Page images
PDF
EPUB
[ocr errors]

66

his bankruptcy. Again, Roberts left the country before he was made bankrupt, whereas Dawes fled from his bankruptcy. But the judges in Williamson v. Dawes held that his going and remaining abroad, although absent eight years, was no more than absconding; and so far from saying that would have been " 'contrary to law" for him to return, they said it was his duty to do so, although he was liable to arrest and punishment. Roberts's return depended entirely upon his own will. If Mr. Welford's reasoning be correct, Roberts "abjured the realm" immediately the warrant was issued (which was only a few weeks after he absconded), because, according to the judgment, he was then in the condition of an "exile" in consequence of his being prevented from returning by the fear of arrest; but the Superior Court held that an absence of even eight years, under similar circumstances, had no such effect. The pleadings in Williamson v. Dawes stated that the husband had "lived in exile beyond the seas" ever since he left the country, during which time his wife traded as a single woman, and contracted the debt in that character. It was argued for the creditor, as in Wood v. Roberts, that where "the husband is abroad, with no probable expectation of return, the wife, with a view to her necessary support, must be considered in the situation of a feme sole. This argument was disposed of as follows: Tindal, C. J., said: The principle established by the case of Marshall v. Rutton is that nothing but the civil death of the husband, or something tantamount, will subject the wife to the liabilities of a feme sole; and looking to the facts of this case, they do not show such an involuntary absence of the husband as within the principle of former decisions can communicate to the wife the privileges, or affect her with the liabilities of a feme sole. The statement alleges no more than a temporary absconding." Gaselee, J.: "I am of the same opinion. In the cases in which the wife has been held liable during her husband's absence abroad, the husband has either been a foreigner or in a situation which precluded return. No such absence appears in this case; and if that were held sufficient the wife would be liable whenever a husband absconds." Bosanquet, J.: "I am of the same opinion. In the case of transportation it is the duty of the party to stay abroad; here it was his duty to return. If this absence were sufficient, a wife must be considered a feme sole whenever a husband absconds." A learned writer on the law of husband and wife (Roper) states that "The liability of a married woman whose husband is involuntarily absent from this country was founded on the principle of his being under the necessity of absenting himself from the kingdom, and that his return to it was forbidden, and did not depend upon his own will and pleasure only." That is undoubtedly an accurate statement of the law, which holds, very reasonably, that a wife shall not incur the liabilities, unless and until she has acquired the privileges of a single woman; until then she cannot acquire or deal with property. Her very earnings belong to her husband, although he is abroad; and she cannot bring an action to enforce her rights against third parties. As Mrs. Dawes was not liable to be sued, although her husband had been absent eight years, so she had acquired none of the privileges of a feme sole; and notwithstanding her husband's long absence, and the fact that she carried on business as a single woman, he might have returned at any moment, and taken possession as his own, of any property she had acquired. The law has now provided a remedy for a deserted married woman by means of an order of protection under the divorce laws, but no order was obtained by Mrs. Roberts. On account of the length to which this letter has already run, I am reluctant to discuss the general question of adjuration of the realm," but I take the liberty of drawing attention to a remarkable mistake made by Mr. Welford. After alluding to the cases of Robert Belknap, "who was exiled or banished beyond the sea," and of Lord Maltravers, "who was put in exile for certain causes" (neither having voluntarily left the country, like Dawes and Roberts), Mr. Welford proceeds to say that "in these and other cases of the same sort, the husband was banished or put in exile without any formal sentence of any court, but merely by the will of the Crown, and was bound to remain there until he obtained the King's grace." ference to Belknap's case, Lord Coke says: 'Abjuration, that is, deportation for ever into a foreign land, is a civil death, and that is the reason that a wife may bring an action or be impleaded during the natural life of her husband. And so it is by Act of Parliament the husband be attainted of treason or felony, and during his life is banished for ever, as Belknap was." Lord Maltravers was put out of the realm" in the same way-viz., under a statute of attainder. Lady Sandy's case, in 1689, was another instance of at tainder and banishment by Act of Parliamentcivil death was the consequence of an attainder. Several centuries before the cases of Belknap and Lord Maltravers, Magna Charta had declared

[ocr errors]

66

[ocr errors]

With re

[ocr errors]

(chap. 29) that "No freeman should be banished unless by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land." This declaration was wrung from King John in order to deprive the Crown of its claim to expel any subject from the country. And in the great text book of the laws," Blackstone's Commentaries," it is laid down that every Englishman may claim a right to abide in his own country as long as he pleases, and not to be driven from it unless by the sentence of the law. The King, by his prerogative, may issue out of his writ of ne exeat regno, and prohibit his subjects from going into foreign parts without license, but no power on earth, except the authority of Parliament (as in cases of transportation) can send any subject of England out of the land against his will.' This statement of the law is based upon Magna Charta. It is obvious, therefore, independently of the actual facts, as stated by Lord Coke, that Belknap and Lord Maltravers could not have been banished, as Mr. Welford states, by the will of the Crown'-the extracts before given from Lord Coke show that they were attainted and banished by special Acts of Parliament, which was the ordinary punishment in those days for treason. It will be noticed that the case of Carrol v. Blencowe, cited by Mr. Welford in support of his judgment, is very different to Wood v. Roberts. Blencowe, the husband, had been transported for a crime, and did not return to this country; he was, therefore, still absent by virtue of his banishment, and his non-return was a continuation of the absence occasioned thereby. The case depended entirely on the original involuntary absence. Mr. Welford did not attempt to distinguish Williamson v. Dawes from Wood v. Roberts, and, in fact, entirely ignored the former ease, and the other authorities cited on behalf of Mrs. Roberts. I venture to express my belief that very few, if any, of your readers will agree with Mr. Welford's judgment, but however wrong it is, the defendant is bound to submit to it because she has no right of appeal. It is true the law gives County Court judges the power to grant an appeal when the suitor is not entitled to it as a matter of right; but my experience enables me to say that Mr. Welford and many other judges invariably refuse to give an appeal in cases which, although of small amount, involve important questions of law. When there is no right of appeal, a powersimilar to that applicable to cases heard before magistrates-onglit to be given to a judge of a Superior Court to order a case to be stated; and it would be well also if, when stated, the case should be left to the decision of a judge of a Superior Court sitting in chambers. each party being represented by attorney, and not by counsel, but with liberty to the judge to refer the question to the court. This would be a speedy, cheap, and satisfactory remedy for suitors, and one which (judging from the decisions of County Court judges as reported in the County Courts Chronicle for this month, vide Higham v. Smith, and a case before the judge of the Greenwich Court) is very much required.

[blocks in formation]
[ocr errors]

EXECUTION CREDITOR v. TRUSTEE.-Whilst I cannot resist the pleasure of occasionally discussing in your columns an interesting and important legal question, I am unwilling to be drawn into a mere wordy contest. I must, therefore, rest my case as to a secured creditor, and indeed the whole question, upon the letters of mine you have already inserted. I am, however, desirous of calling Mr. Bremner's attention to the sections of the Bankruptcy Act which, in my opinion, define the rights of execution crediters, namely, sects. 13 and 95. These two sectionsparticularly the latter-are the foundation of the whole question which has been the subject of the numerous cases now being reported by you. Does Mr. Bremner think it quite fair to say that I have made an assertion of which I offer no proof; that there is no trace of any definition of the rights of an execution creditor in the Act, and he doubts whether the term execution creditor" is even used in the Act? I wish also simply to remark with reference to the contents of Mr. Bolland's letter, that the result of the late decisions is perfectly well known to me, but being of opinion (and I think I gather from his letter that he is of the like opinion) that the plain and clear intention of the Legislature, so well expressed in all the Chief Judge's decisions, has been frustrated by the decisions-first of the common law tribunal, and then of the Court of Appeal, I shall view with great interest the forthcoming appeal to the Exchequer Chamber. At present, no doubt, considerable difficulty will arise upon applications by receivers to restrain creditors who have seized before the filing of a liquidation petition. In ordinary cases, if the debt in the case of a trader does not exceed 50%., or in the case of a non-trader the debt is of any amount, the court may not feel itself justified in exercising the jurisdiction given to it by

the 260th Rule, but surely as it cannot be the 95th contended that the protection of section is to be extended to executions not executed "in good faith," opportunity should be afforded to the general body of creditors of inquiry into the circumstances of an execution before the goods are sacrificed under a forced sale. Suppose also that the debtor, before filing his petition under the 125th and 126th sections, has committed some other act of bankruptcy "available against him for adjudication," and the seizure took place after such act of bankruptcy, but before the filing of the petition; and suppose the creditor had notice of the prior act of bankruptcy, would this circumstance not exclude him from the protection afforded to him under the authority of the recent cases? These and many other circumstances which will occur to Mr. Bolland, and those who have much practice in these matters, would appear to render it desirable that restraining orders should be granted. It appears to me that much responsibility has been cast upon the gentlemen who have to administer the new jurisdiction by these decisions, and I foresee some strange and complex cases which will come before them. This very day several cases have come before the Chief Judge, in which the point has arisen in different ways; and as the amount in dispute in one case amounts to 4000l., it is not impossible that your prediction may be verified by an early appeal to the highest tribunal-that of the House of Lords.

Nov. 6th, 1871.

J. SEYMOUR SALAMAN.

COUNTY COURT REGISTRARS AS ADVOCATES I think there was a discussion some time back in your columns, which I should like to revive, as to the practice in advocacy of County Court regis trars. I do think, with all respect to those functionaries, that they should not be allowed to practise on their own circuits. It creates an unfair monopoly, for one can hardly believe that registrar A., unable to take a case in his own court, will not recommend registrar B. in preference to a solicitor who is without the charmed circle, and who cannot return the compliment, inasmuch as every registrar is sure to have a much greater chance of recommending cases than a solicitor who holds no official position. Moreover, since the Superior Courts do not tolerate the practice in the case of their analogons officers, why should it exist in the case of the County Court, which grows yearly of more importance, and as a carollary, increases the responsibility and advantages of the registrars. It is more than human nature can do to avoid in toto the temptation of sending a suitor who ignorantly asks the registrar to conduct his case, and is told it cannot be done, on to the next registrar, who from the esprit du corps is likely to think it his duty to act in a similar manner. The time has come for three great reforms in these County Courts. When twentyfive years ago they were started as small debt courts, many features might well be absent from them. But now there are three urgent necessities: (1) that the judge should always take full notes as at Nisi Prius; (2) that a simple terse set of pleadings be adopted; (3) that the regis trars be officers of the court simply, and not prac tising advocates. The varied and heavy business now transacted in all the County Courts, and the complex interests concerned demand a formal system, which shall be as regular as that of Westminster Hall, and unless this be acted on it is mere rubbish to talk of making the courts those of first instance in everything. I hope to draw forth the opinions of some of your readers on this matter, as I am sure it demands attention from the Profession. ADVOCATE.

LAW CLERKS' SOCIETY.-Permit me through your coloums to call the attention of law clerks to the desirability of taking some steps with a view to the establishment of a Law Clerks' Society, having for its principal object a means of discussing and considering matters affecting the interests of a class by no means remarkable for their extravagant remuneration or for the general advantages they enjoy compared with other branches of industry. I trust the subject may meet with the support of those to whom some such institution is of important consequence.

WADDIE.

[blocks in formation]

NOTES AND QUERIES ON

POINTS OF PRACTICE.

NOTICE. We must remind our correspondents that this column is not open to questions involving points of law such as a solicitor should be consulted upon. Queries will be excluded which go beyond our limits. N.B.-None are inserted unless the name and address of the writers are sent, not necessarily for publication, but as a guarantee for bona fides

Queries.

OF

11. LIQUIDATION BY ARRANGEMENT - SALE REALTY. A mortgaged real property situate at B. to C., and he (A.) also mortgaged other premises to D. D. has transferred his mortgage to E., and by the same deed A. again mortgaged the property at B. to E. E.'s solicitor has not been paid his costs for the transfer of mortgage. A. has petitioned for liquidation by arrangement. Can E.'s solicitor sell both properties comprised in his mortgage deed under and by virtue of the powers of sale therein contained, without an order of court, and then prove for the deficiency in case the sale should not realise sufficient to pay his principal, interest, and costs, or must E. first obtain an order of court, or of the registrar, to sell the properties, and, if so, who would be entitled to the conduct of the sale ? E.'s solicitor, or the trustee's solicitor under the liquidation? Has E.'s solicitor a lien upon the deeds for the payment of his costs for the transfer of the mortgage to E. ? It is conceived that he has, and if E. were to pay his solicitor such costs could he (E.) legally add the amount so paid to his principal and interest money? AMICUS.

12. PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION.-By the 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127, it is enacted that before being articled to an

attorney the person proposing to be articled must pass

a certain examination. At the end of sect. 8 of the same Act it says, "that the said judges, or any one or more of them, may, where under special circumstances they or he see fit so to do, dispense with compliance with such regulations, entirely or partially, or subject to any such conditions as to them or him may seem fit." I should feel obliged if one of your numerous readers

would inform me what are the circumstances under which the judges will dispense with the examination.

A.

13. CONDITION OF SALE-RECITALS-If a condition of sale provides that every recital or statement in any deed dated twenty years or upwards prior to the day of sale shall be deemed conclusive evidence of the fact or

matter so recited or stated, will this preclude a purchaser from requiring the production or an abstract or covenant for the production of any deed which is missing, and which is recited in a deed twenty years old, or from making any objection or requisition in respect thereof ? If not, how should the condition be framed so as to attain this object without actually referring to the loss of any particular deed?

H.

14. BARRING THE ENTAIL.-From the text books, Williams Real Property, and Fearne's Contingent Re

mainders, I understand that "a tenant in tail of a quasi entail may, by a simple deed of conveyance, bar his issue and all remainders." I can't make out whether the reversion to the cestui que vie is barred at the same time, or only the remainders after the entail for the life of the cestui que vie. If you will have the goodness to enlighten me through the medium of your journal, you will greatly oblige AN ARTICLED CLERK.

15. BANKRUPTCY AND CRIMINAL LAW.-Can any of your readers inform me if there is a book published containing a Digest of Questions and Answers in Bankruptcy (new Act) and Criminal Law, similar to Mr. Hallilay's Digest in Conveyancing, &c. ? M. D. J.

(Q. 4.) SUCCESSION DUTY.-Deductions for probable loss of rent, &c., will not be allowed. E. B.

(Q. 6.) CASE.-Clay v. Yates (1 Hurl. & Norm. 73) has not been overruled. But see Lee v. Griffin (30 L. J. Q. B. 252), where it was discussed. E. B.

(Q. 7.) TALLYMAN'S BILL.-No such Act has been passed as "S. C." thinks. Assuming that the husband and wife were living together when the contract in question was made, and that she had no express authority from him to enter into such contract, then the liability of the husband depends entirely upon the nature of the articles purchased, i e., whether they are such as the wife would by law have an implied authority to purchase. It was held in Phillipson v. Hayter (40 L. J. 14, C. P.) that a wife has only an implied authority to buy such goods on her husband's credit as ordinarily come within the domestic department under her control, and are also suitable to the position in life which he allows her to assume. And if she carried on a separate trade with the concurrence of her husband, she would have his authority to purchase proper and suitable goods in the way of such trade.

COUNTY COURTS.

BLOOMSBURY COUNTY COURT.
Wednesday, Nov. 1.
(Before G. L. RUSSELL, Esq.)
OPPENHEIM v. Moss.

[ocr errors]

E. B.

New trial-Fresh evidence- What must be the nature of evidence to justify. In an action by a traveller against his employer for arrears of salary, the question was whether the agreement was for 21. or 31. per week. The only evidence was that of the plaintiff on the one side, and the defendant on the other, and the jury found for the plaintiff. On motion for a new trial, on the ground that there was fresh evidence, namely, the evidence of defendant's daughter who was present when the agreement was entered into, a fact discovered since the trial, and of her husband to whom the plaintiff had communicated the nature of the

engagement:

Held, that to grant a new trial under such circumstances would encourage perjury; the evidence also being of a nature which with reasonable care might have been discovered before, and it not being clear that a verdict would on the new trial be given for the plaintiff, the motion was refused with costs.

THIS was an action by a commercial traveller against his employer for arrears of wages at 11. per week, it being alleged by the plaintiff that it had been agreed to give the plaintiff 21. per week certain, and 31. if the business succeeded. On the termination of the engagement he claimed as upon 31. per week. The defendant denied that any such engagement had been entered into, but beyond some circumstantial evidence the defen dant was the only witness called to rebut the evidence of the plaintiff. The jury gave a verdict for the plaintiff for the full amount.

since the trial.

F. O. Crump now applied for a new trial, on the ground that fresh evidence had been discovered This was the evidence of the defendant's daughter, who was present when the 16. FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION.-A.'s son mar- plaintiff was engaged, and of her husband, fore

ries B.'s daughter. A. and B. purchase a business for A.'s son. Half of the purchase money is paid, aud A. and B. give a joint and several promissory note for the remainder. Before the remainder is paid A.'s son becomes bankrupt. It turns out that fraudulent misrepresentations have been made by the person who sold the business. If A. and B. prove against the estate of A's son for the whole purchase money, can they set up as a defence to an action on the note a want of consideration on account of the fraudulent misrepresentations, or bring an action to recover part of the amount already paid? Can they if they prove the debt as a contingent debt under the 31st section of the Bankruptcy Act 1869? W. B. S.

Answers.

(Q. 1.) SEDUCTION-INFANT.-(1.) Yes; see Johnson v. Pye (1 Sid. 259), Liverpool Adelphi Association v. Fairhurst (9 Ex. Ch. 422; 22 L. T. Rep. N. S. 318), Bristow v. Eastman (1 Esp. 172), Burnard v. Haggis (32 L. J. 189, C. P.; 8 L. T. Rep. N. S. 320.) (2.) Although the loss of service is the legal foundation of the action for seduction, and though it is difficult to reconcile with principle the giving of greater damages on another ground, the practice has become inveterate, and cannot now be shaken (per Lord Ellenborough, C. J., in Irwin v. Dearman, 11 East, 24.) Damages may therefore be given for the loss which the plaintiff has sustained by being deprived of the society and comfort of his child, and by the dishonour which he suffers: Southernwood v. Rainsden (8 Selw. N. P. 1066, 13th edit.), Chambers v. Irwin (Ibid), Bedford v. McKow (3 Esp 120), Tullidge v. Wade (3 Wils. 19.) And the plaintiff is allowed to prove the amount of the expenses sustained by him in consequence of his daughter's confinement, &c., and the expenses of the medical attendance, though not paid, may be recovered: Dixon v. Bell (1 Stark. 289.) E. B.

man of the defendant's yard, to whom the plaintiff communicated the nature of the engagement, namely, that it was 21. per week. The fact that his daughter was present, had escaped the recollection of the defendant when preparing his defence, and the learned counsel submitted that there having been a direct conflict of testimony, a new trial should be granted. He cited Chitty's Archb. Pract. of the Q. B., p. 1529, that "if new evidence be discovered after the trial, such as to satisfy the court that, if the party had had it at the trial, he must have had a verdict, the court will grant a new trial on payment of costs, in order to do justice between the parties." There being a balance of testimony it was reasonable to suppose that a jury would incline to the side to which evidence was added, and it was essential that justice should be done between the parties. Therefore his Honour, in refusing the application, must be clear as to three things-(1) that justice had been done between the parties; (2) that a jury would not give the defendant a verdict; and (3) that he would not have obtained a verdict had the evidence been adduced at the trial.

His HONOUR, without calling on Francis Turner for the plaintiff, referred to other passages in Archbold to the effect that a new trial will not be granted where a verdict was given against a party for want of evidence which might have been produced at the trial, because it would tend to introduce perjury; moreover, from the passage cited by counsel, it appeared that the court must be satisfied that had the fresh evidence been adduced at the trial, the defendant must have had a An action can be sustained against an infant verdict. Further, the evidence of defendant's (Bristow v. Eastman, 1 Esp.) for seduction or any tor- daughter might, with reasonable care, have been tious act, except fraudulent representation or torts discovered in time for the trial, and it being founded on contract. (2) The damages may be given the evidence of a relation the danger of perjury for the wounded feelings of the parent as well as the actual loss of service: (Bedford v. M'Kowl, 3 Esp.) was very great. He himself was not dissatisfied W. R. with the verdict; substantial justice he thought

had been done, and he did not believe that another jury would, on the fresh evidence, give a verdict the other way.

Application refused with costs.

[blocks in formation]

deposit and in part payment of the purchase of my business (a corn dealers and general shop), situate in the parish of Crayford. That I have sold the said G. C. Heard the said business for the sum of 50%., the same to include all fixtures and utensils in trade. And further, I agree that if Mr. Heard pays down 30l. in cash I will take his two bills of acceptance for the several amounts, the one of 201. payable in three months, and the other to be for the amount of the stock at valuation payable in six months. Received 15th May 1871, Fred. R. Steer, 21."

Leeson, barrister (instructed by N. Jourdain, of Paternoster-row), appeared for the plaintiff, and

Oliver, solicitor, of King-street, Cheapside, was for the defendant.

Upon the foregoing agreement being put in, an it only bore a 6d. agreement stamp, whereas it objection was made by Oliver on the ground that ought to be impressed with an ad valorem stamp as an assignment.

simply an agreement, and, secondly, that the contract having been partly performed, the writing was not necessary to support his case.

Leeson contended, first, that the document was

His HONOUR ruled otherwise, and the plaintiff not being prepared with the penalty, the case was adjourned, to allow of an application being made to the Commissioners of Inland Revenue for a remission of the penalty.

HEARD v. CLARKE.

This was also a suit for specific performance, arising out of the preceding one, the defendant being the owner of the premises in which the business, agreed to be sold to the plaintiff, was carrried on.

The same solicitor and counsel appeared. The agreement was as follows:-“ I, David Clarke, hereby agree to let to Gideon Charles Heard, my shop, adjoining my house, situate in the parish of Crayford, Kent, and now open as a general and corn and flour dealer's the term of business, on an agreement for

three

a

years, at the yearly rental of 201. (subject to the usual landlord's taxes) pay. able quarterly. And I further agree to grant the said G. C. Heard, or his successors, lease of seven or fourteen years at the same yearly rental, either before or at the expiration of the said three years, without any further cost than the said lease shall cost in preparing. David Dated this Clarke. Witness, Fred. R. Steer. 15th May 1871." This agreement was impressed with 2s. duty only.

His HONOUR (to plaintiff).-Who has got up this case for you-some debt collector?

Plaintiff.-No; a solicitor in Paternoster-row. His HONOUR-I thought you had been to some unqualified person who knew no more law than a cat, with a view to save expense.

This suit was also adjourned for the agreement to be stamped, the plaintiff in both cases being

mulcted in costs.

GRANTHAM v. WILLEY. Service of summons.

This was a claim for 15l. 3s., for medical attendance.

Gibson, of Dartford, was for the plaintiff. The case was heard by the Registrar, who gave judgment for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the Judge as to the service of the summons. The return was "served at the place of business of the defendant upon a man apparently above the age of sixteen years, who said defendant was ill, but he would return to the office on Monday, when the summons should be given to him.' There was no evidence that the summons had come to the knowledge of the defendant, who is managing clerk to a solicitor in Fridaystreet, Cheapside, and His Honour held that the office where the summons was left could not be deemed the place of business of the defendant, and, consequently, the service was defective.

Gibson applied that the summons should be served by one of the home bailiffs, as it was almost impossible to get summonses properly served by the metropolitan bailiffs, indeed the proceeding where process had to pass through the metropolitan courts was a perfect farce, scarcely one summons in twenty was properly served.

His HONOUR said that the metropolitan courts were not overburdened with work.

[blocks in formation]

66

strong opinions that the "collision" mentioned in
the Act of 1868 meant "a collision between two
ships." Opinions coming from such a quarter,
though technically they amount to mere obiter
dicta, are, of course, entitled to great weight,
especially when they are brought under the notice
of an inferior tribunal; but still they have no
binding authority. I trust I shall avoid the
charge of presumption if I venture, on grounds
which I shall presently mention to question their
correctness in this instance. The statute was
passed to confer on certain County Courts Admi-
ralty jurisdiction, and the language employed in it
ought, in my judgment, to be interpreted as it
would be were it found in any Act relating to the
High Court of Admiralty. Then, if this be a
sound canon of construction, the word "collision,"
as used in the 3rd section of the Act of 1868, must
mean any collision which the High Court of Admi-
ralty would have power to investigate. Thus far
the learned judges would probably agree with me,
for they actually did decide that the term could
not have a wider interpretation in the County
Court than in the Superior Court, and one cannot
easily imagine any intelligible reason why it
should be held to have a narrower interpre-
tation. But the error, if I may use the
expression, into which the judges appear to have
fallen, has arisen from a misapprehension respect
ing the real limits of Admiralty jurisdiction. Such
a question is one with which common law judges
are not necessarily familiar. In the case under
discussion, the legal arguments were not of a high
order of merit. Several of the leading authorities
were not alluded to at all, and those cited were
calculated to mislead. For instance, the case of
the Bilboa (Lush. Adm. Rep. 152) was quoted
to prove that the Admiralty Act of 1840, by
sect. 6, did not give the Court of Admiralty juris.
diction over damage done by a ship to a barge
within the body of a county, the words of that
section simply applying to "damage received by
any ship or sea-going vessel." This was true
enough, but the inference which the court was left
to draw from the case-viz., that the jurisdiction
of the Admiralty Court continued thus limited in
1868-was altogether illusory. The facts were
these: The case of the Bilboa was decided in 1860,
and in the following year an Act was passed (24 Vict
c. 10, to extend the Admiralty jurisdiction, the
effect of which was entirely to neutralise the
authority of that case. Sect. 7 of the Act is in
these words: "The High Court of Admiralty shall
have jurisdiction over any claim for damage done
by any ship." This Act came into operation on
the 1st June 1861, and in the year 1862 an oppor-
tunity arose for putting a legal construction on
the language just cited. The Malvina, a screw
steamer, contrived to sink the Mystery, a barge
laden with sugar, in the Blackwall Reach, and a
suit in the Admiralty Court was the consequence.
Thereupon the defendant put in a plea that
the barge was not a ship or sea-going vessel,
and that the collision took place within the
body of a county; but this plea was rejected
by Dr. Lushington. On appeal to the Privy
Council the judgment was affirmed. Lord
Romilly emphatically declaring that the effect
of the then recent statute was to confer on
the Court of Admiralty the utmost extent of juris-
diction in all cases of collision: (see the Malvina,
Lush. 493; Brow. & Lush. 57; s. c. in Priv. Co., 6
L. T. Rep. N. S. 359; 8 ibid, 403.) I might cite
several other decisions and statutes which more
or less support the same doctrine, as, for example,
the Uhla (referred to by Sir R. Phillimore in 3
Mar. Law Cas. 40); The Sylph (id., 37); The Ex-
plorer (id., 507): The Sarah (Lush. 507); Ex parte
Ferguson and Hutchinson (1 Mar. Law Cas. N. S.
8); 32 & 33 Vict., c. 51, s. 4; and 30 & 31 Vict., c.
114, and 29, Irish. But, after all, the Malvina is
amply sufficient for my purpose. It was not
alluded to in the Common Pleas. Its high autho-
rity has never been doubted, and it appears to me
to settle the question. The plaintiff cannot prose-
cute his claim in this court, but must proceed, if
at all, before Mr. Commissioner Kerr.

The Malvina and other cases considered.
In this case his HONOUR delivered the following
judgment:-This is an action in which the plain-
tiff seeks to recover damages for an injury caused
to his boat by a collision with the defendant's yacht.
The accident occurred on the Thames, within the
district of this court if the cause can be tried at
common law-within the district of the City of
London Court if the cause be an Admiralty cause.
I purposely make use of this alternative language
because, although I am aware that a different
opinion prevails in some quarters, I am myself
satisfied that a concurrent jurisdiction can-
not be recognised by law in this matter. I am not
now alluding to the jurisdiction of the Superior
Courts of law, but simply to the powers vested
in the County Courts; and I am guided and con-
trolled in my judgment by the express language
of the Legislature. On turning to the County
Courts Admiralty Jurisdiction Act 1868 (31 & 32
Vict. c. 71), I find in sect. 5 that, as soon as a
County Court is appointed to have Admiralty
jurisdiction within any district, no County Court
other than the County Court so appointed shall
have jurisdiction within that district in any Admi
ralty cause," and the term " Admiralty cause" is
defined by sect. 3 as including all the causes
enumerated therein. If, then, this particular
cause be one embraced in that category, cedit
questio; this court has no power to interfere.
The above language appears to me so plain that
it does not require to be fortified by any refe-
rence to the absurdities which might arise were a
contrary law to prevail; but still it may be well
to bear in mind what an unseemly spectacle
of justice would be exhibited if, in a case of colli
sion, cross-actions could be brought in two diffe-
rent courts, governed by different rules, and consti-
tuted in different ways, the one judge assisted by
two nautical assessors, the other attempting to
guide a jury of five landsmen in accordance with
his unaided instincts. Having thus shortly stated
the grounds on which I decide that County Courts
which have, and those which have not, Admiralty
jurisdiction cannot exercise concurrent authority
over the same classes of cases, I come to the more
important question, whether the City of London
Court has jurisdiction over the cause before me. This
depends on the meaning of the words "any claim
for damage by collision," which will be found in
the 3rd section of the Act, as constituting the
subject matter of one of the Admiralty causes
therein mentioned. Now, these words are capable
of receiving at least four different interpretations.
First, they may be confined to collisions between
two ships; secondly, they may include the case of
a ship damaged by a boat; thirdly, they may include
the case of a boat damaged by a ship; and fourthly,
they may include the case of a collision between two
boats. At one time an attempt was made to give
them the last and widest interpretation, and a
County Court judge with Admiralty jurisdiction
BANKRUPTCY LAW.
was invited to try a cause where the litigants were
the respective owners of two dumb barges-that
NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS.
is, barges solely propelled by oars-which had run BANKRUPTCY ACT 1869, s. 6, SUB-SECT. 5, ss. 11,
into each other on the Thames. A prohibition, 87, 95, AND 125-EXECUTION-SEIZURE AND SALE
however, was granted by the Court of Common-LIQUIDATION-RELATION. Sect. 87 of the
Pleas, on the ground that the Admiralty jurisdic.
tion of the County Court over cases of collision
was certainly not larger than that of the High
Court of Admiralty, and that that court had no
power to deal with a collision which should happen
within the body of a county between two dumb
barges, such barges being neither "ships nor
"sea-going vessels" within the meaning of
the 6th section of the Admiralty Act of 1840
(3 & 4 Vict. c. 65): Everard v. Kendall (5
L. Rep., C. P., 423.) This decision was doubt-
less right; but, unfortunately, the learned judges,
not content with simply disposing of the question
before them, were tempted to express more or less

Bankruptcy Act of 1869 provides that where a
sheriff seizes the goods of a trader for a judgment
above 50l., the notice is given to the sheriff within
fourteen days that a bankruptcy petition has been
presented against the trader; he shall hold the
proceeds in trust for the trustee: Held, that the
words "bankruptcy petition" include a petition
for liquidation. Where, under such circumstances,
a petition for liquidation was presented after the
sale, but notice was given within the fourteen
days, the sheriff was restrained from paying the
proceeds to the execution creditor, and directed to
pay them to the trustee : (Ex parte Key, re Skinner,
25 L. T. Rop. N. S. 315. Bank.)

BRIGHTON COUNTY COURT.

Friday, Nov. 3.

(Before WILLIAM FURNER, Esq., Judge.) Re GEORGE THOMAS.

Bankruptcy-Application to annul-Petition for liquidation-Informality in proceedings. THIS was an application on behalf of the bankrupt to set aside the whole proceedings in bankruptcy, on the grounds of certain informalities in the proceedings. The ground of the application, and the statement of the facts, are all clearly set out in his Honour's judgment.

Denny (of London), instructed by Pullen (of London), appeared in support of the application. Gell (of Brighton) for the trustee.

After hearing Denny's arguments at great length, His HONOUR, without calling on Gell to reply, gave the following judgment:-This is an application on behalf of the bankrupt to annul the adjudication made herein on the 18th Oct. 1870. It will be necessary, in considering this question, to review all the circumstancs connected therewith. It appears that a petition for liquidation by arrangement was filed by the bankrupt in this court on the 9th Sept. 1870; that the usual notice convening a meeting of the creditors was duly given under such petition; that a general meeting of the creditors of the said George Thomas was duly held on the 29th Sept. 1870, at which meeting the statutory majority of the creditors then assembled. Resolved, that the affairs of the said George Thomas should be liquidated in bankruptey; that in pursuance of such resolution the said George Thomas was, under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 1869 (sect. 125, sub-sect. 12) duly adjudicated a bankrupt on the 18th Oct. 1870, on the petition of Nevil Smart and Henry Allwork Hammond, two of the creditors of the bankrupt; That at the first meeting held under the said bankruptcy on Nov. 1, 1870, the said bankrupt attended and was sworn and examined, and filed a statement of his accounts. That there were also other meetings under the bankruptcy which the bankrupt also attended. This application to annul the adjudication in bankruptcy is made on the following grounds: first, that the debts of the petitioning creditors are together of an amount insufficient to support an adjudication in bankruptcy; secondly, that the petitioning creditors have not made any affidavit of debt, under the bankruptcy, save an affidavit made by Nevil Smart, one of the petitioners verifying the allegagations contained in the petition; thirdly, that in the affidavit filed by the said Nevil Smart under the petition for liquidation, he swears that he holds a promissory note for part of his debt, and in the petition in bankruptcy he alleges that he holds no security; fourthly, that there is a petition for liquidation pending, and until the same has been disposed of the proceedings in bankruptcy are irregular; fifthly, that the place of business of the bankrupt as an iron and brass founder at the Norfolk Foundry, River-road, Littlehampton, is not stated in the petition of bankruptcy. Sect. 125, sub-sect. 12 appears to me to be an answer to all these objections and a sufficient ground to support the adjudication in bankruptcy. The creditors having at the first general meeting under the petition for liquidation resolved that the affairs of the debtor should be liquidated in bankruptcy, the court could do no other than comply with such resolution and adjudicate the debtor a bankrupt. The objection that the debts of the petitioning creditors are insufficient in amount to support an adjudication in bankruptcy, or that the petitioning creditors have not made any affidavit of debt under the bankruptcy, or that the affidavit of one of the petitioners as to his holding no security for part of his debt is at variance with his affidavit filed under the petition for liquidation appears to me to be of no importance; the petition in bankruptcy having been filed pro forma, all the other requisites to support an application in bankruptcy are supplied by the petition for liquidation and the proceedings had thereunder. The objection also raised that the place of business of the bankrupt as an iron and brass founder at the Norfolk Foundry, Littlehampton, is not stated in the petition in bankruptcy, is equally untenable, the bankrupt having in his petition for liquidation, and in the affidavit in support of the same, described himself as of Myrtle-terrace, Littlehampton, iron and brass founder, which is the same description given in the petition in bankruptcy. I must also observe that the bankrupt having acquiesced in the bankruptcy by attending the first and other meetings held under his bankruptcy, and having filed a statement of his accounts, and having been sworn and examined thereon, without any objection having been made by him it is not now competent for him to dispute his adjudication. I would further observe that by the Bankruptcy Act 1869, sect. 82, it is provided that no proceedings in bankruptcy shall be invalidated by any formal defect or any irregularity unless the court before which an objection is made to such proceedings is of opinion that substantial injustice has been

[ocr errors]

suitably represented; and that after the establishment
thereof no person should be admitted to practise in any
branch of the legal profession, either at or below the
bar, or as an attorney or solicitor, in England without
after proper examinations by such general school of
a certificate of proficiency in the study of law, granted
law. That an humble address may be presented to Her
Majesty, praying that Her Majesty may be graciously
pleased to take into consideration the expediency of
establishing and incorporating, under Her Majesty's
Royal Charter, a general school of law in the metro-

caused by such defect or irregularity, and that
such injustice cannot be remedied by any order of
such court." It also appears that a bill in equity
has been filed by the trustee appointed under the
bankruptcy to recover a certain leasehold estate
alleged to be the property of the bankrupt, which
had been assigned to Phoebe Holmes, a sister of
the bankrupt's wife, but of which no account had
been rendered by the bankrupt, and that by a
decree made in such suit the said leasehold pre-polis.
mises were ordered to be assigned by the said
Phoebe Holmes to the trustee under the bank-

ruptcy, who has since sold the same for the benefit
of the bankrupt's creditors. Under these cir-
cumstances I consider that the adjudication in
this case ought to be upheld, and that an act of in-
justice would be caused to the creditors if the ad.
judication were annulled. I therefore dismiss this
application.

LAW SOCIETIES.

THE INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY OF

LIVERPOOL.

Nov. 1, Mr. Isham H. E. Gill, the president, in the
chair. There was a numerous attendance, among
those present being Messrs. Lowndes (vice-presi-
dent), Edward W. Bird (treasurer), F. Archer
(hon. secretary), Fred. S. Hull, H. Gregory, Wm.
Redcliffe, Hore, Layton, R. A. Payne, Bushby,
Bartlett, Newton, T. Avison, R. H. Cleaver, T. E.
Paget, Fisher, Barrel, Fordsham, Jevons, Kenion,
Gray Hill, W. H. Lace, Richardson, Goffey, Allsop,
Thornley, Collins, Jenkins, J. Townshend, Jones,
J. Forshaw, Dean, A. T. Squarey, &c.
Mr. F. Archer submitted the annual report, of
which the following is an abstract :-

"These resolutions were brought forward, how ever, at so late a period of the session, that the pressure of other parliamentary business caused them to be dropped, without a division being arrived at. They will, no doubt, be again brought forward in the ensuing season, and the committee trust that they will then be passed.

success.

[merged small][ocr errors]

Professional Remuneration.-The meeting of deputies then proceeded to discuss the subject of lutions were arrived at by the meeting: professional remuneration. The following reso

That in view of the recent Act relating to the remuneration of attorneys and solicitors, this meeting

is of opinion that the remuneration of attorneys and solicitors, in certain classes of transactions on ad

valorem principle, is both feasible and desirable. That pro-ling as far as possible the following conditions: (1) any sound system of legal charges should aim at fulfilIt should pay more highly for head work than for mechanical work. (2). It should pay adequately for all real work, and should destroy, or as far as possible lessen the temptation to do sham work or shirk responsibility. (3) It should secure a due recognition of the experience of practitioners. (4) It should produce would favourably compare with the remuneration afforded in other walks of life open to the same class. (5) It should do full justice to the successful suitor by giving him as party and party costs all costs reasonably incurred in the ordinary course of the suit. That this meeting is of opinion that the principle of ad valorem Subsequent meetings of the deputies were held in London on the 14th and 15th April, at which a revised scale was reviewed with great care, and adopted approving it. At these meeting the Manafter a very full discussion a resolution was chester, Liverpool, Birmingham, and Newcastle societies were represented, and their scale was afterwards approved of by the committees of all the societies represented, and also by the Worcester Law Societies. Prior to the next meeting of the deputies held at Liverpool, on the 5th July, the committee of this society had had under contween party and party, which they considered sideration the subject of taxation of costs as beshould be assimilated to a much greater extent citor and client. They selected, as what they conthan is now done with the costs as between solisidered the proper rule, the principles set forth by the Court of Common Pleas, interpreting the Parliamentary Election Act in the case of Hill v. Peel (L. Rep. 5 C. P., 180). With a view of getting an alteration to that effect made, in the Common Pleas of the County Palatine, they first first instance, by the Courts of Chancery and waited upon the Attorney-General of the Duchy, and afterwards upon the Vice-Chancellor of the County Palatine, and subsequently, at the suggestion of the latter, upon Lord Justice James. They they were advised by Lord Justice James to apply were very favourably received in all cases; but in the first instance to the Lord Chancellor himself, in order that any changes that might be desirable might be first adopted in the High Court. The result of the interview was reported to the meeting of deputies on the 5th July, who passed the following resolutions: —

as a result such a remuneration for the Profession as

"Law Lectures. While doing their best to Solicitor to the bankrupt, C. H. Pullen. mote a general scheme for the advancement of Solicitors to the trustee, Black, Freeman, and legal education, the committee have not lost sight Gell. of the importance of those duties that lies nearer home. The proposed law university will necessarily be established in the metropolis; but the provincial members of the Profession require some improved facilities for legal education in their own towns. There have been several attempts to establish law schools in connection with THE forty-fifth annual meeting of the Incorporated Queen's College in Birmingham, and with Owen's Law Society of Liverpool was held at the Law College in Manchester, but hitherto without much Association Rooms, Cook-street, on Wednesday, lectures of a high class has recently been made by charges should not apply to transactions under 3001. A fresh attempt, however, to obtain law the trustees of Owen's College, in which they have been supported by the Manchester Incorporated Law Association. The organisation of Regius Professor of Jurisprudence at the Univerthose lectures was entrusted to Dr. Bryce, the sity of Oxford, through whom arrangements were made with several other gentlemen of acknowledged legal eminence and ability to deliver two successive annual courses of lectures of a comprehensive character. Your committee being informed of what was proposed to be done in Manchester, were desirous of extending the same of the trustees of Owen's College was freely advantages to their own town. The co-operation given to your committee, and it was ultimately be delivered in Manchester should be repeated arranged that the same courses that were to in Liverpool. It was found that this object could be attained at an expense of about 100l. a year, exclusive of the expense of providing rooms, lights, &c.; but individual members have liberally come forward to guarantee the society from loss. less than five years would be no fair test of the Your committee were of opinion that a trial for practicability of establishing a really good law school in Liverpool. The prospectus of the lectures and the syllabus of the first two courses have already been issued, and the first two lectures have been delivered by Dr. Bryce. The fee for the whole of the lectures for one season has been fixed at 21. 2s., with 7s. entrance; and for a single course 11. 1s., with the same entrance fee. These amounts are the same as have been fixed at Owen's College. The subscriptions to the lectures up to the time of issuing this report have reached the sum of 165. 4s., which is more than enough to cover the liability for the first year. The committee cannot quit the subject without pointing out that the ultimate success of the lectures must depend upon the continued personal support of the members of the society and their

"In presenting their report for the forty-fifth year of the existence of the society, the committee have to congratulate the members on the increasing prosperity and usefulness of the society. During the year 14 new members have been elected. The society now consists of 195 members, a considerably higher number than it has ever previously attained. The librarian reports a marked increase in the use of the library by members and their clerks.

66

High Court of Admiralty District Registry.The local administration of civil business has been promoted during the past twelve months by the establishment of the local registry of the High Court of Admiralty, in pursuance of the Act of the previous session. Mr. F. D. Lowndes, vicepresident of the society, has been appointed registrar, and the committee expect that the greater part of the Admiralty business of the port will be transacted in the registry. In order, however, to perfect the machinery of the registry; various amendments in the Act establishing will be required, and it will be necessary for the committee to take this subject into their careful consideration in the ensuing year.

it

"Legal Education. The cause of legal education having been taken up by an association formed specially for the purpose, there has been little occasion for the committee to take any direct

action in the agitation for the foundation of a central law university for the education of students intended for both branches of the Profession. The vote of the last annual meeting, approving of the proposals of the Legal Education Association, enabled your committee to communicate formally to the council of that association the approval of this society. Similar support was given by other provincial law societies. But the most important evidence of the general support of this branch of the Profession is the course taken by the Incorporated Law Society, by whom, after three days' debate, the following resolutions were carried by overwhelming majorities:

That this society approves generally of the proposals of the Legal Education Association for a university or school of law, and is willing to co-operate with this association on the footing-That all the several branches of legal study will be open to all who may become students, without distinction or classification, leaving them to determine with which branch of the Profession they will ultimately connect themselves. That the course of instruction of all members of the university intending to be barris'ers shall not be distinct and separate from the course of instruction of those intending to be attorneys or solicitors; and that an examination by the proposed university or school shall be equally compulsory on both branches. That the preponderance be given to the Bar or to attorney's and solicitors on the governing body.

"The proposals of the associations were brought before the House of Commons on the 11th July, by Sir Roundell Palmer, who moved resolutions

to the following effect:

That, in the opinion of this House, it is desirable that a geueral school of law should be established in the metropolis, in the government of which the different branches of the legal profession in England may be

articled clerks.

[ocr errors]

Legal Organisation.-Your committee have
long felt the importance of co-operation among
law societies and in particular provincial law
societies. The interests of all provincial attor
neys are the same, and in many cases (such as the
localising of law offices) they are opposed to the
interests of London attorneys. The two great
London societies, and in particular the Incorpo-
rated Law Society, far exceed any provincial law
society in numbers and importance, but although
they both admit provincial members in their
governing bodies, the practical decisions are al-
most necessarily given by meetings containing an
overwhelming preponderance of London members.
At the same time, your committee have practical
experience that even a very few provincial law
societies, by their legitimate influence upon the
in their own localities, and, through and in con-
mercantile associations and other public bodies
junction with them, upon their local representa
tives, can exert a much greater influence in Par-
liament than the metropolitan societies. During
the past year your committee thought it desirable
point delegates to meet and discuss in common
to invite all other provincial law societies to ap-
proposed legislative measures affecting the reform
of the law, and the interests of attorneys and
to by a meeting at Manchester, on the 23rd March,
solicitors. The invitation issued was responded
of deputies from the Northern Circuit committee
of the Metropolitan Provincial Law Association,

the Birmingham Incorporated Law Society, the
the Manchester Incorporated Law Association,
Leeds Incorporated Law Society, the Newcastle
and Gateshead Incorporated Law Society, the

That in the taxation of costs, as between party and

party, the principle of allowance should be that successful parties should be entitled to an indemnity for all costs that may be reasonably incurred by them, but in consequence of over caution or over anxiety as to

not to any extraordinary or unusual expenses incurred any particular case, or from conversatious of any special importance arising from the rank, position, wealth, or character of either of the parties, or any special desire on his part to ensure success.

That the

cuarges for time ought to be increased, and that the scale of remuneration for time suggested by the Incorporated Law Society of Liverpool would be proper to be adopted in matters to which such scale can be made applicable, and to be regarded as a standard to regulate the charges for time in cases to which the scal is not distinctly applicable. That a deputation cellor, at some time to be fixed by the chairman, to from the provincial societies wait upon the Lord Chanrepresent to his Lordship the desirability of altering the system of taxing costs in the spirit of the two last

resolutions.

In accordance with these resolutions, an interview with the Lord Chancellor was asked, and granted by his Lordship, and the views of the deputations were presented in a written statement. It expreceding resolutions citing inter alia, the fact pressed in greater detail the sentiments of the that the nominal amount of fees to attorneys and solicitors is the same at present as it was when the value of money was many times greater, and that the nominal fees of 6s. 8d. for an attendance, and 21. 2s. for a whole day's work, which were once full and adequate payments, have since the change of circumstances become totally inadequate. On the 12th May 1870, the Lords of Session matters for the one half-hour 6s. 8d., for the hour in Scotland authorised charges in contentious 10s.; each succeeding hour 5s., up to 4. 4s. a day of eight hours, for work done in Scotland, and

to your Lordship, that if these charges are allowed 51. 5s. a day for journeys from home. We submit in contentious matters in Scotland, at least a similar scale should be allowed in this country.

The Lord Chancellor received the statement of the deputies very favourably, and promised to give the matter his consideration. Your committee are quite aware of the difficulty in the way of the universal or even general adoption of any ad valorem scale of charges, unless formally sanctioned by the courts; they are, therefore, not prepared at present to recommend any resolution on the subject for adoption by the society.

"STAMPS.-Under the Stamp Act 1870, a question of importance to the public and Profession has arisen. Subjoined is a copy of a letter from the Commissioners of Inland Revenue in the matter, in answer to an inquiry addressed to them by the Incorporated Law Society of Liver-pool:

Inland Revenue, Somerset House, London, Oct. 17, 1871. Sir.-The Board of Inland Revenue have had before them your letter of the 4th instant, requesting information as to the proper construction of the Stamp Act, 1870, as regards he charge of duty, under the head "Admission and appointment or grant by any writing to or of any office or employment, and as to the classes of persons affected by it.' It is, of course impossible to specify all the classes of persons affected by the charge to which your letter refers. It will probably afford sufficient information to acquaint you that all appointments by any writing to office, or employment held during good behaviour, or otherwise, of a permanent character, were, prior to the Stamp Act, 1870, and are now under that Act liable to ad valorem stamp duty. I may add that where an appointment is made by a resolution recorded in a minute-book, and there is no other writing of appointment which is duly stamped, the resolution is the writing liable to the stamp duty.-I am, sir, your obedient servant, WM. BOMAS."

"The retiring members of the committee are Messrs. W. G. Bateson, F. S. Hull, F. D. Lowndes, F. T. Maddock, R. A. Payne, A. T. Squarey, and J. B. Wilson. The committee nominate Messrs. W. G. Bateson, F. S. Hull, and F. D. Lowndes for re-election. The other four retiring members are therefore ineligible as members of the committee for the ensuing year."

one half of the metropolitan certificates; and 650 solicitors practising in the country, or less than one-tenth of the country solicitors. A committee is now sitting to consider what steps should be taken to enlarge the operations of the society; and I feel little doubt that at the adjourned meeting of the society a comprehensive scheme will be brought forward which, when carried out, will place it in its proper position as the representative and head of the Profession. Meantime, organisation in the provinces has been proceeding more rapidly. Most of the large towns have now established incorporated law societies, and if representatives from these incorporated societies were joined to the council of the Incorporated Law Society, it would form the most perfect means of representing the Profession in all important matters. (Hear, hear.) The Metropolitan and Provincial Law Association has for some years past performed most useful duties to the Profession, but probably the time has come when the older society may, with propriety, resume the entire duties of head centre, and, with the affiliated local societies, form one complete organisation of the Profession. (Hear, hear.) The question of professional remuneration has occupied a large portion of the committee's time this year. That the present system of law charges is unsatisfactory, both to the practitioner and the public, cannot be doubted; that any new system should fulfil the requirements set out in the report is equally clear. (Hear, hear.) I believe no alteration will really be complete or satisfactory until the practitioner is placed in the same position as a member of any other profession; but until that is recognised much may be done to improve the present state of charges. A very exhaustive discussion on the subject took place at the Newcastle meeting of the Metropolitan Law Association in October, on a paper read by the president of the Manchester Law Society; and it seemed to be the impression that one general scale should be agreed upon as the basis of professional charges, and that such scale should be recognised by authority. In other words, that a solicitor using such scale should be entitled to receive it from his client, and that his client, whether he was trustee, agent, director, or in any other fiduciary character, should be justified in paying it. No doubt a client under Rathbone's Act may make a bargain, but to form the basis of that bargain a scale must be in use, and if that client be acting in a fiduciary character, that bargain will not entitle him to the allowance of the sum paid according to the present rules of taxation. The practical result, therefore, seems to be to endeavour during the ensuing year to get the equity and common law judges to carry out the sugges tions made by the joint deputation in July last, if they be not sufficient, to urge for further legislation on the subject. (Hear, hear.) Loom. ing in the future are the alterations threatened by the High Court of Justice Bill, the Land Transfer Bill, and the reforms to be suggested by the Judicature Commission. In each and all of them we are all deeply interested. By the establishment of local registries, in connection with the county palatine courts of common law and equity, it has been conclusively demonstrated that the public, as well as the local profession, are largely benefited, both by the decrease of expense and the saving of time; and it may fairly be anticipated that the principle of decentralisation having proved to be correct, will be extended and not diminished. (Hear, hear.) The success of the county palatine reform shows a fact long known to our Profession, but little regarded by the public, that legal reforms, to be successful, must proceed from within and not from without; and that those practically conversant with the subject are the proper persons to carry them out. The alterations in the Manchester and Liverpool will supply, to some bankruptcy law will illustrate this. It has from extent, the want of skilled teaching which is one time to time been altered in accordance with the of the most glaring defects. That ninety-two per- popular idea of what should be, and without sons should subscribe for the courses is a signifi- regard to the opinions of those practically concant proof that necessity existed for them; and I versant with them. The result has been change hope that not only the students will qualify them without improvement; and increased cost without selves for the luxury for the future, but the any corresponding benefit. I trust that if land practitioners who have to deal with the present transfer is to be dealt with, the alterations prowill avail themselves of the courses and place posed may be considered by men on every side of them on a permanent sound basis. For a very the Profession; and if that be done I believe that able exposition of the wants of legal education at a real and most necessary reform can be carried the present time, and the proper mode of remedy-out. If it be not done, I fear both the public and ing them, I would prefer you to a paper written the Profession will suffer by a change that will unby Mr. Jevons for the meeting of the Metropolitan settle our existing notions without supplying an and Provincial Law Association of Newcastle efficient remedy. (Hear, hear.) If courts are to be (hear, hear). Towards the proper organisation of established to work out the law by a fusion of law the Profession much has been done during the last and equity, it will be idle to appoint as the working year. It is clear that for this purpose there functionaries or registrars of these courts, barshould be one centre in London, and branches in risters-at-law having an exclusive knowledge of the provinces working in unison (hear, hear). The either law or equity, but not of both. Fusion can Incorporated Law Society of England is naturally only be committed to the attorney or solicitor the centre in London. Having a subsidy from having a practical knowledge of both, and whose the whole body of professional men in the king- previous training peculiarly fits him for organising dom they have means at their disposal, and, by and working out a novel system. Gentlemen, we the selection of eminent London practitioners, have come to the end of a very active and busy they have the best talent to direct the proper appli- session; but the next bids fair to require greater cation of the means. At present they numbered exertions than the last. The society for years 1755 solicitors practising in London, or more than past has pursued an even course of striving for

The President, in moving that the report of the committee be adopted, printed, and circulated in the usual way, said: There is one matter to which I wish to allude, and which is not mentioned in the report. We are going to lose a very active member of the Law Society (Mr. Steble), who is not, I am glad to say, retiring from the Profession in consequence of any misfortune, but through a plethora of capital, which is not very usual among us. (Laughter, and hear, hear.) Although the legislative results of the last session of Parliament have been small, the time of the committee has been greatly occupied by the consideration of the grave and important questions that affect the future of the Profession. The report shows the steps that have been taken with regard to the Law University, the organisation of the Profession, and professional remuneration; and I may be pardoned in saying that in each of these matters I think we have made real progress this year, and sown seed that bids fair to afford a harvest in the future. An education that sufficed for the practitioner of the last century will not suffice for the attorney of the present day. Whether he will or no, he is obliged to perform functions in the local courts that require a knowledge of the principles both of law and equity. No master in the pressure of business can give his articled clerk skilled training-a mere knowledge of practice will not qualify an attorney in these times of transition; and when we find of the 94 candidates that presented themselves in Easter Term last 30 were postponed, or nearly one-third, and of the 199 who presented themselves in Trinity Term six were postponed, or 1.36th part only, I fear we must come to the conclusion that the present system of legal education is defective (hear, hear),

I trust that the establishment of law lectures in

reform that benefits both the public and the Profession. So far it has achieved success, and in the legislation of the future I doubt not it will maintain its proper place; and whilst it will continue to oppose crude alteration, it will always be ready to use its best efforts to support any proposal that is a real improvement. There is only one other matter I will allude to. The law clerks of Liverpool are desirous of establishing a local provident society. This will in no way interfere with the Solicitors' Benevolent Society, because most of the members of the provident society would not be solicitors. This movement is under the management of our active friend Mr. Timpron Martin, and I would invite you to assist in it by giving a small donation to the funds (applause.) Mr Lowndes, the vice-president, said it was his privilege to second the motion." The president had gone so fully over the matters mentioned in the report that he deemed it quite unnecessary to trouble the society with any lengthened remarks. After some complimentary votes the proceedings terminated.

SOLICITORS' BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION. THE usual monthly meeting of the Board of Directors of this Association was held at the Law Institution, London, on Wednesday, Nov. 1, Mr. J. S. Torr, in the chair, the other directors present being Messrs. Brook, Carter, Cookson, Hedger, Monckton, Nelson, Shaen, and Smith, Mr. Eiffe, Secretary. A sum of 115l. was granted in relief of the widows and families of four deceased members of the association, and a sum of 451. was distributed in relief of four deceased non-members' families. One new life and four new annual members were admitted to the association. A bequest in favour of the association was reported of 1501. free of duty, under the will of the late Charlotte Elizabeth Walmesley; and other general business was transacted.

[ocr errors]

LIVERPOOL LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY. A MEETING of this Society was held at the Law Library, 14, Cook-street, on Thursday, 2nd Nov. inst. Mr. H. Gregory, Solicitor, in the chair. The subject for debate was A Telegraph Company is established under the Joint Stock Companies Act 1862. On the form on which the message is written, are printed conditions on which messages are sent, one of which is, that the company shall not be liable for non delivery. A dispatch is sent, received at the delivery office but not delivered, and loss ensues to the sender; is the company liable for negligence?" The question was decided in the affirmative by a large majority.

LAW ASSOCIATON.

FOR THE BENEFIT OF WIDOWS AND FAMILIES
OF ATTORNEYS, SOLICITORS, AND PROCTORS IN
THE METROPOLIS AND VICINITY.
AT the monthly meeting held on Thursday, the
2nd inst., at the Hall of the Incorporated Law
Society, in Chancery-lane, the following directors
being present, viz., Mr. Desborough (chairman),
Mr. Burges, Mr. Carpenter, Mr. Collisson, Mr.
Drew, Mr. Kelly, Mr. Longbourne, Mr. Sidney
Smith, and Mr. Boodle (secretary), an announce-
ment of the death of Mr. Harding, one of the
treasurers, was made and received with much
regret. A grant of 10l. was made to the widow of
and other business was transacted.
a non-member, three new members were elected,

A MEETING of this society was held on Thursday evening, the 2nd inst. Mr. Spink, in the chair, having examined the members on chaps. I. and II. of Williams on Personal Property, the following point was discussed: "In the case of an action for the rent of furnished apartments, would it be an answer to the action that the apartments were not fit and proper for the purpose for which they were let?" Mr. Dawson appeared in the affirmative, and Mr. Wray in the negative, and after a good discussion the point was decided in the affirmative. At the usual weekly meeting on Tuesday evening last there was a large attendance of members. Mr. Dawson occupied the chair, and examined the members on Accident" and "Mistake in Smith's Equity. The moot point was, "Can a devisee in trust disclaim by deed after a previous assent to the devise in words ?" Mr. Spink argued in the affirmative, and Mr. Woodhouse in the negative, and after a lengthy discussion, in which Messrs. Wray, Scott, Jackson, Pearson, Spurr, and Jacobs took part, the point was decided in the affirmative.

HULL LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY.

[ocr errors]

ARTICLED CLERKS' SOCIETY. A MEETING of this society was held at Clement'sinn Hall on Wednesday last, Mr. E. W. Dendy presiding. The treasurer and the committee severally presented their annual reports, which, after some discussion, were unanimously adopted, as were also the reports of the secretary for the societies in union and the Parliamentary secretary. The following gentlemen were elected to serve on the

« EelmineJätka »