Held, per Willes, Keating, and Collier, JJ. (dissentiente, Brett, J.), that the revising barrister was right in allowing the vote, although it was unnecessary to strike out the word "dwelling." Per Brett, J., that the 3rd section of the Representation of the People Act has given a new qualification, and that, as the error was in the nature of the qualification, the revising barrister ought not to have amended: (Townsend v. The Overseers of Marylebone, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 749. C. P.) ESTATE AND INVESTMENT STOCK AND SHARE MARKETS. Bank of England Stock 242 212 242 212 212 242 3 924 92 97 India 43 C. Oct. 1888 106 106 106 106 106 103 North Western.-A dividend at the rate of 6 per FINANCE, CREDIT, AND DISCOUNT COMPANIES. New Zealand Trust and Loan.-Interim dividend ASSURANCE COMPANIES. British Nation Life Assurance Association.-At dend is 18s. per share, or 60 per cent. on the MISCELLANEOUS COMPANIES. British and Foreign Tramways.-Interim divi- British Shipowners.—A dividend at the rate of 7 per cent. per annum. Channel Tunnel (Limited.)-Capital 30,000Z., privately subscribed. The purpose is to make a 92 trial shaft on the English side of the Straits of Dover, about half a mile beyond low water mark, with the view of proving the practicability of tunnelling under the Channel. The completion of this work will furnish data for calculating the cost of continuing the driftway from each shore to be subscribed for that purpose. The committee of a junction in mid-Channel, and capital will then management are Lord Richard Grosvenor (chairman), Captain Beaumont, M.P., Sir E. Buckley, M.P., Mr. Thomas Brassey, M.P., Admiral George Elliot, Messrs. Blount (Paris), Buddicom, Hawes, Michael Chevalier, and Paulin Talabot. The engineers are Messrs. John Hawkshaw, Thomé de Gamond, James Brunlees, and William Low. India Bonds (10001.)... 30s.a 30s.a 30s.a 304.a 30s.a 30s.a Do. (under 10001.) Ex. Bills, 10001. Do. 5001. Do. 1001. and 2001. Metropolitan Board of Works 3 C. Stock. 30s.a 30s.a 30s.a 30s.a 30s.a 30s.a 9s.a 98.a 9s.a 98,a 98. a Premium. REPORTS OF SALES. [NOTE. -The reports of the Estate Exchange are officially supplied in the following list. Auctioneers whose names are registered there will oblige by reports of their own sales.] Thursday, Jon, 18, By Messrs. FURBER. PRICE, and FERDER, at the Mart. Bedford-row. No. 20, John-street, freehoid-sold for 11757. Absolute reversion to 202-7. 78. bd.; Consolidated Bank Annuities, 2513!, 18. Cd.; London Dock Stock, 7107. 12%, 6d. in St. Katharine Dock Stock, thirteen Regent's Canal shares, three Bristol Dock shares. 4317. 5.; Debenture Waterloo-bridge Company; and a judgment debt for 1550. on death of a lady aged 67-sold for 150. By Messrs. HARDS, VAUGHAN, and LEIFCHILD. secured-sold for 500. PUBLIC COMPANIES. RAILWAY COMPANIES. Pernambuco Railway.-Notice is given that debentures falling due on the 31st July next will be paid off on that day, and all interest will cease, unless holders notify their intention to renew. BANKS. Bank of Egypt.-A dividend at the rate of 10 per cent. per annum, with a bonus of 11. 10s., free of income tax, making, together with the interim dividend, 19 per cent. for the year. Birmingham and Midland.-A dividend of 51. per share, payable on the 14th Feb. Bombay New Bank.-Interim dividends, 5 per cent. per annum. Central of London.-Dividend at the rate of Consolidated.-A dividend at the rate of 7 per cent. per annum. London Joint Stock.-A dividend at the rate of 12 per cent. per annum, and a bonus of 17. per share, declared for the six months. London and Westminster.-A dividend at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum, and by way of further dividend out of the profits, a bonus of 6 per cent. Metropoliten.-A dividend at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum. Munster.-A dividend at the rate of 10 per cent. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. TESTAMENTARY SUIT-ADMINISTRATION TO A LEGACY TO MARRIED WOMAN-HUSBAND AND WIFE DIED IN LIFETIME OF TESTATORADMINISTRATION TO WIFE GRANTED TO HER SON-1 VICT. C. 26, s. 33.-A legatee, a married father. Her husband survived her, but also died woman, died in the lifetime of the testator, her before the father. He did not administer to his wife's estate, but left a will, of which one executor was still alive. The court granted administration to the son of the deceased legatee limited to the property bequeathed to her by her father: (In the Goods of Mary Courcell, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 763. Prob. Ct.) PRACTICE ADMINISTRATION SUIT-VARYING DECREE-23RD GENERAL ORDER, RULE 21.Where further proceedings in an administration suit became necessary, the court allowed a decree to be varied by inserting a direction that any of the parties be at liberty to apply: (Warman v. Zeal, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 739. V.C. B.) INSUFFICIENCY OF SPECIAL JURORS-REFUSAL TO PRAY A TALES-COSTS.- Defendant obtained an order for a special jury, but when the trial sent, and neither party prayed a tales. When the on sufficient special jurors were not pretrial came on a second time, defendant obtained a verdict. The practice of the court under such circumstances is to allow the costs of the first trial to the successful party on the second: (Holmes v. Albright, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 747. Q. B.) SHERIFF-FALSE RETURN-ESTOPPEL-DAM AGE TO EXECUTION CREDITOR.-A sheriff re came turned to a writ of fi. f. that he had seized the goods I of the execution debtor, and kept them safe in his possession until he received an order from the SETTLEMENT-TRUST FOR WIFE IN DEFAULT OF CHILDREN-DEATH OF HUSBAND-POSSIBI LITY OF POSTHUMOUS CHILDREN-APPLICATION PREMATURE.-A fund in court was settled upon a married woman absolutely in default of issue. The woman gave birth to a stillborn child on the 1st June, 1871, and her husband died on the 12th of the same month. There was no other On an application by the woman on the 9th Dec. following, that the fund be paid to her Held, that the application was premature. (Attorney-General v. Clement,. 25 L. T. Rep. N.S. 739. V.C. B.) issue. COSTS-TAXATION-COUNSEL'S FEES.-Where the junior counsel who drew the pleadings in a suit has been called within the bar before the hearing of the cause, the fees of three counsel will be allowed on a taxation of costs as between party and party, in a case where the magnitude of the suit is such that according to the ordinary practice of litigants, it was proper to give a retainer to a Cousens, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 713. Chan.) Queen's Counsel in the first instance: (Cousens V. DISCOVERY OF DOCUMENTS.-In applying the rule of the court that he who discovers at all must discover fully, the materiality or immateriality of the discovery is not, in ordinary cases, very accu rately weighed, but the court will weigh it in cases where, under pretence of getting discovery for the purposes of a suit, a discovery might be prejudicial to him, while the plaintiff's case might fail at the hearing, and in cases where the discovery can only be material for some consequential purpose if the plaintiff should suc ceed. In a suit by a firm of merchants who exported certain goods against another firm who exported similar goods, to restrain the defendants from using or placing on their goods certain trade marks, to the use of which the bill alleged that the plaintiff's were exclusively entitled, the defendants by their answer denied that the plaintiffs were entitled to the exclusive use of the marks in question. An order was made against the defendants for production of documents, in pursuance of which the defendants made an affidavit of doenments, sealing up certain portions of the docu ments, which portions they swore did not contain anything relating directly or indirectly to the matters in question in the suit: Held (reversing the decision of the Vice-Chancellor (Wickens) of the County Palatine), that the defendants were not bound to unseal the names of their customers, or the prices paid or received by them for goods, or the names of the writers of letters received by them, or of the persons to whom letters were sent by them, except in the case of letters received from or sent to a former partner of the defen dants: Held also (affirming the Vice-Chancellor's decision) that the defendants were bound to unseal the names of the places to which the goods were exported by them: (Carver v. Piuto Leite, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 722. Chan.) ROLLS COURT. Re JOSEPH BEST (a Solicitor). THIS was an application by way of motion to the Master of the Rolls by Mr. Joseph Best, of Manchester, a solicitor, formerly practising at Liver pool, to rescind an order made by his Lordship in July 1869, suspending Mr. Best from practice for ten years, on the ground of alleged irregularities in reference to the transfer of a mortgage security for 800l. and the application of moneys received in connection therewith. The petition against Mr. Best was presented in June 1869 by the Liverpool Incorporated Law Society, at the instance of a lady named Ormandy, the administratrix of a deceased client of Mr. Best, and of her solicitor, who had caused Mr. Best's several bills of costs lent, amounting to upwards of 859., to be taxed and his claims against the deceased for money and disputed. Litigation between the parties had been pending since 1867. When the petition came answer, alleging that owing to the absence of on for hearing in 1869 Mr. Best applied for time to vouchers and documents indispensable to his defence which were temporarily out of his reach, he was not then prepared to meet the charges made against him, although he asserted that such charges were utterly groundless. The petition, however, was pressed, and an order was made suspending Mr. Best from practice. Jan. 11.-Locock Webb, on behalf of Mr. Best, moved to rescind such suspending order. Charles Hall, counsel for the Liverpool Incorporated Law Society, contra. Lord ROMILLY desired to read the several affidavits filed before giving judgment. Jan. 15.-Lord ROMILLY (addressing Locock Webb) said: I think you have made out your case. I am satisfied there was a great deal of blundering and mistake about the whole matter. The alleged false statement about the mortgage, in my opinion, comes to nothing, and with reference to the question about the concealment of the 191., the two points upon which I particularly relied, in my opinion, it is clearly shown that that was no part of the case at all, and therefore the question does not arise. I am very sorry such an unfortunate result should have happened, but I am bound to say, in my opinion, Mr. Best is entirely acquitted of anything affecting his character with reference to this transaction, I am very sorry I should have been induced, upon what I thought was my duty two years and a half ago, to come to the conclusion that I was bound to suspend him. I think it was owing very much to Mr. Best not having himself brought the case fully before the court at that time, because, if he had done so, I certainly should not have made the order. However, I shall now discharge that order, but I shall discharge it simpliciter, because I am satisfied that all parties before me have acted bona fide in the matter, and if there be any fund which could pay costs it would be the Suitors' Fund. The order of suspension will be discharged. Solicitor for Mr. Best, F. T. Dubois, King-street, Cheapside. Solicitors for the Liverpool Incorporated Law Society, Field and Co., Lincoln's-inn-fields. COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. RE AN ATTORNEY. Garth, Q.C. and Murray moved for a rule calling up n an attorney to answer the matter of an affidavit. The circumstances had only lately come before the Incorporated Law Society, which accounts for the delay that had taken place. It appeared that the attorney had not taken out his certificate since 1869, but on his making application and giving the necessary notice to renew his certificate, the following information had been obtained by the society: In 1863 he entered into a deed of composition with his creditors, appointing his brother-in-law trustee, and from his affidavit it appeared that the deed was fraudulent, the whole of the debts except one being fictitious. Since 1869 there had been a split between the parties, which caused the information to be sent to the Law Society. It also appeared that since 1869 the attorney had resided in Paris, where he had carried on a mock auction of the most flagrant character. In a letter to the brother-in-law the attorney stated that he was carrying on the business of an auctioneer, but as it could not be carried on as such in Paris, the course adopted was to have supposed sales of goods (purchased for the purpose), and of estates under liquidation at enormous sacrifices. His modus operandi he described was to take a shop in a leading thoroughfare in Paris, placard largely, take out the windows of the shop, fill it well with merchandise, and have one or two ruffians outside to kick up a row, and attract customers. It was, he said, one of the most paying games he could have started, for with 60. he had been able to make 31. a day, and, if properly organised, 1001. a day might be made. Scotch shawls, worth 10s. each, he sold for 30s., and that by making great sacrifices. (Laughter.) Sheffield, Birmingham, and Manchester goods, sold equally well, aud with equally good profits. COCKBURN, C.J., said it would be curious to see how the brother-in-law answered that letter -whether he denounced the writer then as now. However, enough had been said to call upon the attorney for an answer. Rule grouted. JUDGES' CHAMBERS. (Before Mr. Justice HANNEN.) Practice-Taxation of costs. An order for taration under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, s. 37. cannot be made in respect of an attorney's bill of costs relating to work done solely in relation to the election of a school board, and not in any of the courts of common law. THIS was an application to set aside an order for the taxation of an attorney's bill of costs made by Master Templar. Mr. Jones, an attorney, clerk to the Llanelly Union, had made an account in the form of an attorney's bill of costs of his expenses in connection with the election of a school board for one of the parishes in the Union, pursuant to an Order in Council under the Elementary Education Act 1871. When the application was made to the master for an order to tax the bill in question, it was opposed by Mr. Jones on the ground that the business to which the bill of costs related was not done by him in his character of an attorney, nor was it transacted in a court of common law. The Master, however, made the usual order for taxation. G. B. Al en, instructed by Messrs. G. L. P. Eyre and Co., on behalf of Mr. Jones, now applied for the order for taxation to be set aside. Berkeley and Calcott, on behalf of the School Board, supported the order for taxation. HANNEN, J., held that the Act (6 & 7 Vict. c. 73), s. 37, only authorised an order for taxation to be made where the business to which the bill of costs related was done by an attorney in one of the courts of common law, and that the order for taxation must be set aside. CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY. LAST DAY OF PROOF. Axox (Jas.), Pepper-street, Chester, gentleman. Feb. 22; Geo. Tibbits, solicitor, Chester. Feb. 29; V.C. B., at twelve o'clock. CRAIG (Jane G.), Priory, Leamington. Warwick. Feb. 17; Harrison and Co., solicitors, 19, Bedford-row, W.C. March 1; V.C. M.. at twelve o'clock. MORCOM (Wm.), Townend-house, Pietermaritzburg, Port Natal, South Africa. Feb. 16; T. Hayter, solicitor, 6, Raymond-buildings, Gray's-inn, England. Feb. 2; V.C. M., at twelve o'clock. UPCOTT (Wm. B.), Wolverhampton, newspaper proprietor. Feb. 16; H. Kitson, solicitor, Wolverhampton. March 8; M. R., at eleven o'clock. FINNEY (Robert), 1, Bishopsgate Without, E.C.. licensed victualler. Feb. 7; Wild and Co., solicitors, 10, Ironmonger-lane, Cheapside, E.. Feb. 19; V.C. W., at one o'clock. FENDALL (Henrietta), Seaton, Devon. Feb. 19; T. C. Mills, solicitor, S. New-square, Lincoln's-inn, W.C. March 4; M. R., at eleven o'clock. PALGRAVE (Chas. F.), Bedford, chemist and druggist. Feb. 14: Cox and Sons, solicitors, 4, Cloak-lane, E.C. Feb. 25; M. R., at cleven o'clock. CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35. Last day of Claim, and to whom Particulars to be sent. ESAIN (Alexander), Esq., Clifton, near Bristol, professor of music. Feb. 3; W. Acland, 37, Lan-downe-crescent, Notting-hill, W. have his name removed from the list of contributories. Held (affirming the decision of the Master of the Rolls), that the letter authorising the liquidator to sue in his name did not constitute a withdrawal of B.'s repudiation of the shares, having been signed by him under the impression that it would not subject him to any liability; and that he was entitled to have his name removed from the list, inasmuch as, if it remained there, he would be liable to be sued for an indemnity against calls by his transferor, who was on'list B.: (Baker's Case, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 727. L.JJ.) A REAL PROPERTY AND CONVEYANCING. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. WILL-SHARE IN LEASEHOLD BELONGING TO PARTNERSHIP-BEQUEST BY ONE PARTNER TO ANOTHER.-F., who was a partner in a firm of solicitors, which consisted of himself and L., and whose business was carried on in leasehold premises of which F. and L. were joint tenants, by his will bequeathed to his partner, L., all his share of the leasehold premises in which his business was carried on, and all his share of the office furniture, books, and other office cr household effects therein, for his own absolute use and benefit. After F.'s death the assets of the partnership proved to be insufficient for the payment of the partnership debts, though F.'s private estate was amply solvent: Held (reversing a decision of Stuart, V.C.), that the share of the leasehold premises belonging to F., being subject to the payment of the partnership debts, nothing passed to L. under the above gift. (Farquhar v. Hadden, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S., 717. L.JJ.) LEASE FOR LIVES OF ECCLESIASTICAL PROPERTY-LUNATIC-TENANT FOR LIFE-SALE BYTRUSTEES.-A lease of land granted by an ecclesiastical corporation for lives was vested by the will of the lessee in trustees, upon certain trusts. The trustees had no power of sale. The tenant for life was a lunatic not so found by inquisition. One of the lives for which the lease was granted having dropped, the Ecclesiastical Commissioners refused to renew the lease, but offered to purchase it, and an agreement for purchase was entered into subTALBOT Richard), IS, Gower-place, Enston-square, Middle-ject to the approval of the court. A petition was sex, afterwards Australia, July 5; Lewis and Co., solici- then presented asking the approval by the court fors, 8, Old Jewry, E.C. of the proposed sale, under the provisions of sect. 38 of the stat. 23 & 21 Vict. c. 124. Held, that the order could be made in Chancery, and that there was no necessity for entitling the petition in lunacy (Re Cheshire, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 721. L.JJ.) WILLS (John C.). Hatherleigh, Devon, gentleman. March 25; J. Pearse, solicitor, Hatherleigh. COTTON (Edmund), 20, Cathcart-road, West Brompton, Middlesex, gentleman, March 1; A. S. Edmunds, solicitor, 11, St, Bride's-avenue, Fleet-street, E.C. WRIGHT (Benjamin), Esq., 1. Spencer-park, Wandsworth, Surrey. March 23; F. and T. Smith, solicitors, 15, Furmval's-inn, E.C. COOPER (William). Esq., High Littleton-house, High Littleton, Somerset. Maica 1; Thomas and Hollams, solicitors, Chancery-lane, E.C. COMPANY LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. UNQUALIFIED PERSON ACTING AS DIRECTOR -IMPLIED AGREEMENT TO QUALIFY.-A man who acts as director of a company must be considered as having applied for, and having contracted to accept, that number of shares which constitutes the minimum qualification for a director. H. was advertised in the prospectus of a company as a director, and attended a meeting of directors at which an allotment committee was appointed, who afterwards allotted to H. fifty shares, which was fixed by the articles of associa tion as the minimum qualification for a director. H. subsequently signed a cheque on the company's bankers as a director. Held, that although H. had made no express application for shares, he was liable as a contributory in respect of fifty shares: (Horward's Case, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 690. V. C. M.) CONTRIBUTORY INFANT TRANSFEREE LIQUIDATION ON COMING OF AGE-SUBSEQUENT DEALING WITH THE SHARES.-In Oct. 1865, B., an infant of the age of nineteen years, executed a request of his employer, who was a friend of the transfer to him of shares in a company, at the real purchaser of the shares. In April 1866, the company was ordered to be wound-up. On the 30th Sept. 1867, B. attained twenty-one. On the 5th Dec. 1867 he was served with notice of a sunimons to settle him on the list of contributories, which notice he forwarded to his employer, as he had also done a notice of a call previously received by him. On the 11th Jan. 1868, he received notice of another call, and on the same day wrote to the liquidator, repudiating the shares. The liquidator then, in Feb. 1868, took out a summons to remove B.'s name from the list of contributories, and substitute the name of the transferor. This application having been refused in chambers, the summons was adjourned into court, but afterwards allowed to drop, and no steps were taken to enforce the call against B. In April 1871, B., in consideration of the liquidator not enforcing the call (which was one for the whole amount remain. ing payable on the shares) against him, signed a letter authorising the liquidator to use his name in proceedings against the real purchaser of the shares. In June 1871, B. took out a summons to : MARITIME LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. INSURANCE- CORROBORATION OF POLICYINCEPTION OF RISK-POLICY ON FREIGHT-GOODS NOT ON BOARD.-A ship was chartered to carry a cargo from Liverpool to Lagos on the west coast of Africa, there discharge and reload another cargo for the United Kingdom, in consideration of a lump sum by way of freight, payable half before sailing from Liverpool, half on delivery of the homeward cargo. The plaintiff, the shipowner, effected an insurance on freight "at and from Lagos," and the policy contained a clause whereby the defendants, the insurance company, agreed that the insurance "shall commence upon freight and goods or merchandise aforesaid from the loading of the said goods or merchandise aforesaid from the loading of the said goods or merchandise on board the said ship or vessel at as above." The ship was lost before she had shipped any of her homeward cargo: Held, that this clause precluded the plaintiff from recovering against the underwriters, although the freight was chartered freight: (Beckett v. The West of England Marine Insurance Company, 25 L. T. Rep. N.S. 739. Q. B.) INSURANCE-CONCEALMENT OF A MATERIAL FACT-LLOYD'S RULE-HALF TIME SURVEYLOSS OF CLASS.-By Lloyd's rule, a vessel classed A 1 for seven years must undergo a half-time survey, signified when undergone by the letters H. T." endorsed on the Lloyd's register. If such survey is refused by the owner, the vessel is struck off the register. Such refusal is not necessarily (Cockburn, C.J., dissentiente) a material fact which need be communicated to an underwriter of Lloyd's, who subscribes a policy on such a vessel after the refusal (the letters "H. T." not being in the rezister), but before the vessel was struck off the register. The materiality of the fact is a question for the jury. Semble, that the initialling of a slip is so far the completion of a contract of insurance that an underwriter is only bound by his knowledge of facts existing at that time. and not by knowledge withir his power between that time and the execution of the policy: (Gandy v. The Adelaide Marine Insurance Company, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 742. Q. B.) MERCANTILE LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. LIVERPOOL STOCK EXCHANGE-COURSE OF BUSINESS-ACTION FOR COMMISSION-TRANSFER NOTE-DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SUM RECEIVED AND SUM TRANSFERRED-INTERPRETATION OF TRANSFER DEED.-The defendant having instructed the plaintiff to purchase certain railway shares on the Liverpool Stock Exchange, received a transfer note on the settling day for the purpose of transferring his shares to the purchaser. It is the custom on the Liverpool Stock Exchange for the original seller to transfer his shares not to the immediate purchaser, but to some sub-purchaser who may have purchased from some person other than the original purchaser; and it frequently happens that the sum in the transfer note is different to the sum which the original seller is to receive. To avoid difficulty, at the foot of the transfer note it is stated that the consideration money differs from that which the first seller is to receive owing to the sub-sale by the original buyer, but that the note is so regulated to fulfil the provisions of the Stamp Act (55 Geo. 3, c. 18). The defendant refused accordingly to sign the transfer because it stated that he had received a sum which was untrue. Held, that the defendant was bound to sign the transfer deed; that the foot note was to be read as part of the tranfer, and was sufficiently explicit. Semble, that a custom to sign for a consideration different from that stated in the deed of transfer would be bad: (Case v. McClellan, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 753. C. P.) STATUTE OF FRAUDS (29 Car. 2, c. 3), s. 4— PROMISE TO ANSWER FOR DEBT OR DEFAULT OF ANOTHER LIABILITY OF THIRD PERSON ASSUMED BUT NOT ACTUALLY EXISTING.-Plaintiff was employed by a local board of health to construct a main sewer, and shortly before its completion the board gave notice (pursuant to 11 & 12 Vict. c. 63, s. 69) to the occupiers of the adjoining houses to connect their drainage with the main sewer within twenty-one days, or the board would do so at their expense. After the main sewer was completed, and before the expiration of the twenty-one days, plaintiff was leaving with his carts and men, when he was asked by defendant, chairman of the board, what objection be had to making the connections. Plaintiff said, "I have none, if you or the board will order the work, or become responsible for the payment," to which defendant replied, "Go on and do the work, and I will see you paid ;" whereupon plaintiff did the work under the superintendence of the surveyor of the board, and sent his account for the work to the board, who refused payment on the ground that they had not ordered it. Plaintiff having subsequently brought an action against the defendant for the amount: Held, that there was evidence on which a jury might find the existence of a primary liability on the part of the defendant, and not merely a liability to answer for the actual or supposed debt or default of another person, and therefore that his promise did not come within the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds. Per Willes, J.-Where the promise is made to answer for the debt or default of a third person, and there is no actual, but only a supposed, liability on the part of that third person, the promise is equally void, whether it be in writing or not. But where the promise is made in respect of a future contemplated liability on the part of a third person, such a promise is within the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds: Mountstephen v. Lakeman, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 755. Ex. Ch.) BANKRUPTCY LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. BANKRUPTCY ACT 1869, s. 37-JOINT AND SEVERAL PROMISSORY NOTE-DISTINCT CONTRACTS-JOINT AND SEPARATE ESTATE-RIGHT OF PROOF-DOUBLE PROOF.-The repayment of a loan was secured by a joint and several promissory note, signed by a firm, and by individual members of the firm. Held (affirming the decision of Mr. Registrar Pepys, sitting as Chief Judge in Bankruptcy), that under the 37th section of the Bankruptcy Act 1869, the lender was entitled to prove against and receive dividends from, both the joint estate of the firm and the separate estates of the individual members of it: (Ex parte Honey; Re Jeffery, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 728 Chan.) bankrupt, who had not obtained an order of dis- BANKRUPTCY ACT 1869, s. 6, SUB-SECT. 3-ACT BRIGHTON COUNTY COURT. Re HENRY ROSENBERG. Holtham, solicitor (of Brighton), appeared for Baker, solicitor (of London) appeared for the sureties. BANKRUPTCY MONEY ACQUIRED DURING BANKRUPTCY-PAYMENT OUT OF SUCH MONEY BY BANKRUPT BEFORE ORDER OF DISCHARGERIGHT OF TRUSTEE TO RECOVER-BANKRUPTCY ACT 1869, ss. 15, 17.-S. became tenant from year His HONOUR said it appeared to him only reato year of a house which a bankrupt had hitherto sonable, when the sureties covenanted to pay off occupied on a similar tenancy, and bought the the mortgage with interest, and had been combankrupt's furniture. He then let the house fur-pelled to pay certain sums, that they should be nished to the bankrupt at a rent of 51. per week, recouped out of the insurance money. When the it being agreed that the bankrupt should pay six debtor had had the benefit of that security, it months' rent in advance, if required to do so. The would be monstrous that the trustee, in the place of the debtor, should pocket the money resulting from that security, and leave the sureties to go to the wall. He should, therefore, make an order for them to be recouped the money actually paid out of pocket. Bill given by debtor and discounted-Fraudulent preference. A motion was then made on behalf of the trustee for an order that Mr. Francis Mason of Worthing, should pay over to the trustee the sum of 135/. 19s. being the proceeds of the discount of a bill of exchange delivered to Mr. Mason by the debtor on the 7th June 1871, under the following circumstances. It appeared that the debtor had received from the father of one of his pupils a bank draft on the Chartered Mercantile Bank of India, London, and China, for 1681. at three months' date, in payment of an account for tuition. The debtor had handed this draft to Mason, who was employed as one of the masters on the 7th June 1871. The bill was taken by Mason to his bankers, who, afterwards on the 14th June discounted it and passed the amount less discount to Mason's account. Mason had handed to the debtor 301. of the amount. The debtor at the time he handed the bill to Mason was deeply in debt owing some 2000, including a large amount to Mason himself he had a bill of sale over the whole of his furniture and effects, and the creditor was in possession as was also one or more sheriff's officers. The debtor filed his petition under the 125th and 126th sections on the 9th June 1871, and on the 24th June liquidation was resolved upon and a trustee appointed. The debtor had made an affidavit in which he had stated that he had handed the bill to Mason for the purpose of getting it cashed at his own bankers, and that Mason had arranged to do so that the debtor might draw upon it from time to time, as he wanted the money for home purposes, and that the balance should remain at Mason's bankers, and the debtor was to draw the same as he wanted it to carry on his school. Mason had been examined before the registrar, and had denied the statement of the debtor, stating that the bill had been handed to him by the debtor in part payment of his debt and in fulfilment of a previous promise made to him by the debtor that he would hand him this bill when it arrived from India. Mason had proved under the liquidation for over 7001. The case had been before the court on two previous occasions, and it had been adjourned for the attendance of the debtor, who was unable to attend on account of serious illness, and he died in November. Salaman now moved on the above facts, and urged that the trustee was entitled to the money, whether the court believed the statement of the debtor or of Mason, if the former, then Mason was only the agent of the debtor, and could not hold the proceeds of the bill as against the trustee; if the latter then the circumstances amounted to a case of fraudulent preference under the 92nd section, as the payment was voluntary and with out pressure, and must have been made with a view of giving the creditor a preference over the other creditors. Gutteridge (of Brighton), appeared for Mason. His HONOUR said he had no hesitation in coming to a conclusion, because Mason was per fectly acquainted with Rosenberg's position, and knew that he was contemplating bankruptcy. There was no doubt that the bill was placed in Mason's hands, as the agent of Rosenberg, to be applied to Rosenberg's use. He received 301. of it at the time, and the discount, 21. 1s., reduced the amount to 1357. 19s., which must be paid over to the trustees. CHELMSFORD COUNTY COURT. Tuesday, Jan. 9. (Before J. T. ABDY, Esq., Judge.) Re REMINGTON. Bankruptcy-Contempt of court-Failure to pay composition Summary jurisdiction of courtNotice to debtor-Ex parte applications. AT the last court, Woodard, of Billericay, made an application for the committal of Mr. J. Rem ington, late a butcher of Springfield, for contempt of court in not obeying an order to pay to Mr. G. B. Hilliard a claim due upon a composition arranged between the debtor and his creditors, of whom Mr. Hilliard was one, and who had obtained an order of the court for payment. The order was granted, but was suspended, on the debtor promising to pay into court within a week the sum of 50l. to cover Mr. Hilliard's claim and Mr. Woodard's costs, and in the event of Mr. Duffield failing in an appeal which he had power to make, if he chose, as to whether the court could entertain Mr. Woodard's application, made on behalf of a single creditor. That sum had been duly paid, and now Woodard made a similar application on behalf of Mr. F. Marriage, farmer, of Springfield, a further application in regard to Mr. Hil liard's claim, and also an application on behalf of me. With regard to your proceedings here to M. J. M. Wood, farmer, of Terling. W. W. Duffield again supported the debtor. Woodard first made the application of Mr. Wood, that an order might issue from the court directing the debtor to pay forthwith to Mr. Wood the amount of his composition as a creditor, in accordance with the resolution passed at the meeting of creditors to accept 5s. in the pound from Mr. Remington. Duffield urged that his client had received no notice of this application; and further submitted that the order ought not to be made until he had addressed the court in defence of his client. Woodard replied that this was an ex parte application, and therefore it was not necessary that the debtor should receive notice. It was an application which could be made before the registrar, if the court were not sitting, and Mr. Duffield had no locus standi entitling him to address the court upon it. The time for any discussion upon the matter would be when he made application for the debtor to be committed, if he failed to comply with the order of the court. Dufield quoted an authority in support of his contention that the court had not power to enforce the order "in a summary manner," without giving the debtor an opportunity of showing whether he had any satisfactory reason for not having paid the composition. Unfortunately they were dealing with a form of procedure upon which no case had yet ever been decided by the Superior Court, for though the courts had previously gone to the extent of issuing an order, they had never heard anything further upon it, and consequently no case had ever been decided. The Registrar (Mr. Gepp) directed his Honour's attention to the forms of procedure as to the case before the court, from which his Honour said he had power to grant Mr. Woodard's order with reference to Mr. Wood's claim "in a summary manner." Duffield contended that the interpretation put upon the passage was to the contrary effect, but His HONOUR intimated that he should grant this application. Woodard proceeded to prefer his application on behalf of Mr. Marriage, who was a creditor to the amount of 811. 10s. The advocate recapitulated the circumstances out of which the composition was accepted. The debtor, according to his statement before the creditors, had nearly 400l. to pay his debts with, which would have allowed 6s. 8d. in the pound, but the creditors agreed to take 5s. in the pound. Mr. Marriage had not received a farthing, and the debtor had not made any overtures to the creditors, implying that he had made a wrong calculation, and was only able to pay a smaller sum. It was not necessary to examine the debtor again, as he was examined at the last court, but he asked for an order to commit him for contempt of court in not obeying the order to pay Mr. Marriage his composition. Duffield.-No. It is entirely in the discretion of the court, upon knowing the whole of the facts, to enforce the composition or not. But the 400l. Mr. Woodard has mentioned is only an estimate, and everybody knows nobody better than Mr. Woodard-that when a statement of this kind is filed the man always estimates his estate at as much as it is worth. Woodard.-Sometimes at only one-half. Duffield. Where fraud is intended it is put down at one-half. It was not the intention of the Legislature to enforce a payment of this kind beyond the means at the man's disposal. He was to have the opportunity of showing that he was not able to pay what he thought at first he might be able to pay, precisely in the same way as the court dealt with a judgment summons. His HONOUR pointed out a distinction between the two cases. Duffield.-Does your Honour mean to say it would be your duty to commit the man to prison perpetually, at the suit of say 100 creditors, extending over six or seven years, who could show that although he honestly believed at the time that his estate would pay the composition, that estate subsequently fell to the ground, and the court would not be justified in refusing the appli cation for an order? His HONOUR.-I should be inclined to say yes. And the only effect would be that debtors would be more cautious in entering into compositions than they are now inclined to be. The REGISTRAR.-It is perfectly true this case has not been decided, but this court is only now pursuing the course taken in the Bankruptcy Court in London. Duffield.-How can that be, when the Court of Bankruptcy in London say they have never had an application for a committal to prison? His HONOUR said he had not the slightest objection to take upon himself the responsibility of deciding. He should at the same time like to see a case properly raised, but could not call upon either of the gentlemen before him to bear the burden of raising it. The REGISTRAR.-Mr. Duffield misunderstood day, up to the order for payment, you have pursued the course of the court above. His HONOUR was inclined to direct that an order should be made for a committal in Mr. Marriage's case. This had been a voluntary arrangement between the debtor and his creditors, who had acted upon his statement, the bona fides of which they believed in, and if his statement was not bona fide then he misled them. The appointment of a trustee, however, would have saved a great deal of trouble and expense to the creditors. But having neglected to appoint a trustee they were not to be deprived of their rights, which were that they were entitled to receive a pro rata share of the sum the debtor said he was able to pay. Mr. Hilliard had already obtained a judgment for his rights, and the court could not turn in favour of one creditor and against another, but Mr. Marriage was equally entitled to an order with Mr. Hilliard. He should graut the order upon the ground that the composition deed, made upon the bona fides, or the pretended bona fides of the debtor, ought to be enforced. Woodard said he had no desire that the debtor should go to prison, and if he would pay another 501. into court he would waive the order of committal. His HONOUR then formally gave his decision in each case thus: Ex parte Wood-That Mr. Wood's composition be paid forthwith; Re Marriage That an order of committal for contempt be issued, with costs to be taxed by the registrar; Re Hilliard-That an order be made for payment of his composition, out of the 50l. paid into court, with taxed costs of the order for committal at the last court, and the present order of payment; the amount of Mr. Hilliard's composition and the setoff to be referred to the registrar; and the balance out of the 50l. to be returned to the debtor. COUNTY COURTS. (Before EDMOND BEALES, ESQ,, Judge.) Landlord's power to distrain-Bankruptcy Act, 1869, sect. 34. Where a landlord recovered judgment for amonnt due for rent, and levied execution, which was subsequently superseded by an act of bankruptcy: Held that by obtaining his judgment, and issuing an execution which proved fruitless, he did not thereby lose his claim for one year's rent under sect. 34 of the Bankruptcy Act 1869. THIS was an application by Page Wallis, the landlord of certain premises occupied by the bankrupt, to recover from the trustee in the bankruptcy, the sum of 50l., being the amount of one year's rent. The facts were admitted on both sides, and were briefly as follows.-The landlord had obtained a judgment in the Court of Pleas for the borough of Cambridge for upwards of 60l. for rent due from the bankrupt. A writ of fi. ja. was issued, and the officer of the Borough Court took possession of the bankrupt's property under it, and by arrangement with Mr. Cole no sale actually took place pending negotiations. These latter proving unsuccessful, Mr. Cole filed his petition, and was adjudicated a bankrupt on the 6th Dec. The trustee took possession of his goods, and the officer in possession under the writ of fi. fa. withdrew. Subsequently Mr. Page Wallis put in a distress for one year's rent. under the 34th sect. of the Bankruptcy Act 1869, but the trustee refused to pay the amount claimed, and by consent of the parties the sum of 50l. was kept in hand by the trustee, and the question as to the trustee's liability reserved for the opinion of his Honour. Cockerell appeared for the landlord-the claimant, and argued that the execution having proved fruitless, the landlord did not lose his right to distrain. In support of his contention he relied upon the fact, that taking a security, such as a bill or note, did not take away the right to distrain. Nor did the judgment, for the landlord's rights were superior to all judgments. In support of this view, he quoted the cases of Davis v. Gwyde (2 A. & E.), and Drake v. Mitchell (3 East), J. W. Cooper, on behalf of the trustee, submitted that the landlord, having chosen his remedy of an action and judgment, could not fall back upon his original right to distrain. A judgment recovered was clearly distinguishable from taking a collateral security, such as a bill or note, and it was superior to the right to distrain, for it would operate for twenty years, whereas the right to distrain would be lost sooner. And further, it would be giving the landlord two remedies for the same cause, which was not allowed. His HONOUR.-But, Mr. Cooper, can you quote any case which overrules those quoted by Mr. Cockerell, where it is held that a judgment unproductive is no bar to subsequent proceedings. J. W. Cooper.-There is no case, as far as I know, exactly in point; but I submit that the point is so clear that it was never the subject of a case. If my learned friend's argument is correct, a landlord might go to the expense of a judgment, and then levy a distress. The law points out a simple remedy, and if a person risks an action and judg. ment, it is his own fault if he fails. In this very case it was the delay of the execution creditor that made the execution fruitless. His HONOUR.-That may be so; but still he is a loser, and can he be deprived of one year's rent, expressly given to him by the 34th section? J. W. Cooper-We contend that he abandoned his original rights, and must stand or fall by his rights as execution creditor. His HONOUR thought the point one fully worthy of being brought before the court; but on the face of the authorities quoted by Mr. Cockerell, and taking into account the obvious intention of the Legislature that the landlord should be protected to the extent of one year's rent, he thought the claim must be allowed. He therefore ordered accordingly with costs. Order on the trustee to pay the landlord 50l. and the costs of the application. LAUNCESTON COUNTY COURT. (Before M. FORTESCUE, Esq., Judge.) Limited dedication of right of way-Mis-user of THIS action was brought to recover damages for easement of way by person exercising right. that the defendant in exercising a right of way through a yard, known as the Town Place at Trenarrett, in Altarnun, the soil whereof, and the gate at the entrance of which belonged to the plaintiff, wrongfully and negligently allowed such colts of the plaintiff escaped from the said Town entrance gate to remain open, whereby certain Place and were impounded. Peter (Launcesto.) was for the plaintiff. Bridgman (Tavistock) for the defendant. It appeared that the land on both sides of the Town Place belonged to the plaintiff; and several aged and other witnesses proved acts of ownership of the Town Place, and that the gate at the entrance had always, within memory, stood in its present position at the entrance, and had been repaired and kept up by plaintiff and his ancestors. The defendant and others had a right of way through the gate and across the Town Place by only a right of way according to plaintiff's way of access to property of his adjoining, but contention. Defendant, in respect of his adjoining property claimed to have a right to use the entrance gate and the Town Place as he pleased, but in common with the plaintiff. On the occasion in question defendant had driven some of his own cattle through the gate but had omitted to close it after passing through. The gate remained open for a considerable time, so that colts of the plaintiff which had been in his Town Place had escaped, got on to the highway and been impounded. gate was an ancient gate, and the right of way The argument for the plaintiff was that as the through the plaintiff's Town Place must be taken to have been dedicated subject to the partial and temporary obstruction caused by the gate, the defendant was bound so to use his easement as not to injure plaintiff's rights. An entire removal of the gate would have been as justifiable as the act of allowing the gate to remain open for an unreasonable time; but such a removal was only to be justified by proof on the part of defendant that the gate was a nuisance, as an illegal obstruction, and might therefore be abated. of ancient stiles would be in point. Those exercising their right of way would not be able to remove such stiles. The case For the defence it was argued that, as the defendant was entitled to have access to property of his through the Town Place, and claimed equal rights with plaintiff in the Town Place, he was entitled to use the gate as he pleased. His HONOUR gave judgment for the plaintiff. It had been established to his satisfaction that the plaintiff owned the property on each side of the gate, and that he had a prescriptive right to have the gate in its present position. The act of the defendant in allowing the gate to remain open for an unreasonable time was therefore unjusti fiable. In the present instance he should give, as nominal damages, the sum of 1s., and certify the defendant persisted, it would be necessary to for costs as in cases where title is in question. If inflict such damages as would prevent him. (See hereon Fisher v. Prowse, 6 L. T. Rep. N. S.; and Mercer v. Woodgate, a recent case.) LIVERPOOL COUNTY COURT. (Before Mr. Serjt. WHEELER, Judge.) PRITCHARD v. HUNTINGTON AND ANOTHER. Liability of landord-Statutory obligation to disinfect-Cause of action for neglect thereof. Copeman for the plaintiff. Grocott for the defendants. The defendants were the owners of a house an shop in Liverpool. They used for the purposes of their business of flour dealers the shop and a room behind, letting off to a resident tenant the remainder of the premises. The premises thus let had no front entrance save by means of the shop and the room behind, the right of passage through which when the shop was open formed part of the demise to the tenant. There was an independent entrance at the back, of which the tenant had the exclusive use. The defendants were in the habit, one or other of them, of visiting the shop for business purposes daily, and they had, of course, a shopman on the premises throughout each day. This shopman was taken ill in the early part of April last, and on the 14th was obliged to absent himself from business in consequence, and his illness turned out to be smallpox. He was succeeded in his duties by another shopman, who was in like manner obliged to leave from illness in four days after the first man had left. This illness proved also to be smallpox. The Public Health Act (29 & 30 Vict. c. 90, s. 39) imposes a penalty upon every person knowingly letting a house, room, or part of a house in which any person suffering from a dangerous infectious disorder has been, without having the premises disinfected to the satisfaction of a qualified medical practitioner and certified by him. In this instance the premises were not disinfected, nor any precautions taken to prevent the infection extending. The tenant of the house at the time the smallpox broke out was a person of the name of Bradley, and being anxious to get away from the place in consequence of the illness of the shopmen and its cause, he opened a negotiation with the plaintiff to succeed him in his tenancy; but he carefully concealed the fact that there had been smallpox there. Bradley was not authorised to conclude an arrangement with the plaintiff, and he therefore referred him to Mr. Horn the defendants' agent. At the time communication was open between the plaintiff and Mr. Horn, both Mr. Horn and the defendants knew that the two shopmen had been necessarily removed from the premises in consequence of their having been seized with smallpox; but no intimation of the fact was given to the plaintiff, and the premises were let to him by Mr. Horn, by the direction and with the knowledge of the defendants, and he was allowed to enter into the occupation in entire ignorance that he was taking his family into the midst of infection. The consequence was that, a few days after he took possession he was attacked by smallpox, and was unable to work for nearly six weeks. The case for the plaintiff was, that the defendants having knowingly let the premises to him after there had been smallpox without previouly disinfecting the same, and the plaintiff having contracted the disease in consequence, a right of action existed for the injury he had sustained. The defendants, however, contended in the first place that the case was not proved; and further, that if it was, there was no liability on their part, either by common law or statute to compensate the plaintiff. His HONOUR in giving judgment said:- It is scarcely possible to exaggerate the importance of this case; for if the contention before me be well founded, the position of a tenant in great towns like Liverpool and in crowded districts is one of vast peril and difficulty. But I do not concur in the view which the defendants, through their attorney, suggest as to the law of the matter. I am satisfied that a right of action does exist, and it is most righteous that it should. It is needless to travel beyond the statute into the question of common law liability, though upon that point I should be prepared to state my opinion if it were necessary, because I think that the imposition by statute of a penalty for the doing of a particular act amounts to a statutable prohibition of that act, and makes it illegal. And if by reason of such illegal act injury arises to an individual, I think that the party injured has his personal remedy by action for the private wrong, and that without reference to the statutable penalty which is intended to meet the public offence, I need only refer, in corroboration of this view, to the wellknown case of Couch v. Steel (3 Ell. & Bl. 403), and to the more recent case of Atkinson v. New. castle and Gateshead Waterworks Company (6 L. Rep. Ex. 401). The legal objections failing, there remains only the question whether the plaintiff has proved his case, and the conclusion at which I have arrived is that he has, He is therefore entitled to my verdict for the full amount which he claims, with costs. LORD MAYOR'S COURT. Monday, Jan. 22. (Before Deputy-Recorder CHAMBERS and a Jury.) DRISCOLL . BALDWIN. Ferocious dog-Action for a bite-Plaintiff the servant of the defendant-Scienter. IN this case the declaration alleged that the defendants unlawfully kept a dog of a fierce and mischievous nature, well knowing that the dog was of a fierce and mischievous Lature, and that the said dog, whilst the defendant so kept It appeared that the dog in question was a bull- J. Cook was counsel for the plaintiff, and The plaintiff's proved merely that the defendant At the close of the plaintiff's case the counsel The learned Deputy Recorder refused to stop The learned DEPUTY-RECORDER directed the jury that if they considered that the defendant knew the dog to be ferocious, and instructed the plaintiff to water it, he was liable for the act of the dog if the plaintiff had done nothing to irritate it, and bring the damage upon himself. He did not agree with the learned counsel for the defendant, that the facts that the breed of the dog and purpose for which it was kept were notorious, affected the question, as attending to dangerous dogs was no part of the regular employment of the plaintiff as groom to a merchant, as in this case. the fifteen guineas for the inventory was intended to cover all the plaintiff's charges. On the 22nd inst. Crump moved for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was against the evidence, and contended, as matter of law, first, that the defendant was bound by the terms of the receipt, which expressed for what the fifteen guineas were paid, and there being no plea of pay ment it could be no answer to the action; and, secondly, that even if it had been payment the continued employment of the plaintiff subsequently, and revocation of his authority before he had obtained a purchaser, entitled him, having incurred expense, to some remuneration. The COURT granted a rule nisi. Attorneys for plaintiff, Brook and Chapman. Attorneys for the defendant, Ravenscroft and Hills. COMPLIMENTARY FAREWELL DINNER TO After some preliminary toasts, The Chairman said it devolved upon him, as the oldest practitioner, to propose to them the health of his Honour, Mr. McTaggart. (Loud applause.) They were called together that day to celebrate in the person of the judge one of the greatest improvements in the laws of England, or of any other country, which had ever been known. Need he refer, in the presence of his learned brethren, to the state of the law thirty years ago; or state, but for the benefit of the visitors who were present on that occasion, that the great reformers of the law had been the lawyers. (Hear, hear) Crump addressed the jury, and submitted that The Chairman then touched upon the great im if they took the view that the plaintiff was autho-provements which had been effected since the rised to water the dog he was acting in a service great Chancellor of James the First eet his stamp for which he was paid, and the dangers of which and seal upon the law of England, and alluded to he knew. If, on the other hand, he was a volun- the changes which had been effected by the bank teer, acting beyond the scope of his employment, ruptcy law since he commenced his career in the the defendant was clearly not liable. legal profession. But when they came to the Cook replied. forms of procedure on the administration of jus tice, they recognised in his Honour a man who had greatly helped to carry out a wonderful alteration in the laws of England, for of all the matter connected with the procedure of the courts the Act for establishing County Courts had been the best. With respect to the Northampton Court, he was able to say his Honour had travelled in his circuit about 10,000 miles a year, and he (the chair. man) complained of him as being a conspirator against the laws of his country. (Laugater.) The amount of the plaints in the Northampton County Court, during the last ten years had been 72,000. and judgments had been given for 28,000. Of the 23,000 cases which had come before him there had only been one appeal from his judgment, and that an unsuccessful one; and of those cases twelve only had been tried by jury. He charged practically abolished trial by jury, and abolished his Honour with conspiracy, for he had actually plause.) Need he say more of a man who could it by force of justice and reason. (Loud apabolish one of the grand bulwarks of freedom, (loud applause) and who could bring home speedy justice to the house of every Englishman? He knew of nothing which Lord Bacon had said upon judical trial which would not apply to his Honour, Mr. McTaggart. Lord Bacon said a judge should be grave and patient. Had not his Honour been patient? (Hear, hear.) He had he (the chairman) was sure been most patient, raost kind, most considerate. (Applause) Consideration was the great quality which made the judge. His Honour had been most considerate in his treatment to the junior members of the profession. If one of them wanted a kind and helping hand, that helping hand Mr. McTaggart had always offered—thear, hear)—and that was not the least that was due to him. In the presence, however, of his Honour he would abstain from further epithets of praise and landation, because merit was always modest; but this he would say, that although the ermine of the judge did not cover his Honour's breast, beneath hi official robes there beat a heart warm and strong with the greatest principles-justice and truth (Loud and prolonged applause.) The jury considered, and returned a verdict for to enter the verdict for the defendant on two the defendant's servant, he could not under the scienter; and secondly, that as the plaintiff was circumstances recover. After some argument, the learned Judge refused leave. Counsel intimated that he should appeal. Jan. 20 and 22. GILBERT v. HINCHLIFF. THE plaintiff in this case, an auctioneer and house - Mr. Ellis MTaggart, who was received with renewed applause, said, in thanking them mos heartily and gratefully for the kindly spirit which had prompted them to ask him to be their gues that evening, and for the cordial and generou welcome which they had given him, he was ba repeating at the best those thanks which some fer weeks ago a similar proof of kindness called forth thanks for the sympathy and good will which fo nearly eleven years he had never failed to mee with from all connected with that circuit, and |