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On the 8th of the following February the defendant wrote to the plaintiff the following letter: The Warren, Wednesday.

W. Buxton, Esq.

Dear Sir,-It is now twenty-eight days since you and I had a deal for my wool, which was for you to have taken all away in twenty-one days from the time you bought it. I do not consider it business to put it off like this, therefore I shall consider the deal off, as you have not completed your part of the contract. I shall now sell the wool to you again at a different price, or shall sell it to someone else; at the same time, I shall be at Braintree to-morrow (Thursday) at eleven o'clock, ready for a fresh deal, if you please to come; but do as you please about it.-Yours, &c., E. J. RUST.

Upon the following day the plaintiff met the defendant at Braintree, and the plaintiff then asked him for a copy of his letter of the 11th Jan., which was the bought note before mentioned; and the following day the defendant wrote to the plaintiff as follows:

The Warren and Leighs,
Chelmsford, 9th Feb.

E. J. Rust to W. Buxton, Esq.
Dear Sir, I beg to enclose a copy of your letter of

the 11th Jan. 1871.

The letter enclosed a copy of the letter or bought note of the plaintiff as before mentioned. The defendant having refused to deliver the wool, the present action was brought.

Powell, Q. C. and R. V. Williams showed cause, and contended that taking all the facts and the correspondence together, there was a sufficient note or memorandum in writing, signed by the defendant, to satisfy the 17th section of the Statute of Frauds. And they cited Bailey v. Sweeting (30 L. J. 150, C. P.); Gibson and another v. Holland (35 L. J. 5, C. P.); and Wilkinson v. Evans (33 L. J. 224, C. P.)

Garth, Q. C. and Shaw, in support of the rule, argued that there was no sufficient note or memorandum in writing to bind the defendant, for that he had repudiated the contract, and had never admitted that the bought note of the 11th Jan. was binding upon him. They cited Cooper v. Smith (15 East 103), and Richards v. Porter (6 B. & C.


The COURT were of opinion that there was a sufficient note or memorandum in writing, under the 17th section of the Statute of Frauds, to bind the defendant, and directed the

Rule to be descharged. Attorneys for the plaintiff, Roy and Cartwright. Attorney for the defendant, Edward Woodard.

Monday, Nov. 13.

(Before the CHIEF JUDGE.)

Debtor's summons-Costs.

THE registrar of the Norwich County Court had made an order dismissing a debtor's summons without costs.

Bagley now applied for the defendant on appeal for an order varying the order of the Registrar by declaring that the summons might be dismissed with costs.

Page, who was a farmer in Norfolk, as surety, and Springall, his son-in-law, grocer at Norwich, had a debtor's summons served upon them at the instance of five creditors at Springate, whose aggregate debts amounted to about 521. Page made the ordinary affidavit stating that he was not indebted to any of the alleged creditors. Upon the assurance contained in this affidavit the Registrar directed the usual bond pursuant to the rule for double the amount of the aggregate debts, and that the question of indebtedness should be decided in the proper court. Accordingly each of the five creditors brought a -claim against Page in the County Court. these cases was removed by a writ of certiorari to One of the Court of Queen's Bench, and the other four were all decided against the creditors, the Judge of the County Court deciding that there was no debt in any case due from Page. Upon this state of the case the registrar, upon the application of Page, dismissed the debtor's summons against him but refused costs, and the judge of that court upon having the case brought before him relegated it to the registrar who confirmed his former decision. Thereupon the present appeal was brought.

Bagley, contended that this discretionary power of refusing costs was to be exercised with great caution. and was to be founded upon the strictest rules of equity and fairness. It was very hard that a man should be compelled to bear the costs of a proceeding unjustly initiated against him by others, as in the present case.

Reed, for the summoning creditors, contended that the conrt had no power to interfere with the discretion of the registrar in the matter of costs.

The CHIEF JUDGE said that since he had known anything of the practice of the court a rule had been clearly established that there should be no appeal on a question of costs, the only exception to that rule being in a case where costs were ordered to be paid out of a fund in which a third

party was interested. In such a case perhaps, and only perhaps, the court would entertain such an appeal. He could not know what facts were before the registrar to influence his opinion, nor could he permit the merits of the case to be reopened; the rule was established for the purpose of avoiding the reconsideration of facts already fully discussed. A man might fail

to establish a legal claim in his attempt to moral ground for his demand. The appeal must recover a debt, and yet he might have good be dismissed with costs.

Solicitors for the appellants, Flux and Leadbitter, agents for W. H. Tillett and Co., Norwich. Solicitors for the respondent, Linklaters and Hackwood, agents for Coaks, Norwich.

Monday, Nov. 13.

Order and disposition.

AN appeal was presented from the decision of the deputy-judge of the County Court of Surrey, holden at Croydon, whereby it was declared that certain furniture in the house of the bankrupt at the time of his bankruptcy did not pass to the trustee of his estate under the order and disposition clause. Hawkins, a builder, residing at Norwood, hired furniture from a dealer living at Woolwich, named Barnet, at a rent of 21. per week, and an agreement was signed by the parties respectively, containing clauses to the effect that Hawkins was to insure the goods in his own name, which he had done, and that in the event of his compounding with his creditors or becoming bankrupt, Barnet should be at liberty to retake possession. Hawkins, at the date of his bankruptcy, had possession of the furniture, and the trustee was served with a notice of Barnet's claim, whereupon the trustee applied to the County Court for an order declaring that the property was in the order and disposition of the bankrupt at the time of the bankruptcy. The order made on that occasion was the subject of the present appeal.

Bagley appeared for the trustee, and contended that the agreement between the bankrupt and Barnet would not affect the right of the trustee, and that a secret agreement like that in the case could not defeat the doctrine of order and disposition. He cited the Bankruptcy Act 1869, s. 15, cl. 5; Lingham v. Biggs (1 Bos. & Pul. 83); Brigson v. Wylie (ibid); Spackman v. Miller (12 C. B. N. S. 659.)

Reed, for Barnet, argued that the custom of hiring furniture was so common that no presumption of ownership arose from the fact of the possession of it. He quoted Robson on Bankruptcy, title order and disposition, page 371. Bagley in reply.

The CHIEF JUDGE said that questions involving the doctrine of order and disposition were always questions of fact within the province of a jury. When property originally belonging to one person was disposed of by hit to another person who allowed it to remain in the possession of the original owner, and he afterwards became bankrupt, the doctrine of order and disposition directly applied. But there was another class of cases in which a man became the possessor of property without being the owner, as in the case of carriages or horses, &c., which are commonly let out on hire. In such cases evidence was admissible to prove the terms upon which the property was held by the hirer in the event of his bankruptcy. The terms of the agreement in the present case were very distinctly stated; and upon the facts in evidence it appeared to be perfectly plain that the bankrupt had not taken upon himself the order and disposition of court below was perfectly right. this furniture as owner, and the judgment of the Appeal dismissed.

ington. Solicitor for the appellants, Hicklin and Wash

Solicitors for the respondent, Wood and Hare.

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Tuesday, Nov. 14.

By Messrs. DANIEL SMITH, SON, and OAKLEY, at the Mart. Surrey, Chertsey. Pannel's Farm, with house, homestead, and 137 acres-sold for 95007.

A cottage, with garden, &c.-sold for 3007.
Beomond Farm, and 70a. Or. 8p.-sold for 51507.

Three enclosures of land and osier ground, containing 22a. 2r. 29p.-sold for 22007.

By Messrs. DEBENHAM, TEWSON, and FARMER. Southgate. Elizabeth Villa, with stabling, &c., term 93 years Clapham-road. No. 5, Wilkinson-street, term 92 years-sold --sold for 3501.

for 3351.


By Mr. W. H. MOORE. Camden-square. Nos. 19, 20, and 21, Stratford-place, term 75 years-sold for 18807. Kentish-town. No. 15, Hawley-road, term 65 years-sold for Mecklenburg-square. No. 27, term 38 years-sold for 4507. Gray's-inn road. No. 187, term 38 years-sold for 2507. Notting-hill. No. 1A, Hayden's-mews, term 90 years-sold Nos. 9 to 14, Hayden's-mews, same term-sold for 5257. Nos 15 to 19,-sold for 4001. Euston-square.-No. 19, Coburg-street, term 48 years-sold Mornington-crescent.-No. 17, Albert-street, term 70 yearssold for 6107.

for 551,

for 1501.




By 22 & 23 Vict. c. 21, passed in 1859 for regu lating the office of Queen's Remembrancer, and amending, the practice and procedure on the revenue side of the Court of Exchequer, the ceremony of counting the horse shoes and nails was transferred from the Court of Exchequer to the Queen's Remembrancer's Office. By sect. 43 it is enacted "That whereas it has been the custom on the occasion of the presentation of the sheriffs of the city of London, and sheriff of the county of Middlesex elect, for the approval of the Crown, to the Barons of the Court of Exchequer at Westminster, to render on behalf of the corporation of the said city in open court, certain ancient rents and services in respect of the tenure of a piece of waste ground called 'The Moors,' in the county of Salop, and of a tenement called The Forge, in the parish of St. Clement Danes, in the county of Middlesex: the said rents and services in respect of the said ground and tenement may be rendered by the corporation of London, or by their agent in their behalf, at the office of the Queen's Remembrancer on the morrow of St. Michael, or between that day and the morrow of St. Martin, and the proper entries in respect thereof shall be made as heretofore on the rolls of the court."

The sheriffwick of London and Middlesex was Henry 1., 1100, at the fee-farm rent of 3001, which first granted to the citizens by the charter of was ordered to be accounted for at His Majesty's Exchequer every year by the charter of King John, granted 5th July 1197. This latter docuconfers increased privileges. It is also recorded ment sets forth fully the grant of Henry I., and in the archives of the City, letter book "K.," that the citizens of London possessed the office of sheriff before the Conquest. The charter of John was confirmed by Henry III. in 1226.

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Madox, in his History of the Exchequer, gives the history of the ceremony as follows: original roll of Henry III., addressed in the fiftyseventh year of his reign to the Barons of the

Exchequer, by which the King at the supplication of the citizens of London, granted to them that they might choose from among themselves, two bailiffs faithful to the King and to the City, to have the custody of the City, and of the county of Middlesex, until the King should give further orders therein; and he commanded the Barons to admit the said bailiffs when the citizens should present them in the usual manner, provided that they answered to the King at the Exchequer for the old form as was customary.

Madox further cites several examples in the reigns of Henry III., Edward I., Edward II., of the presentation of the sheriffs of London and Middlesex to the Barons of the Exchequer and their answering to the King what was due to him. Since the time that the King's (Edward II.) progenitors granted to the citizens of London the power of choosing and making when they pleased, sheriffs of London and Middlesex. He then adds: "Some persons who held of the King in capite, by rent service, paid their rents at the Exchequer. Walter Le Brun, farrier, at the Strand, in Middlesex, was to have a piece of ground in the parish of St. Clement, to place a forge there, he rendering yearly six horse shoes for it." This rent was anciently wont to be paid at the Exchequer every year; for instance, in the first year of King Edward I. &c., and afterwards.


NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. INVITATION TO PREMISES-DANGER-KNOWLEDGE OF-NEGLIGENCE.-The plaintiff went with a cart and team, by implied invitation, to fetch lime from the defendants' railway yard. While in the yard he unharnessed a mare that was leading his team. A passing train frightened the mare; she backed some considerable distance, and, in spite of the plaintiff's efforts to hold her, fell over a dwarf wall of the defendants', and was hurt. An action having been brought in the County Court by the plaintiff against the defendants, for not having a sufficient fence to the yard, it was proved at the trial that the plaintiff knew the place well, and had been there often before. The County Court judge found that the fence was insufficient, and decided in favour of the plaintiff. On appeal: Held, that there was no proof of want of reasonable care on the part of the defendants to prevent damage from unusual danger to persons visiting the premises with full knowledge of the state of the place, and that, therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover: (The Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway Company (apps.) v. Woodcock (resp.), 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 335. Q. B.)

ENCE TO DEBT-WHAT IS ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF -WHAT PROMISE TO PAY-LETTER EXPRESSLY "WITHOUT Prejudice"-EFFECT OF.-Where a debt is barred by the Statute of Limitations, there must be, in order to take it out of the statute, one of three things: (1) an acknowledgment of the debt from which a promise to pay it must be im

The earliest instance which he quotes of the STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-DEBT BARRED BY payment of the six horse shoes is in the 19th-SUBSEQUENT LETTER FROM DEBTOR-REFERyear of Henry III., v. 3: "Walterus Le Brun, Marescallus de Stranda, r. c. de vi ferris equorum pro habenda quadam placca in parochia S. Clementis ad fabricam ibidem locandam sicut continetur in originali, Mag. Rot. 19, Hen. 3. Lond. et Middlesex." In the second instance which he quotes, the nails as well as the horse shoes appear to have been paid at the Stone Cross: 'Middle-plied; or (2), an unconditional promise to pay the sex, Redditus Walterus Marescallus ad crucem lapideam reddit sex ferra equorum cum clavibus pro quadam fabrica quam de Rege tenet in capite es opposito crucis lapideo: (Edw. I. Rot. 1.) "

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Madox continues again, "Nicholas de Mora rendered at the Exchequer two knives, one good, the other a very bad one, for certain land which he held in capite in Shropshire. Salopsire, Nicholaus de Mora reddit ad Scaccarium ü Cultellos unum bonum et alterum pessimum pro quadam terra quam de Rege tenet in capite in Mora:'" (Roll. 29th, Hen. 3rd.) It is thus shown that there is direct evidence of the tendering to the Exchequer six horse shoes and their nails in respect of the tenure of a tenement called "The Forge" in the Strand, from the year 1235, the nineteenth year of King Henry III., as well as two knives for the tenure of a piece of land called the Moor in Shropshire, from the year 1245, the twenty-ninth of Henry III. The counting of the horse shoes and nails appears to have been considered necessary, in order to show that they were duly tendered, and the cutting of the sticks to prove the goodness or the badness of the billhook and chopper. It was formerly the practice for the ceremony to be performed on the occasion of the presentation of the sheriffs in the Court of Exchequer at Westminster for the approval of the Crown, in accordance with the provision in the charter of King Henry III., and before the Cursitor Baron, when the ceremony was performed in open court by the senior alderman on behalf of the corporation, and two bundles of sticks were also cut with the bill and chopper. But on the death of the last Cursitor Baron in 1856 the office was abolished by 19 & 20 Vict. c. 86, and the duties were thenceforth to be performed by any baron or officer of the court, as the Lord Chief Baron should direct, and the ceremony was transferred in 1859 from Westminster to the Remem brancer's office within the city.

The Master of the Rolls, addressing Mr. Jessel on Saturday last, said: "Mr. Solicitor-General, I am delighted to see you take your seat in the centre of the bar by virtue of your new office, and I cannot but observe that you are the fourth gentle. man made Solicitor-General from this court since I have had the honour of sitting here, which is very highly to the credit of the Bar practising before me.' ""

The appointments of Sir John Coleridge as At. torney-General, and of Mr. Jessel, Q.C., as Soli. citor-General, are gazetted. The Gazette also announces the appointment of Sir Henry James Sumner Maine, K.C.S.I., D.C.L., as a member of the Council of India, in the room of Mr. Elliot Macnaghten, resigned.

BREAKFAST.-EPPS'S COCOA.-GRATEFUL AND СомFORTING." By a thorough knowledge of the natural laws which govern the operations of digestion and nutrition, and by a careful application of the fine properties of well-selected cocoa, Mr. Epps has provided our breakfast tables with a delicately-flavoured beverage which may save us many heavy doctors' bills."-Civil Service Gazette. Made simply with Boiling Water or Milk. Each packet is labelled-"JAMES EPPS and Co, Homœopathic Chemists, London." Also, makers of Epps's Milky Cocoa (Cocoa and Condensed Milk).

debt; or (3), a conditional promise to pay the debt in writing, and evidence that that condition has been performed. And, in the opinion of Mellish, L.J., a letter from the debtor which is stated to be "without prejudice," can never be relied upon to take the case out of the statute; for such a letter does not amount to a new contract, but is merely an offer which, if not simply accepted by the creditor, is intended to have no effect at all. In a contract between a steamboat company and a shipbuilder for the supply of certain vessels and engines at fixed times, and for payment by instalments, was contained a provision that the company should be entitled to stated compensation in the event of the builder's failure to deliver the vessels at those times, which compensation the company instalments. It was also provided that all diswas to be at liberty to deduct from the unpaid putes should be referred to three arbitrators, one to be appointed by each party, and the third by the two so appointed. Ultimately all the ships, &c., were delivered, but in several instances not at the dates fixed, and when the builder made his claim for a considerable amount as due to him on the completion of the contract, the company insisted on their right by way of compensation to a sum which exceeded the amount of that claim.

which takes the case out of the statute. (Re The River Steamer Company (Limited) (Mitchell's claim), 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 319. Chan.)

PRACTICE-FORECLOSURE-DISPUTE BETWEEN LEFENDANTS-FORM OF DECREE-CROWN.-In a suit for foreclosure by first mortgagee against a number of subsequent mortgagees and judgmentcreditors, there being a dispute between the codefendants: Held, that the decree should not name successive days for redemption, but that a day certain should be fixed for all or any of the defendants to redeem or be foreclosed. In such a suit, when the mortgagor has been convicted of felony, the court cannot make a decree for foreclosure against the Crown, but will order a sale, although it has no jurisdiction to direct the Crown to convey: (Bartlett v. Rees, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 373. M. R.)

CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY. LAST DAY OF PROOF. ABBITT (Chas. R.), James's-street. Oxford-street, W., butcher. Dec. 5; S. Potter, solicitor, 36, King-street, Cheapside, E.C. Dec. 14, M. R., at eleven o'clock. BODMER (Conrade E.), Zurichin, Switzerland, merchant. Dec. 11; F. Kearsey, solicitor, 35, Old Jewry, London, E.C. Dec. 20; M. R., at eleven o'clock.

BROWN (Mary A.), Kettering. Dec. 11; G. and H. Lamb, solicitors, Kettering. Dec. 21; V.C. W., at one o'clock. BROWN (William), Kettering, Northampton, licensed victualler. Dec. 11; G. and H. Lamb, solicitors, Kettering. Dec. 21: V.C. W., at one o'clock.

CLAPHAM (Thomas E. Stackhouse, near Settle, York.
Dec. 8: Nelson, Bulmer, and Co., solicitors, Leeds. Dec.
MONNEY (Win.), Esq., Fercham, Surrey. Dec. 20; J. Turner,
18; V.C. W., at one o'clock.
solicitor, Union Bank-chambers, 61, Carey-street, Lin-
coln's-inn, W.C. Jan. 12; M. R., at twelve o'clock.
PRICE (Edward), Portugal Hotel, Fleet-street, E.C., hotel
and dining rooms proprietor. Dec. 31; Kynaston and
Gasquet, solicitors, 1. King's-arms-yard, Moorgate-street,
E.C. Jan. 10; V.C. W., at twelve o'clock.
SMITH George T., Ordsall and South Retford, Notts, and
35, Jewin-street, London, E.C., floorcloth manufacturer.
Dec. 4: S. Jones, solicitor, East Retford, Notts. Dec. 18;
V.C. W., at twelve o'clock.

STIMSON (Thos., Emneth, Norfolk, farmer. Dec. 9; Wm.
L. Ollard, solicitor, Wisbeach. Dec. 20; V.C. W., at
twelve o'clock.
WHITEHEAD (Ralph R.), Esq., Amberley-court. near Stroud,
Gloucester, and Rock House, Lynmouth, Devon, and also
of Wharton Towers and Southsyde, both in the parish of
Saddleworth, York. Dec. 1; Litler and Harwar, solicitors
Oldham. Dec. 15; V.C. M., at twelve o'clock.

CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35. Last day of Claim, and to whom Particulars to be sent. BOWYER (Henry A.), Esq., Steeple Aston, Oxford. Dec. 12; Paterson and Co., solicitors, 40, Chancery-lane, W.C. BRIDGE (Geo., Esq., Wood-house, Shepherd's-bush, Middlesex. Dec. 12; Paterson and Co., solicitors, 40, Chancerylane, W.C.

BURRELL (Mary A.), 9, Malvern-terrace, Kilburn-park, Middlesex. Dec. 14; F. and T. Smith and Sons, solicitors, 15. Furnival's-inn, E.C.

DARBY (Henry W.). 98, Regent-street, Lambeth, Surrey, firework manufacturer. Dec. 1; Webb, Stock, and Co., solicitors, 11, Argyll-street, Regent-street, W.

DAVIES (Wm. Corris Talyllyn, Merioneth, quarryman.
Dec. 16; Griffiths Williams, solicitor, Dolgelly.
DOBBINGS (Win.), Golden Cock Inn, Kirkgate, Leeds, inn-
keeper. Dec. 15; Ward and Son, solicitors, Leeds.
FELTON Frederick, Esq., Croydon, Surrey. Dec. 12; Pater-
son and Co., solicitors, 40, Chancery-lane, W.C.
GAMBLE (Geo. 8., Esq., Thwaite, Norfolk. Nov. 30; White,
Borrett, and Co., solicitors, 6, Whitehall-place, London.
HASTEAD Benjamin), Bridgham, Norfolk, gentleman. Nov.
30; F. Fowell, jun., Garboldisham, Norfolk.
HENSON (David), Thringstone, Leicester, jeweller. Dec. 1;
E. Fuller, solicitor, 39, Hatton-garden, London.
HOLBURNE (Alicia 8. A.), 10, Cavendish-crescent. Bath.
Nov. 30; Carlisle and Ordell, solicitors, 8, New-square,
Lincoln's-inn, W.C.

Correspondence ensued; the company appointed JAMES (Edward), Plymouth, Devon, starch manufacturer

an arbitrator, but the builder did not, and it was not in dispute that the debt would have been barred by the statute but for two letters written by the company, which were relied on as taking the case out of its operation. In one of these the company pointed out that they had ap pointed an arbitrator, but that by reason of the builder's neglect the arbitration had not been proceeded with; and in the second they, after stating that the account sent in was altogether incorrect and omitted all the deductions and credits to which the company was entitled, the insertion of which would leave the balance in their favour, offered, notwithstanding, to have all accounts and questions decided by arbitration according to the contract, and again called on him to concur in what was necessary with that object. They added, however, that that letter was "wholly without prejudice." The builder never complied with this request, and the matters were never settled nor was any further payment made. A winding-up order was made nearly three years after this second letter, and the builder then carried in his claim for proof against the estate : Held (reversing the decision of Bacon, V.C.), that the debt was barred by the statute, for that the effect of the letters was rather to deny than to admit indebtedness; and, therefore, they contained no unconditional promise to pay, and that if they could be construed as containing even a conditional promise to pay, the condition was that there should be an arbitration to decide the accounts and disputes, with which condition the builder had never complied, and such implied promise was to pay only such sum as the arbitrators might find to be due. But even if the letters had amounted to an admission of a debt with a claim to set off sufficient to expunge it, they would not have taken

the case out of the statute as an admission of indebtedness a promise to pay may be implied, it is the promise of payment, and not the admission,

and 7; Wedlake and Letts, solicitors, 3, Mitre-court, Temple, E.C. KEMP (Louisa A.), Blackheath. Dec. 4; A. Dobie, solicitor, 2, Lancaster-place, Strand, W.C. LODDER Thos.), 30, Devonshire-road, Holloway, Islington, Middlesex. Dec. 7; Coode, Kingdon, and Cotton, solicitors, 7, Bedford-row, W.C.

MACLEOD (Lady Elizabeth M.), 35, Hamilton-terrace, St. John's-wood, N.W. Dec. 20; Lewis and Co., solicitors, 8, Old Jewry, E.C.

NOYES (Sarah), 13, Christchurch-road, Brixton, Surrey. Dec. 1; Van Sandau and Cumming, solicitors, 13, King'sstreet, Cheapside, E.C.

NURSAW (Edward, Haxby, York, gentleman. Jan. 1; W. Walker, solicitor, 18, Lendal, York.

PENNETHORNE (Sir Jas.), Knight, Worcester-park House, Long Ditton, Surrey. Jan. 1; Few and Co., solicitors, 2, Henrietta-street, Covent garden, W.C.

ROBINSON Maria S.), Twyford, Southampton. Feb. 1; Lee and Best, solicitors, Winchester. ROTTON (Henry B.), Esq., 21. Eccleston-street, Middlesex.

Dec. 10; Gascotte. Wadham, and Daw, solicitors, 19, Essex-street, Strand.

SILBERRAD (Richard), 5, Harp-lane, Tower-street, E.C.; and Willow-cottage, Brixton-road, Surrey, general mei chant. Dec. 26; Simpson and Cullingford, solicitors, 85, Gracechurch-street, E.C.

SMITH (Wm.), Esq., Greenstead, near Ongar, Essex. Dec. 21: Sheffield and Sons, solicitors, 52, Lime-street, E.C. SOLOMON (Napthali H.), 4, Upper Bedford-place, Russellsquare, W.C., and 9, Coventry-street, Haymarket, W., bullion dealer. Jan. 1, 1872; A. Selim, solicitor, 4, Lancaster-place, Strand, W.C.

UPTON (Thomas), Westend terrace, East Dereham, Norfolk, carpenter. Nov. 30; Tatham and Procter, solicitors, 36, Lincoln's-inn-fields, W C.

WALMESLEY (Charlotte E.), 34. Connaught-square, Hydepark, W. Dec. 15: Few and Co., solicitors, 2, Henriettastreet, Covent-garden, W.C. WARD (Harriet M.), St. Anns west, Auckland-road, Southsea, Southampton. Dec. 16; H. Plumbe, solicitor, Winchconibe. WELLS (Esther), Brighton, Sussex. Jan. 1: Sladen and Mackenzie, solicitors, 14, Parliament-street, Westminster, S.W. WESTWOOD (Robert), 16, Newgate-street, E.C.. and 7, Colebook-row, Islington, and Walton-on-the-Naze, Essex, wholesale chymist and druggist. Dec. 16; Lawrance and Co., solicitors, 14, Old Jewry, E.C. WHALES (Sarah), 207, Albany-road, Camberwell, Surrey. Dec. 22; J. Price, solicitor, 12, Serjeant's-inn, Fleet-street, WINSOR (John), Ivybridge, Devon, papermaker. E.C. Dec. 80;

Wedlake and Turner, solicitors, 3, Mitre-court, Temple, E.C.

WRIGHT (Rev. Jno. H. C.), Wolferlow, Hereford, vicar of Wolferlow. Dec. 12; Paterson and Co., solicitors, 40, Chancery-lane, W.C.


(Before Mr. PRESTON, Stipendiary Magistrate.)
Friendly society-Unlawfully detaining effects of—
Production of rules.

Hannan said he appeared on behalf of the Birkenhead Benefit Building Society, to complain that the defendant had retained two keys, the property of the society, and refused to give them up. The rules of the society had been certified in accordance with the Friendly Societies Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict.), and its only trustees were John Robinson, Thomas Carnell, and John Leech. He believed defendant claimed to be a trustee, but he had no appointment in that capacity. The deeds and property of the society were deposited in a strong box, kept at the North and South Wales Bank, Liverpool, and there were three locks on the box, with different keys. Three keyholders were appointed, of whom the defendant was one. The committee was desirous of opening this box, and had applied to all the three keyholders to attend on a certain day. Two of them attended, but Mr. Sherlock refused to attend, and also refused to give up the key. Defendant had said the committee had wanted a deed out of the box to destroy it, but this was a falsehood. It was for the sale of some property.

John Sansom was called, who said he was secretary to the Birkenhead Benefit Building Society. He believed it was a properly certified society, and had made a search for the certified copy of the rules, but could not find it.

Bellringer maintained that it was incumbent upon the complainant to produce the certified copy of the rules.

Mr. PRESTON ruled this to be a valid objection, and gave the complainant the option of the case being adjourned or dismissed.

In accordance with his election the case was dismissed.


for the purpose of establishing a right of common
over the wastes of a manor may be sustained on
behalf of freehold tenants of lands originally
demesne of the manor. Where rights have been
exercised from time immemorial, the court is
bound, if possible, to find a legal origin for them.
Held, that where there were copyholders of the
manor as well as freeholders, but none of the copy-
holders were made parties, a decree could be made
in their absence, and that. although there was in
fact a misjoinder of plaintiffs, relief could be given,
as an amendment might have been ordered at the
hearing (Betts v. Thompson, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S.
363. L. C.)

WILL-CONDITION REQUIRING RESIDENCEMINORITY. A testator after giving a life estate therein to his wife devised certain real estate to trustees upon trust after his wife's death to allow his grandson to receive the rents and profits thereof during his life upon condition that he should reside for two calendar months in each year at the mansion house on the estate, and in case his said grandson did not comply with that condition, then the rents, &c., should go over as if he were actually dead, and after the grandson's decease the testator directed his trustees to hold the estate upon trust for his grandson's first and other sons successively in tail general. And he declared it to be his will that in case his said grandson or any other person who should become entitled to the estate under the limitations of the will, should not reside at the mansion house during two calendar months in each year, the estate of every person by whom such default should be made should become void as if he were actually dead. The grandson died in the widow's lifetime: Held, that the condition requiring residence was not binding on or applicable to the grandson's eldest son, who was now tenant in tail in possession; and leave was given to him to let the mansion house during his minority: (Parry v. Roberts, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 371.) WILL-CONDITION RENDERED IMPOSSIBLE BY ACT OF THE TESTATOR. - C. W., by her will, devised and bequeathed her freehold house, and also her leasehold house in B. street, held under the corporation of L. for the life of T. K., and twenty-one years after his decease, to trustees upon trust, subject to certain conditions, to permit her nieces to reside in the leasehold house "during the remainder of the said term for which the said house is held of the corporation of L. as aforesaid," and after the expiration of the said term then as to her freehold house, upon trusts for her said nieces, as tenants in common, or for whichever of them should have been solely in occupation of her leasehold house "at the expiration of the said term." Subsequently to the date of her will, C. W.

surrendered her lease to the corporation of L.,
and obtained from them a new lease of the house
for seventy-five years. Two years afterwards
C. W. died: Held, that the trusts of the will
original lease would have lasted, and that the
were subsisting trusts for so long a period as the
conditions were not discharged: (Wedgewood
v. Denton, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 379. V.C. B.)

will. Between the execution of the will and the
Testator left a will and a codicil confirming the
execution of the codicil, he scored out certain
others wrote the word "query" also in pencil.
passages in the will with pencil, and against
bate, being satisfied that the testator intended
The court excluded these alterations from pro-
25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 384. Prob. Ct.)
them to be deliberative, not final: (Re Hall,



STUDENTS of the INNS OF COURT, held at
LINCOLN'S-INN HALL, on the 30th and 31st
OCTOBER, and the 1st NOVEMBER 1871.

Michaelmas Term 1871.

The Council of Legal Education have awarded to Hiram Shaw Wilkinson, Esq., student of the Middle Temple, a studentship of fifty guineas per annum, to continue for a period of three years.

James Owens Wylie, Esq., student of the Middle Temple-An exhibition of twenty-five guineas per annum, to continue for a period of three years.

Edward James Ackroyd, Esq, student of the
Middle Temple; Robert Forster McSwinney, Esq.,
student of the Inner Temple; Gustavus Adolphus
Smith, Esq., student of Gray's Inn-Certificates
of honour of the first class.

Charles C. M. Baker, Esq., student of the Inner
Temple; Charles Norman Bazalgette, Esq., student
of the Inner Temple; Samuel William Casserley,
Esq., student of the Middle Temple; Samuel
Winter Cooke, Esq, student of Lincoln's Inn;
Charles Doyle, Esq., student of the Inner Temple;
David Fitzgerald, Esq., student of Lincoln's Inn;
Samuel Thomas Fitzherbert, Esq., student of the
Inner Temple ;
student of Lincoln's Inn; Malcolm Peter Gasper,
Robert James Forrest, Esq.,
Esq., student of Lincoln's Inn; Thomas Joseph
Greenfield, Esq., student of Gray's Inn; Henry
Temple: William Frederick Hunter, student of
Appold Grueber, Esq., student of the Middle
Lincoln's Inn; Walter Bishop Kingsford, Esq.,
student of Lincoln's Inn; Charles Edward Lanauze,
Esq.. student of the Middle Temple; Samuel
Lewis, Esq., student of the Middle Temple;
Somers Reginald Lewis, Esq., student of Lincoln's
Inn; Reginald Godfrey Marsden, Esq., student of
the Inner Temple; Richard Owen Stewart Morgan,
Esq., student of the Inner Temple; Raj Narain
Mittra, Esq., student of the Middle Temple;
Maurice O'Connor Morris, Esq., student of the
Middle Temple; Bedford Clapperton Trevelyan
Pim, Esq., student of the Inner Temple; Ander-
Thomas Robert Stokoe, Esq., student of_the
son Souttar, Esq, student of Lincoln's Inn;
Inner Temple; George Henry Wavell, Esq.,
student of the Middle Temple; Hugh Eden
Eardley Wilmot, Esq., student of Lincoln's Inn;
student of the Middle Temple--Certificates that they
and Charles Palmer Bluett Wiltshire, Esq.,
have satisfactorily passed a public examination.
By Order of the Council, (Signed)

EDWARD RYAN, Chairman, pro tem.

COURT, held at LINCOLN'S-INN HALL, on the
23rd, 24th, 27th, and 28th OCTOBER, 1871.
Michaelmas Term, 1871.

The Council of Legal Education have awarded
to Malcolm Peter Gasper, Esq., student of Lin-
coln's-inn; Robert Parry Nisbet, Esq., student of
the Middle Temple; John Charles Pritchard,
Esq., student of the Middle Temple; Thomas
Watt Smyth, Esq., student of Lincoln's-inn; and
James Dyer Tremlett, Esq., student of the Middle
Temple, certificates that they have satisfactorily
passed an examination in the subjects above men-

By Order of the Council,


EDWARD RYAN, Chairman, pro tem.


I. Preliminary.

Questions 1 to 5 inclusive.

II. From Chitty on Contracts.

6. What are the requisites of a legal contract,
as distinguished from a moral obligation?

7. Mention some instances in which one party
to a contract is bound, though the other is not.
8. How are specialty debts incurred?
9. Upon a sale of goods, without any stipulation

as to delivery or payment, what are the rights of the vendor and purchaser respectively?

10. State the difference at common law between the responsibility of a common carrier of goods, and a common carrier of passengers.

11. When a workman has bestowed labour and skill in the improvement of a chattel bailed to him, what legal remedies has he for his remuneration? 12. Where, upon a statement of accounts between A. and B., a balance is found to be due III. From Williams on the Principles of the Law against B., is B. estopped in law from disputing it? of Real Property.

perty respectively? Mention some instances of 13. What are real property and personal proeach kind.

14. What are corporeal and incorporeal hereditaments, respectively? Mention some instances of each kind.

15. If a tenant for life sell his estate, what is the technical description of the interest which the purchaser acquires ?

16. What is the difference between an estate in remainder and an estate in reversion ?

17. What (if any) is the difference, in effect, of a limitation "to the use of A. B. and his heirs male" in a deed and will, respectively?

18. Give an instance of a contingent remainder, and a vested remainder, respectively.

19. What is an advowson? and what rights does it confer on its owner?

IV. From J. W. Smith's Manual of Equity


20. Explain the meaning of the maxim " antibus non dormientibus æquitas subvenit." relief in the case of the destruction of a bill of 21. Have courts of equity jurisdiction to give exchange? State the distinction, in this respect,

between the destruction and loss of a bill.

22. Mention some instances in which executors posited with bankers who fail. or trustees would be held liable for money de

specific performance of a contract, although 23. When will equity give relief by decreeing damages for the breach of the contract could be recovered at law ?

24. In what cases will courts of equity dissolve fixed by the articles of partnership? partnership before the expiration of the term


securities ?" and for whose benefit will such 25. What is meant by "the marshalling of marshalling be enforced?

courts of equity will interfere by injunction to prevent loss or injury.

26. Mention some familiar instances in which

V. Book-keeping.

27. Describe the simplest form of book-keeping, instance-whose dealings are wholly for ready such as would be sufficient for one-a farmer, for


business in which credit is given.
28. State what books would be requisite for a

29. Give a statement for each of the above cases
of the particulars that must be brought into com-
parative view, in order to ascertain the results of
the transactions for any given period; and show
how this statement, which would be one form of
a profit and loss account, may be converted into a

30. State what are the main and essential books

usually kept by every merchant, manufacturer, or
that are in ordinary use.
company; and name some of the subsidiary books

31. A builder purchases of a timber merchant a certain quantity of deals for 1001., and accepts a bill for the amount, payable three months after date. Enter the transactions in the books of the builder and merchant respectively.




Questions 1 to 5 inclusive.


6. What is the advantage of specially indorsing a writ of summons; and in what cases can it be done? 7. How does a writ of summons under "The

Common Law Procedure Act 1852," differ, in respect of the defendant's right to appear thereto, from a writ issued under The Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act, 1855 ?"

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8. How is a writ of summons to be served upon a public company?

9. For what purpose may interrogatories be administered to either party; and at what stage of an action?

10. On what grounds, and at what time may application be made by a defendant to change the venue ?

11. When a certain number of days is prescribed by the rules or practice of the eourt for doing an act, how is the time to be reckoned?

12. If a rule to show cause requiring two things is drawn up with costs, and the party obtaining it succeeds as to one, but fails as to the other, does he get costs? Give the reason for your answer.

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21. A., possessed of a house for a term of years, died intestate. His widow administered to his

estate, and died, possessed of the house for the residue of the term, having by her will appointed executors, who proved the will. By whom can the residue of the term be effectually assigned to a purchaser ?

22. Can land by any and what means, and under any and what conditions, be effectually conveyed to uses, or upon trusts for a charitable institution ? 23. A testator, being possessed of land for an estate in fee simple, devised it "unto and to the use of A. and his heirs, in trust for B. and his heirs ;" and A., by deed, disclaimed the devise. By whom can the land be conveyed to a purchaser for an estate in fee simple ?

24. What is the difference in duration between an estate in fee simple and a base fee?

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25. A testator, being possessed of land for an estate in fee simple, devised it unto and to the use of A. and B. and their heirs." A. died intestate, leaving an only son, and afterwards B. died intestate, leaving two daughters, C. and D., and no son; and then C. died intestate, leaving a son. Who are the necessary parties to convey the land to a purchaser? And why?

26. What is the meaning of the term "Mortmain," and why is it an inaccurate form of expression to call the stat. 9 Geo. 2, c. 36, the Statute of Mortmain ?

27. A testator left a legacy to his son and a legacy to his nephew, and both died, leaving issue, before the testator. Do the legacies lapse? and if not, to whom are they respectively payable on

the testator's death?

28. A. and B. are man and wife, but have no child. A. is in possession of land limited to him and the heirs of the body of himself and his wife. During the life of B., or after her death, can A. by any, and by what means effectually vest the land in a purchaser for an estate in fee simple?

29. State all the requisites to render valid and effectual the execution and attestation of the will

of a testator.

30. A., owner of land for an estate in fee simple, granted a mortgage of it in fee to B. to secure a sum lent by B. B., during the continuance of the mortgage died intestate. What instrument, and by whom executed, will effectually vest the land in a purchaser discharged from the mortgage?

31. A. and B., two spinsters, were tenants in common in fee of a farm. A. married about ten years

years ago, B. married last month, and both their husbands are living. By what means, if by any, can the interests of A. and B. in the farm be effectually conveyed to a purchaser, and who are necessary parties to the conveyance?

32. Land stands limited to the use of A. and his assigns for his life, with remainder to the use of his first and other sons successively in tail male, with remainder to the use of B. and his assigns for his life, with remainder to his first and other sons successively in tail male. A. has no son. Can the eldest son of B. by any, and by what means, enlarge his estate into an estate in fee simple in remainder, and who are necessary concurring parties, and why?

33. A testator possessed of leasehold premises bequeathed them in express terms to A. and appointed B. his executor. Is it necessary that B. should join in an assignment of the premises to a purchaser, and if so, why?

34. By what means may a female, who is a minor, of say twenty, make a valid and binding settlement on her marriage of real estate to which she is absolutely entitled?

35. A. B. C. are joint tenants of land for an estate in fee simple; C. exccutes a conveyance of one undivided third to a stranger. What is the effect, if any, of such conveyance on the interests of A. B. and C. respectively?



36. What is now your age?

37. Where, and with whom, did you serve your clerkship?

38. State the particular branch or branches of the law to which you have principally applied yourself during your clerkship?

39. Mention some of the principal law books which you have read and studied. 40. Have you attended any, and what, law lectures or law classes?


41. An injunction is wanted in a hurry, and there not being time to get the bill printed, can a written copy be filed, and on what terms ? 42. What is an information? and what steps are necessary on filing one, beyond those needed on a bill?

43. A bill is served on a defendant resident abroad; and he not appearing, the plaintiff enters an appearance for him, and files a replication. How must the plaintiff proceed to get the bill taken pro confesso against the foreign defendant?

44. Who are the usual parties to a bill of foreclosure? Is the plaintiff, if a second mortgagee, obliged to join the first mortgagee? and what are the consequences of not doing so?

45. What is meant by taking the accounts between the mortgagor and mortgagee in possession, with annual rests? and in what case is the mortgagee relieved from having them so

taken ?

46. Can a solicitor on taxation get interest allowed on his cash disbursements, if he be fairly entitled thereto ? and if so, under what Act? 47. What are stop and charging orders respectively? and how are they obtained?

48. A. sues B. at law, and also in equity, in respect of the same subject matter; can B. compel A. to confine himself to one of the two courts? and if so, how; and is there any exception?

49. How far will the Court of Chancery enforce the specific performance of an agreement to enter into partnership, or give damages for the breach of it ?

50. A married lady becomes during the coverture absolutely entitled to money, and claims to have it settled on herself; at the time of her marriage she was indebted to various creditors, who now claim payment of their debts out of her separate estate before any settlement be made of it-Has the lady, or have the creditors, the preferent equity?

51. A. draws bills on B. and ships to him goods, as security for and to meet the drafts-the bills are negotiated, and before maturity-and while the goods are unsold both A. and B. become bankrupt. What equity has the bill holder (he not having taken the bills on the faith of the consignments) to follow the goods as security, and how far is this right affected by the bankruptcy of A. and B., or either of them, and why? Give one or two of the leading cases on the subject.

52. The last surviving trustee of Consols in a settlement goes abroad and cannot be found; how can the parties entitled obtain transfer and payment of the stock and dividends?

53. What is the present law as to setting aside sales of reversions on the ground of undervalue? and what is the last Act on the subject?

wound-up in Chancery holds security; can he, 54. A creditor of a company in course of being according to the last decision, prove in Chancery for the whole debt, or must he (as in bankruptcy) give credit for the value of the securities?

55. A man effects a policy of insurance on his own life and declares on the face of it, under The Married Women's Property Act, 1870, merely dies leaving a widow and infant children; how "For the benefit of my widow and children," and can a good discharge be given to the insurance office? and is any application to the court


VI. BANKRUPTCY AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS. 56. What are the Acts of Parliament, now in force in England, providing for the distribution of the property of a debtor amongst his creditors, and for the punishment of fraud by a debtor ?

57. By whom, and on what grounds, may an adjudication in bankruptcy be obtained against a debtor?

58. An adjudication being made, to what date shall it be deemed to have relation ?

59. In whom does the property of the bankrupt vest after adjudication?

60. By what means can the trustee of the estate relieve it of property which is onerous ? and to what class of property do his powers in this respect extend?

61. Are any, and if so, what, creditors of a bankrupt, excepted from the rule of equal participation in his estate?

62. Where a bankrupt is indebted for rent, does the position of the landlord differ in any way from that of an ordinary creditor?

63. When, and under what circumstances, is a bankrupt entitled to an order of discharge?

64. Within what time are settlements of property by a trader void? and what are the exceptions?

in a husband's estate in respect of his covenant to 65. Can trustees of a marriage settlement prove bring money into settlement after marriage?

66. What are the conditions required by the Bankruptcy Act 1869, to constitute a fraudulent preference?

67. The Bankruptcy Act 1869 contains provisions enabling a debtor, unable to pay his debts, to arrange his affairs without becoming bankrupt; state shortly the nature of these provisions, and the course to be pursued.

68. By the provisions of the Debtors' Act 1869, a bankrupt may render himself liable to the criminal law; of what offences would he be deemed guilty? and what punishment may be awarded him?

69. State shortly some of the cases which would render him so liable.

70. Where a creditor, who has proved his debt and received dividends, discovers that it has been fraudulently incurred, has he any remedy against the debtor left him? or is he bound by his proof?

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74. In order to prove a written instrument on a criminal trial, is it necessary, in any case, to call the attesting witness?

75. Is the evidence of an accomplice, who has been joined in the same indictment as the accused,

admissible against the accused?

76. A person who is indicted for libel seeks to set up as a defence the truth of the libel. What other facts besides the truth of the libel must be alleged in the plea and proved at the trial, in order to sustain the defence?

77. A. is summoned before justices at petty sessions, charged with a common assault. It is proved that the assault was committed in the assertion of A.'s title to land. Does this fact in anyway affect the jurisdiction of the justices to deal with the charge?

78. Mention some of the cases in which it is

enacted, by statute, that it shall be lawful on the trial of an accused person to proceed on several counts in one indictment charging him with distinct acts of felony, and state whether in any cases not provided for by statute, the same course may be pursued.

79. Where a person is indicted for having received goods knowing them to be stolen, may evidence be given to show that stolen goods, other than those mentioned in the indictment, have been found in his possession? Give the reason for

your answer.

80. May justices of the peace, who determine an information or complaint in a summary way, refuse under any, and what, circumstances to state a case for the opinion of one of the Superior Courts of Law? If they improperly refuse, what remedy has the person aggrieved?

81. A. has been tried on an indictment charging him with stealing the watch of B., and acquitted. Can he afterwards be tried for the offence of reason for your answer. attempting to steal the same watch?

Give a

82. What is the direction commonly given by a judge to the jury when the case against the accused rests upon the unsupported evidence of an accomplice; and if the case is left to the jury on such direction, and they find a verdict contrary to such direction, is it good at law?

83. The 34 & 35 Vict. c. 32, enacts that every person who shall molest or obstruct any person in manner therein defined, with a view to coerce such person; being a master, not to offer, or being a workman, not to accept any employment or work, shall be liable to imprisonment. Give instances of cases in which a person shall, for the purposes of the Act, be deemed to molest or obstruct another person.

84. A., by representing to B. that certain plated spoons were Elkington's manufacture, induced B. to buy them. A., by representing to C. that certain other plated spoons were equal to Elkington's manufacture, induced C. to buy them. None of the spoons were Elkington's manufacture, as A. knew, and they were all vastly inferior to Elkington's manufacture, as A. knew. Can A. be convicted of the offence of false pretence in either case?

85. What difference does it make in the character of the offence, if rioters, to the number of twelve or more, remain together for one hour after proclamation, made by a justice of the peace, according to the form provided by the Riot Act ?


NOTES OF NEW DECISION. SALVAGE-PASSENGER'S BAGGAGE-SALVOR'S LIEN-RIGHT TO BEGIN WHERE RIVAL SALVORS -LIFE SALVAGE.-A salvor's lien does not extend to personal baggage and effects (wearing apparel and other goods ejusdem generis) belonging to passengers on board the vessel, to which the services have been rendered, and the Court of Admiralty will order such effects to be released. Where suits of rival salvors come on for hearing at the same time, the right to begin must depend upon circumstances of each case. The F. schooner, having taken on board part of the passengers and crew of a foreign vessel, which was on fire, afterwards transferred them to the S. steamer, in order that they might get ashore more quickly. The whole transaction took place outside British waters: Held, that the services of the two vessels were not so continuous that they could be considered as one, and that therefore the F. was not entitled to life salvage from a foreign vessel as for services rendered either wholly or in part in British waters under the Admiralty Court Act 1861, s. 9: The William III., 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 386. Adm.)


NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. CONTRACT BETWEEN BROKERS OVERPAYMENT BY MISTAKE-CREDIT TO PRINCIPAL LIABILITY OF SELLING BROKER.-One Liverpool cotton broker bought cotton of another, each in his own name; in consequence of a mistake by a clerk of the selling broker, the buying broker paid over too much money. The selling broker gave credit to his undisclosed principal for the sum he received, the principal being largely in his debt. Held, that the buying broker was entitled to recover back from the selling broker the sum so overpaid to him, the case not falling within the rule by which an agent is relieved from responsibility where he has bona fide paid over moneys received by him on account of his principals: (Newall v. Tomlinson, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 382. C.P.)

COUNTY COURTS. ASHTON-UNDER-LYNE COUNTY COURT. (Before J. ST. JOHN YATES, Esq., Judge.) SERGEANT U. SIDEBOTHAM AND BROADBENT. Replevin-Rent in arrear. Edge, counsel for the plaintiff. Addison counsel for defendant. His HONOUR, in giving his opinion upon this case, said:-This was an action of replevin in which the defendant Sidebotham avowed for rent in arrear. Broadbent made cognizance as his bailiff, and the only question was whether the former had such an estate in the premises upon which the distress was levied as entitled him to distrain. The facts were as follows: By will dated March 14, 1836, one Robert Knott devised all his freehold and leasehold estates to his sons John, James, and Robert, upon certain trusts for the benefit of his wife and children. The testator died about the year 1842. John, who survived his co-trustees, demised the premises upon which the distress was levied, and which were part of the testator's real estate to the plaintiff, who has occupied them up to the present time. Shortly before his death John "conveyed, granted, and assigned" all his real and personal estate whatsoever and wheresoever, and all his estate and interest therein respectively to Joseph Knott (since deceased), and the defendant Sidebotham in trust for his own children. During part of John Knott's life, and after his death, the defendant Sidebotham collected the plaintiff's rent, the plaintiff, it was said, being under the impression that he was acting on behalf of the persons beneficially interested under the will of the testator. And this is the more probable, for when it was claimed on behalf of Sidebotham and his co-trustees in their own right, or in the right of the survivor, the tenant refused to pay, and this distress was levied. Upon this state of facts it was submitted, on behalf of the defendants, that as the words "all my real estate whatsoever and wheresoever" were large enough to comprise not only property of which John Knott was beneficial owner, but that also in which his interest was fiduciary, the legal estate in both passed under the deed already referred to, and by survivorship to the defendant Side botham, and justified the distress. On the other hand Mr. Addison, for the plaintiff, contended that the court would look at the deed in its entirety, and not at the operative words alone. And if it should be of opinion that the subsequent limitations were (as was clearly the case) inapplicable to trust estates, it would hold that such estates did not pass, and that the distress was illegal. He quoted Attorney-General v. Buller and several other decisions. But they were all cases in which a

court of equity was called upon to interpret, and
gave effect to the language of a devise. Here a
court of common law has to deal with the words
of a deed. The rules of construction differ
materially. As a general rule, almost without
exception, the legal estate in the hands of a
trustee has at common law precisely the same
properties, and is governed by the same incidents
as if the trustees were the beneficial owners. He
may at law convey, assign, or incumber it, and if
the words be sufficiently comprehensive the legal
estate will pass, subject, nevertheless, to the
interference of a court of equity for the protection
of the cestui que trusts. Where, however, the
estate does not pass by mere operation of law, but
through the medium of intention, as in a will, a
court of equity will look at the instrument as a
whole, and at the circumstances of the trust, and
if there be complicated limitations or such dispo-
sitions of the estate as a testator would not be
likely to make of property not his own, then,
however large the words trust estates will not
pass. Here the court is dealing with a conveyance
inter vivos, the operative words are sufficiently
comprehensive, and, therefore, in my opinion, a
dry legal estate passed to the defendant as having
survived his co-trustee, and entitled him to dis-
train. The judgment will, therefore, be for the
defendants, with costs.


Pew rents.

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a pew so long as an inhabitant requires one. The same principle as to inhabitancy applies when a pew is annexed by prescription to a dwelling-house in the parish. The right to the one cannot be severed from the occupancy of the other, but passes with it to the tenant of the house for the time being. It is clear, therefore, that the right to a pew or sitting in a parish church is, with such exceptions as private aisles or chapels, a purely personal privilege, and, being so, cannot be the subject of sale, demise, or bequest; and it is, in fact, one of the first duties of the churchwardens, as Prideaux says, to put down the illegal practice of buying, selling, or letting pews." This disposes of the first question. Then as the letting of pews is illegal, it follows that money paid upon such a consideration is a voluntary payment, and may at any time be discontinued. In Wyllie v. Mote and another (1 Hagg. 29), this doctrine will be found to be laid down clearly and emphatically. But even assuming the plaintiff's view to be correct, and that payments of this description are subject to the same incidents as rent, my conclusion would be the same. For when the plaintiff ceased to be an inhabitant of the parish, any interest he might then have possessed in this pew was absolutely determined. The churchwardens, as representing the ordinary, were entitled to re-enter and make a new appropriation. They did so, and by an analogy to the consequences of an eviction, by title paramount, the defendant's liability was at an end. I am indebted to Mr. Judge Wheeler for the opportunity of perusing his able and elaborate judgment in the West Kirby case, where the facts were almost, if not altogether, identical. And although I never entertained any doubt as to the correctness of the view which I have taken, it is satisfactory to find it confirmed by the opinion of so able a lawyer. I therefore give judgment for defendant, with costs.

MARYLEBONE COUNTY COURT. Tuesday, Oct. 31. RESIGNATION OF SIR JOHN EARDLEY WILMOT. A LARGE number of practitioners and suitors were present at the Marylebone County Court on Oct. 31, on the occasion of the judge (Sir John Eardley Wilmot) taking his seat for the last time. Lady Eardley Wilmot and several of the relatives of the judge were also present.

Mr. Clarke, attorney, practising at the Maryle bone Court, and Mr. Newman, attorney of the Brompton Court, severally addressed his Houour in very feeling and appropriate language, conveying to him their best and most cordial thanks for his services during the long period he had presided over them, and also expressing their sincere regret that the state of his health obliged him to retire.

Mr. Burrows, registrar of the Marylebone Court, addressed his Honour to the same effect on behalf of the registrars, high bailiffs (who had attended that day for the purpose of bidding his Honour farewell), and other officers of the courts in district No. 43.

His HONOUR said: This action was brought to recover arrears of rent of a pew in the gallery of the parish church, at Ashton-under-Lyne. The evidence has been so fully and so accurately reported in the local press that it would be a waste of time to recapitulate it in detail. I shall confine myself, therefore, to so much of it as is material to the question at issue. It did not appear how or when the gallery was erected, nor with what circumstances the supposed ownership of the pew claimed by the plaintiff originated. A faculty was probably the foundation of both. It was, however, given in evidence that those, through whom the plaintiff claimed title, and who were formerly inhabitants of the parish, had occupied the pew upwards of thirty years ago, and that if the plaintiff had not himself made use of it since his father's death, those by whom it had been occupied had obtained his sanction to their occupation. It also appeared that when the church was restored in 1814 he had, in common with other so-called owners of pews in the gallery, contributed to the expense in proportion to the number of sittings which they respectively claimed, with an understanding that they should not be disturbed in their occupation. In the year 1864, the plaintiff, who had ceased to be a parishioner, or to occupy the pew, let it to the defendant at a rent of 31. a year. The defendant paid his rent regularly up to 1869, when, in consequence of some question having been raised as to the legality of the transaction, he refused to pay any longer. And somewhere about the same time the His HONOUR, who spoke with feelings of deep churchwardns made certain alterations in the emotion, thanked them all most warmly and corchurch, and amongst other acts removed the dially for the kind and flattering language they doors from the pews, and appropriated this pow had used towards him, saying that next to his own to defendant. Under these circumstances two conscience, the approbation of those with whom questions arise. First, whether in the absence of he had been in the habit of acting, either in the statutory powers authorising or recognising pew character of officers of the court, practitioners rents in the parish church of Ashton-under-Lyne, or suitors, was the greatest reward that could a payment in the nature of rent can issue out of be conferred on him. In the arduous labours he the pew in question; and secondly, whether by had so long undergone he had been fortified and the fact of his having paid what is called rent for supported by the knowledge that he had faithfive years consecutively, the defendant was fully, zealously, and impartially endeavoured toestopped from setting up this defence. A very few discharge his duties, and judge honestly between words would suffice to dispose of both questions man and man. The presidency of a County if the parties to the action were alone concerned. Court was, as they well knew, no bed of roses, But as my decision must necessarily affect the whether they regarded the difficulty of modepew rents generally in the church, I consider it rating the angry and excited feelings of oppomy duty to state shortly the principles upon nents, of holding the scale even between violently, which it rests. "Of common law," says and often perversely, contending litigants; the Gibson, in his chapter upon the rules of com- difficulties arising from the rapidity and diversity mon law, concerning the repairing and order of the business, crowding, without rest or intering of pews, "the soil and freehold of the church mission, upon the mind and brain; from every belongs to the parson. The use of the body is faculty of the mind and senses being constantly common to the parishioners," who are all entitled on the stretch: lastly, from the judgment being to be seated in such manner as may most conduce constantly employed-and equally in the most to the convenience and accommodation of all. trifling case as in the greatest and most important The distribution of the seats rests with the ordi--all these things rendered the position of a nary, and is made by the churchwardens as his County Court judge most onerous, and, freofficers, subject to his control: (Heathy. Bosanquet, quently, most embarrassing. His Honour then 8 W. R. 35; Re St. Columb, Londonderry, 8 L. T. adverted to the circumstances which had led to Rep. N. S. 861.) This power, however, is limited in his resignation. Appointed first to Bristol by its exercise to parishioners, so that whenever the Lord Cranworth in 1854, he had, after nine occupier of a pew ceases to be a parishioner, his years there, been removed by Lord Westbury to right to it, however well founded in the first the metropolis, the chief inducement held out to instance, and however valid during his continuance him being that he might thus take part in measures in the parish, ceases, and the appropriation re- from which his position in the country had excluded verts to the ordinary: (Fuller v. Lamb, 2 Add. him. He mentioned this because it would have some 425.) Pews in a gallery or elsewhere, except where reference to his subsequent remarks. He had it is otherwise provided by Act of Parliament, are, found soon after his removal to Marylebone, that with very few exceptions (and to these I need not the duties here were of a far more arduous refer), governed by the same rules, and are sub. character than at Bristol. Not only are the ject to the same incidents. And no faculty is populations in district No. 43, enormous, but they good either in the spiritual court or at common were annually most rapidly increasing, especially law to the effect of entitling a non-pa.ishioner to in the Notting-hill district, and even in the com

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