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voters, and may be designated by some distinguishing addition in the list of voters for such part of a parish.

Edwards, for the appellant, contended that the effect of the two last mentioned enactments was to make it necessary for an objector to specify, beyond what is required by 28 & 29 Vict. c. 36, to what particular polling district he belongs, in any case in which the parish to which he belongs has been divided into polling districts. The objector ought to have added to the words "township of Spotland" the words "Rochdale polling district."

No one appeared for the respondents.

The COURT (Willes, Keating, Brett, and Collier, J.J.) held the description sufficient and dismissed the appeal. Appeal dismissed.

Attorneys for the appellant, Horne and Hunter.

Saturday, Nov. 18.



County vote-Notice of claim for "land occupied" -Claim as 121. occupier. APPEAL from the decision of the revising barris. ter for the Northern Division of Devon. The appellant, on the 25th Aug., sent in a claim to be put on the list of voters for the division of the county in respect of "land occupied." He had a good claim as a 121. occupier. Separate lists are made in counties for the 12'. occupiers. It was objected that the notice of claim was bad, as it did not specify the particular list on which the claimant claimed to be put. The revising barrister was of this opinion, and struck the claimant's name off the list. This was an appeal from that decision. G. Lewis, for appellant.

The respondent did not appear.

The COURT (Willes, Keating, Brett, and Collier, JJ.) held the motice sufficient, and reversed the revising barrister's decision. Decision reversed.

Attorneys for appellant, Coode, Kingdon, and Cotton.

Monday, Nov. 20.

TYSON v. LORD MAYOR OF LONDON. Notice to treat-Lands Clauses Act-Notice under special Act-11 & 12 Vict. c. cclxxx-Mandamus to compel. THE plaintiff was tenant of a house to the Corporation of London, by virtue of an agreement for a lease for three years from Midsummer 1867. The corporation served the plaintiff, on Jan. 25, 1869, with a notice to treat, and also with a precept signifying that they should require his premises for the Holborn Valley Improvements at six months from the date of such notice. On Feb. 19, 1869, the plaintiff sent in the amount of his claim, which, not being paid, he commenced an action for a mandamus to compel them to treat for the assessment of compensation to him. The plaintiff would be entitled to have his damages assessed before a jury if his interest in his premises was greater than a yearly one, if not, it would be assessed by the city justices. The question there fore was, whether the date at which the six months notice was given, was to be taken from the date of the notice, or from the termination of the six months when he would have to deliver up possession. The action had been turned into a special case for the opinion of the


W. G. Harrison, for the plaintiff.

Hon. A. Thesiger for the corporation.

the increased rent of 11. 8s. 6d. being occasioned by the bringing into the dwelling houses a supply of water, and such bringing in of water was a convenience to the tenants, who were charged an increased rent in respect of it. The houses were managed by an agent, who was paid by commission, which I found to be necessary, and who expended during the year, between 31st July 1870 and 31st July 1871, in repairs and otherwise, the following amounts, which I held to be necessary expenses and proper to be deducted from the gross annual rental.

Chief rent Right of way. Repairs Commission

Expended for laying on water for use of tenants

4 11 6 1 10 0 26 15 0 718

21 19 1

61 17 3

which being deducted from the gross rent of 1431. 2s. 10d., left a net annual rental of 811. 5s. 7d., which sum being equally divided between the forty-eight tenants in common, did not leave 40s. for each. Upon this the revising barrister disallowed the votes of the forty-eight tenants in common. The question for the court was whether he was right in deducting the sum of 21l. 19s. 1d. from the gross rental. If he was wrong in so doing, the votes of the forty-eight tenants in common were to be reinstated on the register. C. Bowen for appellant.

Pickering, Q.C. for the respondent.

The COURT (Willes, Keating, and Brett, JJ.), thought the revising barrister was wrong, and reversed his decision. Decision reversed.

Attorneys for appellant, Rickards and Walker. Attorneys for respondent, Baxter, Rose, and Norton.

Tuesay, Nov. 21.


WADMORE. . THE OVERSEERS OF PUTNEY. County vote-Equitable freehold interest-Shares in a bridge.

THESE two appeals from the revising barristers for Middlesex and Mid Surrey, involving precisely ther. It appeared that by an Act 12 Geo. 1. c. 36, the same question, were taken and argued toge bridge across the Thames from Fulham to Putcommissioners were appointed for building a ney, after compensating the proprietors of the then existing ferries, and a pontage or toll was granted to and vested in the commissioners to be applied as directed by the Act. By a subsequent Act of Geo. 2 for more effectually enabling the commissioners to complete such work, they were empowered to convey in perpetuity the tolls and income of the said bridge or ferries to such per. sons as would undertake to erect and maintain the bridge. The commissioners accordingly in 1728 contracted with thirty persons, who subscribed the necessary funds and became the share

holders of the bridge, to build and maintain the bridge, and compensate the proprietors of the said ferries; and afterwards, the bridge having been built, the commissioners in 1729, by a deed which recited the above Acts and their powers thereunder, conveyed the said bridge and tolls, and all such grounds adjacent and belonging by virtue of the said Acts, to certain trustees to the same as they had power to convey, in fee, in trust to permit the said thirty shareholders to receive the said tolls and income,

and bave the sole management thereof. The present appellants deduced their claim from these thirty persons, and were respectively the holders of a share or part of a share, the sufficiency of the money value whereof was not in dispute. The management of the property was vested in a committee of management, appointed annually by the


Friday, Nov. 3.

PALMER AND OTHERS v. Fox. Action on covenant to pay money on request-Plea, a composition deed under Bankruptcy Act 1861, whereby the cause of action vested in trusteesProof of plea-Affidavit of execution by majority of creditors-Evidence in contradiction-Plaintiffs inserting themselves in deed as creditors of themselves-Vatidity of deed-Estoppel.

THIS was an action on a covenant for the payment to the plaintiffs of 1501. upon request, which was tried before Pigott, B., in Middlesex, when a verdict was found for the plaintiffs, leave being reserved to the defendant to move for a new trial on the ground of misdirection. The ques tion turned on the third plea which alleged the execution by the plaintiffs of a composition deed under the Bankruptcy Act 1861, by which, as the defendant alleged, the cause of action became vested in the trustees under that deed. To prove the plea the defendant put in the deed itself, and an affidavit of the plaintiffs, as required by the Act upon registering the deed, that the necessary majority in number and value, &c., of the creditors had executed or become bound by the deed, which the learned Baron held to be good evidence of proof of the plea. To answer that evidence the plaintiffs called the attorney's clerk, who proved that the plaintiffs had put themselves down in the schedule to the deed as creditors to themselves, and so there was not, in fact, a proper and valid majority of creditors in value, &c., and thereupon the learned Baron ruled that the verdict must be for the plaintiffs.

Aspland (by leave) now moved accordingly, and contended that the plaintiffs were estopped from setting up anything in opposition or contradiction to their own deed, and from alleging that their own affidavit, filed in pursuance of the statute with the registrar, wes untrue There was no case closely analogous, for the reason that generally debtors sought to uphold these deeds; but it was somewhat like recent cases, where it had been held that joint-stock companies' certifi cates could not be derogated from in the hands of persons who had taken and acted on them.

you acted on this deed?] In consequence of it BRAMWELL, B.-Ah! that is the point. Have

[BRAMWELL, B.-That won't do. KELLY, C. B You cannot deny that the deed is vitiated.] It is submitted that that is another point. If this deed were what the plaintiffs by their public act in registering it asserted it to be, the defendant would have had a good answer to the action. The deed was executed in 1868, and had been acted on for several years; nor could the defendant know that it was other than what the plaintiff's had sworn it to be. He cited Pearson v. Pearson, in the Exehequer (14 L. T. Rep. N. S. 596; 35 L. J. 172, Ex.; L. Rep. 1 Ex. 308; 12 Jur. N. S. 589.)

the defendant was led to defend the action.

The COURT (Kelly, C. B., and Bramwell, Channell, and Cleasby, BB.) refused to grant a rule. The question, they said, turned on whether it was a valid deed giving a right of action to the trustees under it. It was clearly not such, and neither parly could sue on it. It was not a case of estoppel at all. Rule refused. Attorneys for defendant, Neal and Philpot, Doctors'-commons, E.C.

Friday, Nov. 17.


Sale of a horse-Warranty-Conditions for return of horse within certain time-Horse not answering warranty-Action for breach of warrantyCondition of horse at time of purchase and of return-Difference between.

The COURT (Willes, Keating, Brett, and Collier. JJ.) were of opinion that reading the 121st section of the Lands Clauses Act, with the City Improvement Act (11 & 12 Vict. c. cclxxx.), s. 33, that the period of time when the tenant's interest determined was upon notice being served upon him, and that the plaintiff was entitled to have his damages assessed by a jury. The Court ordered a mandamus to go. hitherto stated, it was held, in Tepper v. Nichols Minie, bought by the plaintiff at a sale by auction

Judgment for plaintiff.

Attorney for defendants, Nelson.

Tuesday Nov. 21.


BUCKLEY (app.) v. WRIGLEY (resp.)

shareholders. On the facts, as they have been

(34 L. J. 61, C. P.), that the shareholders were not entitled to a county vote in respect of their shares. But, since the decision of that case, the Thames Navigation Act 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 149) was passed, by sub-sect. 6 of sect. 10 of which, the bridge and the lands thereunto belonging, and

THIS was an action brought by the plaintiff for the breach of warranty on the sale of a mare called

County vote-What necessary expenses to be de. the tolls, &c., were vested in the committee mals for sale on that day, and amongst them

ducted from gross annual rental-Expense of laying on water. CONSOLIDATED appeal from the decision of the revising barrister for the southern division of the West Riding of Yorkshire. It appeared that the names of the appellant and of forty-six other persons were in the list of voters for the southern division of the West Riding of Yorkshire for qualifications described as share of freehold houses and lands in the township," &c. The conveyance of the property was in fee simple to the appellant and another person in trust for themselves and the forty-six other persons in fortyeight equal undivided shares, as tenants in common. The gross annual rental up to June 1871 was 141l. 14s. 4d.; but for the year between 31st July, 1870 and 31st July, 1871, it was 1437. 2s. 10d.

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Act. It was contended, before the revising bar. entitled to an equitable freehold in the bridge risters, that by this Act the shareholders were and the land thereunto belonging. The revising barristers in each case decided against the claim, and this was an appeal against their decision. E. G. Clarke for the appellants. M'Intyre for the respondents.

The COURT (Willes, Keating, and Brett, JJ.) held that the shareholders were not entitled to such an equitable freehold, but only to a share in Decision affirmed,

the tolls.

Attorney for appellants, Evan Hare. Attorney for respondent, Gardiner.

one of a lot

being that the mare had been "hunted with the at the defendants' establishment, the warranty Bicester and Duke of Grafton's hounds." The facts were as follows: The plaintiff attended March last, and received one of their usual a sale at Tattersall's on Monday, the 13th printed catalogues, describing the various anidescribed in the catalogue as follows: "The fol the mare in question, which was lowing horses, which have been hunted with the Bicester and Duke of Grafton's hounds, the property of J. C. Dunbar, Esq., &c. "87. Minie, action." The plaintiff bid for and purchased by Longrange, dam by Harkaway, with good the mare for 431. 10s., and paid the money. It appeared that after the purchase the plaintiff (the purchaser) became aware that the mare had never been hunted with either the Bicester or the Duke of Grafton's hounds, yet he nevertheless sent his groom, an experienced horseman and rider, to take her away from the defendants' stables. On her way home from the stables to the plaintiff's stables in Manchester-square, she took fright in South Audley-street, and, rushing forward, she ran

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against a carriage which was in front of her, and passing on came against the splinter bar of another carriage and cut her chest, and getting free from that she got into Grosvenor-square, round which she galloped at a furious pace some five or six times before the groom, who was on her (and who was riding her with a gag snaffle," as recommended by the groom of the former owner), could stop her. Upon being pulled up the mare was found to be much injured in the chest in consequence of her having came in contact with the above-mentioned carriage, and the plaintiff returned her the next day in accordance and compliance as he considered and contended with the printed conditions of sale at Tattersall's, which says that, "Horses not answering the description must be returned before five o'clock on Wednesday evening next, otherwise the purchaser shall be obliged to keep the lot with all faults." The defendants received her under protest, contending that she was rot then in the same condition as when she left the stables. It was admitted that the mare had never been hunted with either the Bicester or the Duke of Grafton's hounds, and that the statement in the catalogue that she had been was attributable to the mistake or inadvertence of a clerk of the defendants. Upon the facts, at the trial before Kelly, C. B. and a special jury, at the sittings for Middlesex, after last Trinity Term, a verdict was found for the plaintiff for 43. 18., the jury finding that the plaintiff had been induced by the description in the catalogue to buy the horse, and that the accident had not been occasioned by any fault or negligence or bad riding on the part of the plaintiff's groom, and leave was reserved to the defendants to move to enter a verdict. A rule was accordingly obtained by H. James, Q.C. on the part of the defen. dants, in the present term, to set aside the verdict for the plaintiff, and to enter a verdict for the defendants, on the ground that the sale of the mare was not under the warranty, and that the mare could not be returned in the same condition as at the time of sale; or to enter the verdict for nominal damages; or for a new trial on the ground that the plaintiff was only entitled to recover nominal damages, and not the price paid by him, and against that rule.

Denman, Q. C. and E. C. Willoughby now showed cause; and

H. James, Q. C. and H. R. Graham supported it. The COURT (Kelly, C. B., Bramwell and Cleasby, BB.) gave judgment in favour of the plaintiff, discharging the defendants' rule.

Rule discharged. Attorneys for the plaintiff, Willoughby and Cox, 13, Clifford's-inn, E.C. Attorneys for the defendants, Markby and Tarry,

57, Coleman-street, E.C.

Saturday, Nov. 18.


Covenant not to carry on a trade within a certain distance-The principle of admeasurement. THIS was a rule calling upon the plaintiff to show cause why a verdict should not be entered for the defendant upon the ground that upon a true construction of the defendant's covenant he is entitled to have the verdict entered for him, subject to the award of the arbitrator agreed on between the parties, the court to determine the principle upon which the arbitrator is to proceed, otherwise a verdict to be entered for the plaintiff for 500l. The declaration stated that by a certain deed dated the 10th Feb. 1871, between the plaintiff and defendant, after reciting that the defendant had ⚫ontracted with the plaintiff for the sale to him of the leasehold premises and goodwill of the business of a licensed victualler carried on by the defendant, called the Lord Holland public-house, the defendant covenanted with the plaintiff that in case the defendant should take, keep, or be in any way concerned in the trade or business of a licensed public-house, beershop, or place for the sale of wines or spirits within the distance of onehalf of a mile of the said premises, so called the Lord Holland, that he, the defendant, should repay to the plaintiff the sum of 500., as liquidated damages. The declaration then alleged that the defendant broke his agreement, and kept a place and was concerned in the trade and business of a licensed public-house within the distance of one-half of a mile of the said premises. The defendant pleaded that he did not keep, and was not concerned in the trade and business of a licensed public-house within the distance of onehalf of a mile of the said premises called the Lord Holland. It appeared that shortly after the defendant sold to the plaintiff the premises and goodwill of the Lord Holland, he took and kept a public-house called the Duke of Cambridge, which house was alleged by the plaintiff to be within the distance of half a mile from the Lord Holland. The actual distance had been measured, and it appeared that taking the nearest walking distance, that is, cutting off corners, the distance between the two houses was twenty-five yards short of half a mile; that taking

the distance in a straight line, as a crow flies, the distance is seventy-five yards short of half a mile; but that taking the centre of the road, that is, following the course a carriage would take, the distance was nineteen yards over half a mile. At the trial, before Martin, B., he expressed his opinion that the distance should be measured in a straight line, or as the crow flies, and a verdict was accordingly taken for the plaintiff with 5001. damages, the defendant having leave to move as to the proper mode of admeasurement.

Parry, Serjt. and F. Turner, showed cause, and contended that the true mode of admeasurement was that by a straight line between the premises, or, as the crow flies, and cited: Leigh v. Hind (9 B. & C. 774), Atkyn v. Ward and Dennett (2 Star. N. P. 89), Stokes v. Grissell (23 L. J. 41, C. P.), Reg. v. Saffron Walden (9 Q. B. 76), Jewell v. Stead (25 L. J. 294, Q. B.), Lake v. Butter (24 L. J. 273, Q. B.), Wing v. Earle (Cro. Eliz.), Dingman v. Walker (28 L. J. 867, Ch.).

Garth, Q.C. and A. L. Smith, for the defendant, argued that the true principle of admeasurement was the distance a person would have to traverse in going from the one house to the other, and that that is the principle which is uniformly adopted by the trade in such cases. They relied upon Leigh v. Hind (9 B. & C. 774).

The COURT said the question involved was so very important that the court would consider it and give a written judgment.

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Agreement to pay money in consideration of for bearance to take legal proceedings-Absence of legal right to take such proceedings. THIS was a rule obtained on the part of the defendants to enter a nonsuit pursuant to leave reserved. The action was brought upon a contract entered into under the following circumstances: The two defendants were sons of the father of the plaintiff by a former wife, the plaintiff being his second wife and his widow. The former wife had been living separate from her husband for many years prior to her death, and (as the plaintiff alleged) the plaintiff, believing her husband to be a widower, married him. It also appeared that she was her husband's niece. She had a famliy of three children by him, and they, together with the two defendants, lived together as one family. At the death of her husband, who died intestate (the former wife having been dead some years), she claimed a share of his property, whereupon the defendants entered into the following agree ment in writing with her: "In consideration of your abstaining from making and forbearing to make any claim against our late father's estate, we hereby respectively undertake to pay you over one-third part of the net value and proceeds of the estate up to the time of his decease." Having refused to fulfil this contract, the present action was brought. In her evidence, she stated that she honestly believed that she had the claim that she made; and the jury stated that they believed her evidence throughout.

Manisty, Q. C. and Joyce showed cause, and contended that there was a good consideration for the agreement, there being no fraud, and the plaintiff honestly believing that her claim was just. They cited Callisher v. Bischoffcheim (L. Rep. 5 Q. B. 449).

Dr. Kenealey, Q, C. and Macrae Moir, in support of the rule, argued that the agreement was void, as being wholly without consideration, for that the plaintiff had no pretence of any legal claim. They cited Comyn's Dig. art., Action on the Case; Edwards v. Ball (11 M. & W. 641), Greenleaf v. Barker (Cro. Eliz. 194), Jones v. Ashburner (4 East, 461), Wade v. Simeon (2 C. B., N. S., 548), Burn v. Tucker (4 Taunt. 117), Longridge v. Dor ville (5 B. & Ald. 117), The Duke de Cadaval v. Collins (4 Ad. & Ell 858), Graham v. Johnson (38 L. J. 374, Ch.)


Cur adv. vult.

BAIL COURT. Wednesday, Nov. 22.

FELL V. WHITTAKER. distress-Right to sue for-Property in goods-Husband and wife. ACTION for excessive distress and for money had and received by the defendant to the use of the plaintiff. Pleas: Not guilty by statute 11 Geo. 2, c. 19, s. 21. Issue. The plaintiff occupied a house as tenant to the defendant. He became in arrear with his rent, whereupon the latter distrained goods on the premises, which were the property of the plaintiff's wife, vested in trustees for her use under a deed of assignment. The plaintiff, his wife, and one of the trustees lived together. The sum claimed by the landlord was double the amount of rent really due, and goods to a far greater value were seized by the bailiff, who declined to withdraw until a guarantee was given to him for payment of the whole sum demanded.

This was, however, given, and he went away after having been in possession a little while. The action was tried in the Salford Hundred Court, the judge of which nonsuited the plaintiff. A rule having been obtained to set aside the nonsuit and for a new trial:

Herschell showed cause, and contended that the plaintiff had no right to the goods, was not dam. nified by the seizure, and could not maintain the action.

Heywood in support of rule.

The COURT (Hannen and Lush, JJ.) held, that the plaintiff's right to the enjoyment of the goods was such as entitled him to sue, and that the case, therefore, should have been left to the jury. Rule absolute. Attorneys for the plaintiff, Williams for T. W. Evans, Manchester.

Attorneys for the defendant, Cunliffe and Co., for Brown, Manchester.

Tuesday, Nov. 21.
(Before Lord PENZANCE.)
In the Goods of FOSTER.

Will-Wife nominated executrix for life, and failing her other executor nominated-On the death of wife probate granted to substituted executors, and not to wife's representatives.

S. H. FORSTER, late of Holme, Regent's-park, in the county of Middlesex, died 1st Dec. 1858, leaving a will dated 24th July 1857, which concluded thus: "I do hereby authorise my executrix and executors, hereinafter nominated, to continue any security or securities which I may die possessed of, for any term in their discretion not exceeding trusts aforesaid in this my will contained. And I five years from my death, notwithstanding any nominate and appoint my said wife sole executrix of this my will, and in default of her I nominate

and appoint the said John Knowles and R. Forster to be the executors of this my will." Probate of the will was granted to the wife, Maria Isabella Forster on 27th Dec. 1858, and she died 25th May 1871, leaving a will duly executed, of which she appointed the said John Knowles and R. Forster, together with Topman Moreley, Benjamin Haigh Allen, Christopher Procter, and John Rae Campbell, the executors. The question at issue was whether the executors of Maria Isabella Forster were the personal representatives of the deceased S. H. Forster, or whether John Knowles and R. Forster were not entitled to probate of his will as substi tuted executors, Maria Isabella Forster failing


executors named, moved that probate be granted Dr. Swabey, on behalf of the two substituted to them with the consent of the wife's executors.

The COURT held that the executorship was given to the wife for her life, and, failing her, to the other two executors, and directed probate to issue as if she had been Lominated executrix for


Solicitors, Tatham and Procter.


Testamentary suit - Aministrator pendent lite refused on security being given to the amount of the plaintiff's interest.

THE plaintiff in this case propounded a will of the late Mrs. Thwaites, under which he took a legacy of 10,000l. The value of the estate bequeathed by the late Mrs. Thwaites was between 400,000l. and 500,000l., and it had formed the subject of a previous suit, in which a subsequent will had been pronounced against as the result of a compromise to which the present plaintiff was not a party. behalf of the petitioner for the appointment of an Ballantine, Serjt. (Bayford with him) moved on administrator pendente lite.

The Attorney-General, (Sir J. D. Coleridge) (Dr. The defendants Tristram with him) objected. were willing to give security in any way to cover the plaintiff's legacy.

think of appointing an administrator pendente lite The COURT.-The court certainly would not in a case like this, where there have been previous proceedings, and where the only person interested in this cuit can have ample security for the amount of his legacy.

Motion refused, on condition that the defendant give security for the amount of the plaintiff's legacy with interest in such manner as may be satisfactory to the registrar.

Tuesday, Nov. 21.

(Before Lord PENZANCE, J.O.)


Judicial separation--Permanent alimony-Appli cation for increase-Substituted service-Order for payment of arrears.

IN this case the wife had obtained a decree of judicial separation from her husband, and perma nent alimony had been allotted. The husband, who was a captain in a regiment stationed in

India, had since the decree obtained his promotion from the rank of captain to that of major.

Poulter, for the wife, now applied for an increase in the permanent alimony corresponding with the increase in his pay. Notice of the application has been given to the husband's attorney who acted for him in the suit.

Lord PENZANCE, J.O.-I do not think the court can make an order of this kind behind a man's back. It is not as if the suit were going on, and this were alimony pendente lite. The suit being concluded there may be no communication between the attorney and the respondent. You had better serve some of his relations with notice. Poulter also applied for an order on the husband to pay the arrears of alimony amounting to 6501. Lord PENZANCE, J.O.-You have an order on him to pay the alimony. What more can you

have ?

Poulter.-If there were an order of court on him to pay the arrears, specifying the amount, the India Office would recognise it, and take steps to compel him to pay.

Lord PENZANCE, J.O.-If it is of any use there may be a further order on him to pay the arrears.

WILSON v. WILSON AND STOWELL. Matrimonial suit-Alimony pendente lite-Commission to examine witness in Scotland-Wife's costs. THIS was a husband's petition for dissolution, and the wife had presented a petition for alimony. Inderwick, on her behalf, now moved for a commission to examine witnesses in Scotland, and for an order on the husband to produce his books before the commissioner.

Searle, contra.-This is the first time such a commission has been asked for in a matter of alimony.

Lord PENZANCE.-The court, in these matters always considers what would be the least expense to the husband, and it certainly would be less expense to him to have these witnesses examined in Scotland than to bring them up to this court. The commission may go.

Inderwick asked that, in accordance with the usual practice when a commission was granted, the wife might have a certain sum secured to her for the costs of the commission.

Searle, contra.-The costs ought to abide the event. If the husband's answer to the petition for alimony turned out to be correct, he ought not to be called on to pay the costs of an unnecessary inquiry.

Lord PENZANCE, J.O.--The court has never been accustomed to make an order on the husband to furnish the wife with costs for an intermediate inquiry into alimony.

Newman, Dale, and Stretton for petitioner.
Crosse for respondent.


Judicial separation-New charge of cruelty. THIS was a wife's petition for a judicial separation on the ground of cruelty. The citation was served Nov. 23, 1870, and the husband's answer denying the cruelty was filed Jan. 12, 1871. The case was set down for trial at the sittings after last term, but was then postponed at the instance of the wife, and it stood for trial at the present sittings.

Inderwick now moved to add two new charges of cruelty.

Searle, contra.

Lord PENZANCE, J. O.-It would be opening the
door to a very bad practice if I were to allow these
charges to be added now. Cruelty is a thing which
must be within the wife's knowledge from the
commencement, and she ought to state once for
all what are her complaints against the husband
in this respect.
Motion refused.

(Before the Full Court, Lord PENZANCE, J.O.,
Validity of new rules and orders-Power of Judge
Ordinary to make rules-Absolute appearance-
Plea to jurisdiction-Practice.
THIS was a petition by the husband for a dissolu-
tion of his marriage, on the ground of his wife's
adultery with the co-respondent. The respondent
entered an absolute appearance to the citation,
and afterwards filed an answer praying for the
dismissal by reason of the court having no juris-
diction, the domicil of the parties being Scotch,
and the marriage and adultery also being Scotch.
Searle, for the petitioner, moved to strike the
answer off the file, on the ground that, by rule 22,
a party desiring to object to the jurisdiction must
appear under protest, and is not at liberty to
do so after entering an absolute appearance.
The Court, after hearing Dr. Spinks, Q.C. and
Inderwick contra, made an order to take the
answer off the file unless within a fortnight the
respondent amended it by pleading to the merits.
Against this order the respondent appealed.

Dr. Spinks, Q.C. and Inderwick on her behalf, now contended that the Judge Ordinary had exceeded is powers in making this order without the con


sent of the other judges of the court. The order
was bad, because it shut out the party from a
defence which was material.

Searle for the petitioner, was not called on, and
The Full COURT held, nem. diss., that the Judge
Ordinary had power to make rules and orders
alone, both under the original statute of 1857, and
the amending Act of 1860. They also confirmed
the order made by the Judge Ordinary directing
the answer to be taken off the file unless it were
so amended as to show that it was meant to be a
final answer.

Monday, Nov. 20.

Ex parte ROBERTS; Re BURdett.
Bill of sale on indemnity-How discharged—
Liability of surety.
THIS was an appeal from a decision of the Judge
of the County Court of Birmingham, directing
Mr. Roberts, the appellant to deliver to the
trustee of the bankrupt's estate certain stock in
trade of which he had taken possession under a
bill of sale. The facts which were admitted on
both sides were as follows: In December, 1866,
the bankrupt entered into an agreement with
the executors of Mr. Strange, a jeweller, for
the purchase of the stock in trade of the
deceased at the sum of 12761., to be paid
by half-yearly instalments, and the appellant
entered into a bond jointly with the bankrupt to
secure the punctual payment of these instalments.
In order to secure himself against loss he might
sustain on account of the bond, the appellant took
an assignment of all the above mentioned stock in
trade, which, by virtue of the above mentioned ar-
rangement, became vested in the bankrupt. These
facts were recited in the bill of sale, which also
contained a covenant by the bankrupt to pay the
instalments as they became due; and a proviso to
the effect that if the instalments were regularly paid
the deed should become void, but in case of default,
then that Roberts should be at liberty to take
possession of the property comprised in the deed.
When the time arrived for the payment of the
first instalment, the bankrupt was unable to meet
the demand, and applied to Roberts to assist him.
Roberts accordingly paid the required amount to
the bankrupt's credit at his banker's. This trans-
action was repeated with regard to the other
instalments as they respectively fell due. Upon
each one of these advances being made by Roberts,
the bankrupt gave him a promissory note payable
on demand (not negotiable) to secure the amount
so advanced, together with interest at the
rate of 6 per cent. When the case came be-
fore the court Roberts stated that he had to
pay the same rate of interest to his bankers
for the money which he borrowed from them
for the purpose of lending it to the bankrupt.
In July 1871 Roberts became dissatisfied with the
bankrupt's mode of conducting his business, and
took possession of his stock-in-trade, &c., under
the bill of sale. Five days afterwards the bank-
rupt presented a petition for liquidation, which,
having fallen through, an adjudication of bank-
ruptcy followed. The trustee thereupon claimed
the property seized under the bill of sale, and,
having brought the matter before the court, ob-
tained the order, which was the subject of the
present appeal.

his credit by Roberts; in fact, he made the pay-
ments out of his own money. In the year 1869,
Roberts was discharged from all liability under
the bond, and he took possession of the property
not for the purpose of indemnifying himself
against claims under the bond, but in order to
satisfy the amounts owing upon the notes of hand.
Upon no ground of law, equity, or common sense,
can Roberts hold this property against the other
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Solicitors for the appellant, Field, Roscoe, and

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By Mr. BEADELS, at the Mart.
Essex, near Witham. An estate, known as Latneys," with
residence, homestead, and 56a. 3r. 18p.-sold for 50007.
for 22007.

Hyde-park. No. 34, Connaught-square, term 52 years-sold
By Messrs. C. C. and T. MOORE.
Bow. No. 11, High-street, copyhold-sold for 3701.
No. 16, adjoining, and Nos. 1 and 2, Baker's-alley, copyhold-
sold for 400Z.

Friday, Nov. 17.

By Messrs. NORTON, TRIST, WATNEY, and Co., at the Mart.
A freehold ground-rent of 6 0l. per
Essex, Southend.
annum, amply secured upon the Cliff Town Estate-sold
for 16,6007.

By Messrs. RUSHWORTH, ABBOTT, and Co.
No. 64, Lowndes-square, with stabling in
Harriet-mews, term 57 years-sold for 92007.
No. 6A, Harriet-mews, stabling, same term-sold for $102.

Tuesday, Nov. 21.

By Messrs. DRIVER, at the Mart. Bucks, Cheshamn. The Charteridge Estate, of 287a. 1r. 18p., with farmhouse and homestead-sold for 12,4002.

A ditto, containing 20a. er. 24p.-sold for 7607.
A ditto, containing 15a. 3r. 26p.-sold for 6207.
Great Wissenden. Hobbs-hillwood, containing 30a. 1r. Sp..
including timber-sold for 41507.

Wednesday, Nov. 22.

By Messrs. EDWIN Fox and BOUSFIELD. -sold for 5101, each.

De Gex, Q. C. and Day appeared for the appellant. The only question was whether the bankrupt had any right to complain of the seizure made by Roberts. The only ground upon which he could have sustained a bill for an injunction to restrain the appellant from seizing was that he had ful-A plot of freehold land, containing 9a. Ir. 22p.-sold for 3207. filled his covenant by indemnifying Roberts, or that Roberts had not made these advances upon the faith of the bill of sale. In the present case the payments, though nominally made by the bankrupt, were really made by Roberts, and these were covered by the bill of sale, and formed the consideration of that deed, payments which were not covered thereby. They cited Vaughan v. Leslie (2 Ba. & Be. 509), Curtis v. Rush (2 V. & B.) Little, Q. C., and Reed, for the respondent, contended that the bill of sale was absolutely void at law, that the notes accepted by Roberts constituted a new security; and that by accepting the new security Roberts abandoned the old. More. over the default upon which the bill of sale was to come into operation had never taken place. They cited Chitty on Contracts 677-8; Jarman on Mortgages, vol. 4, pp. 529, 534.

De Ger in reply.

The CHIEF JUDGE recapitulated the facts of the case, and said: In point of law this is as plain a case as can be. This bill of sale was given for no other purpose than to protect Roberts against claims which might be made against him as surety by the executors of Strange. Is that bill satisfied? Beyond all question it is. The money is received by the person against whose claim that bill of sale was to insure the appellant, and that being so the bill of sale is absolutely satisfied at law. The sums paid by the bankrupt in discharge of the instalments as they fell due, were paid by the money which had been placed to

Clapham-road., Nos. 18 and 20, Binfield-road, term 70 years
Brixton, Millbrook-road. Percy House, term 51 years-sold
Loughborough-park-villas. No. 17, term 52 years-sold for

for 5502,


51. in six

A prospectus of the Bilbao Iron Ore Company (Limited) has been issued. Its capital is 500,0007. in 10,000 shares of 501. each. 2. to be paid on application and 81. on allotment. months; 5l. in nine months; 51. in twelve months. It has been formed for the purpose of acquiring the concessions from the Spanish Government, held by Sir John Brown and William Fowler, Esq., of the extensive and valuable iron mines known as the Mines of Galdames (called La Escarpada), La Cenefa, Berango, Moruecos, and El Cerrillo, near Bilbao, all in the province of Biscay, and for working the same, and for making and working railways in connection therewith, and for other purposes as set forth in the memorandum of association. The mines of the Bilbao district have been worked from time immemorial, are celebrated for their purity and richness, yielding from 50 to 60 per cent. of metallic iron, and the analysis of the ores proves they are the nearest approach in composition to the hematites of Cumberland.


NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. DOMICILE-DOMICILE OF BIRTH-ABANDONMENT OF.-A Frenchman who had taken up his residence in England in 1833, and continued to reside there until his death in 1868, was held to have acquired an English domicile, although in 1861 he refused to become a naturalised British subject, as he was unwilling to lose his status as a French citizen: (Brunel v. Brunel, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 378. V.C. B.)

ADMINISTRATION-APPLICATION FOR JOINT GRANT TO NOMINEE OF NEXT OF KIN AND PARTIES ENTITLED IN DISTRIBUTION-20 & 21 VICT. c. 77, s. 73.-In the absence of special circumstances the court declined to make a joint grant to parties entitled in distribution and the nominee of the next of kin, who was an old lady of eighty-one, and unable to attend to business: (In the Goods of P. Richardson, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 384. Prob. Ct.)


-Although the Consolidation Order ix., by rules 14 and 16, requires that a special order to amend shall not be granted unless upon affidavit of the : plaintiff and his solicitor that the amendments have been approved by counsel, and are not intended for vexation or delay, and not by the solicitor alone, unless the plaintiff is unable to join therein, the rule does not apply to the case of information and bill, in respect of which such special order may be obtained on the affidavit of the solicitor alone, where the proposed amendments have been approved and signed by the Attorney-General: (The Attorney-General v. The Castleford Local Board of Health, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 371. M.R.) SETTLEMENT BY SON IN FAVOUR OF FATHER -BILL TO SET ASIDE UNDUE INFLUENCEDELAY IN SEEKING RELIEF.-A son, when at the age of twenty-one, and while residing with his father, made a settlement in favour of his father, who was at the time in receipt of a comparatively small income, whereas the son was in affluent circumstances. Fourteen years afterwards the son filed a bill to set aside the settlement on the ground of his youth, inexperience in business, want of proper advice, and undue influence on the part of his father at the time of its execution: Held, that, upon the evidence, no proper ground

had been shown to induce the court to set aside

the settlement, and that, in any case, the delay in filing the bill was fatal. The principles upon which the court interferes to set aside family arrangements stated: (Turner v. Collins, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 374. V.C. M.)

DEMURRER-BREACH OF TRUST-ACQUIESCENCE-A testator appointed a personal guardian of his illegitimate children, to whom he bequeathed a bond debt, and the guardian became possessed of the bond, but took no steps to enforce it, and the debt became irrecoverable. Shortly afterwards the wards were made acquainted with the existence of the bond, but took no steps against the guardian in respect of it. On the death of the guardian, thirty-eight years afterwards, they filed a bill against his executors to recover from his estate the amount of the bond debt and interest. On demurrer to the bill, held, that the plaintiffs were barred by their acquiescence: (Sleeman v. Wilson, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 408. V.C. B.)

COMMON PLEAS OF LANCASTER-CAUSE TRIED AT THE ASSIZES - BEFORE WHAT COURT A MOTION TO BE MADE FOR A NEW TRIAL4 & 5 WILL. 4, c. 62, s. 26.—When an action is brought in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster, and tried at the assizes, a rule for a new trial, &c., must be made in the Court of Westminster of which the judge who tried such canse is a member. Where, therefore, such an action was tried before Kelly, C.B., and a nonsuit was entered, this court refused to entertain a motion to set aside the nonsuit and for a new trial: (Cox v. Sillen, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 425. Q. B.)

Nov. 8 and 10.

(Before Master JOHNSON.)

Attorney and client-Costs-Agreement to take a fired sum after the conclusion of the actionSummons for delivery of bill.

Held, that an agreement made between an attorney and client to accept a fixed sum for costs, although entered into subsequently to the conclusion of the action, did not preclude the client from his right to a bill of costs.

THIS was a summons by Harding, the plaintiff in a recent action in one of the Superior Courts, calling on a Mr. Davies, his attorney, for the delivery of his bill of costs. It appeared that the action just alluded to had been compromised, and subsequently the plaintiff had agreed with Mr. Davies for a fixed sum to be received by the latter for doctor's bills, attorney's charges, &c., and had

given him a receipt for the balance in full discharge.

By the affidavits of Harding and others, the following facts were deposed to: That Harding was totally unacquainted with business habits, and unable to write his own name, and that he was unaware of the nature of the discharge given to Mr. Davies. The giving of the receipt in full discharge was also denied. Mr. Davies' affidavits, on the other hand, especially stated that the whole matter had been settled, and that no bill of costs, was, or ever had been, in existence.

CHAMPION (Graham), Stafford-street, and 15, Dover-street,
Middlesex, dairyman, Dec. 20; Capron and Co., solicitors,
Savile-place, New Burlington-street, W.

DARBISHIRE (Samuel D.), Esq., Pendyffryn, Carnarvon.
Dec. 31; Darbishire and Barker, solicitors, 26, George-
street, Manchester.
ELSTER (Derrick J.), 5, John-street, Adelphi, W.C. and 36.
Camomile-street, E.C., merchant and commission agent.
GATES (Jno.), West Grinstead, Sussex, gentleman. Dec. 30;
Dec. 18; J. E. Carter, solicitor, 64, Austin-friars, E.C.
R. Edmunds, solicitor, Worthing, Sussex.

GLOVER (James S.). Kingston-upon-Hull, gentleman.

Dec. 15; Roberts and Leak, solicitors, 16, Bowlalley-lane, Hull. Dec. 31:

GORHAM (Ruth), Uxbridge-common, Middlesex.

Clutton and Haines, solicitors, 10, Serjeant's-inn, Fleetstreet, E.C. HEPBURN (Augustus P.), Long-lane, Bermondsey, and 5, Grove-road, Clapham-park, Surrey, tanner and leather factor. Dec. 31; Sheffield and Sons, solicitors, 52, Limestreet, E.C. IMLACH (Henrietta), 47, Hope-street, Liverpool. Dec. 7: Brydges and Mellersh, solicitors, Public Offices, Cheltenham.

Pritchard, in support of the summons, having stated the facts, contended that no agreement whatever could preclude a client from his right to see his attorney's bill, it had been repeatedly decided that all agreements made between these parties to receive a fixed sum for costs were illegal, and likely to cause both dissatisfaction and fraud. The recent Attorneys' Act did not OAKELEY (Edward), Esq.,, Charles-street, St. James'saffect the matter in question.

A. B. Carpenter opposed the summons. He admitted that in many instances an agreement by an attorney to accept a fixed sum for costs from his client was illegal, but this description of agreement was valid, it having been entered into subsequently to the settlement of the action. He cited Re Whitcombe (8 Beav. 140), where Lord Langdale held that the agreement was valid, although it ought to be looked upon with jealousy; also Re Newman (30 Beav. 196), in which case he depended upon the dictum of Sir John Romilly (Master of the Rolls) who decided that there was a vast distinction between an agreement to accept a fixed sum for attorney's charges, when made after the proceedings, to those cases where it had been entered into previously, or while the action 608), where it was decided that the settlement of a was pending; also Stedman v. Collett (17 Beav. solicitor's bill by the client for a fixed sum is valid, and will not be disputed by the court, when it has been entered into fairly and with proper knowledge on both sides.

Master JOHNSON referred to Philby v. Harle (29 L. J. 370, C. P.) for the consideration of which case the summons was adjourned until Nov. 10. Philby v. Harle was an action by the attorney to recover a sum agreed to be paid him by his client before it became due.

Nov. 10.-Master JOHNSON said he thought Harding had a right to see his attorney's bill, he considered the dicta in the last cited authority went to show that a client was in all cases entitled to a bill of costs; but he based his order more particularly upon Tanner v. Lea (5 Scott Rep. 237), which appeared to him, to be almost precisely in point. The court had there ordered the delivery of the bill, although an ascertained sum had been received for costs after the settlement of the action. It would be afterwards open to argument, as to whether the bill so delivered should be taxed or not. He therefore made an order for the delivery Order made.

of the bill.


MALLALIEU (William), Ockbrook, near Derby. Dec. 31; John Taylor, solicitor. Bakewell, Derby.

square, Middlesex. Dec. 23; F. H. Turner, solicitor, 40. Bedford-row, W.C. PEDLEY (Thos. H.), Esq., Wilbury Rocks, Eastbourne, Sussex. Dec. 30 Hathaway and Andrews, solicitors, 12, Bedford-row, W.C. PRYCE (James E. C.), Bombay, East Indies, Master Attendant and Conservator of the Port of Bombay. Dec. 31; Hedges and Stedman, solicitors, 9, Red Lion-square,. Bloomsbury, London, W.

SHIRLEY (Edwin), Oakenclough-hall, Heathylle, Aistonfield,

Staffs, farmer and merchant. Jan. 1; Hacker and Allen, solicitors, Leek. Feb. 2; W.

SMITH W. Darlington, banker's clerk.

Walker, solicitor, 18, Lendal, York. SUGG (Hubert H.), Sheffield, attorney-at-law and solicitor. Dec. 11; G. E. Gee, solicitor, Fig-tree-chambers, Sheffield.. squatter. Dec. 30; W. Moon, solicitor, 15, Lincoln's-inn. London, W.C. TINDALL (Thompson), Scalby Mill, Scalby, York, miller.

TARELL (Ratcliffe), Wallabadah, New South Wales.

Dec. 22; Drawbridge and Rowtree, solicitors, 74, Newborough-street, Scarborough. TWEDDELL (Hubbersty, M.), Esq., 35, Abbey-road, St. John's-wood, N.W. Dec. 30; Bell and Co., solicitors, 9, Bow-churchyard, E.C.

ULLATHORNE (Ann H.), 39, Kensington-park-gardens, Middlesex. Dec. 25; Richardson and Sadler, solicitors, 28, Golden-square, W.

WATTS (Henry), Anerley, Surrey, gentleman. Dec. 31; Bridges and Co., solicitors, 23, Red Lion-square, W.C. WILSON (Wm. H.), Esq., 6, Victoria-street, Westminster. and Chapel House, Battersea, Surrey. Dec. 17; Baker and Co., Solicitor, 6, Victoria-street, Westminster.

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BERRYMAN (Mary C.), Tamar-terrace, Stoke, near Devon-wind-up a benefit building society compulsorily on

port. Dec. 23: E. O. Gard, solicitor, 6, St. Aubyn-street, Devonport. Jan. 10; V.C. M. at twelve o'clock. DAVIES (Sarah), Queen street, Wrexham, Denbigh. Dec. 14; J. C. Owen, solicitor, Wrexham. Dec. 20; V.C. M. at twelve o'clock.

FOSTER (Maria J.), The Holme, Regent's-park, N.W.

Dec. 12; Uptons and Co., solicitors, 20, Austinfriars, E.C. Dec. 20. V.C. W., at ten o'clock. FOWLER (Walter M., St. Michael's-alley, Cornhill, E.C. and Redclyffe-road, West Brompton, Middlesex, stock and share broker. Dec. 11; E. W. Walker, solicitor, Founder's Hall, St. Swithin's-lane, E.C. Dec. 21, V.C. W., at twelve GEDDES (Geo.), Esq., Lambkin-hill, St. Mary, in the Island of Jamaica. Feb. 10, 1872; Oliver and Sons, solicitors, 61, Carey-street, Lincoln's-iun, Middlesex. Feb. 24; M.R., at eleven o'clock,



HARROP (Jas.), Dukinfield, Chester, pawnbroker. Dec. 7; Wm. Marshall, solicitor, Ashton-under Lyne. Dec. 18; V. C. M., at 12 o'clock. JONES (Hugh), Esq., Bryngwyn-hall, Flint. Dec. 30; Barnard and Harris, solicitors, Gresham-buildings, Basinghallstreet, E.C. Jan. 15; V.C. W. at twelve o'clock. PINER Henry, Gerard's-cross, Chalfort, St. Peter, Bucks, farmer, brickmaker, and potter. Dec. 27; E. Mirams, 2, New-inn, Strand, W.C. Jan. 12; V. C. W., at twelve SANDGROVE (Wm. H. P.), Eldon-street, Moorfields, Middlesex, cabinet manufacturer. Dec. 9; Tanqueray and Co.. solicitors, 1, New Broad-street, E.C. Jan. 12; V. C. M., STEVENS (James), Hoy Hotel. Margate, Kent, licensed victualler. Jan. 1, 1872; A. H. Boys, solicitor, Margate. Jan. 11; V.C. W., at twelve o'clock. Woop (Robert B.), Buxton, Derby, Lieut.-Gen. in Her Majesty's Army. Dec. 8; Ellis and Ellis, solicitors, 16. Spring-gardens, Westminster. Dec. 15; M. R., at eleven o'clock. YEOWELL (Jas), 1, George-street, Berwick-street, Goldensquare, Middlesex, baker. Dec. 13: Newbon and Co., solicitors, 1, Wardrobe-place, Doctors' commons, E.C.

at 12 o'clock.

Jan. S; M.R., at eleven o'clock.

CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35. Last day of Claim, and to whom Particulars to be sent. BEATHE (Jas. H.), South-bank, Surbiton, Surrey, civil en

Strand, W.C.

gineer, Jan. 13; J. Rose, solicitor, 11, Salisbury-street, BENTLEY (Robert Thomas), Esq., Buschhouse, Isleworth, Middlesex. Jan. 1; Watkins and Co., solicitors, 11, Sack:

ville-street, W.

BEZANT (Wm.), 7. Whittington-terrace, Highgate-hill, Islington, Middlesex, pawnbroker. Dec. 21; Thompson and Edwards, solicitors, 7, Doughty-street, Mecklenburgh square. Middlesex

BROWN (Thos.), 63, Cadogan-place, Sloane-street, Middlesex, gentleman. Jan. 31; J. M Mullen, solicitor, 59, Blooms bury-square, W.C.


the petition of advanced members, contrary to the wishes of the majority of the creditors and the contributories, unless a plain injustice will be done to the petitioners by refusing the order. The trus tees of a benefit building society under 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 32, were by the rules authorised from time to time, as might be necessary for the purposes of the society, to borrow money, for which they might give their own personal security, and they were to be indemnified out of the first funds of the society which should be received. The society owed about 19,000l. to 105 depositors, most of whom were not members. There was also 43001. due to the society's bankers, and there were a few other debts which brought up the total of debts to about 25,000l. The assets were estimated as worth 24,500l. There were fifty-five advanced and twenty-four unadvanced members. society became involved in difficulties, principally by reason of a number of notices to withdraw deposits having been given. The directors reported that the business must be closed, and proposed an amalgamation with another society of a similar nature. This proposition was approved by seventy-seven of the depositors, and at a meeting of the members, at which forty-four members were present, the proposition was approved, two only dissenting. members, one of whom was in arrear in making the society wound-up compulsorily, alleging that it repayments due from him, petitioned to have the could not pay its debts, that it would be just and equitable to make a winding-up order, and that there had been an erroneous division of alleged profits among the members. After the petition was presented the bankers released the petitioners from their debt, as did nearly the whole of the depositors, and the trustees of the society covenanted to indemnify the petitioners from the remaing debts: Held (reversing a decision of Wickens, V.C.), that no winding-up order ought to be made: Held, also, that the rule authorising the borrowing of money was bad, and that the

Four advanced

society could not be sued for the sums due to the depositors: (Re the Professional, &c., Building Society, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 397. L. JJ.)

POOR LAW-SETTLEMENT-PARISH NOT MAINTAINING ITS POOR-ASSOCIATION OF TOWNSHIPS FOR RATING PURPOSES.-The ecclesiastical parish of Old Swinford never maintained its own poor; but the township of Upper Swinford, within the said parish, and three other townships also therein, from time immemorial associated together under the designation of the "parish of Old Swinford," jointly appointed overseers, and made rates for the relief of their poor. The four townships, however, disjointed, pursuant to a mandamus directed to one of them in 1842, and separate overseers have since been regularly appointed, and separate rates made for each. The township of Upper Swinford now forms part of Stourbridge Union, which comprises the parishes and places of Stourbridge, Old Swinford, &c. A. was born about the year 1804 in the township of Upper Swinford. The wife and children of his son, paupers, were entitled to derive a settlement from the birth settlement of A., and were therefore adjudged by an order of justices to be legally settled in the parish of Old Swinford, and to be removable to the Stourbridge Union: Held, in consequence solely of the decisions in Reg. v. The Inhabitants of Tipton (3 Q. B. 215), Reg. v. The Inhabitants of Hunnington (5 Q. B. 273), and successive similar cases, that as there had been a change in the chargeable area wherein the birth settlement of A. lay, by the separation of the united townships, the paupers had no legal settlement there, and that the order was bad: (Guardians of Stourbridge Union v. Guardians of Droitwich Union, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 411. Q. B.)


NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. LIEN PRIORITY SHIP'S AGENT SHIP. BUILDER - WAGES - REPAIRS - MERCANTILE ACCOUNT.-The master of a ship has a maritime lien on her for his wages and disbursements, and his claim takes priority over all other claims, save claims for salvage and damage by collision. A ship's agent was appointed by the master on his arrival at B. He had no previous knowledge of either master or owner, but made no inquiries as to how he was to be repaid his advances for necessaries. He allowed the vessel to be placed in the hands of a shipwright to be repaired, and when her value was by this means increased, caused her to be arrested: Held, that he was not entitled to be paid his claim in priority to the shipwright. Where there are several claimants against the proceeds of a vessel in the registry, and she has been sold at the suit of one, the costs of such sale will be paid before all claims, as such sale was for the benefit of all: (The Panthea, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 389. Adm.)

PRACTICE-COSTS-BAIL-RE-ARREST OF SHIP -ADMIRALTY CONTRACT.-Where a suit has been instituted for an estimated amount to cover damages and costs, and the damages recovered and the costs taxed are a larger sum than the bail given, and there has been no carelessness on the part of the plaintiffs, the court will issue a writ under the Admiralty Court Act 1861, ss. 22 and 15, for the re-arrest of the ship to satisfy the costs, and will direct such writ to the marshall for execution. The fact that generally the amount in which a suit is instituted is laid to cover probable damages and costs is simply a matter of convenience: (The Freedom, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 392. Adm. Ct.)

BRITISH VESSEL IN UNITED STATES COURTWAGES-PROTEST OF BRITISH CONSUL-VOYAGE NOT ENDED JURISDICTION.-A crew shipped in a British vessel for a voyage "from Liverpool to Bombay and any ports and places in the Indian, Pacific, and Atlantic Oceans, and China and Eastern seas, thence to a port for orders, and to the Continent, if required, and back to a port of final discharge in the United Kingdom, term not to exceed three years." On arriving at Boston on the return voyage, the crew claimed their wages as per schedule, and brought a suit in the United States Court. The British acting consul protested against the jurisdiction, on the ground that the voyage was not ended, and that by English law British seamen are not permitted to sue in foreign ports unless discharged there, or so illtreated as to be put in fear of their lives. Held, that although the couat might doubt the validity of the ship's articles, it could not, in the absence of special circumstances, entertain the suit against the protest of the British consul: (The Becher dass Ambaidass, 25 L. T. Rep. N.S. Un. St. Adm.)

Master Park, of the Common Pleas, died on Tuesday night, aged 70.

Mr. Francis Snowden, of the Western Circuit, has been appointed Senior Magistrate of the Straits Settlements.


NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. LOCAL CUSTOM OF BANKERS-BILL OF EXCHANGE-PROVISIONAL PAYMENT ACCOUNTS | MISTAKE-CORRECTION OF ERRORS AT DAY END. Bank of England at Newcastle-upon-Tyne, paid in -The plaintiffs, customers of defendants' Branch to the defendants a bill of exchange accepted by H., which the defendants discounted, placing the amount, less discount, to the credit of the plaintiffs in their books. On the morning of the day the bill fell due the defendants' clerk took it to the banking house kept by L. and Co., where it was payable, for the purpose of ascertaining, according to the practice among the bankers at Newcastle, whether it was in order for payment and would be paid. Upon presentation, the bill was, in accordance with the above-mentioned practice, marked by L. and Co. for payment, and a credit note was given indicating that it, with other moneys, was in order for payment and would be paid. At 2 p.m. the defendants' clerk took all the cheques drawn on L. and Co. to the bank of the latter, together with the said credit note, which was admitted into the total amount, and a cheque upon the Branch Bank of England was handed by L. and Co. to the clerk for the balance due to the defendants. The Newcastle banks close to the public at 3 p.m., but the defendants' bank keeps open until 4 p.m. for the other bankers only to attend there during those hours for the purpose of having the day's accounts between them and the Branch Bank investigated, and of rectifying any mistakes and errors of any kind that may have arisen in the course of the day, and of finding and stating final balances between them. All mistakes and errors made in the course of the day are subject to correction during that investigation. At 3.30 p.m. on the day in question, L. and Co. discovered that H. had stopped payment. They sent to the defendants, declared that the bill had been paid by error, and requested them to take it back. This the latter did under protest, reserving their rights. The amount of the bill had then been placed to the debit of L. and Co. in the banking account kept by them at the branch bank. The defendants afterwards treated the bill as dishonoured, and passed the amount thereof to the debit of the plaintiffs' account. On a special case,-Held, that as the defendants failed to show that the giving of the cheque by L, and Co. for the bill of exchange was a mere provisional transaction subject to rectification at the end of the day, the plaintiff was entitled to have credit with the defendants for the amount of the bill: (Pollard and another v. The Bank of England, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 415. Q. B.)


(Before G. L. RUSSELL, Esq., Judge.)

Set-off of private debt against partnership_debt allowable when there has been no sufficient publication of the partnership.

Williams (Solicitor) for the plaintiffs.

Dodd (barrister, instructed by Taylor, Kingsroad) for the defendant.

could hardly have held that such words ought to have put the defendant upon inquiry since they are frequently used when there is no partnership. I decide this case on the authority of Ramazotti v. Bowring (29 L. J. 30, C. P.), Jemenza v. Brinsley (34 L. J. 161, C. P.), De Mantort v. Saunders (1 B. & Ad. 398). The conclusion of fact at which I arive is, that Newell permitted Coling to appear as sole trader, that Whitley was induced to believe, and did believe him to be a sole trader, and consequently the right of set-off attaches. Verdict for defendant.

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CAPTAIN DOOLITTLE, master of the coasting schooner Union, brought an admiralty suit against Mr. William Broomham, merchant, of Liverpool, to recover 381. 18s. 10d. for demurrage, for the detention of the vessel.

Gully (instructed by Masters and Fletcher), appeared for the plaintiff.

Segar (instructed by T. and T. Martin) for the defendant.


It was stated that the plaintiff's vessel brought cargo of coal to Liverpool; that it was contracted that the cargo should be received by the defendant when the vessel got into a berth; that for the defendant's own convenience he did not do this, and that, therefore, the demurrage claimed arose. It was stated that 211. 13s. 6d. had been paid into court as a tender; but beyond that amount the defendant was not liable, as the delay was the result of the plaintiff's laches. A question arose in the case involving the sum of 15s. 4d., which had been paid by the captain for town dues, and which he sought to recover, but which was contested by the defendant on principle.

During the discussion of this point Segar said he could not find in any of the Acts of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board power to enforce the payment of town dues.

His HONOUR said he scarcely thought this could be so, for it would affect the collection of a large amount of the revenue of the port of Liverpool.

Mr. Registrar Hime: About 100,000l. a year.

Gully said that under the Mersey Docks and Harbour Act 1857, the town dues were transferred to the Dock Board. The 32nd section of that Act said that "all such powers, rights, and privileges of imposing or collecting any of the dues, herein. before called town dues and anchorage dues, as are now vested in, or have been lawfully exercised by, the Corporation of Liverpool, shall from Jan. 1858, be transferred and vested in the board."

His HONOUR held that the plaintiff was entitled to 11. 5s. 4. demurrage, including the 15s. 4d. town dnes, beyond the amount paid into court.


The facts, and cases cited, sufficiently appear from the written judgment of the Court given-REGISTRATION.-A resolution to adjourn a


This is an action for wine sold, the defendant has given notice of his intention to prove a set-off against the price of certain wine, for which this action is brought. Prior to the delivery of the wine, Coling was indebted to Whitley, on account of goods supplied to him by Whitley, to a larger amount than the value of the wine. This private debt of Coling's, to Whitley, is now sought to be used as a set-off against the partner's claim for wine supplied by them to Whitley. The order for the wine was in writing and was directed to Coling alone. Whitley ordered this wine because he could not obtain from Coling payment in money; there was no agreement that the wine should be in payment of Coling's private debt, which distinguishes this case from a somewhat doubtful case of Mallace v. Kelsall, 7 M. and W. 264, cited in argument. No invoice was sent with the wine, but a delivery note was sent with the words "Coling and Co." printed upon it; this ticket was signed by the defendant's servant and then at once handed back to the carman who brought the wine, the defendant never saw it. There is a rule of law that a partnership debt cannot be set off against a private debt. But there is also a rule that the right of a principal, who keeps in the background, to intervene and claim the benefit of the contract, is subject to the condition that the other party to the contract is not prejudiced thereby. If the delivery note had even been an invoice, sent to the defendant himself, with the words "and Co." upon it I think I


NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. LIQUIDATION BY ARRANGEMENT-ADJOURNMENT OF MEEting of CredITORS-RESOLUTION, VALIDITY OF-VOTING-SIGNING BY CREDITORS meeting of creditors under a petition for liquidation by arrangement, in order to be valid must (like any other resolution) be reduced into writing, and must be signed by the proper majority of the creditors who have proved their debts, and are present at the meeting. It is not necessary that the ceditors who dissent from the resolution should evidence their dissent by any writing, as the resolution cannot be carried unless it is signed by the proper majority in value of assenting creditors. A creditor who does not wish to take any part in the voting, must withdraw his proof as provided by rule 273. At a meeting of creditors, under a petition for liquidation by arrangement, a resolution to adjourn the meeting for a week was proposed, and was de. clared by the chairman to be carried. The adjourned meeting was held, and the creditors then passed a resolution in favour of liquidation by arrangement. The resolution for adjournment was reduced into writing, and was signed by certain creditors present at the original meeting, who professed to be a majority of those present. They were, in fact, not a majority in value of those present. The County Court judge held that the resolution to adjourn was invalid, and that it could not be registered, and that all the subsequent proceedings were also invalid. The Chief Judge in bankruptcy directed the resolution to adjourn to be registered. On appeal, the decision of the Chief Judge was reversed, and that of the County Court judge affirmed: (Ex parte Orde; re Horsley, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 400. Ch.)

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