincent for the defendant.

The VICE-CHANCELLOR made a decree for sale. Solicitors, Farrer, Finch, and Tatham; Percy C. F. Tatham.

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. Thursday, Jan. 11. GEE V. THE METROPOLITAN RAILWAY COMPANY. Evidence of negligence-Ordinary behaviour of a railway passenger--Contributory negligence. THIS was an action for negligence tried before Cockburn, C. J. in Middlesex. Verdict, 250l. for plaintiff; leave reserved to defendants to move on the ground that there was no evidence of negli gence on defendants' part. Plaintiff and his brother were talking about signals by lights upon railways whilst in one of defendants' carriages. Just before arriving at Sloane-square station plaintiff put his hand upon the rod of the offdoor in order to look at the signals at that station.

He was immediately precipitated upon the road between the lines and seriously injured. A rule in pursuance of the leave was obtained, and also for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the evidence of plaintiff's contributory negligence.

Huddleston, Q. C. and L. Kelly showed cause, and argued that the door must have been left unfastened through defendants' negligence. M. Chambers, Q. C. and W. G. Harrison supported the rule.

The COURT (Cockburn, C. J., Blackburn, Mellor, and Quain, JJ.) considered that the plaintiff's proceedings were not beyond the ordinary and reasonable behaviour of a railway passenger, and that there was evidence to justify the verdict. Rule discharged.

Attorney for plaintiff, Thos. H. Dixon.
Attorney for defendants, Burchells.

Nov. 28, 1871, and Jan. 11, 1872. LOYD v. SPence.

LOYD v. FLEMING.

Action by assignee of policy of marine assurance— Interest of assignee in subject of policy-31 32 Vict. c. 86, s. 1.

cases.

THESE were demurrers to the declarations in both The actions were brought upon a policy of marine insurance underwritten by the defendants, the only difference between the two actions being that in the former the defendant pleaded a composition deed to which the plaintiffs demurred; but upon the argument it was admitted that no objection to the plea could be substantiated, and the only question for the court therefore was the validity of the declarations. The plaintiffs were executors of one Entwistle, deceased, and it was alleged in the declaration that the persons who insured the goods, the subject of the policy, were interested at the time of the loss alleged. By reason of loss it was alleged that the assured did by their factors and servants sue, labour, and travel for, in and about the defence, safeguard, and recovery of the goods, and thereon and for that purpose did necessarily lay out and expend divers large sums of money. And after the said loss and misfortune, and the said expenditure had been incurred, the said policy, together with all rights accrued under and by virtue thereof, was for good consideration duly assigned to the said Entwistle in his lifetime. The declaration concluded with the general averment that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the amounts underwritten by the defendants.

F. M. White (with him Lanyon), for defendants, contended that under the Policies of Marine Assurance Act 1868 the declaration was bad in that there was no averment that Entwistle was interested in the goods assured.

Holker, Q.C. (with him Maclachlan), for plaintiff, argued that the word "duly" was sufficient to show that the assignment was operative within the meaning of the Act.

Cur. adv. vult.

Jan. 11.-The COURT (Blackburn, Mellor, and Lush, JJ.) gave judgment in favour of the plaintiff. Attorneys for plaintiff, Swinburne and Parker. Attorneys for defendants, Hillyer and Fenwick.

Wednesday, Jan. 17.

GUILDFORD UNION (apps.) v. ST. OLAVE'S UNION (resps.).

Status of irremovability-Break of residence

Stay in a hospital-Animus revertendi. THIS was a special case, stated by consent on appeal from an order of removal of a pauper to the place of his last legal settlement. The pauper lived in the respondents' union before the 25th March 1867, long enough to obtain a status of irremovability. On that day he was admitted into the respondents' workhouse, and he remained there until the 27th Aug. 1868, when he voluntarily took his discharge, and on the same day became an inmate of a hospital in another union. On the 31st Dec. 1868 he was discharged from the hospital, and took a lodging in the respondents' union, where he remained until until the 20th Jan. 1869, when he was again admitted into the respondents' workhouse.

E. Clarke, for respondents, contended that by Reg. v. Glossop (L. Rep. Q. B. 227), without a house or lodging to which to return in the respondents' union, the pauper could not have a constructive residence there during his absence in hospital.

Thesiger, for appellants, called attention to the exception of time passed in a hospital from the computation of irremovability by 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, s. 1, and the case of Hartfield v. Rotherfield 17 Q, B. 746), decided upon that section. [Stopped by the court.]

The COURT (Cockburn, C. J., Blackburn, Mellor, and Quain, JJ.), held that independently of the exception by statute, the pauper's status of irremovability was not destroyed by the circumstances of his absence.

Judgment for appellants. Attorney for appellants, F. F. Smallpeice. Attorneys for respondents, C. Wellborne.

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS.

DENT V. NICKALLS.

Jan. 11 and 12.

Sale of shares-Usage of Stock Exchange-Ultimate purchaser-Infant. THE plaintiff having in the year 1867 through his broker on the Stock Exchange, sold to the defendant, a jobber, 160 shares in the Bank of Hindustan, China and Japan, the defendant on the name day gave the plaintiff's brokers the name of Edward Eaton, Dry salter, Macclesfield, as the ultimate purchaser. It turned out that Edward Eaton was, in fact, a boy of the age of sixteen years, and just returned home from school. Upon the company being wound-up the name of Edward Eaton, a minor, appeared upon the register as a shareholder. The Court of Chancery ordered the transferor's name, the plaintiff in this action, to be placed on the list of contributories, whereby the plaintiff became liable to the payment of, and was obliged to pay calls in respect of the said shares. Evidence was given to prove the usage and custom of the Stock Exchange, and that the liability of the jobber ceased upon his giving the name of the ultimate purchaser within the meaning of that term on the Stock Exchange, if no objection was taken to such name according to the usage. The jury having found a verdict for the plaintiff, a rule was obtained for a new trial on the ground of

misdirection.

and Dent with him) for plaintiff, contended that Sir George Honyman, Q.C. (Watkin Williams a custom to pass on the name of a pauper, a married able one, and that in the event of the custom being woman, a lunatic, or an infant, was an unreasondecided to be so, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover from the defendant by virtue of his contract.

Joseph Brown, Q.C. (A. R. Jelf with him), in support of the rule.

The COURT (Bovill, C. J., Brett and Grove, JJ.) were of opinion that a jury should find by their verdict what is the established and recognised usage and custom of the Stock Exchange, and made the rule absolute for a new trial in order that the custom should be found by a jury.

Attorneys for plaintiff, Thomas and Hollams. Attorneys for defendants, Morley and Sherrif.

Monday, Jan. 15.

HANSON . THE LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY COMPANY.

Negligence, evidence of-Onus of proof. ACTION for compensation for personal injuries sustained by a passenger on defendants' line. It appeared that the train in which the plaintiff was travelling was turned off the line by a log which lay across it. This log had fallen off a luggage train just before, and no negligence was imputed to the driver of the train in which plaintiff was travelling. It was, however, contended that the log fell off the luggage train through the defen dants' negligence. It appeared that the logs were fastened on to the truck by means of a chain, and that this chain had broken; it further appeared that there was a new method (more effectual than the use of a chain) of securing logs in a truck by means of stanchions, and that the defendants in many cases used these stanchions, though in others they still adopted the old-fashioned method of securing the logs by means of a chain. At the trial, before Willes, J. at the last Liverpool assizes, the learned judge held that, under these circumstances, there was evidence of negligence to go to the jury. The case went accordingly to the jury. The defendants gave no evidence, and the jury found for the defendants.

Holker, Q.C., moved for a new trial on the ground of misdirection. He contended that wherever there is evidence of negligence to go to the jury, the onus of proof is thrown on the defendant to show that there was no negligence, and that, as the defendants in this case called no evidence, the judge ought to have directed a verdict for the plaintiff.

The COURT (Willes, Byles, Brett, and Grove, JJ.), refused the rule. Rule refused. Attorneys for plaintiff, Bower and Cotton.

Nov. 11, 1871, and Jan. 15, 1872. Re BRUTTON, an Attorney. Attorney, suspension of-Practice. Nov. 11th, 1871.-Murray moved on behalf of the Incorporated Law Society for a rule calling on one Brutton, an attorney, to show cause why he should not be suspended for three years. He based his application on the fact that the Master of the Rolls had already suspended him for three years for professional misconduct, and he read portions of the judgment of the Master of the Rolls. The court refused the rule, on the ground that they would not act without aff davits setting forth the misconduct complained of; as they might not necessarily agree with the Master of the Rolls as to the amount of punishment to be inflicted.

Murray subsequently renewed his application on affidavits, and a rule nisi was granted. No cause being shown, the court took time to consider what course it would adopt.

Cur adv. vult. Jan. 15.-The COURT, thinking that the misconduct was such that they ought to strike Brutton off the Rolls, were unwilling to adopt that course, as they would thereby overrule the judgment of the Master of the Rolls. They therefore made the rule absolute, to suspend him for three years, and further to suspend him from practising until the court should otherwise order. Kule accordingly. Attorney for the applicants, E. W. Williamson.

Wednesday, Jan. 17. STAFFORD (Trustee, &c.) v. Gardner. Custom of the country-Incoming tenant-Payment

of rent in arrear to landlord.

ACTION for the value of acts of cultivation by the

trustee in bankruptcy of an outgoing tenant against the incoming tenant of a farm. The defendant received notice from his landlord to pay the valuation money to him in consequence of the outgoing tenant being in arrear with his rent, and accordingly paid the landlord. This action was brought to obtain the sum awarded by the valuers to the outgoing tenant. By the custom of the country the landlord is bound to pay an outgoing tenant for the value of the acts of cultivation and produce left upon the farm, and the landlord looks to the incoming tenant for reimbursement.

O'Malley, Q.C. (with him Merewether), argued that the contract was one between landlord and incoming tenant, and that defendant could not be made responsible by reason of his having, as a matter of convenience, appointed a valuer. Bulwer, Q.C. (Graham with him) contra. The COURT (Willes, Brett, and Grove, JJ.) were

not having registered it was not entitled to recover, and against that rule.

Fooard, for the plaintiff, in showing cause, contended that the whole thing turned on sect. 24 of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 24, which rendered registration of a "book" compulsory; but first, this song was not a "book" within the meaning of the interpretation clause, sect. 2; and secondly, there had not been any publication of it by the plaintiff, so as to render registration necessary, nor anything to give property in it to anyone but the author or his assignee. The defendant had infringed the plaintiff's copyright both at common law and under the statute.

Kemp, for the defendant, in support of his rule. -This was not a "song," but simply words sung to a song tune, which had been known to, and the property of the world for years. Printing a thing was not as defendant had contended, a publication, but the means only by which it was published. This song had been as much published by the plaintiff singing in public as a speech delivered by a member of any right for a newspaper to print. It became to his constituents, which it was no infringement the property of all who heard it sung. Being then published, it required registration, and not having been registered, the plaintiff could not maintain the action.

circumstances, the rule must be discharged, The COURT were of opinion that, under the Kelly, C.B., and Channell and Cleasby, BB., thinking that the case must be decided on the express terms of the rule itself, by which the tiff, so that whatever doubts might have arisen on defendant had assumed a publication by the plainthe construction of the statute 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, had the points been made before, the only question on the rule now was whether registration was necessary, and that it was only necessary, as a matter of compulsion, in the case of a book, and

"ascertained," i.e., "made certain" when the testator died, although it could not be known for some time after.

The COURT took this view and made the grant. Proctor, Ayrton.

COURT OF DIVORCE.

Friday, Jan. 12.

(Before LORD PENZANCE, J.O.) GABB v. GABB AND MARSHALL. Dissolution suit-Hearing-No security given for wife's costs-Postponement-Practice. THIS was a husband's suit for dissolution, and the case had been set down for trial at this sittings. The husband, however, had failed to deposit the wife's taxed costs for the hearing in the registry, or to give security for them.

Searle, on 11th Jan., obtained an order that the case should not be tried before next term.

Thrupp, now on behalf of the wife, moved that the cause be taken out of the list altogether, and placed on the reserved list.

Searle opposed.-The husband believed that he should be able to deposit the costs by next term, and he was anxious that the case should not lose its place in the list.

The COURT.-The best order to make will the wife has had a fortnight's notice that her be that the case shall not be tried until after costs are deposited, or that security has been given for them.

Attorney for petitioner, Hendricks.
Attorney for respondent, Oldershaw.

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MILNE v. MILNE AND FOWLER. Dissolution-Variation of settlement-Appeal to full court-Motion to strike out certain paragraphs in the husband's case for appeal.

of opinion that the incoming tenant having paid this song was clearly not a book, within the IN this case a decree absolute had been pro

no such

the sum due to the outgoing tenant to the landlord, was discharged, and that there was evidence of a contract between the incoming and

outgoing tenants as to bind the defendant after payment to the landlord.

Attorneys for plaintiff, Thomas and Hollams.
Attorney for defendant, Ridley and Stokes.

COURT OF EXCHEQUER.

Thursday, Jan. 11.

CLARKE v. BISHOP.

interpretation clause (sect. 2), but rather a "dramatic representation," which did not require registration; whilst, on the other hand, Martin, B., though he did not, under the circumstances, intend to differ, was not prepared, had the case been one of greater pecuniary importance, to agree that an action at common law would lie against the defendant for what he had done.

nounced and the court had made an order varying the settlements on the marriage, and directing the trustees under the will of the wife's father to pay a certain sum annually to the husband.

Sir J. Karslake now moved to strike out certain

statements in the husband's answer to the wife's case for appeal as impertinent and scandalous.

Hawkins, Q.C. for the husband, took a preliminary objection that the application should be made to the court of appeal, which alone had

Rule discharged.
Attorney for the plaintiff, W. T. Bateson, 6,
Guildhall Chambers, Basinghall-street, E.C.
Attorney for the defendant, Thos. Angell, Guild-power to direct the form in which the questions

Copyright-Action for infringement of in a song-hall-yard, City.
Publication-Registration-What is a publica-
tion-What productions require registration-
5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, ss. 2, 24.

66

THIS was an action for the infringement of the copyright of a song, tried before the Common Serjeant, in the Lord Mayor's Court, London, on the 30th Sept. last. The plaintiff was a comic vocalist, and the proprietor and owner by assignment of a comic song called "Come to Peckham Rye," which had never been printed or published, but the words of which he had purchased for a valuable consideration from a Mr. Elton, who had written the words thereof subsequently to the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 15, and the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, and which were sung to the well known air of Coming through the Rye." The plaintiff was in the habit of singing this song, dressed in character as a quaker, at various music halls, and had obtained considerable notoriety and popularity by so doing, and itwas first brought out or produced in London on Boxing night of 1870. It had never been registered under the Act of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, The defendant having heard the plaintiff sing the song in question took the words down, and subsequently printed and published the song with a few slight verbal differences, in a sheet of songs, under the title of "Down at Peckham Rye," after which the plaintiff had to give up singing the song, and also lost the profit of granting licences to other singers to sing it at various music halls, and the song which before was a property of value to the plaintiff, became, in consequence of its publi cation by the defendant, of no pecuniary value at all to him. The declaration contained two counts, and the defendant pleaded, first, not guilty; secondly, that the plaintiff was not the proprietor of the song; thirdly, that he was not the proprietor of the copyright, and, fourthly, that the copyright was not a subsisting copyright; on all which pleas issue was joined. The assignment by Elton to the plaintiff was dated the 10th Dec. 1870, and was in the following terms, "I hereby assign to Henri Clark all my copyright property and interest in the song I composed called Come to Peckham Rye," and of which I am the author, and the right to sing it whenever and whereever he pleases." It had not been printed or published any way except by the plaintiff's singing it as above mentioned before the printing of it by the defendant. A verdict was found for the plaintiff for 10. and a rule was obtained by Kemp for the defendant, in Michaelmas Term last to set aside that verdict and enter it for the defendant, on the ground that the plaintiff had published the song within the meaning of the Act of Parliament, and

in

COURT OF PROBATE.
Thursday, Jan. 11.
(Before Lord PENZANCE.)
In the Goods of TEPPER.

No will forthcoming-Next of kin a brother in Australia-Grant to cousin in this country, ad coligenda with special directions.

J. TEPPER died suddenly on 10th Dec. 1871, and on search being made in his repositories no will could be found, although he had frequently spoken of having made one, and had told his cousin (Mr. Turner) that he had appointed him executor. His next of kin was a brother, who had been absent for forty years in Australia. It was necessary that an administrator should be appointed at once, in order to carry on his business as a solicitor, to collect his debts, and represent him in a Chancery suit.

Bayford now moved for a grant under the 73rd section to Mr. Turner, the deceased's cousin.

The COURT made a grant ad coligenda bona to the cousin for the use and benefit of the next of kin, with special directions to the administrator to pay certain fire assurances. The sureties to justify, but the bond not to cover that part of the estate which was in the Court of Chancery. Attorney, Robarts.

Tuesday, Jan. 16.

(Before Lord PENZANCE.) In the Goods of SIDEBOTHAM.

Bequest of residue to trustees for the benefit of children living at the time of death of testatorNo children living at that time and widow not enceinte - Failure of trust when ascer tained.

T. H. SIDEBOTHAM, late of Staley, in the county of Chester, duly executed a will, by which he bequeathed his residuary estate to his two brothers, James and Walter Sidebotham, in trust for the benefit of any of his children living at the time of his death, or born within due time afterwards. There were no children living when testator died, and it turned out that his wife was not enceinte. His brother James died within a fortnight of the testator, and the question was whether his share of the residue vested in him before his death. The other executor and residuary legatee had renounced, and C. A. Middleton now moved for grant of adminis tration with the will annexed to the executors of James Sidebotham as one of the residuary legatees. He submitted that the failure of the trust was

brought before it should be raised and stated.

The COURT took this view, and declined to make any order.

Attorneys for petitioner, Pritchard and Sons. Attorneys for respondents, Pyke, Irving, and Pyke.

WILSON ". WILSON AND HOWELL. Matrimonial suit-Alimony-Husband's faculties -Alimony allotted on capital invested in business from which no income was received. THIS was an application for alimony. The husband's faculties arose out of a sum of 20,000l., of which 10,000l. was in settlement, and produced an income of 500l. a year, and 10,000l. was invested in ironworks under articles of partnership, which provided that the profits should not be received, but should remain accruing in the concern until the capital had risen to 13,0001. The husband was willing to pay alimony on 500l. a year interest.

Inderwick for the wife, now moved that alimony be allotted at 1000l. a year, including the value of the second 10,000l. with its increments. Searle for the husband, contra.

The COURT held that though the second 10,000l. was not at present producing an income, it was in the nature of property increasing yearly in value, and capable of being disposed of, and therefore must be counted in the husband's faculties. It therefore allotted alimony at the rate of 2001. a year.

Attorneys for petitioner, Newman, Dale, and Stretton.

Attorney for respondent, E. W. Cooper.

JONES v. JONES. Matrimonial suit-Wife's petition dismissed-Ap• peal to full court-Alimony pending appealPractice.

IN this case a wife sued for a judicial separation on the ground of her husband's adultery, but the court found the issues against her, dismissed the petition, and refused to allow her the costs. She appealed to the full court, and the husband having refused to pay any further alimony after the dismissal of the petition,

Searle now moved for an order on him to con

tinue the payment of alimony, at the rate ordered pending suit, and cited Loveden v. Loveden (1 Phil. 362).

The COURT.-The registrar tells me that in the ecclesiastical courts there was always a new order made for alimony pending appeal, made by the court to which the appeal was carried. Though here the full court is the same court as this, only differently constituted. As the full

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