Steam Tag Company of that port. The vessel left Liverpool without paying this money, and until within a few days since the company, who now appeared before the court in the character of plaintiffs, were unable to obtain any information as to her whereabouts. The newspapers, however, having recently given particulars of an accident which happened to the Robert L. Lane off the Start, and the company having also ascertained that the ship was in Plymouth Sound, Mr. Joseph Corkhill, the manager, at once came to Plymouth, and male an affidavit, resulting in the issue of a warrant on the authority of the judge of the County Court, to detain the vessel, and to prevent her proceeding on her voyage until the claim of the plaintiff's had been satisfied.

R. G. Edmonds, however, now made an application for the discharge of the ship, on the ground that at the present time she was the property of American owners, having been seized and sold at New Bedford, in the United States, in order to repay a bottomry bond upon her.

The master of the Robert L. Lane, Jonathan Cowan, was called, and he stated that at the time the services were rendered, in respect of which the company now sought to detain her, she was an English ship, the property of English owners, and carrying the English flag, but since that she was, as Mr. Edmonds had stated, sold by the authority of the Admiralty Court in America in discharge of a bottomry bond. He added that for nearly three years after the sale she lay by the side of the dock at New Bedford, in disuse, but just over a year ago she was purchased by her present owners, and witness was put in command of her. He himself took the necessary steps for transferring her flag from the register of the English Court to the register of the American Court. On the other hand, it was asserted by Wolfer. stan, who appeared for the Liverpool Tug Company, that in the month of Feb. 1867 the vessel had the words New York" painted on her stern, and that at that time she actually belonged to America.

Edmonds.-We can telegraph to Liverpool, and by to-morrow afternoon at two o'clock we can

not come.

only to necessaries, in which the word towage does statute did not begin to run until that duty had been discharged, which was not until June 1868, when the balance had been obtained from Farraday, and the bills carried in and taxed, and payment obtained as far as it could extend.

Edmonds. But towage means salvage. After some further arguments, his HONOUR repeated that he had carefully gone into the matter; he had come to the conclusion that the arguments of Mr. Wolferstan did not apply to the present case, and that he must discharge the order for arrest. Wolferstan.-I must give notice of my intention to appeal against your Honour's decision, because it is really a matter of importance to my clients. Edmonds. You have no power of appeal. His HONOUR.-Never mind whether they have or not. If they have I hope they will avail themselves of it. The order to release the ship was then given, and the men in charge by the authority of the court were withdrawn from her during the afternoon.

SKIPTON COUNTY COURT.
(Before W. T. S. DANIEL, Q. C., Judge.)

ROBINSON'S EXECUTORS v. WALKER. Statute of Limitations-When it begins to run against an attorney's bill-Retainer-When it ceases-What it authorises.

H. D. Robinson for plaintiffs.

defendant. Shaw, instructed by Geo. Robinson, Skipton, for

This action was brought by the executors of the late Mr. Henry Robinson, of Settle, solicitor, to recover £8 12s., the balance of a bill of costs, under the following circumstances: In July 1862, deceased, as his solicitor, to file his petition and the defendant, a market gardener, retained the obtain his discharge under the Bankruptcy Act 1861. This was done, and the order of discharge was obtained in Nov. 1862. John Farraday was appointed creditor's assignee, and he was the only creditor who proved under the bankruptcy. The estate realised by him amounted to £28 58. 11d., out of which, after paying rent due to the landlord, and the high bailiff's charges, there remained a balance of £9 19s. 1d. This sum he improperly retained in his own hands. He ought to have paid it into court, that it might have been applied in

His HONOUR, having taken time to consider, said he was of opinion that the retainer in this case, if it involved any personal liability at all, was exhausted when the order of discharge was obtained in Nov. 1862, and that as to the charges on that account, which amounted to £15 2s. 4d., the Statute of Limitations, was a defence. The object of the retainer was then accomplished, and if the solicitor had intended to rely on this personal liability of the defendant he was entitled then to deliver and demand payment of his bill, and the statute began to run from that time. For this ruling the case of Rothery v. Mincing (1 B. & Ad. 15) appears to be an authority expressly in point. As to the subsequent charges the case rests on different grounds. In Rothery v. Mincing the plaintiff recovered for the items of charge which were within the six years, but in that case there could be no doubt that the original retainer involved the personal liability of the client, and the subsequent iteras had reference to his interest and not the interest of the proctor. In this case the subsequent items had reference to the interest of the solicitor in securing a fund for payment of his costs, and not to the interest of the defendant. And having reference to the nature of the employment, and the relative position of the parties, I am satisfied that the solicitor transacted the business upon the credit of the fund, and not upon the personal liability of the defendant. Judgment will, therefore, be entered for the defendant, with the usual costs.

BANKRUPTCY LAW.

MR. DANIEL ON PROCEEDINGS IN LIQUIDATION.

the order of discharge. The solicitor, if not bound to look to the estate for payment of his costs, found it was his interest to do so, and he He did not deliver his bill to the defendant or apply to him for payment, but in 1867, having applied to Farraday to file his accounts as assignee, and Farraday having neglected, he an plied to this court for an order on Farraday to file

her, inasmuch as she is going away from this country, and we cannot fall back upon her

wards.

His HONOUR.-If you mean that I have the power to arrest, in consequence of things that have Subsequently taken place, a ship that I had no power to arrest at the time these services were supplied, I must say that I do not agree with

Wolferstan.—My contention is, that you have the power to arrest at any time, no matter where the ship was registered.

His HONOUR.-I do not think you quite understand Mr. Edmonds' point. He says she was a British ship with British owners, and that even at the time this towage was supplied, there was no power to arrest in this court, and further, that as

ON the 9th ult. the learned judge of the Bradford County Court made the following observations on the working of the Bankruptcy Act as regards proceedings in liquidation, and the jurisdiction to the case of Ec parte Calvert, which we publish to-day :The case which I have just disposed of has suggested to me the propriety of making some observations upon a practice disclosed by some of the proceedings in it, which I consider to be unwarranted by the rules and forms in bankruptcy, I allude to the practice of the debtor's attorney by liquidation injurious to the interest of creditors. printing his own name and the name of his clerk in the form of proxy, which he delivers to the tors with notice of the first meeting. As the registrar to be sealed and posted by him to credinotices are not accompanied with any statement of debts or assets, creditors are often without notice which comes to them under the seal of the any means of judging how their interests may be affected by the liquidation, but finding upon the court, that a form of proof and proxy will be found debtor's attorney and of his clerk. proposed as on the third side, and in that proxy the name of the proxies.creditors may be misled into the belief that the court sanctions and suggests the appointment of these persons'as proxies, and be led to sign the

not exist before the change.

It was then arranged that the case should stand over until two o'clock the following afternoon, in order that a telegram might be sent to Liverpool for an office copy of the ship's register.

On the following day,

2, leaving £2 18s. due on account of that bill. Thus matters stood up to the death of the solicitor, which occurred subsequently to June 1868. On the 5th June 1871 the plaintiffs, as the executors of the solicitor, delivered to the defendant a signed bill containing continuous charges for the business comprised in the four taxed bills, as from July 1862 to June 1868, £10 16s. 2., the amount received out of court. as leaving the balance of £8 12s., the sum now a sum to be credited against the £19 18s. 2d., sought to be recovered.

resolution for an inadequate composition, or even, friendly creditors, to carry at the first meeting a by an abuse of the 302nd rule, a resolution for his immediate discharge. Not many months after the Act of 1869 came into operation, a member of a firm of solicitors in Bradford called the attention he had received, and objected to it, as being not of the registrar to a form of this character which

that fact admitted, that his IIonour had juris. diction.

His HONOUR.-I am quite certain that it is not I remained here for some time yesterday for the purpose of inquiring into that very point. Wolferston.-I have also gone into the cases, and I would call your Honour's attention to this, that the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 65, s. 6, gives the High Court of Admiralty jurisdiction to decide all

claims and demands whatever in the nature of salvage rendered to cr damage received by any ship or seagoing vessel, or in the nature of tow. age, and also for necessaries to any foreign ship or seagoing vessel." Previous to that Act the Admiralty had no right to entertain any claim for towage.

Then again, the 24 Viet. c. 10 says: The High Court of Admiralty shall have juris. diction over any claim for necessaries supplied to any ship elsewhere than in the port to which she belongs, unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that at the time of the institution of the canse any owner or part owner of the ship is domiciled in England or Wales." That is confined

fessional mode of soliciting business, and the registrar was requested to refuse to seal and post such notices. But the registrar, though feeling the force of the objection, did not consider himself justified in acceding to such a request on his own Shaw, for the defendant, relied upon the Statute authority. Some time afterwards, the matter was of Limitations (which had been specially pleaded) brought to my attention, and having the proceedas a defence to so much of the bill as related to incs in the case just disposed of before me, and business done more than six years ago, that is up being satisfied that the practice was not warranted to Nov. 1862, when the order of discharge was by the rules or forms, and was one which might obtained. This amounted to £15 28. 4., and as tend to the injury of creditors, I gave a written to the residue that the business was not done in direction to the registrar, which was made public, the retainer of the defendant, but was done by not to receive in liquidation proceedings, for the the solicitor in his own interest, in order to secure purpose of being scaled or posted, any notices a fund in court, to which alone he looked for pay-of first meeting in which either the amount or ment.

H. D. Robinson, in reply, insisted that the original retainer was not exhausted when the order of discharge was granted, but it was the duty of the solicitor towards the defendant to take the various proceedings, subsequently, to secure a fund in court in order to relieve the defendant from his continuing personal liability, and that the

consideration for the debt or the names of the proxy shall not be in blank. That direction has been since followed here, and has, I believe, been followed in some other courts. I am aware how little this court can do to prevent abuse in such matters, but what little it can I consider it ought to do, especially as complaints are made and dissatisfaction is sometimes loudly, and per

haps justly, expressed as to the working, in some respects, of the Act of 1869. For the manner in which the judicial and administrative functions of his court are discharged, a judge may be considered responsible, at least to the extent of omit ting no duty which I am able to perform, and permitting no abuse which I have power to prevent. But for abuses which creep in through, the supineness indiscretion, or misplaced confidence of creditors, they alone must be responsible. As we have now completed the second year of the operation of the Bankruptcy Act, and are just entering upon the third, it has occurred to me that there are two matters to which public attention may be usefully directed. 1. As to the number of peti tions, and the relative proportions of bankruptcy and liquidation. From the comptroller's return, laid before Parliament last session, it appears that for the year ending 31st Dec. 1870, there are 6046 petitions presented; of these 1758 were petitions for adjudication in bankruptcy, and 4288 petitions for liquidation by arrangement or composition, the proportion of the latter to the former being about two and a half to one. From the entries in the Gazette for the year ending Dec. 1871 (and which I take from the lists published in the Weekly Notes of Dec. 30), the total number of petitions is 7842, being an increase over those of the year 1870 of nearly 30 per cent. Of these 7842 petitions, 945 only were petitions for adjudicution in bankruptcy, and 6609 are petitions for liquidation, the proportion of the latter to the former being about 7 to 1 against 2 to that of 1870. These facts seem to demonstrate that, under the Act, the winding-up of insolvent estates is drifting rapidly from bankruptcy into liquidation; and as, under liquidation, the debtor has the initiation of the proceedings, and the control of the time and place for holding the first meeting, if through supineness, indiscretion, or misplaced confidence on the part of creditors, the debtor is enabled to procure resolutions to be passed in his favour to their prejudice, the court cannot be held responsible. Evidence was given last session before the House of Commons'committee on the Tribunal of Commerce, by Mr. Rupert Kettle (a County Court judge of much larger and more varied experience than I possess), to this effect. In answer to question 1609, he says, "In the Bankruptcy Law in matters which are called liquidation and arrangement, they should, I think, be under the authority of some public tribunal. I do not think the control should be left to what may happen at a meeting of the creditors where proxies are admitted. I find that the law is systematically, I will not say abused, but that rogues avail themselves as freely of the law now as they did before the passing of the last Act of Parliament. There is nothing to prevent the buying of proxies, and there is nothing to prevent making promises of some future advantage if the proxies are given. I find that the system of liquidation is open to as great abuses as deeds of arrangement under the Act of 1861." How far this evidence may accord with the experience and judgment of others having equal means of observation, I know not. But if the conclusions are accurate, they have an important bearing upon the fact disclosed by the Gazette entries of the year 1871, namely, the large increase in the number of these proceedings, and their increased proportion to bankruptcies, and creditors thus warned must be on their guard. The other subject to which I propose to refer is the jurisdiction conferred by the 72nd section of the Act of 1869, and the effect of its operation in the interest of suitors. This jurisdiction, as the section has been expounded by decisions of the appellate courts, is unlimited and exclusive as to all rights and interests in property which affect the winding-up of estates of insolvents, which have to be administered here. This court is therefore, to the extent of that jurisdiction, a court of first iustance, and where that jurisdiction is exercised, suits in equity and actions at law are rendered unnecessary, and can be prevented by the party sued. The delay and expense which are unavoid able in the Superior Courts, are unknown here. The cases that arise are raised upon a notice of motion, are investigated fully, the litigants when ever necessary or desirable are confronted, and they and their witnesses examined in open court, all necessary documents are produced without hesitation or difficulty, affected excuses for delay are rarely if ever made, the legal bearings of the case are sifted and carefully examined with zeal and ability by the advocates (counsel or attorney), the decisions are given promptly, and every order made is open to appeal. As the beneficial results of this system go on increasing year by year, it is not, I trust, a vain hope, that though by slow, yet by sure degrees, the public and the profession will arrive at an appreciation of its value, and in due time co-operate for its extension, it being borne in mind that the merits of the system are intrinsic, and wholly independent of the external accident of the quality of the staff, judicial

or administrative.

From an important paper headed "The County

Courts of England and Ireland," published in the Times of the 4th inst., the public are unofficially informed that the result of the labours of the Judicature Commission as to the higher tribunals will not be immediately brought under the attention of the public-in plain words, that the revision of our judicial system in England, including these plebeian tribunals, must wait for a more convenient season. In any reasonable delay there will, I think, be much advantage. For the writer of the paper referred to does not perceive or fails to recognise the important difference to suitors in these courts between limited and unlimited jurisdiction. It has occurred upon several occasions on this circuit since I have sat as judge that justice has been denied to a plaintiff through its appearing by the evidence that the limit of jurisdiction was exceeded. I will select two instances that struck me strongly: In one case in equity where a conveyance absolute upon the face of it was sought to be reduced to a mortgage, with a view to redemption, the case of the plaintiff was put out of court by it being shown by incontrovertible evidence that the value of the property comprised in the deed was 5201., the limit being 5001. In another case, an action for disturbance of an easement by the owner of the dominant tenement against the owner of the servient tenement, the latter proved that the annual value of his tenement was 21. 15s., the limit of value of either tenement being 201. No doubt in each of these cases the plaintiff defeated here might seek his remedy in the Superior Court, but in each case it happened that the plaintiff was poor, and neither plaintiff could afford to purchase justice at the price he would have had to pay for it in Lincoln's-inn or Westminster Hall. The one asked for bread, the law offered him a stone; the other asked for a fish, the law offered him a scorpion. No such violation of Magna Charta can ever occur in these courts under their bankruptcy jurisdiction. That being unlimited, justice can never be denied. The judge may be at times-often, it may be-in fault; but the corrective is at hand in an appeal, at once simple, inexpensive, expeditious, and efficient. Any reasonable delay in measures of law reform which shall serve to prove to the public the benefits derivable from the unlimited exercise of this jurisdiction by properly constituted local courts need not be the subject of regret.

DEWSBURY BANKRUPTCY COURT.
Thursday, Jan. 25.

(Before Serjeant TINDAL ATKINSON, Judge.)
Re HEILIWELL.
Act of bankruptcy.

petition in liquidation ending in composition with creditors, which has been duly carried out under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 1869, Part VII., is not an act of bankruptcy; nor is an assignment of the whole of the debtor's effects made for the purpose of raising the money pay the composition which was in fact paid by such means, an act of bankruptcy. Carter, Leadenhall-street, London, for the petitioning creditors and trustee in bankruptcy. Pullan, Leeds, for James Helliwell, the assignee of the debtor's effects.

to

The facts and authorities are fully set out in the following judgment:

His HONOUR said: This case comes before me by way of motion made on behalf of the petitioning creditors, James Harrison Paul and Howard Douglas Williams, for an order to compel one James Helliwell, the uncle of the bankrupt, to forthwith deliver up to the trustee of the property of the bankrupt an account in writing, verified by affidavit, of all the estate and effects of the bankrupt taken or received by or assigned to him, James Helliwell, under a deed dated the 10th Nov. 1870, and that the said James Helliwell shall within a short time, to be named by the court, deliver up to the said trustee all such estate and effects which shall not have been sold, collected, or converted into money by him; and lastly, that he is to be ordered to pay to the said trustee all such moneys and debts so received or got in by him, together with the proceeds of all such property and effects as may have been so sold, realised, or converted into money. The facts and dates, so far as they are material to the decision of this case are, that previous to the 7th Oct. 1870, the bankrupt Edward Helliwell was in embarrassed circumstances, and petitioned the Leeds Bankruptcy Court on the 7th Oct., under the 125th section of the Bankruptcy Act 1869, for liquidation by arrangement or composition, such petition containing, according to the Form 106, a declaration that the petitioner was unable to pay his debts. A general meeting of the creditors, convened by notice, was held on the 26th Oct. 1870, and the statutory majority of the creditors present passed a resolution that a composition of 48. in the pound, payable at three and six months, described in the list, amounting to

8544 9s. 9d. should be accepted in satisfaction of the debts, and that the security of James Helliwell should be accepted for such composition. On the 7th Nov. this resolution was duly confirmed, and one John Routh appointed by the creditors as their trustee for the receipt and distribution of the composition, when paid, upon the statement of assets required to be furnished by Edward Helliwell, under the head of consignments, to the present petitioners, Paul, Williams, and Co., after stating that they held goods belong. ing to him amounting to £1837, on which certain advances had been made, and that a sum of £284 may be expected to be realised in favour of his estate. At this time, James Helliwell, against whom the motion is made, was an unsecured creditor for £1025. He had offered, and the creditors had accepted, his guarantee for the payment of the composition of 4s. in the pound, amounting to £1708 18s., and on the 10th Nov., two days before the registration of the second resolution, a deed of assignment was executed by Edward Helliwell, conveying the whole of his estate and effects to James Helliwell, under which possession was taken by him; he afterwards, according to the terms of the resolution, duly paying the sum he had guaranteed. The deed recites the fact of Edward Helliwell having petitioned the court for the liquidation of his affairs by arrange. ment, or composition, the resolutions passed by the creditors to accept 4s. in the pound in dis charge of their claims, amounting to £8511, and that, in consideration of such guarantee having been given by James Helliwell, and the pay ment of the sum required, he, Edward Helliwell, assigns absolutely to him all his estates and effects of every kind whatsoever. On these facts it is contended, on behalf of the claimants in this case, that the declaration contained in the petition for liquidation filed by Edward Helliwell, that he was unable to pay his debts, was an act of bankruptcy, and that James Helliwell having had notice of this, as the recital in the deed of assignment shows he had, it was a contract and dealing with respect to the disposition of property by the bankrupt which, even, if made in good faith, and for valuable consideration was invalid, having been made at the time when he, James Helliwell, had notice of an act of bankruptcy. And it was also further contended that, supposing that the statement in the petition for liquidation was not an act of bankruptcy, the con veyance by Edward Helliwell of all his estate and effects was in itself such, and having been com mitted within twelve months from the date of the adjudication, there was relation back under sect. 11 for twelve months, and the assignment of the 18th Nov. was brought within the second sub-section of sect. 6, and was an act of bankruptcy as being a fraudulent preference, and having the effect to delay creditors. With reference to the first point viz., was the declaration of inability to pay his debts, contained in Edward Helliwell's petition for liquidation an act of bankruptcy ?-I am clearly of opinion that upon the facts in this case it was not. The case of Re Tims (Weekly Notes, 1870, p. 71), no doubt decides that such a petition was an act of bankruptcy, but then the creditors resolved that the affairs of the petitioner should not be liquidated by arrangement, and presented a peti tion under sect. 6, praying that the debtor might be adjudicated a bankrupt, alleging that the debtor had filed a petition according to Form 106, which contained an allegation that he was unable to pay his debts. The Chief Judge held that the rule 267 was decisive on the question, as under that rule the court, in the event of any neglect on the part of the creditors to pass a resolution that the debtor's affairs should be liquidated by arrangement, might, on the application of any creditor, make an order of adjudication and direct the bankrupter to be proceeded with. But it must be observed that the present case differs materially from that, inasmuch as here the composition has been ac cepted by the creditors, has been sanctioned by the court, and has become in law a perfected transaction; the registration of the resolutions, in the absence of fraud being conclusive, that all the requisitions of the Act in respect of such reso lutions have been complied with. It appears to me that the language of the 26th section, part 7, of the Bankruptcy Act was framed expressly to meet the case of a debtor, who, by accident or misfortune, had fallen into difficulties, and who, by satisfying his creditors that he was acting with good faith in the distribution of his assets, and that the costs of a bankruptcy would be avoided by the acceptance by them of a composi tion. In such a case they might resolve that without any proceedings in bankruptey, such com position should be accepted in satisfaction of the debts due to them from the debtor. Proceedings in bankruptcy are, therefore, by the resolutions passed and registered in this case, expressly excluded, and if I were to hold that any step taken in the preliminary stages, such as filing this petition in liquidation, was an act of bankruptcy, I should, in scope and object of the section, be acting

my own view of the

in direct contravention of the statute. I am, therefore, clearly of opinion that the first point-that an act of bankruptcy available for adjadication, committed by Edward Helliwell on the 6th Oct. 1870-contended for, fails. Then as to the assignment of the 10th Nov., which conveyed to James Helliwell the whole of the assignor's property, being an act of bankruptcy under sect. 6, sub-sect. 2, as being a fraudulent conveyance, gift, delivery or transfer of the debtor's property, I am of opinion that in this transaction, no fraud was committed or contemplated either by James Helliwell or by Edward Helliwell. The consideration for the advance of the composition and the recital of the then pending proceedings in the Leeds Bankruptcy Court, which are fully set out in the deed, possession also having followed out, and no concealment having been used, there is, as it seems to me, a complete absence of any circumstance which would bring it within the 13 Eliz. cap. 5, as being a fraudulent deed or aliena tion, having for its immediate object to defeat creditors. The cases of Rose v. Haycock (1 Ad. & Ell. 460), Pannell v. Reynolds (11 C. B. N. S. 709), Mercer v. Patterson (L. Rep. 3 Ex. 106), Lomax v. Buxton (40 L. J. 150, C. P.), establish that a bona fide sale by a trader of the whole of his effects for an equivalent which is paid to a bankrupt, and with which he may deal, is not an assignment within the rule which makes an assignment an act of bankruptcy, where it necessarily puts it out of the power of the bankrupt to continue his trade. And in a late case, Re Colemere (L. Rep. Ch. 128), it was held that an assignment by a trader of all his property as security for an advance of money, which he afterwards applied in payment of existing debts, was held not necessarily fraudulent within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Acts. In order to make such an assignment fraudulent, the lender must be aware that the borrower's object was to defeat or delay his creditors and such an assignment cannot be an act of bankruptcy, unless it is also void as being fraudulent. But how can it be said that there was any intention here to defeat or delay creditors, when by the proceedings under the composition they were to have distributed equally among them the money realised by the assignment. Upon the whole facts I am of opinion that this was a dealing with the property of Edward Helliwell, by James Helliwell, in good faith and for valuable consideration, that it was not done to defeat or delay creditors, and was not an act of bankruptcy available for adjudication, and that the motion must be dismissed with

costs.

Notice of appeal by the trustee in bankruptcy was given.

LIVERPOOL COUNTY COURT.
Friday, Jan. 19.

(Before Serjt. WHEELER, LL.D., Judge.)
Ex parte STUart.

Petition for liquidation-Questions as to the rights of third parties.

THIS motion came before the court in December, Gully being for the appellants, and T. H. James for the respondent.

His HONOUR, who had reserved judgment, now said: This was a motion on behalf of the trustee for an order upon Stuart and Co. to pay over to him 7601., the proceeds of a policy of insurance upon cotton improperly received by them, and which, in fact, form part of the debtors' estate, or for such other order as the court, under the circumstances, may see fit to make. The facts are voluminous and somewhat complicated, but so far as material to the present question they seem to be these:- -The liquidating debtors, through Rome and Co., of Liverpool, their brokers, purchased four lots of cotton belonging to Paton, Anderson and Co., of Memphis. The first purchase was on the 10th Nov. 1869; the last on the 30th March 1870. There is no dispute as to the three first purchases; the dispute arises out of the last transaction. That purchase consisted of 100 bales. of which thirtyeight were burnt in the course of transit from Memphis, the place of shipment, to New York, the remaining sixty-two bales only coming to hand. The course of business was for Paton, Anderson and Co. to forward the cotton, with bills of lading, to New York, to Stuart and Co there, who accepted the vendors' bills for the amount, and then drew bills ou the debtors, which were forwarded to the Manchester firm of Stuart and Co., and through their Liverpool agents presented to the debtors for acceptance. The cotton wasinsured for the benefit of the holders of the bills of lading, the first of the four lots of cotton being insured in America by Paton and Co., who, however, charged a premium to the debtors. The other lots were insured by the debtors in Liverpool in their own names. The policy of insurance for the last 100 bales, which covered the inland transit, was retained by the debtors; and on the 30th April 1870, they received notice of the oss by

fire of thirty-eight of the bales. In respect of those thirty-eight bales, a sum of 7601. became payable under the policy, and after it had become payable as all the parties well knew, namely, on or about the 7th May, the debtors delivered and indorsed the policy to Rome and Co., undoubtedly in breach of the equitable rights of Stuart; and Murphy's statement of the arrangement under which this deposit was made, differs from that of Rome and Co., Murphy asserting that the deposit was to secure advances then intended to be made by Rome and Co. to meet the acceptances of the liquidating debtors in respect of the cotton in question, which advances never were made, whilst Rome and Co. say that the deposit was intended to cover any balance of account due, or to become due to them. It is not necessary, in the view I take of the case, to decide this disputed question; but if I was called upon to do so, I should have great difficulty in reconciling the statement now made by Rome and Co., with the terms of their letter to the debtors of the 18th June, in which they say they have only a margin of about 2001., and they request payment of that amount as a security against any further decline, making no allusion to the alleged fact that they had any lien or claim upon the policy then in their hands or its proceeds; whereas at that very time, if what they now state be true, they had a margin of upwards of 7001. as they prove in the proceeds then payable of the policy. On the 16th July 1870, the debtors wrote to Rome and Co. to demand the return of the policy, and gave notice to the insurance company not to pay the proceeds to Rome and Co., or to anybody save to them or their order. On the 21st of that month the debtors filed their petition for liquidation of their affairs, and subsequently to the filing, and after notice of it both to Rome and Co. and Stuart and Co., Rome and Co. endorsed and delivered the policy to Stuart and Co., of Manchester upon payment by them of the debt now due to Rome and Co. from the liquidating debtors, namely 2001., and 51. for interest. Stuart and Co. have received the whole proceeds of the policy, 7601., and they now claim as against the trustee to retain the moneys-first, in repayment of the 205l., which they paid to Rome and Co., in order to obtain possession of the policy; and secondly, in discharge, so far as the balance will extend, of their own equitable lien. Under these circumstances, it appears to me that Stuart and Co. stood as respects the liquidating debtors in loco Paton, Anderson, and Co., the vendors, and that they had a derivative vendor's lien upon the goods, and so far as those goods had been destroyed by fire upon the policy which represented or covered them. Whatever was the state of things under which the debtors who had effected the policy in their own names for cotton of which they were the owners, indorsed it to Rome and Co., and questionable, and indeed, improper, as that act certainly was, the indorsement to Rome and Co. gave the latter, as I think, no authority to transfer or re-indorse the policy to Stuart and Co. Rome and Co. were under no liability in respect of the claim of Stuart and Co., upon the liquidating debtors, nor was there any privity between Rome and Co. and Stuart and Co. The indorsement, therefore, act, and Stuart and Co. cannot acquire any additional title thereby, their title resting exclusively on their equitable claim, which was not forfeited, nor, indeed, affected, by the indorsement in their favour of Rome and Co. Viewed strictly as a mere legal right, Stuart and Co. are not, in my judgment, entitled to retain any part of the proceeds of the policy of which they thus possessed themselves. But inasmuch as their equitable rights under the policy cannot be affected by the irregularity of the means by which it came into their hands; and inasmuch as the trustee under the liquidation, if he had received the proceeds, as in strictness he was entitled to do, would have been bound, in my view, to satisfy their equitable claim thereout. I shall place them in the same position by my order of to-day as if that course had been taken. That position would have been that they would have been entitled to receive for their own use so much of the 7601. as sufficed to satisfy their equitable claim, but nothing more. Nor to the extent of that equitable claim do I see anything in the order and disposition clause of the Act which was referred to in the argument that really affects the case or their rights. My order therefore will be that an account shall be taken of the amount due to Stuart and Co. at the date of the receipt by them of the 7601., and that to the extent of the amount then due they shall be at liberty to retain the moneys in their hands; but that they must pay over to the trustee a part of the debtor's estate, the balance remaining. I may just add, with respect to the 2051. paid by Stuart and Co. to Rome and Co., that the payment was at their own risk and in their own wrong, and the trustee has nothing to do with it or with any question or controversy arising out of it. The costs of the trustee in this motion ought, I think, to be paid by Stuart and Co., and I shall so order.

was a tortious

LEGAL NEWS.

THE NEW SHERIFFS.

(From the Gazette of Tuesday.) Ar the Court at Osborne House, Isle of Wight, the 5th day of February, 1872, present the Queen's most excellent Majesty in Council: Sheriffs appointed by Her Majesty in Council for the year 1872:

ENGLAND.

(Excepting Cornwall and Lancashire.) house, Esq. Bedfordshire.-William Francis Higgins, of TurveyBerkshire.-Sir Nicholas William Throckmorton, of Buckland-house, Bart.

Esq.

Bucks.-Richard Rose, of The Chesnuts, Aylesbury, George Fitzwilliam, of Milton-park, Northamptonshire. Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire. - The Hon. Cheshire.-Egerton Leigh, of Jodrell-hall. Esq. Cumberland.-George Moore, of Whitehall, Esq. Derbyshire. Thomas William Evaus, of Allestreehall, Esq.

Devonshire.-John George Johnson, of Cross, Esq. Dorsetshire.-Edward Joseph Weld, of Lulworth Castle, Esq.

Durham.-Rowland Burdon, of Castle Eden, Esq. Essex.-Thomas Kemble, of The Hall, Runwell, Esq. Gloucestershire -Sir William Vernon Guise, of Elmore-court, near Gloucester, Bart.

Herefordshire.-John Habington Barneby Lutley, of Brockhampton, Esq.

Hertfordshire.- Thomas Curtis, of The Hall, Great Berkhampstead, Esq.

Kent.-Sir John Frederick Croft, of Doddington,

Bart.

Leicestershire.- Sir Henry St. John Halford, of Wistow-hall, Bart.

Lincolnshire.-Sir Robert Sheffield, of Normanbypark, Bart.

Monmouthshire.-James Charles Hill, of The Brooks, Abergavenny, Esq.

Norfolk.-William Angerstein, of Weeting-hall, Esq. Northamptonshire.- Henry Osmond Nethercote, of Moulton-grange, Esq.

Northumberland.-Roddam John Roddam, of Rod

dam, Esq.

Nottinghamshire.-George William Mason, of Mor ton-hall, near Retford, Esq.

Oxfordshire.-Charles Sartoris, of Wilcot-house, Esq. Rutland.-Charles Cave John Orme, of Oakham, Esq. Shropshire.-John Henniker Lovett, of Fern-hill, Oswestry, Esq. Somersetshire.-Mordaunt Fenwick-Bisset, of Bagborough, Taunton, Esq.

ming, of Chilworth-house, Southampton, Esq. County of Southampton.-John Brown Willis FleStaffordshire.-Henry Ward, of Oaklands, Esq. Suffolk.-Henry Alexander Starkie Bence, of Thorington-hall, Esq.

Surrey.-Albert George Sandeman, of The Hollies, Weybridge, Esq.

Sussex.-Sir James Duke, of Laughton-lodge, Bart. Warwickshire.-Thomas Lloyd, of The Priory, Warwick, Esq.

Westmoreland.-Frank Atkinson Argles, of Eversley,
Milnthorpe, Esq.
Wiltshire.-Sir John Neeld, of Grittleton, Chippen-
ham, Bart.

Pershore, Esq.
Worcestershire.-Henry Sales Scobell, of The Abbey,
Yorkshire. Frederick Bacon Frank, of Campsall-
hall, Doncaster, Esq.

WALES.

faen, Esq. Radnorshire.

Rhayader, Esq. Robert Lewis Lloyd, of Nantwilt,

IN an action in Illinois for breach of promise, plaintiff's mother was asked by plaintiff's counsel whether plaintiff from her conduct was or was not sincerely attached to defendant, and the question was held admissible.

NEWGATE PRISON.-The following is the official report of the state of Her Majesty's Gaol of Newgate on Sunday, the 4th Feb. 1872:Prisoners under sentence of penal servitude for 15 years, male 1; ditto, 14 years, female 1; ditto, 12 years, male 1; ditto, 10 years, males 7; ditto 7 years, males 17, females 3; ditto, 5 years, males 5, females 3: ditto under sentence of imprisonment in Newgate, females 2; ditto, whose judg. ment is respited, males 2; ditto, committed for trial, males 4, females 2; ditto, remanded for next session, males 4; ditto, remanded for furtner examination, males 12, females 3; ditto, insane on arraignment, males 2; ditto, for House of Correction, males 4, females 2; total-males 59; females, 16; grand total, 75. In the infirmaries, males 2; patients not in the infirmaries, females 7, males.— Gaol of Newgate, Feb 5.

THE NEW SILKS.-Crown Office, Feb. 5.-The Queen has been pleased by Letters Patent under the Great Seal to grant precedence within the Bar to Augustine Sargood, Serjeant-at-Law, next after Samuel Pope, Esq., one of Her Majesty's counsel learned in the law now being. The Queen has also been pleased by Letters Patent under the Great Seal to constitute and appoint Thomas Charles Renshaw, Esq., of Lincoln's-inn; Leofric Temple, Esq., of Lincoln's-inn; Charles William Wood, Esq., of Lincoln's-inn; Eneas John M'Intyre, Esq., of the Middle Temple; William John Bovill, Esq, of Lincoln's-inn; Samuel Boteler Bristowe, Esq., the Inner Temple; John Charles Day, Esq., of the Middle Temple: John Berry Torr. Erq., of the Middle Temple; Nathaniel Lindley, Esq., of the Middle Temple; Joseph Napier Higgins, Esq., of Lincoln's-inn; Thomas Halhed Fischer, Esq., of Lincoln's-inn; James Kemplay, Esq., of the Middle Temple; Theodore Aston, Esq., of Lincoln's-inn; Alexander Edward Miller, Esq., of Lincoln's-inn; Charles Russell, Esq., of Lincoln's-inn; and Farrer Herschell, Esq., of Lincoln's-inn, of Her Majesty's counsel learned

in the law.

CORRESPONDENCE OF THE

PROFESSION.

NOTE. This department of the Law TIMES being open to free discussion on all professional topics, the Editor is not responsible for any opinions or statements contained in it.

LAW CLERKS.-I have read with interest your notice relative to the proposed establishment of a "National Society of Public Accountants," and also a letter from Mr. Charley on the subject of The Legal Profession," both of which appear in your issue of the 20th ult.; and whilst it seems probable, from the notices given by Mr. Charley, and the motion by Sir Roundell Palmer, as to the foundation of a law school, that everything that can possibly be done for the advantage of the legal profession is about to be done; may I trespass

upon your space a little to draw the attention of the profession generally, and that of the clerks in particular, to the position in which the latter are now placed. Some time since a letter appeared in your valuable paper, signed "Spec," on the same subject, and with the sentiments of which I most cordially agree, and it is with the view of eliciting from others of the "unadmitted" an avowal of opinion on a subject so closely concerning their welfare that I now trouble you. It must be patent to all that the province of the unadmitted clerk (which has been, and now is anything but an enviable one) is suffering from a rapidly increasing invasion; so great, in fact, are the inroads now being made that I venture to think it must ultimately result in persons of any respectability being absolutely driven from the field. Various are the means by which this will be brought about; the principal, however, is undoubtedly the overcrowding of the profession, of which anyone who reads your journal can have no doubt. In the issue I have mentioned is to be found no less than seventeen applications from admitted gentlemen for clerkships, and in most of the cases they are for situations which could be occupied by men without the pale of the profession. One of these gentlemen seeks to become a "resident assistant' on the "board, lodging," and he should have said "washing" system, with a stipend of 251. a year, which reminds one very much of an engagement with a flunkey or a dairymaid. His case too is not an isolated one, for of late there have been numbers of the same class and kind. Clerks, however, have little to fear from men of his stamp (and I for one sincerely wish that he may find a "comfortable home"); but it is from men who, having been admitted, are intended for, and ought to be working in another sphere, that we have most to complain. I would also call attention to the fact that we are suffering encroachment not only at the hands of the strictly legal profession, but also from a numerous class of individuals calling themselves accountants. The numerous duties which formerly devolved upon the account. ant clerk of the office, and for which he sometimes received a higher rate of remuneration, are now, most instances, handed over to and undertaken by these men, who, not content with this, seek still greater advantages by advertising themselves as trustees in bankruptcy, and this I fearlessly assert should justly have fallen to the office of the accountant clerk. With the formation of a law school must be considered the fact that by imposing the terms at present proposed, the hopes of many indus. trious clerks, who have laboured their whole life with the view of being ultimately admitted into the profession, will be for ever cut off, unless we find some worthy champion who will undertake our defence and promote our interests in the Honse of Commons; and if Mr. Charley at the same time that he is looking so keenly after the interests of the profession, will but remember us likewise, I

in

am sure he will obtain the thanks of a numerous family of worthy recipients. When so many things then are threatening to overwhelm us, it behoves us to be up and doing, for whilst every other branch of trade and profession has its association or union, we have no kind of amalgamation wherewith to protect ourselves or support our interests, and I would ask, cannot something be done by us to form a "National Society of Law Clerks ;" and it is with this view that I desire the opinions of your readers, feeling as I do that the profession itself would be as much benefited thereby as the clerks themselves.

FIDELIS.

LIABILITY OF BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEES FOR COSTS.-RE HAMMOND PARKER.-I fully concur with the views set forth in your ably written article under date 13th Jan., in reference to the judgment of Mr. Serjeant Atkinson against me. The fact of my acting under an order of the court, dated 17th March last, which is in the file of the proceedings, and worded thus-"It is further ordered that these inquiries (referring to Wilde's and Drake's securities) shall be prosecuted without delay," has been unrecognised by the learned judge, and which, in my judgment, ought, if known, to make my case the stronger. Had I not obeyed this order, I would have been chargeable with neglect of duty, and could have been committed for contempt of court; and because I simply do my duty as trustee, I am persecuted for resisting what I regarded as a most unjust demand; two executions were issued against my property, and I was brought up before the late Besides the loss of my remuneration, I have been Judge Stansfeld to be committed to prison. unjustly compelled to pay £45 out of my own pocket in this matter.

GEORGE P. COTTON.

INVADERS-I send you a copy of an advertisement appearing in the Telegraph of this day (Jan. 25, 1872) :—

Lscription of claim collected and enforced by legal

AW BUSINESS, debts, contracts, and every deprocess. Small commission on actual receipts. No charge whatever unless successful. Consultation free. Mr. Robinson, 3, Germain-villas, Brockley-road, Forest-hill.

(a fact not difficult to ascertain), I must say his If the advertiser is not a duly qualified solicitor impudence is little short of sublime, and the solicitors will have shown an extraordinary amount of apathy if they take no action in the matter.

NOTES AND QUERIES ON

POINTS OF PRACTICE..

NOTICE.--We must remind our correspondents that this column is not open to questions involving points of law such as a solicitor should be consnited upon. Queries will be excluded which go beyond our limits. N.B.-None are inserted noless the name and address of the writers are sent, not necessarily for publication, but as a guarantee for bona fides.

Queries.

91. SCOTCH PROCEDURE.-Where, on a trial of murder, in a Scotch court, a verdict of "not proven" is returned, can the prisoner be again tried on the same charge, if additional evidence be forthcoming? F. W. S.

92. ARTICLED CLERKS.-Could you or any of your readers kindly me if there are any monthly mags. zines published for the assistance of articled clerks? W. S. C.

93 BEQUEST PAUPER LUNATIC. Would any of your readers inform me if any form of bequest of a sum of money to a puper lunatic could be suggested so that the authorities of the parish or the asylum can have no claim thereon? Z.

94 BANKRUPTCY-MOTION PRACTICE. I am concerned for a trustee, and notice has been given me by a creditor whose proof the trustee has rejected, of the creditor's intention to move the Court for leave to prove, and affidavits have been filed in support thereof. On my taking affidavits in opposition to be filed by the registrar, he declined to file them until I made an appli cation to the Court for leave to do so, and paid the fee, 5s, and referred me to rule 54 as the authority. Will some of your readers who are registrars of County official or practitioner with a large practice in the Courts, with bankruptcy business attached, or some London Bankruptcy Court, state the practice in their Courts.

E.

95. ARTICLED CLERK. A gentleman named Walter Smith was articled under that name. He has, for various reasons, adopted the name of Brooksbank, and is now known as Walter Brooksbank Smith. He is about to go in for his Intermediate Examination. What formalities (if any) are necessary to prove that he is the same person as the Walter Smith named in bis articles of clerkship? Is an affidavit to that effect_re quired? Z.

96. LANDLORD AND TENANT.-Lodging house keepers at the sea-side are very sharp, and in the event of a dispute, and the unfortunate lodger should quit the apartment a few minutes after twelve at noon, will be it this is legal, and whether (if it be so) the law is, down upon him for another week's pay. I should be glad if some of your correspondents would inform me strictly speaking, the same in the case of a yearly, quarterly, and monthly tenancy.

I feel doubtful about it, because in Stephen's Commentaries it is stated that if I am bound to pay money on any certain day, I dis charge the obligation if i pay it before twelve o'clock at night, and rent does not become due till the last minute of the day on which it is payable.-P. W. F.

Answers.

(Q. 74.) INTERMEDIATE EXAMINATIONS.-The "Arti cled Clerk had better get, from the Law Society's Hall, Chaucery-lane, Lond n, a list of the subjects for the intermediate examinations of the year in which he intends to go up for it. And for further information he may require, I would advise him to get the book called. "Order for conducting the Preliminary and Intermediate Examinations under the Act 23 & 24 Vier. c. 127, ss. 5, 8, and 9," from the same place. He will find himself better informed on this subject by getting what I have mentioned, than be would by asking questions in the LAW TIMES. And he will also find he will both save his own time and the time of those who uuder. ANOTHER ARTICLED CLEEK.

(Q. 77.) LANDLORD AND TENANT The Court of Com mon Pleas have held that a tenancy from week to week

does not determine without reasonable notice: Joncs

v. Mils, 19 C. B. N. S. 778.) It would not be safe to ens der less than a week's notice expiring at the elu of some complete week as a reas uable notice. See the remarks of Mr. Justice Williams in the above case. Z. Y.

SHERIFFS' FEES.-The liability of attorneys for fees of sheriffs' officers has lately been much discussed. There is a special case to be argued very soon arising out of an action for sheriffs' fees, commenced in the City of London Court, in which some of the main points in dispute may be decided, but we understand that the case referred to is likely to go off on other points, and even if it does not a special case cannot, it seems, be appealed. take to auswer his queries. The chief points in dispute we take to be, first, can a sheriff or an officer, or a bailiff legally sue for any fees whatever? secondly, if so, can he sue the attorney who issues the writ of execution. We assume there is no express promise or special employment by the attorney. The contention is that he cannot recover or take any fee legally except where the debt has been levied by seizure and sale. We contend also that a writ is not executed until a levy has been made, and that there cannot be a levy without both seizure and sale. These questions are often recurring to us, and no doubt to many other firms who, like ourselves. have had a disinclination to contest the points at the expense of the client. It has, however, been suggested that very probably many firms will be glad to subscribe a guinea or two to a fund to meet the expenses of getting the matter decided by a sufficient authority. This would be somewhat expensive, but, on the other hand, it would be a great thing to be relieved for the future from the annoyance, trouble, and sometimes loss, arising out of their claims. We should be glad t› take the initiative in the matter on the firs opportunity, if the movement is sufficiently supported. We should have no difficulty in starting the fund, and would gladly take some trouble in the matter. If you, Sir, insert this letter we shall hope for success, as we shall feel you consider the proposal a legitimate one. We ask such of your readers as are interested in this subject to communicate with us.

BARNARD AND CO.

8, Lancaster-place, Strand, W.C.

(Q. 78.) DEEPS-DUTY. I intended to have replied to this query last week, but as there appears no ausser to it in your last issue, this may still be of service to your

correspondent, Clerk." Assuming there has been no accretion of fresh property to the trusts since the original deed, or will, was made, there would then be no Separate duty for the declaration of trust, and the duties would otherwise be as follows: (1) For the instrument of appointment, containing a transfer of property as name, stamps 10s, and 10s.; (2) for the transfer of the three Debenture Bonds of £3000 each, if by one instrament, stamp 10s., if by three instruments, stamp 10s. on each of the three; (3) on the three Mortgage Transfers. for £1690, 1590, and £800, stemps respectively of Ss., 7s. 6d., and 4s. I may add that while, on the fint coming into operation of the Consolidation Act (Stamp Act 1870, 33 & 34 Vict. e. 97), there was, I have reason your correspondent may rest satisfied that the Inland to believe, some difference of opiuion in official quarters,

Revenue authorities will rule in accordance with the views above expressel. The following practical diffien ty may, however, arise. Companies do not acknowledge trusts, only absolute wuership, and the company by whom the transfer of the debentures bave to be regis tered may object to the suficiency of the Ds, duty, in which case they should be shown seet. 78 of the Stamp Act, and required to accept the transfers upon the fol loving certificate being written, as I would suggest, en