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BOROUGH, HUNDRED, AND MANORIAL COURTS. The names of 26 local courts are given in the table, having jurisdiction for the recovery of debts. In 7 of these, in none of which proceedings were taken in 1869, no business appears to have been done in 1870 either. In two others only one plaint in each was entered in 1870, in one case for 408., in the other for 29s. In one of these courts there were three plaints entered in 1869; in the other there were 20 in that year. In the Southwark court of record, in which there were no proceedings in 1869, 8 plaints were entered in 1870. For the Salford Hundred court of record 7950 writs were issued in 1870, for an aggregate amount of 97,5521., against 8301 writs, for an aggregate amount of 111,723., in 1869. For the remaining courts the total number of plaints entered in 1870 was 4898, for an aggregate amount of 102,428., against 5845 plaints for an aggregate amount of 177,2861. in 1869, and 6031 plaints for 182,3201. in 1868.

The total amount of debts (exclusively) for which judgments were obtained in 1870, in the whole of the courts, inclusive of the Salford Hundred Court, was 72,7281.; the aggregate amount of costs, exclusive of fees, was 15,393; the aggregate amount of fees was 5234l. These amounts for 1869 were, respectively, 105,2891., 16,864., and 60441.

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THE VALUE OF LAW REPORTS AND TEXT BOOKS.

THE REPORTERS AND TEXT WRITERS.
(Continued from page 409.)

Best on Evidence.-Willes J., in Reg. v. Briggs (Dearsly & Bell C. C. 102), characterised this as one of the best books on our laws. And Stuart, V.C., in Marriott v. The Anchor Reversionary Company (8 Jur. N. S. 52), pronounced it "a very remarkable book." See also the observations of Willes, J., in Hollingham v. Head (4 C. B., N. S., 391), and in Ex parte Fernandez (10 C. B., N. S., 40.).

Blackburn on the Contract of Sale.-" Another authority referred to entitled to great respect."-Bramwell, B., in Chinery v. Viall (5 H. & N. 294.). Bracton.-Designated by Sir William Jones the best of our juridical classics." Treatise on Bailments, 75.

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Brooke's Abridgment.-"High authority."-Kelly, C.B., in Morton v. Woods, 38 L. J. 86, Q. B. As reported in L. Rep. 4 Q. B. 305, “great authority."

Brydall Jura Coronæ, A.D. 1630.-Not of much authority in itself: (Sir Roundell Palmer, Attorney-General, arguendo in Feather v. The Queen, 6 B. & S. 265.)

Bunbury's Reports.-Lord Mansfield, in Tinkler v. Poole (5 Burr. 2658,) said Mr. Bunbury never meant that those cases should have been published; they are very loose notes. But Baron Platt, in answer to counsel who had cited this remark of Lord Mansfield's, observed: "The authority of the note in Bunbury cannot be got rid of in the manner attempted; for, although Lord Mansfield, in the case of Tinkler v. Poole, cast some imputation on Bunbury's notes, the learned serjeant who edited them gives them a very different character, and it may be doubted whether the observations attributed to Lord Mansfield were not the result of some hasty expressions on his part before he was fully aware of the value of the notes." In his preface, Serjeant Wilson, the editor, says that the printed volume contains such cases only as the author took in court with his own hand, and are settled and corrected by himself from his notes. Baron Platt, after quoting this statement from the preface, proceeded: "These notes having been collected and published under such circumstances and by persons of such experience and learning, it certainly appears to me rather a rash proceeding to give them the character which Lord Mansfield is represented to have done. And since the expression of Lord Mansfield has been alluded to, I thought it right thus to bring before the court the character given to these very notes by the learned serjeant, who had the responsibility of publishing them, he himself bearing as high a character as any member of the bar:" Reg. v. Edwards (9 Ex. 51-53.)

Burn's Justice.-In Reg. v. Williams (Temple & Mew. C. C. 241), a warrant issued by justices of the peace was held to be bad. Maule, J., observed: "They follow the form in Burn's Justice; but it is not the first form in that work which has been objected to, and decided to be wrong.'

Campbell's Reports.-In a very recent case, Lord Cranworth, L. C., observed: "Although that was merely a dictum in a Nisi Prius case, yet on all occasions I have found, on looking at the reports, by the late Lord Campbell, of Lord Ellenborough's decisions, that they really do, in the fewest possible words, lay down the law, very often more distinctly and more accurately than it is to be found in many lengthened reports; and what is so laid down has been subsequently recognised as giving a true view of the law as applied to the facts of the case:" Williams v. Bayley (L. Rep. 1 H. L. 213.)

Carrington and Payne's Reports.-'Espinasse's Reports. Of these two reporters, Blackburn, J., said: Neither reporter has such a character for intelligence and accuracy as to make it at all certain that the facts are correctly stated, or that the opinion of the judge was rightly understood :” Rodhead v. Midland Railway Company (8 B. & S. 401; 9 B. & S. 531; L. Rep. 4 Q. B. 388).

See 'Espinasse.

Carter's Reports.-In Pennoyer v. Brace (Com. 441), Lord Holt disclaimed all knowledge of "that Carter," and would not allow his authority: (4 C. B. 592 note.)

Chalmer's Opinions of Eminent Lawyers.-Forsyth's Cases and Opinions on Constitutional Law.-In Phillips v. Eyre (40 L. J., N. S., 28, Q. B.), the Court of Exchequer Chamber allowed these works to be referred to as part of the argument of counsel, but not as possessing any authority, p. 29 n. (1).

Chitty's Archbold's Practice of the Court of Queen's Bench in Personal Actions and Ejectment. "There is an admirable book,-Mr. Prentice's edition of Chitty's Archbold's Practice,-a most useful book,-one of the best books ever written."-Martin, B., in Andrews v. Saunderson (3 Jur. N. S. 118, 119).

Coke's Fourth Institute.-" Holt said the Fourth Institute had not my Lord Coke's last hand; the judges have not allowed that so much as the other parts; though the Second Institute be a posthumous work, yet is is more perfect."—Rex v. Pain (Holt, 295).

Coke's Reports.-Mr. Justice Putnam thus expressed his opinion of Coke's style of reporting: "There was no necessity for the court to have decided the various matters which were resolved in the case; but if the readings and resolutions which we find in Lord Coke's Reports, which were not necessary for the decision of the particular case, were struck out, an immense proportion of the common law there digested and clearly stated would be lost, unless with infinite labour it should be collected trom Year Books and other black letter authorities. The extra-judicial opinions of Lord Coke, contain more of the common law than is to be found in the writings of any other reporter, before or since his time. His mode of reporting, however, should be considered as the exception to the general rule, rather than the one which should be adopted at this day." Arnold v. Arnold, 17. Pick. 9, 10. And Lord Mansfield remarked of the reports: My Lord Coke was very fond of multiplying precedents and authorities; and, in order to illustrate his subject, was apt, besides such authorities as were strictly applicable, to cite others, not applicable to the question under judicial consideration:" (Rex v. Cowie, 2 Burr. 858; see also Sugden on Powers, 22, note, 7th edit.)

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Lord Coke himself thus states "the method the reporter doth use:" "I challenge that which of right is due to every reporter, that is, to reduce the sum and effect of all to such a method as, upon consideration had of all the arguments, the reporter himself thinketh to be fittest and clearest for the right understanding of the true reasons and causes of the propositions and resolutions in question:" (Calvin's Case, 7 Rep. 4a.)

Comberbach's and Cartnew's Reports.-In Dyer v. Best (4 H. & C. 194), note, Pollock, C.B., referred to Clarke's Bibliotheca Legum, 355, where the authority of these reporters is impugned. Lord Denman, C.J., also, has

said: Comberbach is very far indeed from being a reporter to whose doubt any importance should be attached. I remember hearing Lord Kenyon say so very early in my professional career. Lord Erskine, then at the Bar, founded an argument upon the remark of Lord Kenyon. He admitted its truth, but said that a sentence or two in the report which he then used were on that account of great weight, as they must have been really delivered by the court; for, he said, they contained something like sense, and, therefore could not be Comberbach's own: (Newton's case, 13 Q.B. 726, and note.)

Crompton's Practice.-In Rolleston v. Scott (5 T. R. 372), Buller, J., remarked that many of the cases published in this book were hastily collected by himself before he was at the Bar, were never intended by him for publication, and were too loose to be relied on.

Dalison's Reports.-In Roe v. Nevill (11 Q. B. 471), note, Lord Denman, C.J., and Wightman, J., referred to the unfavourable mention of Dalison, attributed to Sir H. Hobart, in Sir Harbottle Grimston's preface to Cro. Eliz. (prefixed sometimes as in the folio 1669, to Cro. Car.) Wightman, J., also noticed the commendation by Sir Robert Wright (dated 1687), prefixed to Dalison's Reports, edit. 1689.

De Portibus Maris.-Patteson, J.: "The treatise De Portibus Maris is, I suppose, the treatise of Lord Hale, notwithstanding what my brother Merewether has said on that subject:" (Regina v. Betts, 4 Cox C. C. 213.) Dickens's Reports.-"It is scarcely necessary to notice this case. The accuracy of Dickens's Reports is not to be relied upon, and this case is a remarkable instance of their inaccuracy:" Stuart, V. C., in Holland v. Holland, 20 L. T. Rep. N.S. 59.

Digest, The.The opinions of the great lawyers collected in the Digest afford us very great assistance in tracing out any question of doubtful principle; but they do not bind us:" Blackburn, J., delivering the considered judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber in Appleby v. Myers, L. Rep. 2 C. P. 660.

Dyer and Lord Raymond.--" There are a good many cases in the time between Dyer and Lord Raymond (1621-1694), (which may properly be called the middle age of the law) in respect to which one hardly knows what to say. They have been doubted and denied, and then again supported and qualified; and in some instances there is a string of cases each way, so that it is difficult to say which is the best authority:" Judge Story. Letter to Sinon Greenleaf, Esq., 1819. Story's Life and Letters, vol. i. 328. Emerigon (Balthazard Marie).-Traité des Assurances et des Contrats à la grosse, conféré et mis en rapport avec le nouveau Code de Commerce et la Jurisprudence; suivi d'un Vocabulaire des termes de Marine et des noms de chaque partie d'un navire, par P. S. Boulay-Paty, 2 vols. 4to. Rennes, 1827.

In Ionides v. The Universal Marine Insurance Company, 10 Jur. N. S. 21, Mr. Justice Willes referred to this edition of Emerigon, and designated him as "that most learned and experienced of lawyers."

'Espinasse's Reports.-In Small v. Nairne (13 Q. B. 844), Lord Denman said: "I am tempted to remark for the benefit of the profession, that 'Espinasse's Reports, in days nearer their own time, when their want of accuracy was better known than it is now, were never quoted without doubt and hesitation; and a special reason was often given as an apology for citing that particular case. Now they are often cited as if counsel thought them of equal authority with Lord Coke's Reports." This remark is quoted by Coleridge, J., in Wenman v. Mackenzie, 5 El. & Bl. 453: (see Carrington and Payne.)

Fuller, Thomas, D. D. Church History of Britain, 1605 or 1606.—“ A quaint but faithful historian :" (Sir Robert Phillimore in Martin v. Mackonochie, L. Rep. 2 Ad. & Ec. 179.)

Gale on Easements.-" A very excellent book," said Lord Campbell, C.J., in Renshaw v. Bean, 18 Q. B. 124. "An excellent treatise," said Lord Wensleydale in Rowbotham v. Wilson, 8 H. of L. Cas, 359. "A work of much ability," says that first-class authority, the 6th edit. of Saunders's Reports, 2 Saund. 400 a.

Gibson (Edmund, Bishop of London).-Codex Juris Ecclesiastici Anglicani; or the Statutes, Constitutions, Canons, Rubricks, and Articles of the Church of England, methodically digested under their proper heads, with a Commentary, historical and juridical. 2 vols. fol. Lond. 1713; 2nd edit., 2 vols. fol. Oxford, 1761.

Lord Denman, C.J.: "It is needless to observe that that writer is not to be considered as an authority. The passage is made up of extracts from cases decided in our courts, from which it will be found extremely difficult to deduce any rule of law whatever:" (Craven v. Sanderson, 7 Ad. & El. 894, 1838). Ten years later the Lord Chief Justice thus expressed his opinion of this writer: " Bishop Gibson is a most remarkable authority in my opinion upon the subject. He was assailed by one of the most learned Judges who ever sat in this court, Sir Michael Foster, as one disposed to erect, the church into an imperium in imperio, a sacerdotal order which must in time absorb all the other powers in the state. Gibson wrote his invaluable treatise, the great storehouse of ecclesiastical law; and from that copying more ancient works, we derive all the evidence in favour of this application:" (Reg v. Archbishop of Canterbury, 11 Q. B. 658, 1818.) In delivering the opinion of the Judges in the House of Lords, Blackburn, J. said of this book: "We cannot think it of any great weight as an authority on a question of law :" (Bishop of Exeter v. Marshal, L. Rep. 3, H. L. 37).

In the considered judgment of the Court of Common Pleas in a very recent case, Byles, J. observed: "A passage was cited from Gibson's Codex. But the authorities in the margin do not support the position. The opinion of Bishop Gibson, who, though 'an indefatigable compiler, was not a lawyer by education or profession, weighs little against the doubt of so profound a lawyer as Mr. Serjeant Hill :" (Ross v. Adcock, L. Rep. 3 C. P. 668.)

Greenleaf on Evidence.-The first volume "is to be regarded rather as a discussion and statement of the grounds and principles of proof in general than as a detail of the rules of evidence:" (Shaw, C. J., in Commonwealth v. York, 9 Met. 106.)

Hale's Pleas of the Crown.-Very soon after the first edition of his Reports was published in 1763, Mr. Justice Foster retracted what he had said in that edition respecting Lord Hale's inaccuracy: (see p. xxxii. of the 3rd edit. (see also per Monahan, Attorney-General, arguendo in Reg v. Mitchell, 3 Cox C. C. 117.) "Everyone who relies on Lord Hale should remember-first, that he corrected his MSS. only to the twenty-seventh chapter; secondly, that Lord Hale 'not having always had leisure to consult the books themselves, had frequently copied from the misprinted quotations in the margin of Lord Coke's third volume of his Institutes ;' which also clearly shows that he had relied on Lord Coke's statements themselves. See the preface to Hale's Pleas of the Crown, pp. xi., xii. ;" 2 Russell on Crimes, 182 note, 4th edit.

LAW LIBRARY.

A Treatise on the Law relating to Profits à Prendre and Rights of Common. By JOHN EDWARD HALL, Barrister-at-Law. London: Sweet.

THE last book on this subject was the treatise of the late Mr. Serjt. Woolrych, published in 1824, and its latest predecessor was a century old. But then the question comes, is there any and what new law upon it to supersede for practical purposes a work of such high reputation. Mr. Hall anticipates this query, and answers it by reference to the Prescription Act, by which the mode of proving rights of common has been greatly facilitated, and the decisions upon that admirable statute, the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 36, which has abolished the old forms of real actions, in which the right to a profit à prendre could be contested, and he might have added the far more important Inclosure Acts. But this scheme he has preferred to exclude altogether, inasmuch as it has been amply treated of by Mr. Wingrave Cooke.

Having some small personal interest in the subject to which this volume is devoted we have looked at it carefully, and can commend it highly. It is not a mere thing of shreds and patches; cuttings out of head notes, tied together by a clumsy thread, as is the character of too many of our modern law books. It is an essay, learned, and yet practical, in which the law is stated by the author, instead of being left to be eviscerated by the reader. It discusses, first, the nature of a profit à prendre, which is the right to take part of that which another man's lands naturally yield. It differs materially from an easement, although it is so often confounded with it, and as this difference should be carefully borne in mind, we extract the difinitions.

Easements differ from profits à prendre in that the former do not confer any participation in the produce of the soil.

The right to receive air, light, or water, passing across a neighbour's land, may be claimed as an easement, because the property in them remains common; but the right to take something out of the soil is a profit à prendre, and not an easement.

Easement is a privilege that one neighbour hath of another, by writing or prescription, without profit; as a way or a sink through his land, or such like.

And again :

In order to distinguish a profit à prendre as opposed to an easement, the produce taken out of another person's soil must be something capable of ownership. Under the legislation of Justinian running water, aqua profluens, was considered a res communis, that is, a thing in which all mankind might have an interest, and which belonged to no man. By the law of nature these things are common to mankind-the air, running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea. A similar doctrine prevails in the English law; it seems clear that water, unconfined in a vessel or cistern, is not the subject of property. Sir E. Coke says: "Also the waters that yield fish for the food and sustenance of man are not by that name demandable in a præcipe; but the land whereupon the water floweth or standeth is demandable; as, for example, viginti acras terræ aquâ coopertas." Again, Sir W. Blackstone, after quoting a passage from Sir E. Coke, in which it is stated, that land, in its legal signification, comprehends waters, proceeds thus: "It is observable that water is mentioned here as a species of land, which may seem a kind of solecism; but such is the language of the law; and, therefore, I cannot bring an action to recover possession of a pool or other piece of water by the name of water only; either by calculating its capacity, as, for so many cubical yards; or by superficial measure, for 20 acres of water; or by general description, as for a pond, a watercourse, or a rivulet; but I must bring my action for the land that lies at the bottom, and must call it 20 acres of land covered with water. For water is a moveable wandering thing, and must of necessity continue common by the law of nature; so that I can only have a temporary, transient, usufructuary property therein; wherefore, if a body of water runs out of my pond into another man's, I have no right to reclaim it. But the land, which that water covers, is permanent, fixed, and immovable; and, therefore, in this I may have a certain substantial property; of which the law will take notice, and not of the other.'

The next question is whether certain rights recognised by law confer ownership in the soil of the land over which they are exercised, or are merely profits à prendre. The author then proceeds to consider the creation and transfer of this curious form of property; how far it may be lawfully enjoyed by licence; when it is claimed by virtue of a non-existing grant; of such as exist by prescription at common law; under the Prescription Act; by custom generally, and by customs growing out of copyholds. The custom of tin-bounding occupies an entire chapter; and then the writer turns to the law of common, comprising common of pasture, common appendant and appurtenant, common by reason of vicinage, common in gross, of piscary, turbary, and estovers. The question so often mooted of the right to game is fully treated of in the 21st chapter. The next is devoted to consideration of the suspension and extinction of profits à prendre, and this is followed by a very practical examination of a question of continual recurrence, the power of the owner of the soil to inclose and thereby to defeat the enjoyment of the commoner, and the right of the lord of a manor, with the consent of the homage, to grant the wastes thereof. In conclusion, Mr. Hall describes the remedies of commoners for infringement of their rights.

The extracts we have made are fair specimens of the author's style, concise, yet clear. And the above sketch of the scheme of his treatise will show how exhaustively the subject has been dealt with. It is a valuable addition to the law library, and may be consulted with advantage by landowners and commoners, who will find no difficulty in understanding the law as Mr. Hall has here expounded it.

ESTATE AND INVESTMENT JOURNAL.

STOCK AND SHARE MARKETS. The following are the fluctuations of the week. ENGLISH FUNDS. Fri. Sat. Mon, Tues Wed. Thu. Bank of England Stock 240 241 Cent. Red. Ann.... 91 91 Cent, Cons. Ann 92 921

3

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New 2 Cent. Ann...
Do. do. Jan. 1894.
Do. 3c. Jan. 1894
New 3 Cent. Ann.
5 Cents. Jan. 1873
Annuities April 5, 1885
Do. exp. Jan. 1880
Metropolitan Board of
Works 31 c. Stock.
Corporation of London
44 per c. Bonds.....
Red Sea Tele. Ann. 1908
Consols, for Acc...

India 5 Cent. for Acc.

Do. 5 Cents. July 1880

India Stock, 1874

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REPORTS OF SALES. NOTE. -The reports of the Estate Exchange are officially supplied in the following list. Auctioneers whose names are registered there will oblige by reports of their own sales.]

Wednesday, Oct. 25.

By Messrs. EDWIN FOX and BOUSFIELD, at the Mart.
Peckham-rye. Freehold house-sold for 4007.
Creeds Cottage, freehold-sold for 3057.

Rye Cottag, freehold-sold for 3057.

Avenue House, with stabling, &c., freehold-sold for 8107.
Linden House, with stabling, &c. -sold for 9107.
Freehold detached residence, with stabling and one acre of
land-sold for 20007.

Hopetown Lodge, freehold-sold for 6107.
Freehold villa, with stabling, &c.-sold for 5857.
Ellwood House, with stabling, &c., freehold--sold for 6701.
Freehold villa, with stabling, &c.-sold for 7801.
Freehold residence, with cottage and large garden-sold for
10307.

pose being, first, with respect to value, that it should be worth 101. a year; secondly, that the occupier should have been rated to the poor in respect of it. In the case of a dwelling-house there was a further requirement, as was finally decided in the case of Cook v. Hunter (11 C. B., N. S., 33), viz., that it should be a complete house, structurally separate from all other buildings. The first restriction seems to show that the tenement was held to entitle the occupier to vote, as implying the possession by him of a certain amount of property. To understand the effect of the second restriction it will be necessary to observe what was the law with respect 91 to rating. By the statute 13 Eliz. c. 2, it was provided that every occupier of a house or of land should be rated to the poor, and many cases decide that a house in that statute includes part of a house, and that the occupier of one or more rooms in a house, unless his landlord retains a control over the whole, ought to be rated. This is made abundantly clear by the preamble of Sturges Bourne's Act (59 Geo. 3, c. 12), which was passed expressly to obviate the difficulties arising from the fact that separate rooms were thus rateable as well as those springing from the frequent changes in the occupiers of small houses-where, however, the tenant of a house retains his character of master of the house, although he 238.a takes in a person to reside with him, and allows him the exclusive possession of certain rooms, he is in law still the occupier of the whole house, and the person living with him, a lodger in the strict sense of the word, and not an occupier of his rooms within the statute of Elizabeth. Whether a person does retain the character of master of the whole house is a question of fact depending upon the terms on which he underlets the rooms, but prima facie, and in the absence of special circumstances he will be held to do so, if he continues to reside in a part of the house, but not if he does not do so. The law will be found to be laid down as I have stated it in Smith v. Lancaster (L. Rep. 5 C. P. 246), and the cases there cited. Such being the law of rating, it will be seen that the requirement that a voter should be rated in respect of the qualifying tenement was in effect a requirement that he should occupy the tenement independently of the control of his landlord, and not as a lodger. Turning now to the Representation of the People Act 1867, we see that the effect of sect. 3 was to do away with the first condition-viz., that of value, where the qualifying tenement is a dwelling house, leaving, however, the second condition still in force. In the case of the new voters, therefore, the tenement can hardly be considered as implying the possession of property, but rather, since it is required to be a dwelling house and the second restriction is retained, as showing-First, that the occupier is the head of a family, having a home of his own; and, secondly, that he has that home independent of the control of a landlord, and not as a mere lodger. The requirement of structural severance which may have had some significance where the house was required to be of the value of 101. seems obviously inappropriate where the tenement is only considered in the light of a dwelling, and its continuance would have led to the inconsistency that while many occupiers of single rooms would have possessed the franchise, such rcoms being often structurally separate, very few of the class above them who occupy two or three rooms would have been entitled to vote. If we turn in the light of these considerations to the 61st section of the Representation of the People Act 1867, we find that dwelling house is defined as including any part of a house which is "occupied as a separate dwelling," and "separately rated to the relief of the poor," that is, which possesses the two characteristics which, as we have pointed out, we should expect to be treated as essential in a tenement to confer the franchise under the late act. And the meaning of the section appears to be abundantly clear. It has been contended, however, that even if this is the interpretation of the Act, the rooms occupied by Ellis and the other persons whose cases I am now considering, are not occupied as separate dwellings, because the use of the staircase which is used in common with other persons is essential to their enjoyment. I think this, however, is a forced construction of the facts in Stamper v. The Overseers of Sunderland (L. Rep. 3 C. P. 388) Byles, J. says of a similar occupier "he has the exclusive occupation of a particular room, and has a right to use the outer door, the staircase, and other conveniences as easements appurtenant to his occupation." The rooms which alone constitute the tenement are certainly occupied separately, and they are not I think the less occupied as a dwelling because certain easements are attached to them which are necessary to their full enjoyment. Certainly, according to the ordinary use of language by which Acts of Parliament ought to be interpreted, Mr. Ellis would be said to live in his two rooms, and they would be called his dwelling, he would not be said to inhabit two rooms and part of a staircase. The

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IN this case the Revising Barrister reserved judgment, which he delivered as follows In the case of John Ellis, in which I reserved judgment, the facts were these: He occupied two rooms in a house which were not structurally separated from the rest of the house, and in passing from one to another of which, he used a staircase in common with the other tenants of the house; the other rooms of the house were let to another tenant named Chambers. Ellis was separately rated for the rooms he occupied, and had paid the rates. Several similar cases depend upon my decision in this case. In the case of John Collins, the facts were similar, except that he was not actually rated for the rooms he occupied, but he had duly claimed to be so rated under the provisions of the Reform Act, s. 30, which, if he was legally rateable would have the same effect. These cases, therefore, raise distinctly the question, what is the meaning of the 61st section of the Representation of the People Act 1867, and whether the occupiers of rooms in a house not structurally severed, are occupiers of a dwelling-house within its meaning? The main object of the Representation of the People Act 1867, was to extend the occupation franchise, and to interpret the provisions it is necessary to consider what was the existing law on that subject at the time it was passed. Under that law the right to vote depended upon the occupation of a tenement (the value of the tenement being enhanced by easements attached to it), but it was in respect of the tenement which was occupied as owner or tenant, and not of the easement, that the right to vote accrued. There were various conditions to be fulfilled by a tenement to entitle its occupier to vote, the two principal ones for our present pur.

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question which I have been discussing however has been the subject of a decision in the Court of Common Pleas, in the cases of Thompson v. Ward and Ellis v. Burch (L. Rep. 6 C. P. 327) and it is necessary to consider what is the effect of that decision. Willes, J., in those cases held that structural severance is still necessary to constitute a dwelling house within the Act. Such an interpretation however as pointed out by the other three judges renders the interpretation in sect. 61 entirely nugatory, for though doubts had been entertained whether part of a house, though not structurally severed, might not be a house, no doubt had been expressed that the term house would include part of a house if that part was structurally separate, moreover the expression of Erle, C. J., in Cooke v. Humber, that “a part of a house cannot truly be said to be a house unless the word house is used in two senses seems to be clearly referred to in the words "dwelling house shall include part of a house," and I cannot doubt that the object of the 61st section was to alter in respect of the new franchise the rule of interpretation laid down in Cook v. Humber. Brett, J., while conceding that structural severance was not necessary, adopted the view I have above referred to, that the rooms did not constitute a separate dwelling, because they could not be used without the staircase. Such an interpretation is open to the objection that it also renders the interpretation clause practically nugatory, since it would be in the rarest cases that rooms not structurally separated could be occupied without the use of some common staircase or passage. I have already stated my other reasons for not adopting this view. The Lord Chief Justice, and Keating J., adopted the view which I have already explained as my own, but the Chief Justice threw out a suggestion that the case of Stamper v. Overseers of Sunderland (L. Rep. 3 C. P. 388), such rooms ought not to be rated, and that the occupiers of such rooms were on that ground not entitled to the franchise and though in the case of Ellis, who has been actually rated, this would probably be immaterial, the case of Collins, whose claim to be rated would be invalid, unless he was entitled to be rated, renders it necessary to consider what is really the effect of that decision and the present law with respect to the rating of separate apartments. By the statute of Elizabeth as we have seen, such apartments were rateable, and Sturges Bourne's Act which was passed to alter the law in this respect does not apply to Parliamentary boroughs. A considerable number of boroughs, however, obtained local Acts of similar import under which in those boroughs the owners and not the occupiers of separate apartments or houses below a certain size were rateable, and a general Act called the Small Tenements Act (13 & 14 Vict. c. 99) was also passed under which the vestry of any parish could enter into special agreement with some or all of the owners of small tenements within the parish to rate them instead of the occupiers. At the time of the passing of the Representation of the People Act 1867, therefore, the law was different in different boroughs, in some, as in the city of Exeter, the old law continued, and the overseers were bound to rate the occupier of a room or rooms unless his landlord by living on the premises or otherwise, retained the position of master of the whole house. In other boroughs the owner was always rateable, and the occupiers were not; while in a third class of boroughs the law was different in different parishes, or even parts of the same parish, the owners being rateable in some parts of the borough under the Small Tenements Act and the occupiers in others. By the 7th section of the Representation of the People Act 1867, it was provided in the first clause that, "where the owner is rated at the time of the passing of this Act to the poor rate in respect of a dwelling house or other tenement situate in a parish wholly or partly in a borough in place of the occupier, his liability to be rated in any future poor rate shall cease; "in other words, in all boroughs in which, under a local Act, or from the adoption of the Small Tenements Act, the owner was rated, such Acts were repealed so far as the right conferred by them to rate the owner was concerned. The section then contains a general provision that, in all boroughs, for the future, the occupier and not the owner, should be rated. This provision was necessarily made to apply to all boroughs, in order to prevent boroughs which at the time of the passing of the Act, when under the old law, subsequently adopting the Small Tenements Act. Then follow the words which were the subject of consideration in Stamper v. Overseers of Sunderland: "Where the dwelling house or tenement shall be wholly let out in apartments or lodgings not separately rated, the owner of such dwelling house or tenement shall be rated in respect thereof to the poor." It can hardly be doubted that the Legislature wou'd assume that overseers were in the habit of acting according to the law in the different boroughs, and, therefore, the condition that the apartments were not separately rated at the

passing of the Act would confine this provision to the same boroughs or parts of boroughs to which the first part of the section was applicable, and its effect would be to re-enact in their case so much of the local Acts or Small Tenements Act as

relate to apartments, leaving the occupiers of complete houses, however small, still rateable. It has been suggested that this last clause may have been inserted with special reference to the franchise, and in order to prevent persons who only occupied part of a house from voting except as lodgers; but it appears to me impossible to suppose that the Legislature should have, with such an object, have enacted a section will give the occupiers of such apartments a right to vote in some boroughs, such as the City of Exeter, and no right to vote in others and which in some boroughs will give to persons occupying rooms in one part of the town a right to vote, and to per: sons occupying similar rooms in another part of the town where the Small Tenements Act happened to have been adopted, no such right. It may be true that in some boroughs the section will in fact disfranchise the occupiers of parts of a house, but I cannot suppose that was the object of the clause. The natural interpretation appears to me to be the true one, that the clause was intended to mitigate the hard. ship of casting upon parishes the duty of rating all occupiers of tenements, however small, and to continue to those parishes, which at the passing of the Act had a right to rate the owners of small tenements, and exercised that right, the privilege of doing so in the case of apartments, in the case of which it would be especially difficult to rate the occupiers. I should have no doubt as to the above interpretation of the 7th section of the Representation of the People Act 1867, but for the case of Stamper v. Overseers of Sunderland, and the interpretation put upon that case in Ellis v. Burch by Bovill, C.J., who was one of the judges who decided it, and who says that it decided that persons such as those whose cases I am now considering ought not to be rated. On examination it will be found that the decision in Stamper v. Overseers of Sunderland is perfectly consistent with the view of the section which I have expressed, for the rooms there in question were in a borough in which under the Small Tenements Act the owners were rated instead of the occupiers, and the court decided that the section applied to such a case, and that the owner must continue to be rated; the contention of the respondent, which was overruled by the court, was that the clause applied generally to apartments which, from their character, were not rateable under the statute of Elizabeth, being, in fact, occupied by lodgers, and the court clearly pointed out that such an interpretation would render the clause_nugatory. The only authority against the views I have expressed, therefore, are the expressions used by the judges in that case and the dic. tum of Bovill, C. J., in the case of Ellis v. Burch. The question whether the section applied to boroughs which were still under the old law, was never brought distinctly before the court; and with all respect for the opinions so expressed, I do not think I should be justified in deciding contrary to what appears to me the plain meaning of the Act of Parliament, because of opinions expressed by the judges upon a question which had not been argued before them, and was not involved in the cases before them. I am of opinion therefore that Mr. Collins ought to have been rated by the overseers, and that having duly claimed to be rated, he is in the same position as if he had in fact been rated, and is entitled to have his name retained on the register. In conclusion, I wish to call the attention of the overseers, who may be present, to their duty in respect to the rating of occupiers, if the above views are correct. Their duty is not to inquire of the landlords or agents who are their tenants, but to go to each house and ask who lives in the different rooms, and to whom they pay their rent, and they should then put upon their rate-book every person who occupies a room or rooms, rating each separately in respect of the room or rooms they occupy, unless the person to whom they pay their rent keeps the character of master of the house, when they will be only lodgers and must not be rated, but the person to whom they pay their rent must be rated for those rooms as well as any he occupies himself; the general rule being (in the absence of any special circumstances) that if the person to whom they pay their rent resides on the premises, he is to be considered as being master of the house, rated for the whole, the under tenants not being rated, but treated as lodgers; while if he does not reside in the house the occupiers of the different rooms are to be each separately rated for their rooms in the manner I have described above. If it be said that this will entail great additional labour on the overseers, it must be remembered that the vestry in any parish may make an order under the recent Act (32 & 33 Vict. c. 41), s. 4, and the owner will then in all cases be rateable without the occupiers losing their right to the franchise. My

decision, of course, is not binding upon the overseers, and should any of them determine to rate the owners and not the occupiers in accordance with what appears to be the opinion of Bovill, C. J., the occupiers of such apartments, if they desire the franchise, have the remedy within their own hands, as they have then only to go to the overseer and claim to be placed on the rate, and tendering him the rates (if any) that are due, and they will then be in the same position with respect to the franchise as if they had been actually rated.

THE BENCH AND THE BAR.

THE FIRST DAY OF TERM. RECEPTION OF THE JUDGES.

Mr.

UNCLAIMED STOCK AND DIVIDENDS IN THE BANK OF ENGLAND.

Transferred to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt, and which will be paid to the persons respectively whose names are prefixed to each in three months, unless other claimants sooner appear.]

BLACKETT (Sir Edward, Bart. and BLACKETT, (Edward Win.), Esq., both of Matfen-hall, Northumberland, 18331. 18. Sd. Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimants, said Sir Edward Blackett, and Edward Wm. Blackett, Esq. MONCKTON (Anne), Stretton, Staffs., widow, 7067. 148. 8d. Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant, said Anne Monckton.

SMITH (Rev. Richard Carter), deceased, of Charlton, Kent. clark; COLLETT (Rev. Wm. Lloyd), Shepherd's-bush, Middlesex, clerk; and BARNEY (Stephen), Esq., Inner Temple, E. C., one dividend on the sum of 2201. Reduced Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimants, said Rev. Wm. Lloyd Collett and Stephen Barney, Esq., the survivors.

APPOINTMENTS UNDER THE JOINT-STOCK WINDING-UP ACTS.

EVANS'S (Covent-garden) (Limited.) Petition for winding-up to be heard Nov. 10, before V.C. M.

ing-up to be heard Nov. 10, before V.C. W.

CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35.

Last day of Claim, and to whom Particulars to be sent. ATTWOOD (Francis), Esq., The Close of the Canons of the Cathedral Church of Sarum, Wilts. Nov. 20; Macdonald BAILEY (Rev. Wm. P.), Rector of Great Waldingfield, Sufand Brodrick, solicitors, The Close, Salisbury. folk. Nov. 10; F. Leach, solicitor, 10, Lancaster-place, Strand, Middlesex, W.C. BARROW Edwd.). Wedmore, Somerset, surgeon. Dec. 23: Wm. C. Barrow, 2, Pavia-place, Park-road, Dalston, Middlesex.

ON Thursday at noon the Lord Chancellor received POLTESCO MARBLE COMPANY (Limited. Petition for windher Majesty's Judges at breakfast, according to custom on the first day of term. Their Lordships arrived in the following order :-Baron Bramwell, Mr. Justice Blackburn, Mr. Justice Mellor, Justice Brett, the Lord Chief Baron (Kelly), Mr. Mr. Justice Hannen, Baron Cleasby, Justice Lush, Chief Justice Bovill, Lord Justice James, Mr. Justice Byles, Mr. Justice Keating, Vice-Chancellor Sir J. Malins, Vice-Chancellor Sir J. Bacon, Vice-Chancellor Wickens, the Queen's Advocate, Sir Lawrence Peel, Baron Martin, and Mr. Justice Willes. A large number of Q.C.S had also the honour of being present. After breakfast their Lordships proceeded to open their There was about the usual respective courts. gathering of the public in Westminster Hall to witness the ceremony. The business of the term commenced about mid-day.

SOLICITORS' JOURNAL.

-

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. PRACTICE-DISMISSING BILL-FATHER AND SON-COSTS-SOLICITOR AND CLIENT-TRUSTEES.-Where a bill filed by a son against his father to set aside a voluntary settlement made by the son in favour of the father is dismissed with costs, the court will only give costs generally as between solicitor and client. But where trustees are improperly brought before the court, they will be entitled, as against the plaintiff personally, to their costs as between solicitor and client, and will not be left to take the difference between party and party costs and solicitor and client costs out of the trust fund: (Turner v. Collins, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 264. V.C. M.)

DEMURRER CREDITORS' DEED - PARTIESALLEGATION.-A bill filed in 1871 alleged that, previously to a debtor's conviction for felony, by an indenture made in 1862 between himself of the first part, a trustee of the second part, and the several other persons whose names and seals were or were intended to be thereunto subscribed and set, being respectively creditors of the debtor, of the third part, the debtor assigned all his personal estate and effects to the trustee upon trusts in favour of his creditors; and that the said indenture was duly executed by the debtor and the trustee, and registered under the 194th section of the Bankruptcy Act 1861; and the bill prayed for a declaration that the defendant, who had, in 1858, purchased a house in trust for the debtor, was a trustee of the house in question for the trustee of the deed. On demurrer, for want of equity and of parties: Held, that the bill contained no sufficient allegation that any creditor had executed or assented to the deed: Held also, that the lapse of time since the execution of the deed was a complete bar to its being treated as an act of bankruptcy. Demurrer accordingly allowed, without leave to amend, doubt being expressed as to whether the registration of the deed under the 194th section of the Bankruptcy Act 1861 would have the effect of rendering it irre vocable by bringing it within the operation of the provisions of the 187th section of that Act: (Glegg v. Rees, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 261. Rolls Ct.)

STATUTE 27 ELIZ. c. 4-CONSIDERATIONVOLUNTARY SETTLEMENT-LOAN.-Suit instituted by a mortgagee seeking to set aside a settlement made previously to the mortgage, on the ground that it was voluntary. At the time of making the settlement, a friend of the settlor advanced him 150l. on his promissory note, which enabled him to meet some pressing demands, and at the same time persuaded him to make the settlement in question on his wife and children. The only consideration expressed in the settlement was "divers good causes and considerations." Held (affirming the decision of James V.C.), upon the evidence, that the loan was the consideration for the settlement, which, therefore, was not voluntary. The smallness of the consideration for a settlement is not a matter into which the court will go, except so far as it is evidence that the transaction was a fraudulent one: (Bayspoole v. Collins, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 282. Ch.)

BENNETT (Chas.), 107, High-street, Croydon, Surrey. G. H.
Hogan, solicitor, Park-street, Croydon.
BURNES (Capt. Sydney H.), 21, Sale-street, Paddington.
Middlesex, a captain on the Bombay Staff corps. Dec. 31;
E. A. Crosse, solicitor, 4, Bell-yard, Doctors'-commons,
E.C.
CARRINGTON (Samuel), Esq., 8, Pittville-lawn, Cheltenham.
Jan. 1, 1872; F. and E. Griffiths, solicitors, 2, Crescent-
place, Cheltenham.

CHAMBERLAIN (Edwd. H.), Esq., 7, Norfolk-street, Park-
lane, W., Nov. 30; Pyke and Co., solicitors, 43, Lincoln's-
inn-fields, WC.
CHIVERS (Ann), Devizes. Dec. 1; H. Kent Norris, solicitor.
Devizes.

COTES (Manuel M.), Lima, Peru. Dec. 1; Clarke and Co., solicitors, 28, Coleman-street, London, E.C.

CRUIKSHANK (James), 23, Grove-road, St. John's-wood, N.W. Nov. 26; Waller and Handson, solicitors, 27, King-street, Cheapside, E.C.

CRUSE Richard, 373, City-road, E.C., and 3, Joiner's-hallbuildings, E.C., gentleman. Dec. 13; C. W. Stevens. solicitor, 35, Bucklersbury, E.C.

DAVIES (Martha M. H.. 7. Brompton-square, Middlesex. Dec. 5; J. Aitkens, solicitor, 15, Lincoln's-inn-fields, W.C, DAWE Sampson R.), Castle-street, Swansea, Glamorgan chemist. Dec. 20; J. Jones, solicitor, 7, Fisher-street, Swansea.

EDLIN (Wm.), Broadwater Farm, Harefield, Middlesex, farmer. Nov. 20; Woodbridge and Sons, solicitors, Uxbridge.

EDWARDS (Wm., Esq., Bowdon-hall, within Bowdon, Chester. Dec. 16; Cunliffe and Leaf, solicitors, 26, Brownstreet, Manchester.

FRASER Jas. W., Esq., 8A, Kensington Pala e-gardens, Middlesex. Nov. 30; Milne and Co., solicitors, 2, Harcourtbuildings, Temple, E. C.

GAMBLE Geo. S., Esq., Thwaite, Norfolk. Nov. 30: White and Co., solicitors, 6, Whitehall-place, Middlesex. GRIFFITHS (Elizabeth), 1, Havelock-villas, Landsdown-road, Croydon, Surrey, Nov. 30; Geo. H. Hogan, solicitor, Park-street, Croydon.

HOLBURNE (Alicia S. A.), 10, Cavendish-crescent, Bath. Nov. 30; Carlisle and Ordell, solicitors, 8, New-square, Lincoln's-inn, W.C.

HOOPER Rowland), Esq., Heston-house, Heston, Middlesex. Nov. 20; Deane and Chub, solicitors, 14, South-square, Gray's-inn, W.C.

LITTLE (John D.), Biddestone, St. Nicholas, near Chippenham, Wilts, gentleman. Nov. 27; Keary and Co., solicitors, Chippenham.

LODDER (Thos.), 30, Devonshire-road, Holloway, Middlesex. Dec. 7; Coode and Co., solicitors, 7, Bedford-row, W.C. LYON (Mary), 2, Derby-place, Southport, Lancaster. Jan. 1; F. and E. Griffiths, solicitors, 2, Crescent-place, Cheltenham.

MCLACHLAN (Colin B.), Esq., Baddow, Essex. Dec. 11;
MARTIN (Jane H., 58, Manor-street, Clapham, Surrey.
Nov. 30; Geo. H. Hogan, solicitor, 23, St. Martin's-lane,
Cannon-street, E.C.
MEDHURST (Jno.), Esq., Lewisham-hill, Blackheath, Kent.
Nov. 29; C. W. Davis, jun., solicitor, 24, Charles-square,
Hoxton, Middlesex.

J. F. Holmes, solicitor, 9, Finsbury-place-south, E.C.

MEYER (Philip H.), Esq., Stondon House, Stondon Massey,

Essex. Dec. 17; G. Norcutt, solicitor, 11, Gray's-innsquare, Middlesex, W.C.

MORRISON Dame Jane), Snaresbrook, Wanstead, Essex.
Dec. 8; J. F. Weymouth, solicitor, 19, Essex-street.
Strand, W.C.
MORTIMER Rev. Geo. F. W.), Eccleston-square, Middlesex.
D.D. Dec. 13; Mackenzie and Co., solicitors, 1, Crown-
court, Old Broad-street, E.C.
MOSENTHAL (Jos.), 18, King's Arms-yard, E., and St.
Germain Laurie park, Sydenham, Kent, merchant. Dec.
10; A. Mosenthal, 18, King's Arms-yard, Moorgate-street,
E.C.
NOYES (Sarah), 18, Christchurch-road. Brixton, Surrey.
Dec. 1; Van Sandau and Cumming, solicitors, 13, King-
street, Cheapside.

PERRY (Stephen), Needham-market, Suffolk, gentleman.
Dec. 2; Hayward and Sons, solicitors, Needham-market,
Suffolk.

PIGGOTT (William H., 32, Corn-street, Bristol, and Florence-
villa, Tyndall's-park, Bristol, tailor and diaper. Dec. 1;
A. H. Wansey, solicitor, 24, Clare-street, Bristol.
REEVES (John), Bewdley. Worcester, gentleman. Jan. 1,
1872. William N. Marcy, solicitor, Bewdley.
ROTTON (Henry B.), Esq., 21, Eccleston-street, Middlesex.
Dec. 10; Wadham and Daw, solicitors, 19, Essex-street,
Strand, W.C.

SAUNDERS (William B.), 7. Valentine-row, Blackfriars-road.
Surrey, bacon dryer. Dec. 10; W. Easton, solicitor.
13, Clifford's-inn, Fleet-street, E.C.
SMITH (Edward H.), Esq., Dover. Dec. 1; Andrews and
Pope, solicitors, South-street, Dorchester.
SPAIN (Nancy), St. Bartholomew's, near Sandwich, Kent.
Dec. 6; urrage »nd Emmerson, solicitors, Sandwich.
STOPFORD Mary E.), Laxton Villa, Cheltenham. Jan. 1,
1872; Brydges and Mellersh, solicitors, Public Offices.
Cheltenham.

UPTON (Thomas), West-end terrace, East Dereham, Norfolk, carpenter. Nov. 30; Tatham and Proctor, solicitors, 36, Lincoln's-inn flelds, W.C.

WADE (William Thomas), Great Dunmow, Essex, solicitor. WINSOR (John), Ivybridge, Devon, paper maker. Dec. 30; Dec. 31; Wade and Knocker, solicitors, Great Dunmow. Wedlake and Letts, solicitors, 3, Mitre-court, Temple, E.C.

MAGISTRATES' LAW.

CAMBRIDGE COUNTY QUARTER SESSIONS. Friday, Oct. 20.

(Before A. SPERLING, Esq., and other Justices.) HANDLEY V. JUSTICES OF CAMBRIDGESHIRE. Public-house appeal-Wilfully permittiny drunkenness-Refusal of licence-Evidence. Upon an appeal against the refusal of magistrates to grant a licence to the appellant upon the ground that he had wilfully permitted drunkenness in his house, it was held that evidence of what took place outside the house was admissible to show what kind of persons used it that, convictions against persons for drunkenness who were seen coming drunk from the appellant's house were evidence against him as tending to show that he wilfully permitted drunkenness within, although no proof was alleged of any supply of drink to drunken persons in the house. Lastly, that it was not necessary to show that the appellant had been convicted of any offence against the tenor of his licence, and it was discretionary in the magistrate to grant or withhold it. THIS was an appeal by John Handly against the refusal of certain justices of Cambridgeshire to grant him a licence upon the ground that he had wilfully permitted drunkenness within his house. Bush Cooper (specially retained) and J. W. Cooper were for the appellant.

Mayd and Browne for the respondent justices. -The magistrates had refused the licence upon the annual licensing day in August, upon the report of P. C. Martin, who stated that upon seven occasions he had seen drunken persons whom he named leave the house. He also admitted that upon twelve occasions when he went into the house he saw drunken men there on one occasion only, and even upon that visit no beer was supplied to them. The appellant produced rebutting evidence at the hearing of the appeal, but at the court below was not represented, nor was the case allowed to be reopened at the adjourned meeting.

Bush Cooper took the objection that the refusal to grant the licence was not made upon a legal ground or by legal evidence. Licences were granted by the magistrates upon certain conditions, and once a licence was granted, the magis trates had no power to refuse its renewal, except upon a legal ground. In this case the publican had not been convicted of, nor had he committed, any legal offence against the tenor of his licence. The offence was wilfully permitting drunkenness within his house, and evidence of what occurred outside the house was inadmissible, nor would it prove, if admitted, any offence.

Mayd submitted that the evidence was admissible to show the general character of the customers. If drunken persons came out of the house it was evidence to show they got drunk there, or, at least evidence as to the characters admitted by the landlord.

Bush Cooper, in reply, submitted that the police were bound to complete the case, and show a legal offence to have been committed. They had the power to enter the house at all times, why dd they not do so? He also objected to the convictions of any persons named for drunkenness being put in. These convictions could not properly be evidence against a third party.

Mr. C. W. Palmer, magistrates' clerk, produced the following convictions: David Watts convicted 19th Feb. 1870, for drunkenness, and fined 5s. Bush Cooper objected to this as too remote, but it was admitted.

The COURT ruled that the convictions were admissible, to prove the character of the persons frequenting the house; and after hearing counsel on both sides, they dismissed the appeal with costs.

CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT.

THIRD COURT.
Wednesday, Oct. 25.

(Before Mr. CHAMBERS, the Deputy Recorder.) Charge of perjury against a solicitor-Swearing

affidavit of increase-Witnesses unpaid. Mr. Harry Greville Tanner, a solicitor, surrendered to recognizances to answer an indictment charging him with wilful and corrupt perjury. He was also charged with having obtained 2361. from the South Eastern Railway by false pretences, and with intent to defraud, and also with having optained from Sir Frederick Pollock, one of the Masters of the Court of Exchequer, a warrant for the payment of 2001. 14s. 8d., and a certain valuable security.

G. Denman, Q. C. (Willis with him), for the prosecution.

Digby Seymour, Q. C. and F. O. Crump, for the defence.

Denman stated that the defendant, Mr. Tanner, had been employed for the plaintiffs, a Mr. Day and his wife, in an action against the SouthEastern Railway for injuries sustained in a collision on their line, in which the plaintiffs obtained a verdict, with 3001. damages. It was afterwards the duty of the present defendant, Mr. Tanner, to claim the costs due to the plaintiffs from the company in respect of the attendance of witnesses and to travelling expenses, and to procure the Master's allocatur. The cause was originally set down for trial at Kingston, but was eventually tried at Westminster. The costs were taxed on the 24th July, and he obtained Master Sir Frederick Pollock's allocatur for 2361., which sum was made up in various ways. The charge of perjury turned upon the affidavit of increase which the defendant made in the cause, and in which he set ont various sums that he alleged he had caused to be paid to witnesses for attendance and travelling expenses. The case against the defendant was that in a majority of instances he had not paid the sums he had deposed to having paid, nor any part of such sums. He (Mr. Denman) believed that altogether 601. or 80%., which the defendant had sworn to have paid by anticipation, he had not paid at all.

Formal proof was given that on the 4th Aug. 2361. was paid to the defendant in the shape of taxed costs in the case of Day and Wife v. The South-Eastern Railway Company. The affidavit of increase was also put in evidence to which the defendant had sworn. It related, among other things, in a circumstantial way, the various sums he had paid to the several witnesses for attendance and travelling expenses. The 2361. included all the various sums alleged to have been paid to the witnesses, and it was paid in the full belief that the defendant had paid those sums.

Robert Boys, a witness on the trial at Westminster, proved that he had not received 21. 2s. for two days' attendance at Kingston, or 7s. for mileage, nor any part of those sums; nor had he received 31. 3s. for attendance at Westminster, or 3s. 6d. for mileage. He had applied to the defendant at judge's chambers for the money due to him. He replied he could not pay, and that he was to apply to Mr. Day, one of the plaintiffs in

the action.

Digby Seymour complained of the harsh manner in which defendant had been treated in not being allowed to have the matter investigated in the usual way before a taxing master, to whom he could and would have given his own version of the affair. That the defendant should have been prosecuted at all was attributed to a vindictive feeling on the part of his client in consequence of the small amount of damages obtained in comparison with the claim (30001.), and of the heavy costs incurred. Witnesses were called, who gave the defendant a high character for honesty, integrity, and veracity. It was also proved by some of the medical witnesses in the action that, although they had not received their fees at the time the

affidavit was made, they had since been paid in full, and that they would have looked to the defendant's cousin, Dr. Tanner, to pay them if he had failed to do so. They expressed it as their belief that the prisoner had no intention to defraud them in the matter.

The jury returned a verdict of not guilty, and being understood to express his opinion that the the defendant was discharged, the Deputy-Recorder defendant had not acted corruptly in the matter, but that the utmost of which he was guilty was an inadvertence.

REAL PROPERTY AND
CONVEYANCING.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. CONSTRUCTION OF SETTLEMENT-" ELDEST" OR "ONLY" SON-PERIOD OF VESTING.-By a marriage settlement certain real estate was limited to the use of the husband for life, with remainder, subject to a jointure for the wife, to the use of the first and other sons in tail male. By another settlement, reciting that referred to, real estate of the wife was limited to her use for life, with remainder to the use of all and every the son and sons, other than and except an eldest or only son, and daughter and daughters of the marriage, in equal shares as tenants in common, and to the heirs of their respective bodies. And it was thereby provided that if any one or more such younger son or sons, or daughter or daughters, should die, and there should be a failure of issue of his or her body, or in case any such younger son or sons should become an eldest or only son before twenty-one, then the share or shares of such younger son or sons so becoming an eldest son as aforesaid, should go over to the use of the survivor or others or other of the said younger son or sons, daughter or daughters, as tenants in common in tail. E., the eldest son, attained twenty-one, but died after his father but before his mother, without issue: he left surviving J., his brother, and two sisters. J. died after twenty-one, before his mother, and left an infant son. On the mother's death part of her real estate was sold, and the purchase money was paid into court under the Trustee Relief Act. On a petition of the two daughters for payment of the whole to themselves, it was Held (affirm ing the decision of the Master of the Rolls), that the proper time for ascertaining the class entitled to participate in the fund was the period of distribution, and consequently the second son was excluded. The gift over contained in the settlement could not legitimately alter the construction of the gift itself: (Re Bayley's Settlement, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 249. L.JJ.) WILL-LIMITATIONS-TENANCY IN COMMON

Henry Amer was called, and proved that he had not been paid 11. 10s. for attending as a wit--CROSS-REMAINDERS. A testator gave his at Kingston, or 78. for mileage, or any part of those sums, nor had he been paid 21. 58. for attendance at Westminster and 3s. 6d. for mileage, or any of those amounts.

Another witness called for the prosecution was a clerk named Wright, articled to his father at New Inn. He went to judges' chambers, having at the time a summons, taken out at Bow-street, in his pocket, and overheard a conversation between the defendant and Boys. He went home and wrote it down in his note book, which, however, he did not produce. In cross-examination he said that the defendant referred both Boys and himself to the plaintiff Day. He himself had not been subpoenaed to attend the trial, nor did he attend, but he asked.

Mr. Palmer continued: Watts was convictedness on the 23rd April 1870 for drunkenness, and committed for seven days, without the option of a fine. On the 17th Sept. 1870 he was fined 6d. and costs for drunkenness, and on the 5th Aug. 1871 was fined 11. and costs for being drunk and riotous. William Rowell, on the 17th Sept. 1870, was fined 6d. and costs. On the 21st Jan. 1871 was fined 11. and costs; on the 12th Feb. 1871 was fined 1s. for an assault in the appellant's house; on the 19th March 1871 convicted of an assault; and on the 2nd April there was an information against him for an assault, but it was settled out of court, defendant paying the expenses. George Lowrings was convicted of drunkenness, and fined 10s. and costs; on the 22nd Oct. 1870, and on the 17th June 1871 was fined for a similar offence. Henry Wye was convicted of being drunk and riotous on the 22nd Oct. 1870, and fined 10s. and costs. John Oslar was convicted on the 1st July 1871, and fined 1s., the costs being divided.

By J. W. Cooper.-In March 1870, Rowell was convicted of an assault upon the landlord of the Sun. I do not know if the appellant was present upon the occasion when these convictions took place.

Bush Cooper submitted that there was no case made ont. It is not proved that the appellant knowingly or wilfully permitted drunkenness upon the premises. The drunkenness in the house was negatived by the evidence of the constable. It was no offence to harbour a drunkard.

Other witnesses whom the defendant deposed to have paid various sums for attendance and travelling expenses were called, and denied having received any such sums.

For the defence it was urged that the defendant was justified in stating that he had "caused to be paid" to the witnesses the various sums, he having reason to believe that in several cases his client, Mr. Day, had arranged to defray, and had actually defrayed, the expenses of the witnesses, and having made an arrangement with a relative, a member of the medical profession, to pay all the doctors called in the case. The defendant, it was said, had no corrupt motive in the matter, but, on the contrary, had every reason to uphold an excelent character which he had borne for many years.

residuary personal estate to trustees, upon trust to invest in the purchase of land, which he directed to be settled to the use of H. S., the eldest son of J. S., and the assigns of the said H. S. during his life, with remainder to the use of trustees to preserve contingent remainders, and after his decease to the use of the first and every other son successively of the said H. S., in remainder one after another, and the heirs male of the body of each such son, the elder and the heirs male of his body taking before the younger and the heirs male of his body, and on the failure of such issue (which event happened), to the use of every son then living, or who should come into existence in the testator's lifetime, of the said J. S., and the assigns of such son during his life, and immediately after the determination of his estate in his lifetime to the use of trustees to preserve contingent remainders; and, immediately after his decease, to the use of such son's first and other sons successively in remainder one after another, and the heirs male of the body of each such last-mentioned first and every other son, the older and the heirs male of his body taking before the younger and the heirs male of his body. Held that, on the failure of the issue of H. S., all the younger sons of J. S. took concurrent life estates as tenants in common, with remainder, after the death of each tenant for life, to his first and other sons successively in tail male, with cross-remainders between them: (Surtees v. Surtees, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 288. M.R.)

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