Lord ROMILLY.-I think the directors' remunetion was to be paid out of the profits only. The 45th article meant that if one-tenth of the profits do not produce £100 a year for each of the directors, then they are to have £100 a year, and if the profits will admit of it, a larger sum equal to one-tenth part of the profits; not that the shareholders are to pay the directors personally if the company should be unprofitable. Mr. Harvey Lewis must, therefore, refund the sum received by him for director's fees.

Solicitors: R. Miller; Tatham, Curling, and Co.

Wednesday, Feb. 28.

Re SOUTHAMPTON IMPERIAL HOTEL COMPANY (LIMITED) (HUNT'S CLAIM). Company - Winding-up- Compromise and pay. ment by trustee for the company-Claim against the assets of the company.

policy of the law that fathers should be allowed, to deprive themselves of the control of their children, but it was also against the policy of the law that fathers should be allowed to retain the control of their children when it is proved that such control is injurious to the children. He considered the charges of cruelty and adultery were supported by the evidence, and not being prepared to say that it was not fit for the children to pass any time with the father he was now disposed to take the same view of the case as the Lord Chancellor had taken on the motion, and made an order restraining Mr. Hector from preventing the two

elder children from passing their holidays as the trustees had directed, with liberty to apply. His Lordship held that the intention of the covenant for delivery up of the journals included the copies, and directed they should be given up, and, the suit having been occasioned by Mr. Hector, he must pay the costs.

Solicitors: Janson, Cobb, and Pearson; Clarkson and Co.

V. C. MALINS' COURT. Friday, March 1.

Ferrers for Mr. Hunt.

Everitt for the official liquidator.

Lord ROMILLY said it was reasonable that Hunt

should make a fair compromise and be allowed to prove for the amount against the company, and directed an inquiry in chambers whether £800 was a fit and proper sum. Solicitor, J. Harwood.

Feb 28, and March 1 and 4. HAMILTON v. HECTOR. Separation deed-Specific performance-Custody of children.

ANNE HECTOR, one of the plaintiffs in this case, was, in 1858, married to the defendant, Alexander Hetor, and there was issue of the marriage four children. In Oct. 1870, Anne Hector gave instructions to her solicitors to present a petition in the Divorce Court for a judicial separation, and also filed a bill in Chancery against her husband to set aside a certain appointment as having been obtained from her by undue influence. After some negotiation between the parties, it was agreed that there should be a deed of separation, rather than that the proceedings in the Divorce Court should be prosecuted, and a deed of separation, dated the 10th Dec. 1870, was accordingly executed by both parties. It provided that Mrs. Hector might live separate from her husband, and contained a declaration that the two elder children should remain at such schools in England as Mrs. Hector, or such schools elsewhere as Mr. Hector, with the consent of Mrs. Hector, should direct, and that their holidays should be passed at such places as the trustees of the deed should direct, having regard, as far as practicable, to the wishes of both parties. It also contained a covenant by the husband to deliver up his wife's journals. The two elder children were placed at schools chosen by Mr. Hector, but he did not allow them to pass any of the following Christmas or Easter holidays with Mrs. Hector, and as he would not make any arrangement as to the Midsummer holidays, the trustees, on the 26th May 1871, sent him notice that they directed that the first four weeks of the children's holidays should be passed with Mrs. Hector and the rest with Mr. Hector. The present bill was then filed, and an injunction moved for, to restrain Mr. Hector from preventing the two elder children from passing the first month of the coming Midsummer holidays with Mrs. Hector, as he had threatened to do. The Master of the Rolls then held that the agreement was contrary to the policy of the law, and made no order on the motion. The plaintiffs appealed, and in July last the Lord Chancellor held that, although a father cannot by agreement deprive himself of the control of his children, yet the agreement in this case as to where the holidays of the children should be passed was reasonable, and would be enforced by the court, and he accordingly restrained Mr. Hector from interfering with the direction of the trustees as to the then ensuing Midsummer holidays. Mr. Hector had, since the institution of the suit, returned his wife's journals, but retained copies of them, and the bill, as amended, asked that such copies might be directed to be given up.

Lindley, Q.C. and Montague Cookson, for the plaintiffs.

Sir R. Bagallay, Q.C., Miller, Q.C. and E. Harvey, for the defendant.

Lord ROMILLY said that it was against the

INDIA COMPANY ASSURANCE SOCIETY.

Annuity granted by life assurance company Amalgamation of companies-Novation-Discretion to postpone winding-up order. THIS was a petition to wind-up the above society presented by a widow lady named James, whose husband had in 1863 entered into a contract with the society that in consideration of certain premiums to be paid by him, they would pay his wife an annuity of £50 in case she survived him. The husband died in 1864, and the annuity was paid to the widow by the above society until 1866, when its business was transferred to the European Assurance Society. The annuity was paid by the European until 1871; but an order to wind-up that society was made by V.C. Malins on the 12th Jan. 1872, and the petitioner now sought to wind-up the original society, on the ground that it remained liable to pay her the annuity.

Cotton, Q.C. and H. M. Jackson, in support of the petition.

Locock Webb and Henderson for other annuitants, also supported the petition.

Pearson, Q.C. and Murray, for the liquidators of the European, asked that the petition might stand over, pending the passage of a bill through Parliament for the liquidation of the affairs of the European. Should any order be made, they asked that the proceedings in chambers might be postponed.

Gasse, Q.C. and Higgins, for Sir Frederick Smith, and the former directors of the Naval and Military, contended on the construction of the deed of settlement that the society did not exist for the purpose of being wound up; that if it did, the petitioner had accepted the European as her debtors, and that there was no debt upon which a winding-up order could be made.

The VICE-CHANCELLOR held that on the question of novation the case was governed by The Family Endowment Society (21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 775.) Nor could he postpone an order to which the petitioner as an immediate creditor was entitled on an application on behalf of the European Society, from whom the petitioner would get but a very small dividend. An immediate winding-up order was accordingly made.

Solicitors: Wilkins, Blyth, and Marsland; Lewis, Munns, and Longden; Manning.

investors of the stock, was distinguishable from Ex parte Ramm, where the petitioner was only the representative of one of the investors. He accordingly made an order in the form adopted in Ex parte Holland (1 Phil. 379), directing the stock to be transferred to the petitioner, and that thereout he should pay and retain the costs. Solicitors: Raven and Bradley; Allen and Son.

Saturday, March 2.

Re THE HERCULES INSURANCE COMPANY (LIMITED); PUGH'S CASE; SHARMAN'S CASE.

name.

Company-Application for shares in fictitious THESE were two adjourned summonses, the one being taken out by Samuel Pugh and Mary Pugh, his wife, for the purpose of removing her name from the list of contributories of the above company; the other being taken out by the liquidator for the purpose of placing the name of John

Sharman on the list instead of that of Mary Pugh. The company was registered in 1865, and a voluntary winding-up was in Feb. 1869 ordered to be continued under the supervision of the court. John Sharman who carried on business as a draper at Leighton Buzzard in Bedfordshire, held 157 paid-up shares in his own name, and also 500 shares of £10, upon which £2 had been paid. Mary Pugh was a daughter of John Sharman, who had married Samuel Pugh, a Baptist minister at Devizes.

In Jan. 1866 she was staying on a visit with her father; and it appeared from the evidence that Sharman being unable to obtain the allotment of any more shares in his own name, induced his daughter to sign a document which proved to be an application for 400 shares, in which Mary Pugh," resithe applicant was described as Mary Pugh dent at Leighton Buzzard, Beds. alleged that she did not know what the document was, and that she did not tell her husband what she had done. She denied that she had authority from her husband to make any application for shares, or that she ever gave her father authority to make such an application. Both she and her husband denied that they ever received any notice of allotment, or that any dividend warrant, or other communication respecting the shares had been sent to them. It appeared that John Sharman paid both the application and allotment moneys. The notice of allotment and the scrip certificates were sent to him, and he received the dividends which became payable on these shares.

Cotton, Q.C. and Ford for the liquidator.
Pearson, Q.C. and Warmington for Mary Pugh.
Higgins Q.C. and Tweedy for Sharman.

The VICE-CHANCELLOR said it was not disputed that if Sharman had been alloted shares in his own name, and had subsequently endeavoured to transfer them into a fictitious name, the transfer would have been inoperative, and he would have remained liable. There was no substantial difference between that case and the present, in which an application had been made for shares in what was really a fictitious name. By making that application Sharman had agreed to become a member of the company; and his name must be placed on the list instead of that of Mary Pugh.

Solicitors: Merriman, Powell and Co.; Haigh, Herbert, and Co.

V. C. BACON'S COURT. Wednesday, March 6. HUNTER v. BULLOCK. Will-Charitable bequest-Direction for repair of

gravestones.

Edmund James in support of the petition. Hemming, for the Attorney-General and the Commissioners, contended on the authority of Ex parte Ramm (3 Myl. & Cr. 25), that the concurrence of the beneficiaries was necessary.

The VICE-CHANCELLOR said that the present case, where the petitioner was one of the original

Karslake, Q.C. and Everitt, for Elizabeth Hunter, the tenant for life.

Amphlett, Q.C. and Bailey, for the parties entitled in remainder.

D. Chauncy Beale for the Benevolent Institution for the Relief of Aged and Infirm Journeyman Tailors, at Haverstock-hill.

C. T. Mitchell, for the executors. The VICE-CHANCELLOR held that the direction to repair the gravestone or gravestones was

honorary, and that the Tailors' Institution was entitled to the whole of the £1000 legacy. Solicitors: Fielder and Sumner; Pike and Son.

Feb. 20, 21, and March 6. BEATTIE v. LORD EBURY. Advance to railway company on authority of directors-Ultra vires-Personal liability of directors-Cancellation of shares issued as security. THIS was a bill filed against the Watford and Rickmansworth Railway Company and its directors, to make the directors personally liable to the Union Bank of London in respect of advances made by the bank to the company; and further, to procure the cancellation of shares in the company

which had been transferred to trustees for the bank as security for the advances. In 1860 a written authority was addressed to the bank, by which the bank was requested to honour cheques upon them signed by two directors of the company and countersigned by the secretary; and advances were subsequently made by the bank to the company to the extent of £32,000. In 1864 the company (under an Act which authorised them to raise capital by the issue of shares) issued as paid up 2000 preference shares of £10 each in the names of Lord Ebury and Dillon, and these shares were transferred into the names of trustees for the bank, to be held by them as security for the amount of the advances. Ten debentures of £1000 each were also issued and transferred in the same way. These securities proving worthless, the bank now sought to compel the directors personally to repay the advances. The railway was in the hands of a receiver appointed by the Court of Chancery.

It was contended on behalf of the directors that the shares and debentures were really transferred to trustees for the bank, to enable the bank to possess themselves of any money which might be paid by the public in respect of those shares and debentures, in the event of there being a bonâ fide issue; and that the nature of the transaction was well-known to the bank. Is was contended on behalf of the company that it was ultra vires on the part of the directors to obtain the advances, and that the holders of the securities were liable to pay the amount which the securities represented.

The Solicitor-General, Swanston, Q. C., Wood, Q.C., and T. A. Roberts for the Union Bank.

Sir Roundell Palmer, Q. C., Serjt. Ballantine, Fry, Q.C., and Speed for the directors.

Kay, Q.C., and Locock Webb for the company. The VICE-CHANCELLOR said that if a person acting on behalf of a company so acts that, without any words to that effect, his acts amount to a representation that he has authority to enter into a contract, he incurs a personal liability to make good that representation; and in the present case the directors had incurred the personal liability which the plaintiffs sought to enforce. As to the securities, it must be taken that a representation had been made to the bank that they were good securities, and it was impossible to suppose that the bank intended to be satisfied with securities which were perfectly worthless. The securities must therefore be cancelled. The directors must be decreed to repay to the plaintiffs the whole amount due to them in respect of the advances, without prejudice to any question between the co-defendants.

Solicitors: Dobie; W. Clarke; Baxter, Rose and Norton.

V. C. WICKENS' COURT. Wednesday, Feb. 28. Ex Parte STANLEY. Practice-Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845 -Purchase of settled estates by Board of Works -Apportionment.

THIS was a petition presented under the above Act, praying that a fund in court might be apportioned. The question was whether a portion of certain property belonging to the Stanley family did or did not pass by a settlement, executed in 1864, whereby the family property was settled upon certain persons for life, with remainder to their issue. The property in question was included in the plan which was annexed to or placed in the margin of the deed of settlement, but it was not included in the recitals or operative part of the deed.

Karslake, Q.C. and Lonsdale, in support of the petition, contended that the property did not pass by the deed, but was vested in the petitioner in fee simple.

Pauli (Greene, Q. C., with him) for the respondents, argued that there was sufficient to show an intention that the property was included in the

settlement.

Casson for the Board of Works, the purchasers of the property, and other portions of property belonging to the same estate.

The VICE-CHANCELLOR was of opinion that there was no intention to include the property in the settlement, and directed the fund to be appor.

Solicitors, Lee and Pemberton.

Thursday, Feb. 29. ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND COLBECK AND MARRIOT V. THE MAYOR, ALDERMEN, AND BURGESSES OF BATLEY.

or

Pleading-Demurrer-Want of equity. THIS was a demurrer. The bill was filed by the Attorney-General and two of the ratepayers of Batley, for the purpose of obtaining a declaration that the mayor, aldermen, and burgesses of the borough, their council, treasurer, officers, and agents, might be restrained from purchasing otherwise providing, out of the borough or district rates, or out of any other rates levied or to be levied for public purposes within the borough or district, or out of any other rates the property or funds vested in or belonging to the corporation for public purposes, a gold chain or badge, or any similar or other decoration for the personal use or adornment of the mayor for the time being of the borough. The bill stated that certain members of the corporation of Batley had recently conceived the project of purchasing a be worn by the mayor for the time being of the borough, and that thereupon a resolution was passed by the general purposes committee of the town to make recommendation to that effect to the town council; the chain to be of gold last a meeting of the committee was convened, and not to cost more than £200. On the 23rd Dec. and a design for a chain was approved. It was further resolved that the chain was to be paid for out of the public rates. This gave rise to much discussion among the ratepayers in the borough, and even among the members of the town council itself. Eventually two of the ratepayers and the Attorney-General filed this bill, praying as above. To this bill defendants demurred for want of equity.

Ichain of office to

Karslake, Q.C. and Ince for the demurrer. W. Barber (Greene, Q.C. with him) for the bill. The VICE-CHANCELLOR allowed the demurrer. Solicitors, Ridsdale, Craddock, and Ridsdale, for Chadwick and Son, Dewsbury; Edward Lay

ton and Jenks.

Saturday, March 2. LEWIS v. ALLENBY.

Will-Gift to charities-Mortmain Acts. THIS was a petition presented in the above suit for the purpose of obtaining the approval of the court to a scheme for the distribution of £11,360, part of the estate of the testator in the cause, among a number of charities. The testator, by a codicil to his will, dated 25th July 1868, bequeathed the residue of his personal estate to trustees, upon trust "to get in and realise the same, and pay and divide the proceeds of such realisation in such parts, shares, and proportions, and in such manner and form, amongst any hospitals or charitable institutions situate London or elsewhere in England; and whether the proposed objects of the bounty should have been instituted for similar or different purposes, as they in their sole discretion should think proper." The testator died on the 26th July 1868. The trustees had prepared a scheme for the distribution of the testator's residuary estate among certain charities, and they now presented this petition for the purpose above mentioned.

same to or for the benefit of the Vicar of Chepstow, upon consideration of his having a daily service in his church, or upon some other conditions. The trustees had ever since the death of the testator received the tithes or the rentcharge payable in lieu thereof, and kept them at their bankers. The bill prayed for a declaration that the devise was void, as a secret trust not sanctioned by the statutes of Mortmain. The defendants, the trustees, and the Vicar of Chepstow, maintained that they were entitled to the tithes under the 23rd section of 13 & 14 Vict. c. 94 (an Act to Amend the Laws relating to the Ecclesiastical Commissioners of England, which enacted that "the owner or proprietor of any impropriation tithes, portion of tithes, or rentcharge in lieu of tithes, shall and may have power to annex the same or any part thereof unto the parsonage, vicarage, or curacy of the parish church or chapel, where the same lie or arise, or to settle the same in trust for the benefit of such parsonage, vicarage, or curacy, any statute or law whatsoever to the contrary thereof in anywise notwithstanding."

Lindley, Q.C. and Bush for the plaintiff. Napier Higgins, Q.C. and Bedwell for the Vicar of Chepstow.

Greene, Q.C. and F. O. Haynes for the trustees. The VICE-CHANCELLOR held that there was a clear secret trust which was void under the Statutes of Mortmain. That those Acts were not affected by the enactment referred to, which was not passed with reference to the subject in quesconstruction, be held by mere general words to tion, and could not, on any sound principle of repeal such solemn legislation as the provisions of the Mortmain Acts.

Solicitors: Ranken, Ford, Longbourne and Longbourne; Wood, Street, and Hayter, for Paul and James, Exeter.

Will

Karslake, Q.C. and W. P. Dickens for the petitioners.

Hemming for the Attorney-General.

Nalder, Bathurst, and Borthwick, for other parties.

The VICE-CHANCELLOR decided that the bequest of the residue was a good charitable gift, subject to the condition that the impure personalty was to be applied only for the benefit of charities exempt from the Mortmain Acts; and made an order on the petition sanctioning the scheme, pro tanto, with liberty to apply as to the

rest of the fund.

Solicitors: Bell and Newman; Hicks and Son; Raven and Bradley; Miller and Smith.

Monday, March 4. BURR v. MILLER. Will-Devise of tithes-Secret trust-13 & 14 Vict. c. 94, s. 23-Statutes of Mortmain. THE question in this suit was, whether a devise of certain tithes upon a secret trust for the benefit of the Vicar of Chepstow, was void, under the Statutes of Mortmain. The facts as stated by the bill were shortly these. The Rev. James Henry Scudamore Burr, by his will, dated 9th July 1849, devised all the great tithes of Chepstow, in the county of Monmouth, then belonging to him, to his friends, the Rev. C. Miller and the Rev. S. W. B. Lee, their heirs and assigns for ever, as joint tenants in common. The testator died in May 1852, leaving the plaintiff (his eldest son) his heir at law. It was admitted by the devisees that

The COURT.-That is so. Probate will go, and no costs will be allowed to the witnesses for attending here. It may be that if John Price Hamer had been a party the court would have condemned him in the costs of this proceeding.

Attorneys: Sharpe, Parkers, Pritchard, and Sharpe.

LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Monday, March 4.

SUPREME COURT OF FINAL APPEAL.

Lord WESTBURY, who had given notice of his intention to ask whether the Government intend to bring in before Easter a Bill for the establishment of a Supreme Court of Final Appeal, said he

wished to make a few remarks introductory to the question which he had put upon the paper. He congratulated himself that in listening to the discussion which had just terminated he had found no reason assigned against the initiation of Bills in that House that applied to the particular measure which it was his desire to elicit from the Government. Everyone admitted that such a measure was not only wanted, but that it ought to originate in that House. Those who had heard Her Majesty's gracions Speech had felt assured that that Bill would be immediately introduced. There had been no earthly reason that he knew of to prevent the Government from giving its attention to that measure during the recess. Therefore, he should expect with confidence that his noble and learned friend on the woolsack would be prepared not only to answer, but to answer in the affirmative, the question he proposed to put to him.

He trusted the Lord Chancellor would be able to give him an answer to his question whether the Government had prepared a measure for the establishment of a Final Court of Appeal, and if

not, why not; and whether such a measure would be introduced before Easter, and if not, why not? He concurred entirely in all the regrets which had been expressed from time to time with regard to the inactivity of their Lordships in the earlier part of the session; these regrets might be reduced to a stereotyped formula, but he hoped that this measure at least would form an exception to the general rule, and that the Government would lay a Bill on the table of the House at such a time that it could be fully deliberated upon before Easter, and sent to the Commons shortly after. The necessity for some action in the matter is beyond all precedent; the state of the appellate jurisdiction of the country would scarcely be credited by anyone not actually concerned in it. To this House came all appeals from all the Common Law Courts and Courts of Equity in England, Ireland, and Scotland; but this great demand upon the House was not met in any systematic manner. Their Lordships had no appointed judges and no appointed times of sitting. The consideration of appeals was not even carried on in a judicial manner, but their Lordships sat as a deliberate assembly, and the sittings were dependent upon the meeting of Parliament. During the session appeals were heard upon four days of the week, no accident intervening, and the despatch of business was dependent entirely upon the voluntary attendance of such members of the House who had filled the office of Lord Chancellor and one or two others. Whether one or two of them attended was utterly uncertain, and who they might be was equally uncertain. No suitor could tell beforehand who would hear him or who would determine his suit. Beside this, the sittings were frequently interrupted. The Lord Chancellor had his political duties to attend to; the most serious argument by counsel had to be interrupted at two o'clock because the Lord Chancellor had to attend a levée, or even at one, because the Lord Chancellor had to attend a meeting of the cabinet by virtue of his office. The result was that appeals were delayed from day to day, or half days only were given to them. The noble lord on the woolsack had been diligent, and the appeals had been well kept under, but his diligence did not correct the defects in the tribunal itself, and could not relieve the Legislation from the necessity of amending those defects. A greater sense of decency prevailed in these days, but in Lord Eldon's time, when the Lord Chancellor attended to hear appeals, he occasionally found himself alone, and inasmuch as three peers were required to make a House, the officers of the House were obliged to catch a bishop, and invite him to act as dummy. A lay peer was also pressed into the service; and the Lord Chancellor, gravely assisted by these two mutes, administered justice in a final manner. The improvement of the present day, however, ought only to convince their Lordships of the necessity of doing much more. Upon the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council devolved the duty of deciding not only upon all ecclesiastical and Admiralty appeals, but upon all the appeals that came from the 300,000,000 British subjects in India and all other British colonies. The small improvement made last year could not be regarded as more than a temporary expedient, though it had worked well. It had reduced the number of arrears, but it was by no means a fitting tribunal for finally settling the enormous number of appeals coming from our courts. What should be done? These two tribunals, co-ordinate, each final, and therefore always in danger of asserting principles contradictory of each other, which no power but Parliament could decide upon, should be consolidated into one great court of appeal, presided over by the élite of the land to be selected from the judges of the other courts. If such a court were well constituted, made easily accessible and economical, sitting throughout the year, and with its doors open for the admission of every appellate suitor, then one appeal ought to be sufficient. There might be cases in which facility should be given for a re-hearing or even a double appeal, but one appeal for the generality of causes would suffice. This was necessary because facilities should not be given to litigious persons. It was to the interest of the State to stop litigation after reasonable facilities had been afforded for obtaining justice. At present the appeals were too numerous. The jury decided upon the question of fact; but upon questions of law appeals from the Courts of Common Law were carried to the Exchequer Chamber, and it might happen then that three judges out of the five would over-rule the opinien of seven or eight, or even eleven judges. In the Court of Chancery the Lords Justices sometimes sat as a Court of Appeal, sometimes the Lords Justices with the Lord Chancellor, and sometimes the Lord Chancellor by himself. There might be an advantagefto the Lord Chancellor in having a subordinate Court of Appeal, because the great part of the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery consisted of a preventive jurisdiction, such as the granting injunctions. In Scotland matters were in a state which would be insupportable but

for the self-love of the people, which led them to attribute perfection to all their institutions. (A laugh.) An appeal lay from the sheriff substitute to the sheriff deputy; from the sheriff deputy to the Court of Sessions; thence to the Lord Ordinary with a right of ultimate appeal to their Lordships' House. With regard to the Judicial Committe he would gladly hail any measure that would eliminate from that body the bishops, who now formed a portion of that tribunal, and he regretted that when last session a noble marquis had brought the subject forward he, in the impression that the motion had been abandoned, was not in his place to support him by his vote, because he believed that nothing would more tend than their exclusion to promote the peace of the church. Such a tribunal as that which he had been advocating would be of little use unless it were composed of men who were willing to devote the whole of their time and ability to the discharge of the duties which would devolve upon them, and for that it would be necessary to give them a large and liberal remuneration. (Hear, hear.) That was the work which lay before them. There was no quarrel to be apprehended with the House of Commons as to whose right and whose duty it was to be the first to set hands to it. He would not give vent to any suspicion of his own with reference to the preparation of the Bill, but would end as he had begun by asking whether the Bill had been prepared; if not, why not? Would it be brought in immediately, and, if not, when would it be brought in? (Hear, hear.)- -The LORD CHANCELLOR said that his noble and learned friend had covered a large field in the course of his disquisition upon this very important subject. He could not complain of the course taken by his noble and learned friend, for the subject was one in which he had personally felt the deepest interest for many years, before he had any opportunity of evincing it in any practical form. He would state very briefly the exact state of the case in reference to the questions which had been put by his noble and learned friend. In the session of 1870 two bills, one for the improvement of the appellate jurisdiction and the other for the construction of a high court of judicature were passed through their Lordships' House, but owing to a vast pressure of other business it was found impossible to introduce them there with any prospect of being gravely considered, as was befitting the importance of the subject to be dealt with. He need not refer at length to the circumstances which prevented the matter being dealt with last session in the House of Commons, but he would say, simply, that though the Bills were not brought before Parliament the time had not been lost. To prepare Bills of this sort not only required much thought and consideration, but required, also, that those who had charge of the matter should take every possible opportunity to improve and perfect the measures before submitting them to Parliament. The moment it was ascertained that the Bills could not be introduced in the House of Commons last session he set himself actively to work to obtain information such as could conduce to the improvement of Bills intended to effect a work so great as the establishment of a High Court of Justice and a High Court of Appeal. He circulated copies of the Bill among the learned Judges, from many of whom, including the Lord Chief Justice, he obtained valuable suggestions. He could not represent the Lord Chief Justice as approving everything being done exactly as it was proposed in the Bill, but he admitted that it was a great improvement in the Bill of the year before, and made a considerable number of suggestions for its improvement. In addition to this, the members of the Judicature Commission, gentlemen with hard work enough of their own to do, offered to take the Bill for the establishment of a High Court of Justice into their consideration. They formed a subcommittee on the subject, and from time to time he received very valuable suggestions from them, but it was not until the month of January in the present year that he received their final report. He did not think it was necessary to introduce the two Bills simultaneously and, that being so, he should have no diffi culty in placing the High Conrt of Justice Bill almost immediately before their Lordships. Some of the alterations made in the Bill he had just mentioned would necessitate modifications in the details of the measure relating to appellate jurisdiction. The Bill had been placed in the hands of the draughtsman for this purpose, and he had every expectation of being able to ask the House to read both Bills a first time before Easter. He had had sufficient experience of their Lordships' House to convince him of the difficulty of proceeding swiftly, and the importance of proceeding carefully, in reference to matters of this kind. When he entered the House there was the law of bankruptcy to be dealt with, and at that time there were before Parliament three Bills and a report of a Select Committee of the House of Commons in reference to the subject. He looked through all this, and drew the heads of a Bank.

ruptcy Bill which had given to creditors full power to attend to their own business in the way that seemed best to them and had abolished imprisonment for debt. This was true, notwithstanding the charge sometimes made against the present Government, that they had done nothing for the improvement of the law. It was true, as had been said, that the administration of the appellate jurisdiction was not in nearly so unsatisfactory a state as in the days of Lord Eldon; but he might, nevertheless, mention that on one occasion he conducted an appeal which lasted during three days before the Lord Chancellor and two other noble lords who had never sat on the woolsack, the last-named peers being different on each day. (Hear, hear, and a laugh). He might also state, further, that there were only fifteen appeals waiting for hearing in Chancery; and when first the courts assembled after Hilary Term there were only eight, not one of them being a month old. When first he had the honour of a seat in their Lordships' House there were the arrears of two and a half sessions to be cleared away, and this session commenced with the arrears of half a session only. He did not mention these facts in any spirit of personal vanity, because other noble lords had, by their zeal, contributed to bring about this improved condition of affairs, but simply to show that there had been an improvement effected of late years in the conduct of the appellate jurisdiction. (Hear, hear.) Before sitting down he desired to say a few words in reference to what had fallen from the noble earl this evening as to the Bills of the Government being ill-prepared and badly drawn. Those remarks were not just to those persons who had prepared the very important Bills passed by Her Majesty's Government during the last three sessions. Never before in three consecutive years had measures of such extreme_magni tude and importance been passed. In par ticular extreme care and precaution were necessary in preparing the Irish Church Bill and the Irish Land Bill, and he ventured to assert that they were drawn up most carefully. Something had been said about the Habitual Criminals Bill. That was a most useful measure, and the testimony of all the judges on circuit was that it had worked admirably, and that the number of habitual criminals brought before them was much less than before. Then the Education Bill was one which required to be drawn with extreme care. It point of fact, great attention was bestowed upon it, and no one could justly say that it was an ill-prepared and slovenly bill. It was only due to those employed in the preparation of these Bills that he should make these remarks. In con clusion, the noble lord repeated that it was his expectation and belief that the Appellate Jurisdiction Bill and the High Court of Justice Bill would be introduced and read a first time before the Easter recess.

resolutions that they should be impartial, so that they should obtain the confidence of all persons concerned in the instruction of youth. It is the right of anyone who may dissent from my views to call on me to show cause for these resolutions. I wish, in the first instance, to say something as to the general grounds on which the establishment of a school of law appears to me to be desirable. I have said I wished to see a school established which may take rank with the best law schools of other countries. We have no such law schools at thy present moment in England. Practically, it may be said, without much exaggeration, that we have no great law school in England at all. (Hear, hear.) And I cannot but think that whether we look at the importance of the law, whether we look at the eminence which many persons among us have attained in the law, whether we look at the general interests of society in correcting the defects of the law and diffusing as far as may be, a sound knowledge of the law, it is almost enough for my purpose merely to state the fact that we have in England at this moment no such thing as a great school of law. If the thing were not good in itself of course the mere fact that other countries have it would not prove the desirableness of what I desire to establish. But the practice of other countries, their experience on this matter, long established and long tried, shows that it is a wise and good thing in itself. I am not going trouble the House with long details of the system carried on in countries where law schools are established, but I will take as an example what is done in Her Majesty's own dominion-in Scotland. In Scotland there is a well-organised system of legal instruction which all persons intending to practise in any of the branches of the legal profession there are required to go through. At one or other of the Universities those persons are tested by a very thorough and searching examination. In France there are six faculties of the law-one established in the metropolis and the other five in the chief provincial centres, at which all persons intending to practice in any branch of the legal profession are required to go through a fixed and stated course of a very severe and searching character, and afterwards they are submitted to public examinations. That system, I believe, has its imperfections. I am told on very high authority it is too much under the control of Government, too much in the nature of a Government monopoly, and on that account it has a tendency to the very same kind of narrowness which I desire to see avoided in the school which I now propose to establish in this country. But, with all its drawbacks, that system is capable of being improved by being released from the restrictions and drags by which it is hampered, and it has been productive in France of very great men and of a very advanced scientific knowledge of the law. In fact, in spite of all the misfortunes into which that country has fallen, it may point with pride to its achievements in the codification and simplification of the law. (Hear, hear.) All the other great European countries under different modifications have long adopted some system, and in all of them it has been productive of very eminent and excellent fruits. I will merely say that it seems to me a just observation that having the benefit of the experience of so many other countries which have established schools of this kind on a very large and generous scale, and examinations of the same nature as those which I contemplate, with good results, the same good results will probably be attained here, where we have the advantage of being subject to none of the defects which exist in any of those systems, and of being able to avoid them. Now, what is our system in this country? I shall presently remind the House of some of the judgments passed upon that system by very high authorities, but I will say that it is in truth a hand to mouth system. (Hear, hear.) Everybody is left to pick up his own instruction in law as well as he can, entirely with a view to practice; and by doing it in that manner, with the assistance of those who are themselves en. gaged in practice, it is impossible that any foundation of a scientific knowledge of the law can be laid, however desirable it may be, and, as a matter of fact, it is not. I hope I have never given any just grounds to anyone to suppose that I think lightly of the many excellencies of the laws under which we live, or of the great eminence which many have attained in the profession to which I belong, and in the administration of the law. But it is not the part of a real friend, either of men or of institutions, to shut your eyes to their defects and to represent everything in the most favourable light beyond the truth. There is no doubt that the body of our law contains many most excellent things, yet it is on the whole a very immethodical and undigested mass. There is no doubt that the science of the law has not been making progress with us in the lapse of time, and if we look for our great legal luminaries we have to go a considerable way back rather than to search for them very near at home. That is the inevitable result of the

system of learning by practice, and practice only, under which we live. Would it not be better that our students should be encouraged and assisted, at least as much as any public institution can encourage and assist them, to lay the foundation of their legal knowledge of principles, and of the study of the law upon a large, wide, liberal, and scientific basis? (Hear.) I don't think there can be any difference of opinion on that point. There may be differences of opinion as to the best mode of doing it. For instance, I find that when Lord Cairns gave his evidence before the Commission of 1854, while recognising most fully the great advantage there would be in extending as widely as possible the range of reading in jurisprudence for all who proposed to follow the legal profession, he thought it possible that that might be done in our Universities by assistance to be given by the Inns of Court in the foundation of Lectureships and Law Scholarships. I should be very glad to see everything done that could be done in that way, and I recognise the advantages which have been conferred by these means. But it is impossible that places which are not naturally schools of law should do the work of those great schools which I desire to see established. It is not possible, it cannot and will not be done. What did Sir H. Maine say? He said he thought it of the greatest importance, of growing importance, looking to the course which our legislation every day was taking, and to the changes which it had a tendency to undergo, that those who practised the law should be well grounded in the principles of jurisprudence, and he observed that nothing in the world was more difficult than to get those who were studying with a view to practice as early as possible to devote themselves to a scientific study of those principles. I might multiply testimonies on this subject. Lord Westbury and others have expressed in the most forcible terms their sense of the great deficiency of our system in point of science and method. But I abstain from going through them, because you have the authority of the two former inquiries which have been held on this question. I do not wish to repeat anything I have said on a former occasion, but I trust I shall stand excused for calling attention again to the report upon this branch of the subject of the committee of this House in 1846. They foundThat the present state of legal education in England and Ireland, in reference to the lasses, professional and non-professional, concerned, to the extent and nature of the studies pursued, the time employed, and the facility unsatisfactory and incomplete, and exhibits, a striking with which instruction may be obtained, is extremely contrast and inferiority to such education, provided, as it is, with ample means and a judicious system for their application, at present in operation in all the more civilised States in Europe and America. They add

That it may be assorted as a general fact, to which there are very few exceptions, that the student, professional and non-professional, is left almost solely to his own individual exertions, industry, and opportunities, and that no legal education worthy of the name is at this moment (1816) to be had in either England or Ireland. That was the report of the Committee of 1846. Now, what did the Royal Commission which sat in 1854, and reported in 1855, say ?—

The present system of practical study in a barrister's chambers must be admitted to be very efficient in fitting the student for the active duties of his profession; it affords, however, no facilities for the study of the scientific branches of legal knowledge-including, under that term, constitutional law and legal history, and civil law and jurisprudence. True knowledge of these subjects must be useful to the barrister, not only as an advocate, but as a judge; and especially if he should be appointed to any judicial office in Iudia or in the colonies. And although during the ordinary period of preparation for the Bar it would probably be found impracticable to obtain an entire acquaintance with them without sacrificing objects more immediately pressing, yet there would be time enough to lay the foundation of this knowledge, which might be completed after the student should have wholly absorbed by practice. been called to the Bar, and before his time become By mastering principles the student becomes more interested in and obtains a steadier grasp of practical details. The most convenientmethod of acquiring knowledge of these subjects is by lectures, followed by examinations applicable both to the lectures and to the subjects generally. That report was signed by the present Lord Chancellor, Sir J. Taylor Coleridge, Lord West. bury, Sir J. G. Shaw-Lefevre, and other eminent men. And now a few words upon the usefulness of the teaching which might be given upon the system of such a school as I propose. There are many persons who depreciate and some who over estimate the value of teaching by lectures. It is a kind of teaching much better adapted to some subjects than to others, and to students of an advanced age rather than to those who are young. But, as to this particular kind of teaching, it is eminently fitted to create an interest in and to give guidance to the student of the principles of jurisprudence. I can hardly imagine any subject in which that kind of general teaching is more wanted to correct the narrowing effects of the system of merely practical study, and we find accordingly that the best books on the general principles of law which are referred to constantly in all countries have been the product of this

system of teaching principles by lectures in large schools or Universities. Some of the very best works on the law of Scotland are the product of such a system, as well as the commentaries of Chancellor Kent and the treatises of Story and of Savigny. In this country, if we want to get general views, we go to Blackstone, whose book was written in the form of lectures to the University of Oxford, or to Austen, whose lectures were delivered to the University of London. These examples show what is likely to be the nature of first-rate instruction, and its value in guiding the minds of young men towards the principles of law, in enabling them to group their ideas round those principles, and at the same time exciting their interest in larger and more liberal views of the law than they are likely to gain from instruction confined merely to the practice of the law. Here I may mention the testimony of one who was lost too early to his profession-the late Mr. W. D. Lewis, who was himself a lecturer in Gray's Inn, and who stated in his evidence in 1851 that he entered upon his duties with some prepossession against the value of lectures as a means of instruction in the law, but that his experience entirely removed this prepossession, and he came to the conclusion that this kind of instruction might be made most useful and advantageous to the students. Mr. Lewis added, as a result of his own experience as a practitioner of the law, how great an advantage it would have been if, when he was a student, he had had opportunities of hearing the law expounded and taught as a science. Before parting from the general subject let me glance at one other consideration. It is not only for those who mean to practise the law that I advocate the establishment of such a school as this; it is for the general benefit of the country, and with a view to extend the benefits of such a school far beyond the range of mere practitioners. There can be no question that anything which gives an interest to the study upon a right method of the principles of law, both among law students and among the community generally, has a most powerful tendency to assist in all sound legal reforms. The moment you are able to grasp the whole subject, to see the bearings of legal details upon legal principles, then you can much better understand the real tendencies of crude or objectionable projects for the change of the law, and where the real want of such changes as are beneficial lies. I cannot but take advan

tage of an observation made upon a recent public occasion by a very learned judge-Vico-Chancellor Wickens, one of the most accomplished men we have upon the bench or had at the bar, a man of very general attainments as well as accurate knowledge of his profession. The learned judge stated that he was glad to take the opportunity of saying again what he had said before-how profoundly he was convinced that the simplification of the law depended upon its scientific teaching and that scientific teaching depended substantially and practically at this moment on what could be done in the direction of this movement. I leave these general views of the subject and now pass to particulars. Here I come to the next principle upon which I desire to insist, and I hope the House will concur with me in considering it to be of cardinal importance. I mean that this system should be comprehensive; that there should be nothing exclusive, nothing narrow in it, nothing bringing forward with unnecessary and premature jealousy the distinction which in after life and practice may exist between those who may addict themselves to different branches of the legal profession. (Hear, hear.) In the stage of studentship the great object is to give the benefit of the best system of instruction which you can confer and which they will accept to everybody who will take it, and it is as desirable for those who will hereafter be attorneys and solicitors as for those who will hereafter be barristers that they should have the best opportunities of acquiring the utmost amount of the best possible knowledge. (Hear, hear.) It is no part of the system I propose that everybody should be obliged to attend the same lectures, go through the same compulsory course, and submit to the same examination. The idea is to have a great school, where the best possible instruction upon subjects on which instruction is best worth having should be given-a school for all students of the law, no matter what branch of the profession they propose to follow; a school also for all who desire to qualify themselves for public employment, for the work of legislation in Parliament, for the magistracy; a school, in short, for anybody who may be willing and able to profit by it. (Hear, hear.) I am glad upon this subject to be able to refer to an authority of whom, if he were absent, I might venture to speak in terms from which I abstain in his presence; but I think it will carry weight to the House to be told that in the year 1854, in giving evidence before the Commission, my right hon. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer expressed the opinions which I will now read :—

It must be remembered that the teaching of an advo

cate, or even of an English Judge, is only a small part

It would be the greatest possible advantage to us, who are now framing rules for the examination of civil serv nts in India, if there were any body constituted to which we could delegate the task of examining them. It is our opinion that every civil servant of the East India Company should go out with some knowledge of the principles of law, but we are at a great loss for the means of examining them.

I may venture to say that from many quarters I have received communications from gentlemen belonging to the public service in India, speaking of the great and increasing importance of providing the means of thorough instruction, not in the technicalities of English law, or in that sort of law which people study here and practise in the English Courts, but in the law as a system and a science. These gentlemen say that such opportunities of study would be of the greatest possible value and importance with a view to the administration of the various systems of law with which they have to deal in India, and with a view also to the qualification of natives who assist in the administration of justice in the Indian Courts. But I have not done with the opinions of my right hon. friend. In answer to another question he said, and his answer thoroughly expresses my own sentiments :

I think legal education is a much larger question than the education of the Bar, or even of the Bench. I think it is exceedingly desirable that every English

gentleman who is independent, and whose time is at his own disposal, should be educated in law to a much greater extent than is now the case.

Well, my desire is that the school which I wish to found should be founded upon these broad principles; that nothing about it should be narrow or merely professional; that it should be qualified to instruct the members of the legal profession in everything which is important for them to learn in scientific and general principles, while it should not be inconsistent with their study of the details of practice; and that it should give such an education as is worth the while of everybody to receive who desires to understand the laws of his country and the principles of law in general. (Hear, hear.) Now, I want to know how this object should be attained, and this brings me to the next important principle which I attempt to embody in the resolutions. I say it should be done with public authority. We have been going on a great deal too long upon the system of allowing this matter to take care of itself, leaving it in the hands of irresponsible bodies, who acknowledge no public trust, who are under no public constitution, who are not incorporated, and who, even if much better organised than they are, have not shown themselves in past times capable of doing the public work in this respect. It is a work which should be done by public authority. We want now to organise something which shall not depend upon the greater or lesser degree of activity, the greater or less prevalence of sound views at one time or another, among bodies which recognise no public responsibility at all. Is or is not what I propose in conformity with the opinions of those who have most considered the subject and spoken with the greatest authority upon this point-I mean as to the necessity of organising the school in a public manner by Act of Parliament or by charter, and under public authority? There can be no doubt it is, and I think I can quote authorities of considerable weight to show that upon all the principles for which I contend they have taken substantially the same view. First of all, I wish to notice that we are in this anomalous situation that centuries ago we were much nearer the points I am aiming at than we are at this moment. Speaking of the reign of Henry VI., Chief Justice Fortescue in his celebrated work gives an account of the ten Inns of Chancery and four Inns of Court, representing them to be something very much in the nature of a university, and stating that there were in these institutions 3000 students of one kind or another, intending to go to various branches of the law. No wonder the Chancellor of the Exchequer should say in his evidence before

the commission:

My own impression is that the Inns of Court are, as at present constituted, a university in a state of decay. They are in the same position, as I understand it, as the University of Oxford was at the end of the last century, when the University had virtually delegated the power of conferring a degree to the colleges; the consequence of which was that the colleges, whether from competition among themselves, or having no sufficient motive, had brought the thing down to the very lowest point. Then, in the beginning of this century, the University was, as it were, reconstituted, and the examinations re-assumed by her, and from that moment the standard of education has risen. Applying that to the Inns of Court, what is needed is some central authority to confer the degree of barrister something auswering to the Senate of the University of Loudon, or to the governing body in Oxford or Cambridge. If I substitute for the degree of barrister the certificate necessary to qualify for the Bar, it appears

to me that my right hon. friend has recommended substantially that which I am advocating, certainly so far as relates to a central authority superior to the Inns of Court, and with which they should be connected, so far as with public advantage they may. The same views are recommended by the committee of 1846 and the commission of 1854. Neither of those bodies extended its views practically beyond the consideration of connecting the Inns of Court and the preparation for the Bar, but were of opinion that the Inns of Court should be incorporated by public authority into a species of legal university, and that they should not be left, as at present, owning no responsibility, but that they should be so reconstituted that they should be charged with work such as that which I desire should devolve on the Law School which I seek to have established. I have given, I think, good reasons for the view which I take on this point of the subject, but I should, at the same time, be glad to see the due weight and influence of the Inns of Court brought to bear, whether under their present organisation or otherwise, on the school which I propose. A similar view was taken by Lord Cairns, who, in 1862, induced the Benchers of Lincoln's Inn to adopt a resolution to the effect that, in their opinion, the constitution of a legal University to which the various Inns of Court might be affiliated would be desirable. It seems to me that everyone who approaches the subject from an impartial point of view will be disposed to regard that as a desirable thing. Let me add one more recent testimony, which I think is a striking one, because it not only comes from a very eminent judge, but rom one who in the evidence which he gave before the Commission of 1854 rather professed himself not to have very strong views on the subject of legal education. I am referring to Solicitors' Association, expressed the following Sir F. Kelly, who, in presiding at a meeting of the opinion, which I cannot but regard as strongly confirmatory of that which I have been stating to the House. He expressed himself as anticipating the time when a general system of legal education would be established something like that of the great Universities of this country, to which all the members of the profession might belong, and by be determined. In proposing my less ambitious which the rights of each individual member might plan I avail myself of the opinions expressed by should be nothing derogatory to the honour and so eminent a judge, and I contend that there dignity of the Bar or likely to interfere with its duties or interests in uniting, for the purposes of education, with all the other branches of the interest in the study and practice of the law. legal professions, or with those who take an I wish now to say a single word with respect occasion to be entertained-that in making the to the apprehension which appeared on a former proposal which I am advocating we wish to create a body with a monopoly of legal education. Nothing can be more entirely opposed to my purpose and intention, or to the purposes or intenNothing can be more certain than that you may tions of those who agree with me on this question. the value of the instruction which it gives may be establish a school which by its own excellence and well calculated to attract to it students of every kind without saying that nobody shall be admitted to the legal profession who has not passed through that school. I propose nothing of the sort. Not only do I not propose it, but I have no faith in that a school with the exclusive privilege of teachmonopolies of any description. I do not believe would have to depend for its success on its own ing would be found to be half so good as one which and I am against saying it should be a necessary merits. I am, therefore, against any monopoly, condition for the passing of an examination, or for admission to the profession, that a student should have gone through this particular school. I perceive with the greatest satisfation that the law school of University College in London, as well as those of Oxford and Cambridge have been considerably improved. I heard also with the utmost satisfaction of the establishment, with every prospect of success, of law schools in Liverpool and Manchester. I hope similar schools will be established elsewhere throughout the country. I expect great good from such a movement, and I should desire to see them co-operating with the central body which I propose. I believe that if we had a good central school, we should have minor schools springing up in all directions; but without the greater institution you will have considerable difficulty in infusing life into those smaller schools in making them as energetic as they ought to be. It has been objected that it would be undesirable to give the teachers of the central school an exclusive power of examining, but that I may observe is no part of my object. It would of course rest with the Government to determine the particular constitution of the school, and I imagine they would take the fittest men to represent the different branches of the legal profession, and having chosen them, by election or otherwise, to make the governing body absolutely, impartial. The examiners should be

chosen, in my opinion, as far as possible, not from the teaching body; and now let me inquire for a moment what are the competing schemes. There is that of the two Inns of Courts, with whom, or with us, the other Inns are willing to co-operate should the Government of the country authorise the esta blishment of a school of law. I have no doubt the Inns of Court which at preseit oppose themselves to our plans would, from my knowledge of the high character of the men who compose their governing bodies, and their public spirit, if the Government at once determined to establish by public autho rity such a school, desire to take their proper places in it, and exercise in it their proper influence. It is one thing to advocate your own views and to leave matters alone, to prefer what is inevitable to human nature, to keep the power which you happen to possess in your own hands, and entirely another thing in the case of highminded men such as those of whom I am speaking, to set themselves against a measure intended for the public good, if Parliament should think proper to adopt such a measure. I am convinced the Benchers of the Inns of Court would do nothing of that sort. In asking for the establishment of a central school of law, I do not, I may add, in any way desire to stickle for my own views as to matters of detail. I stand on great principles, and I say that the irresponsible bodies by which the Inns of Court are governed have not in past times done that amount of good which they ought to have done. I make no complaint against any particular generation. There was probably something in the nature of their constitution which prevented them from making that advance which some may think we had a right to expect at their hands. I honour them for what they have accomplished, but I cannot therefore admit that they are entitled to intercept a larger scheme for sible footing on which they have hitherto stood in the public benefit, or to continue on the irrespon the exercise of a power which I contend should be conferred by public authority, and exercised under public responsibility. Although they have come to the conclusion to make the passing of a test examination necessary for the Bar, and to make considerable additions to the sums expended on legal education, they have not, after all, gone out the rule that education for the Bar should be kept of a narrow groove. They still desire to maintain as separate as possible from all other legal educashould be carried on in that inn itself. That tion, and that the education in each particular course of proceeding would keep everything on such a footing that I venture to say the profes sional character, and the narrow professional cha..

sy tem so carried on. that I am right in my proposal, it will, of course, it for the good of the country to have one general not be acceded to; but if the House should deem School of Law accessible to all, then those temporary measures into which some of the Inns of Court have been stimulated ought not to be admitted as reasons for refusing to adopt this larger measure. (Hear, hear.) It may be said that this measure, being more comprehensive than that Commission of 1854, is at variance with the princi recommended by the Committee of 1846 and the ples of the recommendations of those bodies; but that is not the case, and the very men who signed those recommendations, or, at any rate, the great majority of them, approve what we are doing, and prefer the larger system. In the last session, as petitions numerously signed by gentlemen at the well as in the present session, I have presented looked at the list of names, to be the best Bar, who would be admitted by anyone who of the Bar. I also have in favour of the representatives of the intelligence and experience scheme the principal teachers of law at the Universities.

racter, would be most certain to attach to a If the House does not think

have received in the course of the societies, from attorneys, solicitors, articled clerks, session many petitions from the incorporated law law students, and the Incorporated Law Society of the United Kingdom, signed by not many short of 6000 names.

up among persons who do not understand the These are not like petitions got matter about which they petition. The petitioners are all intelligent men, and they are all of opinion that the establishment of a school of law on the conditions I have described would tend to elevate the dignity of the profession of the Bar without causing any confusion of one branch of the profes sion of the law with another. I may appeal to the experience of Scotland on this point. In that country those who intend to be what we call attorneys and solicitors have always mixed in the course of education with the advocates or barristers and received the same instruction without any disadvantage. In a lecture delivered by the late Lord Advocate at Edinburgh University, that learned lord bore emphatic testimony to the fact that many advantages and no disadvantages arose from the mixing together of the different students. He said it had been found in practice that many young advocates got business by means of the knowledge of their ability and capacity obtained by the pupils studying other branches of the law in the same