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the 10,000l. was bequeathed in the first place in trust for Mrs. Cantley for life for her separate use, with a proviso determining her life interest in certain events which, did not take place, and that, subject to such determinable life interest, it was bequeathed to her children as she should appoint, and accordingly that her will operated as a valid appointment, and that her husband was not liable to take out letters of administration in respect of that sum. Solicitors for the petitioners, Bailey, Shaw, Smith, and Bailey. Solicitors for the respondents, Solicitors to the Inland Revenue.

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. Thursday, Nov. 23.


judgment in the Exchequer Chamber. Leave was reserved as to whether this ruling was right. Day, for the defendant, now moved for a rule nisi to enter a nonsuit pursuant to the leave, and also for a new trial on the ground that the damages were excessive.

The COURT (Cockburn, C.J., Blackburn and Mellor, JJ.) considered this case to be stronger in favour of the plaintiff than that of Frost v. Knight, where the promise was to marry on the death of defendant's father; and they thought that the ruling in this case was right, whatever might be the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber. The rule was therefore refused upon the leave reserved; it was granted with regard to the damages, unless the plaintiff agreed to accept half the amount assessed by the jury.

Ex parte EDMUNDS. Bills of Sale Acts 1854 & 1866-Affidavit filed with Right of receiver of public moneys to claim audit bill of sale-Description of assignor's residence. of his accounts-Mandamus. INTERPLEADER issue, plaintiff claiming the proParry, Serjt. (with him Joyce) moved on behalf perty of one Isaac Anthony, under a bill of sale, of Mr. Leonard Edmunds for a writ of mandamus and the defendant, being an execution creditor. to compel the Lords Commissioners of the TreaThe case was tried at Swansea during the Spring sury to have his accounts audited. It appeared Assizes, 1871, before Mellor, J., when a verdict from his affidavit that he was appointed to the was found for the plaintiff, leave being reserved office of Clerk of the Patents by the Crown in 1833, to the defendant to move for a nonsuit on the and held the office until 1864, during which time ground that the affidavit filed with the bill of sale he received and disbursed on account of the Crown contained an insufficient description of the resimore than a million and a half of money. He dence of the said Isaac Anthony, the assignor. alleged that his accounts had never been brought In the bill of sale, he was correctly described as the party of the first part, "Isaac Anthony, of audit, and report," either on behalf of the Crown to statutory or Parliamentary "examination, Dynevor Lodge, in the parish of Llanarthney, in or on behalf of the House of Commons, and the county of Carmarthen, auctioneer." It was proved that a letter addressed to Isaac Anthony, effectual certificates of discharge, even and quit,' that in the absence of his lawful "valid and Dynevor Lodge, would reach him from the he was to this day held personally responsible and neighbouring post town of Llandilo. The affidavit was accountable to the Crown and to Parliament for as follows: "I, Walter William the whole of the said milllon and a half. He Edwards, of Llandilo, in the County of Carmarstated that he had incessantly demanded from then, attorney's clerk, made oath and say as follows: 1. That the paper writing hereto annexed year to year and in every year from 1834 to the is a true copy of a bill of sale made or given by present day as of right and according to law and Isaac Anthony to David Jones, of Wern, in the justice, that he might be forced by the Executive Government, under the provisions of the Acts of parish of Llanarthney, in the county of Carmar- Parliament, into the examination of his said then, gentleman, and of the schedule or inventory accounts. The various departments of the thereto annexed or therein referred to and every Government refused his said demands, and inattestation of the execution thereof. 2. That the stituted proceedings against him in the Exchequer, bill of sale was made or given on the 5th Dec. upon which the matters in difference between him1870, being the day of the date thereof. 3. That self and the Crown were referred to arbitration, I was present and did see the said Isaac Anthony and in the result the arbitrators found him sign and execute the said bill of sale, and that the indebted to the Crown in a sum of over said Isaac Anthony resides at Dynevor Lodge, 70001. In consequence he was imprisoned and is an auctioneer. 4. That the name W. Win. for the debt and costs, and deprived of his Edwards, subscribed as a witness attesting the pensions; but as no formal audit had taken execution of the said bill of sale, is in my hand-place, and he had received no legal discharge, writing, and that I reside at Llandilo and am an attorney's clerk. Sworn at Llandilo, in the county of Carmarthen, this 17th Dec. 1870, before me, Nath. Davies, a commissioner for taking affidavits in the Court of Queen's Bench, Westminster, W. Wm. Edwards." A rule nisi had been obtained by the defendant in pursuance of the leave reserved.

De Rutzen now showed cause. Coleridge supported the rule. They discussed the two Bills of Sale Acts, (17 & 18 Vict. c. 36, and 29 & 30 Vict. c. 96), and also the following cases: Pickard v. Bretz (5 H. & N. 9); Hewer v. Cox (3 El. & El. 428); Briggs v. Boss (L. Rep. 3 Q. B. 268); Thorp v. Browne (L. Rep. 2 E. & I. App. 220); Brodrick v. Scale (L. Rep. 6 C. P. 98); Allen v. Thompson (1 H. & N. 15); Hatton v. English (26 L. J., Q. B., 161); Routh v. Roublot (1 E. & E. 850).

The COURT (Cockburn, C.J. Blackburn and Mellor, JJ.) considered the last case, Routh v. Roublot, an authority more applicable than any other to the circumstances of the present case, and held that the description was sufficient.

Rule discharged.

Attorney for plaintiff, Thos. Clarke. Attorneys for defendant, Ingledew, Ince, and Greening.

Saturday, Nov. 25. TARGETT V. VINCENT. Breach of promise to marry-Condition precedent -Action before fulfilment of condition. ACTION for breach of promise of marriage tried before Blackburn, J. at Westminster. Verdict for plaintiff, damages 2501. Leave reserved to the defendant to move to enter a nonsuit, the court to be at liberty to amend declaration, if it should be proper and necessary to do so. The declaration alleged that the promise was to marry within a reasonable time. The evidence established a promise to marry as soon as the father of the man, who was defendant, should consent. The engagement was broken off by the defendant, on the alleged ground of his father's refusal to consent, and his consequent inability to provide for a wife. Defendant had been in receipt of 401. a year, and his father was a druggist. The judge at the trial held that the declaration ought to be amended, and that the action lay, notwithstanding the nonfulfilment of the condition precedent, on the authority of Frost v. Knight (L. Rep. 5 Ex. 322), which case is now awaiting

it was now contended that the Acts of Parliament relating to the audit of public accounts, viz., 25 Geo. 3, c. 52; 1 & 2 Geo. 4, c. 121; and 29 & 30 Vict. c. 39, not only appointed auditors whose business it was to examine these accounts when ordered to do so by the Treasury, but also laid upon the Commissioners of the Treasury the duty of ordering the auditors to examine the accounts of those receivers of public moneys who claimed to have their accounts so examined.

The COURT refused to grant a rule, on the ground that no such right as that contended for had been granted to the receivers of public moneys. The duty of ordering the audit of accounts was imposed upon the Commissioners of the Treasury in the interests of the public and the House of Commons, but upon the materials before them the court declined to express an opinion as to whether that duty had been neglected. Rule refused.

Attorney for applicant, E. Johnson.

HOLMES v. ALBRIGHT. Insufficiency of special jurors—Refusal to pray a


ACTION came on for trial at the Oxford Summer Assizes 1870. The defendant had obtained an order for a special jury, but seven special jurors only attended. Neither plaintiff nor defendant would pray a tales, and the trial went off. At the Spring Assizes of this year, the action was tried and resulted in a verdict for the defendant. The master had allowed the defendant the costs of the first trial, and Byles, J., had affirmed his order. A rule had been obtained to rescind this judge's order, and to review the taxation; two of the masters had been desired to report upon the practice of the court in such a case, and the following report of masters Hodgson and Unthank was now read: "We think the practice in this court is to allow the costs in such a case as this to the successful party as costs in the cause, and not as costs of the day."

J. O. Griffits appeared to show cause against the rule, but the Court called upon

Dowdeswell, Q.C. for the plaintiff.-He argued that the failure of the first trial was the fault of both sides; and therefore the costs were thrown away, and ought not to be imposed upon either party. He relied upon Wood v. Duncan (5 M. & W. 87); Bostock v. North Staffordshire Railway Company (21 L. J. 384 Q. B.). [Master Smith re

ferred the court to the case of Seeley v. Power, 3 Dowl. P. C. 372.]

The COURT declined to disturb the practice of the court. Rule discharged. LONDON AND SUBURBAN BANK v. WALKINSHAW. Action against drawer of bill-Payment by acceptor after action brought-Holder's right to proceed for costs. ACTION upon a bill of exchange, tried before Blackburn, J., during this term. Verdict for plaintiff 1s., with leave to plaintiff to move to enter a verdict of 501., the amount of the bill. Plaintiff commenced actions against the acceptor and drawer of the bill; the defendant in this case being the drawer. Before declaration against the drawer the acceptor paid the amount; plaintiffs then declared in this action, without first demanding of defendant the cost of the writ. Afterwards defendant refused to pay what he considered the unnecessary cost of the declaration, and pleaded, amongst other pleas, payment before action; he did not, however, plead payment after action brought. The learned judge considered the plaintiffs' conduct improper, and directed the verdict as above and refused to certify for costs.

Anderson showed cause against a rule, granted in pursuance of the leave reserved, and argued that what was done at the trial was within the judge's discretion, and that this case was distinguishable from Randall v. Moon (21 L. J. 226, C. P.), relied upon by the plaintiff when the rule was moved.

Rose appeared to support the rule, but was not heard.

The COURT considered that in strict right the

plaintiffs had a right to go on with this action for their costs; that the defendant might have pleaded payment after action; and that the judge was wrong in allowing evidence in reduction of damages under the plea of payment before action.

Rule absolute.


Action against sheriff for a false return-No injury to plaintiff.

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ACTION against a sheriff for a false return, tried before Mellor, J., in Middlesex. Verdict for defendant, with leave reserved to enter verdict of 771. for plaintiff. In an action of the present plaintiff against Follows, the sheriff of Leicestershire returned to a writ of fi. fa. obtained by the plaintiff : By virtue of the within writ to me directed, I seized the goods and chattels in my bailiwick of the within named Henry Follows, and kept them safe in my possession until the 19th Sept., 1870, when I received from John Wilkinson Smith, the attorney of the plaintiff, in the said writ named, an order to withdraw from possession of the said goods and chattels. Whereupon I immediately withdrew from such possession." At the trial the defendant did not attempt to prove the truth of this return, but he called evidence to show that the only goods Follows appeared to have, had been assigned under a bill of sale, which the jury found to be valid. A rule had been obtained in pursuance of the leave, on the ground that the defendant was concluded by his return.

Mundell, Q.C. and Abbott showed cause, and argued that as no actual damage to the plaintiff was proved, the falsity of the return was not suffi cient even for a nominal verdict..

Field, Q.C. and J. W. Mellor, in support of the rule, contended that the sheriff in this case ought to have interpleaded or returned nulla bona; that this was his deliberate act, and being an official return he was estopped from contradicting it at the trial. They relied upon a dictum of Lord Campbell's, in Remmett v. Lawrence (15 Q. B. 1004), which, according to Williams, J., in Levy v. Hall (29 L. J. 130, C. P.), is supported by two cases, Clerk v. Withers (2 Lord Raym. 1075). Mildmay v. Smith (2 Wms. Saund. 343), and

The COURT considered that the two authorities cited failed to support the mere obiter dictum of Lord Campbell, and that this action of tort, like others, requires injury to the plaintiff as well as a wrong by the defendant. Rule discharged.

Attorney for plaintiff, Jeremian Briggs. Attorneys for defendant, Preston and Robinson.


COMPANY. Incidents to a right of way over water-Obstruction maintained by owner of soil. SPECIAL case without pleadings. Plaintiff was owner of the fee simple of the soil of Lake Ulleswater; defendants were owners of the fee simple of some of the adjoining land. The public have a right of way over the whole of the lake. Defendants had constructed a pier from their own land out into the lake, for which the plaintiff successfully instituted proceedings against them. The Since the year case is reported 3 B. & S. 732. 1861, when those proceedings were finally cor. cluded, the pier has remained as it was structed, and the defendants have landed passen


gers from their steamers upon it. This action was brought for breaking and entering the plaintiff's pier, and for causing passengers to traverse the pier.

Manisty, Q.C. (with him Forbes), for the plaintiff contended that this pier was an obstruction to the navigation of the lake, set up by the defendants; and that they had no right to avail themselves of their own wrong, and justify their use of the plaintiff's property merely because it was an obstruction.

Holker, Q.C. (with him Kemplay), for the defendants, argued that as the plaintiff had maintained the pier since he had been compensated for the wrong done by the defendants, he was in the same position as if he had erected an obstruction himself, in which case, according to the Eastern Counties Railway Company v. Dorling (28 L. J. 202, C. P.), the public would have a right to use the obstruction so far as it is necessary for the enjoyment of their rights. The COURT (Blackburn, Mellor, and Lush, JJ.), Judgment for defendants. Attorneys for plaintiffs, Bell, Brodrick, and Gray. Attorneys for defendants, James and Curtis.


Wednesday, Nov. 29.

DAVIES AND WIFE v. SOLOMON. Slander of wife-Loss of husband's cohabitation, and of friends' hospitality-Special damage. DEMURRER to a declaration. The action was for slander by the defendant of the female plaintiff, the words being, "I can prove that John Davies' wife had connection with a man named Labrach two years ago, but I would rather have the tongue cut out of my mouth than separate man and wife." The declaration proceeded to allege that the female plaintiff was thereby injured in her character and reputation, and became alienated from, and deprived of, the cohabitation of her husband, and lost, and was deprived of, the companionship, and ceased to receive the hospitality, of divers friends, and especially of her hus band, and three persons whose names were mentioned, who had, by reason of the premises, withdrawn from the companionship of, and ceased to be hospitable to, or be friendly with, the female plaintiff. The alleged ground of demurrer was that the special damage was too remote.

Lawrence, for the defendant, relied upon Lord Wensleydale's judgment in Lynch V. Knight (9 H. L. Cas. 577). He further contended that the only pecuniary damage alleged was loss of hospitality, which was damage to the husband alone, and he ought therefore to sue by himself.

Prentice, Q.C. appeared for the plaintiffs. The COURT (Blackburn, Mellor, and Hannen, JJ.), considered that the judgment cited by defendant did not apply, and that there was an allega

tion of real loss to the wife.

Judgment for plaintiffs. Attorney for plaintiffs, Geo. L. Norman. Attorneys for defendant, Taylor, Hoare, and Taylor.

Wednesday, Nov. 22.

County Vote-Freehold-Poor and necessitous

burgesses - Bye-law passed by corporation

Custom-Yearly tenants.

THE names of the claimant and 110 other persons were on the list of voters for the county of Stafford for qualifications described as freehold land, situate at Coton Field. They were duly objected to. The mayor and corporation of Stafford were for many years possessed of certain freehold land within the borough called Coton Field. In the year 1836 a bye-law was passed, that in future, whenever any part of the Coton Field became vacant, it should be held in future by the poor and necessitous burgesses of the borough, by birth or servitude duly qualified to vote for members of Parlia ment, or by widows of such burgesses; it was also declared that no person should hold more than one acre of such land; the rent payable was to be fixed from time to time by the corporation, and no one was to be considered a poor and necessitous burgess unless declared so by a majority of the council of the borough. All the claimants had been shown to be poor and necessitous burgesses, and each of them paid 5s. per annum for the portion of land allotted to them. The revising barrister was of opinion that the claimants had not a freehold to entitle them to a vote for the county, and he disallowed all the claims accordingly.

Streeten (Gorst with him) for the appellant, contended that a custom had existed prior to the passing of the Municipal Corporation Act, and that at any rate the claimant had an equitable freehold estate entitling him to a vote, and that although the corporation could alter the bye-law, -they could not alter the possession of a burgess after he had once been admitted. Gough for the respondent.

The COURT (Willes, Byles, and Brett, JJ.) were of opinion that the vote could not be supported on the ground of custom; and that the claimants were merely yearly tenants, who would be liable to be turned out at any time by the repeal of the bye-law. Decision affirmed. Attorneys for appellant, Corser and Howler. Attorney for the respondent, Beddall.

REGISTRATION APPEAL. HUCKLE v. PIPER. Qualification in county-Rateable value under several landlords. OBJECTION was taken to the name of Henry Greves as a voter for the county of Bedford. He was described as of Sandy, the nature of his qualification in the third column being 121. rate able value. He was tenant of lands and tenements in the parish of Sandy under four separate and distinct landlords in small sums, all under 121., but making up in the aggregate considerably more than 127. The lands were properly assessed to the poor rates. It was objected that Greves could not be retained on the list, as he was not separately assessed to the poor rate in respect of a separate occupation of premises of the value of 121., and was not the occupier under one landlord of premises of such a value as to confer a vote. The revising barrister was of opinion that the qualification was sufficient and allowed the vote. Bulwer, Q.C. for the appellant. H. Shield for the respondent.

The COURT (Willes, Byles, and Brett, JJ.) were of opinion that the aggregate of the sums for which the claimant paid poor rates should be added together, and that it was no objection to the vote the tenants holding under different landlords. Decision affirmed. Attorney for appellant, Williams and James for Wikinson and Co., St. Neots. Attorneys for respondents, Saunders, for Whyley and Piper.

REGISTRATION APPEAL. CHORLTON v. OVERSEERS OF STRETFord. Sub-lessee-Interest in leasehold houses—2 Will. 4. THOMAS SURWOOD was in actual occupation of c. 45, s. 20-30 & 31 Vict. c. 102, s. 5. No. 4, Gladstone-street, Stretford, and claimed a vote for the county, by virtue of that qualification, and also by an interest in two leasehold houses, with a term of over sixty years. Surwood was a sub-lessee of the leaseholds for a period of not less them. The value of No. 4, Gladstone-street, was than sixty years, but had no qualifying interest in over 51. but under 10l. per annum. The claimant contended that the Representation of the People Act 1867, sect. 5, extended to the case of a sublessee, and was substantially a repeal of 2 Will. 4, c. 45, s. 20. The Revising Barrister was of opinion the claimant's case did not come under the Representation of the People Act, and that to entitle a person being a sub-lessee of premises to a vote. The premises must be of a value of not less than 10l. per annum, and expunged the claimant's name from the register.

Joshua Williams, Q. C. (Edwards with him), for the appellant.-The 5th section of the Representation of the People Act must be read with 2 Will. 4, c. 45.

The respondent was not represented by counsel. The COURT (Willes, Byles, and Brett, JJ.) were of opinion that Thomas Surwood was entitled to a vote for the county under the 5th section of the Representation of the People Act; and that the effect of that section was not to create a new franchise, but to lower the value.

Decision reversed.

Quain, Q.C. for the respondent, was not called upon.

The COURT (Willes, Byles, and Brett, JJ.), held that the objection was to the nature of the qualification, and was sufficiently explicit to call the atten tion of the voter as to what was to be proved. Decision affirmed.

Attorney for appellant, Hicking.
Attorney for respondent, Southgate.

Thursday, Nov. 23.

TETLEY AND ANOTHER . SHAND. Broker selling his own goods-Right to recoverCustom.

THIS was an action by a broker to recover a sum lost by him through the defendant not accepting cotton sold under the following circumstances Defendant had sold a lot of cotton at 94d. for delivery on a future day. To enable him to fulfil this contract, he subsequently came to the plaintiffs, who were cotton brokers; they told him they thought they could buy at 84d. Defendant told them to buy gradually at 8d. if they could not do better. Plaintiffs accordingly sent defendant a bought note as follows: "Bought for your order to arrive 500 bales of cotton,&c., at 84d.," signed by the plaintiffs as brokers, and an amount appeared on the note as the amount payable for brokerage. Plaintiffs really had no principals, but sold cotton which they had not at the time, but which they subsequently bought at a less price than 84d. A custom was proved that when a broker sold without disclosing the name of his principals, he was himself liable as the principal. Defendant swore at the trial that he would not have made the contract if he had known that plaintiffs were selling their own cotton, and that he employed them to act as his brokers. On finding out that the plaintiffs were selling their own cotton, defendant refused to accept it. The case was tried last spring at the Guildhall, before Bovill, C.J. It did not go to the jury, but a verdict was directed for the plaintiffs for the amount claimed, with leave for the defendant to move. A rule having been obtained,

Sir G. Honyman, Q.C. and Watkin Williams showed cause.

Sir J. Karslake, Q.C. and Cohen in support of the rule.

of opinion that the plaintiffs, having been em-
The COURT (Willes, Keating, Brett, JJ.) were
ployed as brokers, and having professed to act as
such, had no right to sell their own cotton.

Rule absolute.
Attorneys for plaintiffs, Thomas and Hollams.
Attorneys for defendants, Simpson and Culling-

Re COOKER (An Attorney).
Practice-Attorney-Professional misconduct in
appropriating money-Rule to strike him off the
rolls, and to pay over the money appropriated.
Garth, Q.C. (Murray with him) moved to make
absolute a rule nisi, which had been served on
Cooker, an attorney, calling on Cooker to show
cause why he should not be struck off the rolls, or
pay to the trustees under the will of a Mrs. Hirst,

deceased, the sum of 18407. It appeared that Mrs. Hirst had some years ago entrusted the sum of 1840l. to Cooker, as her attorney, for him to invest for her. Cooker invested it according to her instructions, but afterwards, without the knowledge or consent of Mrs. Hirst, drew it out and applied it to his own use, but continued every year to pay his client quarterly sums, which he represented to be the dividends. It was not until the death of

Mrs. Hirst that all this was discovered. The rule nisi had been granted in the alternative, and it was now asked, no cause being shown, to make

Attorneys for appellant, Horne and Hunter, the rule absolute to pay over the money.



Objection-Nature and qualification-County and borough vote.

OBJECTION was made to the Rev. William Cocken's vote for the county. His place of abode was described as The Rectory, Bishopswearmouth, and the nature of the qualification in the third column as a "freehold benefice," the street where situated was described as Bishops wearmouth parish. The qualification for which it was endeavoured to retain Mr. Cocken's name on the register was the parsonage house, to which he was entitled as rector. The objector proposed to show that the house was situate within the Parliamentary borough of Sunderland, and that Mr. Cocken was entitled to a vote for the borough, and therefore not for the county. It was objected on behalf of the voter, that the objector, who grounded his objection on the nature of the interest, was not entitled to go into this particular ground of objection. The revising barrister admitted the objection, and struck the name off the list of voters.

Udal for the appellant. -The objection is to no column, and is not specific.

The COURT (Willes, Keating, and Brett, JJ.) at first thought the rule ought to be made absolute only to strike the attorney off the rolls, but on further consideration they made it absolute to strike him off the rolls and to pay over the money. Rule absolute accordingly. Attorney for applicant, H. S. Willett.

Nov. 9 and 25.

NORTH BRITISH AND MERCANTILE ASSURANCE COMPANY v. MOFFATT AND ANOTHER. Insurance-Goods, "assured's own, on trust or one commission, for which he is responsible"-Goods at a wharf which assured has sold, but of which he still retains the dock warrants. SPECIAL case without pleadings. The defendants, on Oct. 13, 1865, effected two policies with plaintiffs, by which plaintiffs, in consideration of an annual premium, insured from loss or damage by fire as from Sept. 29, 1865, to an amount not exceeding 3500l. merchandise" the assured's own, in trust or on commission, for which they are respon sible" in any of the warehouses, &c., specified, of which Beale's wharf was one. On the 30th Oct., while the said policies were still in force, Beale's Wharf was burnt down and certain tea lodged there was destroyed. The defendant claimed 1130l. 8s. 7d. in respect of the loss of this tea,

DEC. 2, 1871.]

alleging it to have been covered by the abovementioned policies. It appeared that these teas had been deposited in bond by the importer with the wharfinger to whom Beale's Wharf belonged, and who issued warrants for the same, deliverable to the depositor or his assigns by indorsement thereon. The defendants had purchased the teas from the importer, who indorsed to them the warrants in blank. The defendants, before the fire occurred, had resold a large portion of the teas in specified chests to customers, and had They held, however, been paid for the same. the warrants on behalf of such customers, but merely for the convenience of paying, if required to do so, the charges necessary to clear the teas, payable by the vendors, all charges payable by the defendants having been previously paid. The property in the teas had passed to the vendees, The plaintiffs, under these circumstances, paid, under the above-mentioned policies, the sum claimed by the defendants, which sum included a sum of 6361. 13s. 7d., which represented the value of the teas which had been, as above stated, The plaintiffs paid resold by the defendants. under an agreement by the defendants to repay this sum of 6361. 13s. 7d., if the court should be of opinion that the teas in question were not covered by the policy. The question for the court was, whether the teas were so covered? If they were not, then plaintiffs were to be entitled to a verdict for 6361. 13s. 7d.: if they were, then the verdict was to be for the defendants.

H. Matthews, Q.C. (Holl with him) for the plaintiffs.

Sir J. Karslake, Q. C. (Watkin Williams and Underdown with him) for the defendants.

Cur adv. vult.

Nov. 25.-The COURT (Willes, Keating, and
Brett, JJ.) gave judgment for the plaintiffs.
Judgment for plaintiffs.
Attorney for plaintiffs, G. M. Clements.
Attorney for defendants, Cox and Willoughby.

Friday, Nov. 24.
Stock Exchange-Custom of transferring shares
-Difference in price-Transfer note to last pur-


ACTION to recover commission due from the defendant to the plaintiff who was a stockbroker. The plaintiff instructed defendant to sell certain railway shares for him on the Liverpool Stock Exchange. The defendant accordingly sent the plaintiff a sold note in the usual form, stating that he had sold 4001. stock of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway at 1401. 3s. 4d. per cent. It is the custom on the Liverpool Stock Exchange for the vendor of shares to transfer to the last purchaser of such shares, and for him to sign a transfer note to such purchaser. It accordingly happened that the sum stated to be paid to the defendant instead of being 1401.3s. 4s. was 1411. 5s. The defendant having really only received the former sum refused to sign the transfer. At the foot of the transfer note is a paragraph stating that the consideration money set forth differs from that which the first seller is to receive, owing to a sub-sale by the original buyer, but that it is arranged to fulfil the provision of the Stamp Act for regulating the ad valorem duty under 55 Geo. 3, c. 184. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, leave being reserved to move to enter a nonsuit or a verdict for defendant.

Gully showed case. Temple, in support, contended that the custom was an unreasonable one.


ruled that this was not a June shipment, and so
have directed a verdict for the defendant.
Quain, Q. C. and Watkin Williams, showed

Butt, Q. C. and Cohen, in support of the rule.
The COURT (Willes, Keating, and Brett, JJ.)
held that the direction was right, and discharged
Rule discharged.
Attorney for plaintiff, Thomas and Hollams.
Attorney for defendant, Simpson and Culling-

the rule.


Monday, Nov. 27.

Contract-Sale of cargo "expected to arrive" by a
particular ship.
THIS was an appeal against a decision of the
Court of Queen's Bench making absolute a rule
for a nonsuit (see 23 L. T. Rep. N. S. 240). The
action was brought for breach of an agreement in
not delivering a quantity of nitrate of soda "ex-
pected to arrive at a port of call by the ship
Precursor," to which the defendants pleaded (2)
that the shipment of the nitrate of soda was,
before breach, prevented by the destruction of the
soda by an inundation, caused by an earthquake
at the port of lading, being one of the circum-
stances and accidents within the meaning of the
contract. Between the date (16th July) of the
defendants' agents at Valparaiso chartering the
Precursor to take the soda which they had pur-
chased to England, and the 8th Sept., when the
contract of sale to the plaintiff was made, an
earthquake had (on 13th Aug.) destroyed the
greater part of the soda while lying at the port of
lading, and on the 2nd Sept. the Valparaiso agents
had cancelled the charter of the Precursor. These
agents afterwards purchased another quantity of
nitrate of soda of the same amount, and obtained
a transfer of a charter of the Precursor for con-
veying the soda to England to enable the defen-
dants to execute their contract with the plaintiff,
or to sell at a profit, if at liberty to do so. Defen-
dants refusing to acknowledge plaintiff's claim to
this cargo, an action was brought against them on
the contract, when a verdict was returned for the
plaintiff, leave being reserved to defendants to
move to enter a nonsuit or a verdict for them, pur-
suant to which leave a rule was obtained, and was
subsequently made absolute.

R. G. Williams (with him Quain, Q. C.) for the

Milward, Q. C. (with him Baylis) for the defendants.

The COURT (Kelly, C. B., Willes and Keating.
JJ., Channell, Pigott, and Cleasby, BB.) affirmed
the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench,
making absolute the rule to enter a nonsuit.

Judgment affirmed.
Attorneys for plaintiff, Jones, Blaxland, and
Son, for Abbot and Leonard, Bristol.
Attorneys for defendants, Walker and Sons, for
Ellis and Field, Liverpool.

COATES AND ANOTHER v. COLLINS. Lease for lives-Covenant-Description. ERROR. Declaration on a covenant in a deed that a good, valid, and subsisting a certain lease is " lease in the law for the lives of W. W., W. J., R. H., and the survivors and survivors of them." The breach alleged was that at the time of the execution of the covenant, the said lease was not a good, valid, and subsisting lease in the law for the lives of the said W. W., W. J., and R. H., and the The COURT (Willes, Keating, and Brett, JJ.) survivors and survivor of them, but that the said were of opinion that the defendant was bound to W. J. had died long before. Plea, setting out the sign the transfer note, as the paragraph at the deed containing the above covenant, whereby the defendant conveyed unto the plaintiffs "all that bottom was to be read as part of the document. Attorney for plaintiff, Forshaw, Commerce-messuage, &c., to have and to hold the said messuage, &c., for and during the lives and life of the court, Liverpool. Attorneys for defendant, Gregory Rowcliffes and said W. W., W. J., and R. H., and the lives and life of the survivors and survivor of them," and a good, valid, and subCo., for Payne, Liverpool. covenanted that it was sisting lease in law" for the lives as above set out. The deed of conveyance contained also a covenant for further assurance "for the lives of the said W. W., W. J., and R. H., and the lives and life of the survivors and survivor." Demurrer to the plea. The Court of Queen's Bench (Cockburn, C.J., Mellor and Lush, JJ.) held the covenant to amourt only to this, that the lease was a good, valid, and subsisting one; and that the words "for the lives of the said W. W., W. J., and R. H.," were merely words of description of the lease, and not amounting to a warranty that each of the three persons was alive at the time. Brown, Q.C. (with him Lawrence), for the plaintiff, contended that the meaning of the covenant was that each of the three persons named was alive at the time of the assignment of the lease.


Saturday, Nov. 25.

Contract-Construction-Question left to the jury. ACTION for not accepting maize. Defendant had contracted with plaintiff for the purchase of a large quantity of maize, "for June or July shipment.' It was proved at the trial, before Brett, J., that maize shipped in June or July was always in better condition than that shipped earlier. One lot of the maize tendered by plaintiff, consisting of about 1480 kilos, was refused by defendant, on the ground that the plaintiff had begun to put it on board ship on the 12th May, and got about 650 kilos on board in May, and the remaining 830 kilos in the first four or five days in June. On this ground it was contended that this was not a June or July shipment. Brett, J. at the trial left it to the jury to say whether the shipment was one which would pass in ordinary mercantile phrase as a June shipment, and the jury found for plaintiff. A rule was subsequently obtained for a new trial, on the ground that the judge ought to have


Manisty, Q.C. (with him Lord), for the defen-
dant, contended that the words in the covenant
as to the three lives were words of description

The COURT affirmed the decision of the Court of
Queen's Bench, being of opinion that the words

were merely words of description, and did not
amount to a warranty that each person was alive
Judgment affirmed.
at the time.
Attorneys for plaintiff, Stocken and Jupp.
Attorneys for defendant, Routh and Stacey.

Lands injuriously affected-Title to compensation
-Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 (8 Vict.
c. 18), s. 68-Effect of incorporation of Lands
Clauses Consolidation Act in Special Act.
ERROR on a special case. By sect. 83 of the
66 so much of the
Chelsea Improvement Act 1845,
Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 as is appli-
cable, and is not modified by this Act, or as is not
apply to the improvements authorised by this
inconsistent with the provisions hereof, shall
Act to be made, and shall be read as forming part
of this Act." By one section of this Special Act
the commissioners under the Act are empowered
to alter the level of streets, but nothing is said in
the Act as to any compensation being made for
injuries to property caused by such alteration.
By other sections the commissioners are em-
powered to remove from houses projections into
the streets which were existing at the time of pas-
sing the Act, and also on the rebuilding of pro-
jecting houses, to set them back to the line of the
street; and in these cases the Act contains a
proviso that compensation shall be made to the
owners, &c., by the commissioners. The com-
missioners having, in raising the level of a street,
injuriously affected a house by impeding the
access to it, a mandamus was issued command-
ing the defendants to take up an award alleged to
have been made under the Act, to which the
defendants made a return; whereupon a case was
stated for the opinion of the Court of Queen's
Bench, who gave judgment for the Crown, and
holding that the incorporation of the Lands
Clauses Consolidation Act of itself gave a title to
compensation where property was injuriously
affected, though no provision to that effect was
contained in the special Act.

Sir J. B. Karslake, Q.C. (with him Raymond), for the defendants, contended that the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act did not of itself give a title to compensation, but only provided a machinery for assessing compensation in those cases where a title to it was conferred by the Special Act.

Philbrick (with him H. T. Atkinson), for the Crown, were not called on.

The COURT affirmed the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, and held that the incorporation of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act had of itself the effect of entitling to compensation in all that a special provision to that effect was not cases where lands were injuriously affected, and necessary in the special Act.

Judgment affirmed. Attorneys for the Crown, Batt and Son. Attorneys for defendants, Lee, Pemberton, and Lewis.

MOUNTSTEPHEN V. LAKEMAN. Promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another-Whether third person must be actually liable-Sect. 4 of Statute of Frauds (29 Car. 2, c. 3.) of Queen's Bench making absolute a rule to enter Plaintiff had been employed by a THIS was an appeal from a decision of the Court a nonsuit. local board of health, of which defendant was chairman, to construct a main sewer; and the local board gave notice to the occupiers of the adjoining houses to connect their drainage with the sewer within twenty-one days, or the board would do it at their expense. Before the lapse of the twenty-one days the plaintiff when about quitting the work was asked by defendant why he did not make the connections, to which the plaindefendant antiff replied, "I have no objection to do the work, if you or the local board will give whereupon the the order," swered, "You go on and do the work, and I will see you paid.' The plaintiff having done the work and not being paid for it by the board, to whom he sent in his account, brought an action against defendant, and the jury gave a verdict for him. A rule nisi being obtained to enter a nonsuit the Court of Queen's Bench made it absolute on the groound that the defendant did not undertake to be primarily liable for the amount, but only in case the board did not pay it; that therefore the promise was one to answer for the debt or Statute of Frauds, have been in writing. default of another, and must therefore, by the

Charles (with him Lopes, Q.C.) for the plaintiff, contended that to bring the case within the Statute of Frauds, there must be an actual debt or default on the part of the third person, and that here there was none, as the board never became indebted.

Cole, Q.C. (with him Pinder) for the defendant, contended that the promise was one to pay only in case the local board or the occupiers did not, and therefore came within the Statute of Frauds.

The COURT were unanimously of opinion that the judgment of the court below was wrong in holding it sufficient to bring the promise within the Statute of Frauds, that at the time it was made, there is an assumed or supposed, though not actual, liability on the part of the third person, and therefore that the judgment should be reversed. Judgment reversed.

Attorneys for plaintiff, G. E. Philbick for W. and C. Kitson, Torquay.

Solicitors for the defendants, Church, Sons and Clarke, for Francis and Baker, Newton Abbot.


(Before the CHIEF JUDGE.)


GOORD (Thomas), Bunce-grove, West Hoathley, Sussex, gentleman. Dec. 28; A. Hastie, solicitor, East Grinstead, Sussex. Jan. 13; V.C. W., at twelve o'clock. HOLY (Daniel), Newbold, Derby, gentleman. Dec. 21; Walker Brown, solicitor, Sheffield. Jan. 11; V.C. M., a twelve o'clock.

SIMPSON (Christopher), Brace-grove, Tottenham, Middlesex, gentleman. Dec. 21; Baker and Blaker, solicitors, 3, Cloak-lane, E.C. Jan. 9; M. R. at eleven o'clock.



THE COMPENSATIONS OF THE BAR. (From an Address by E. E. HALE,) "I HOPE the American lawyer understands the same truth, that, unless he deals with infinite values, his Profession is a handicraft, and his duty a job. Unless he deals with justice, pure as Heaven-unless he deals with truth, virgin as truth was born, there is for him no ermine. These

CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35. Last day of Claim, and to whom Particulars to be sent. BENESH (Maurice), 118, Fenchurch-street, E.C., and 6, Sydney-place, Stoke Newington, Middlesex, commission agent. Dec. 28; J. N. Mason, solicitor, 7, Gresham-States, in our organization of society, have given

street, E.C.

HEWETT (Catherine F.), 1, Grosvenor-square, Southampton.
Dec. 30 Hume and Bird, solicitors, 10, Great James-street,
Bedford-row, W.C.

KNIGHT (Joel E.), Esq., 51, Church-road, De Beauvoir-town,
Middlesex. Jan. 81; G. and J. Clark, solicitors, 28, Fins-
bury-place, London."
PARNELL (Ratcliffe), Wallabadah, New South Wales,
squatter. Dec. 30; W. Moon, solicitor, 15, Lincoln's-inn.
PULFER (Catherine), 19, Denmark-row, Camberwell, Surrey.
Dec. 31; Prideaux and Son, solicitors, Goldsmith's-hall,


STOCK AND SHARE MARKETS. The following are the fluctuations of the week. ENGLISH FUNDS. Fri. Sat. Mon, Tues Wed. Thu Bank of England Stock 238 239

239 239


Cent. Red. Ann....



Cent. Cons. Ann New 24 Cent. Ann.

91 91 93 93

91 912 91 93$ 93 93

In this matter three questions were submitted to the Chief Judge by Mr. Registrar Murray, one of the registrars of the London Court of Bankruptcy. On the 23rd May last Mr. Wehner, a merchant in London, presented his petition for the liquidation of his affairs, and on the following day a receiver was appointed. At the first meeting, held on the 23rd June, a resolution was proposed for the liquidation of the debtor's affairs by arrangement. This proposal was supported by fifty-two creditors out of fifty-nine, whose aggregate debts amounted to 32,0721. A few of the creditors at the same meeting proposed a resolution for the liquidation of the estate in bankruptcy, amongst those who supported this proposal was the proxy of the Schaffhausen Banking company a creditor for 69631. A second meeting was held on the 21st Aug., and on that occasion Messrs. Fraser and Co., creditors for 1425l., supported the proposal for liquidation in bankruptcy. Upon the Schaffhausen Banking Company hearing that so large a majority of the creditors were in favour of a liquidation by arrangement, they directed their proxy to withdraw the vote he had given for a bankruptcy, and to vote in favour of a liquidation by arrangement, or, if this could not be done, to withdraw their proof. The Messrs. Fraser subsequently gave similar directions to their proxy, and accordingly, when the matter came before the registrar on the 5th Sept. for registration, these proxies respectively desired leave to withdraw the votes they had given in favour of bankruptcy proceedings and enter them in favour of a liqui dation by arrangement, or to withdraw their proofs altogether, as, in that case the resolution for liquidation by arrangement would have been carried by the requisite majority. The registrar, being in doubt as to the proper course to be pursued, applied to the court for instructions as to whether Messrs. Fraser and Co., and the banking company, having voted in favour of a bankruptcy, were at liberty to withdraw their votes and vote in favour of a liquidation by arrangement, and also whether they might now withdraw the proofs respectively of their claims against the estate?

Reed appeared in support of the application. The Act of 1869 had clearly conferred upon creditors a right which these parties claimed to exercise. They had a perfect right to sign all resolutions, &c. connected with the proceedings for the administration of an estate under the direction of this court.

The CHIEF JUDGE said that the signatures of the parties having been once affixed to a resolution for the administration of the estate in bankruptcy could not now be withdrawn, but that they might sign the resolution for a liquidation by arrangement. The effect of this would be that the contrary signatures would neutralise one another, and the parties be omitted altogether from the computation. This would enable the other creditors who desired to have a liquidation by arrangement to effect their object.


1Transferred to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt, and which will be paid to the persons respectively whose names are prefixed to each in three months, unless other claimants sooner appear.] PERRIN (WIn.), and GODFREY (Wm. Henry), both of Windlesham, Surrey, farmers. 51. 48. 9d., New Three per Cent. Annuities, Claimant, the said Henry Godfrey the


HEIRS-AT-LAW AND NEXT OF KIN. BROWN, formerly HARRIS (Sophi Stuart), Hippenscombehouse, Hippenscombe, near Hungerford, Wilts, widow. Next of kin to send in Jan. 11, at the chambers of V.C. M. Jan. 15, at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hear. Ing and adjudicating upon such claims.


FORBES Charles), Devonport-road, Shepherd's-bush, Middlesex, barrister-at-law. Dec. 26; G. J. Brownslow, solicitor, 34, Bedford-row, Holborn, W.C. Jan. 10; V.C. W., at one o'clock.

Do. do. Jan. 1894.
Do. 3 c. Jan. 1894

New 3 Cent. Aun.


Cents. Jan. 1873 Annuities April 5, 1885 Do. exp. Jan. 1830 Metropolitan Board of

Works 31 c. Stock.

Corporation of London

44 per c. Bonds...... Red Sea Tele. Ann. 1908

Consols, for Acc.....

India 5 Cent. for Acc. Do. 5 Cent. July'


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to the men of his calling distinguished position, have shielded them by privilege else wholly unknown; they are exempt from many of the burdens of other life, and see open to them its highest honours. This is because they are pledged in their very training, and by their oaths of office are sworn, to obtain justice for all men, and for the State. The American lawyer ought not to forget the traditions of his Profession. The Templars of England, through whose hands come down to him the methods of the past, are the direct descendants of Templars bound to the service of chivalry. The only fee which he receives is in form an honorarium,' not the pay for service. The service is the unbought service of the king of truth and of right. He goes forth on his circuit-such is the theory of his Profession-with the same determination to protect the right and to crush the wrong which sent out Lancelot or Arthur. Who needs his help? It it this poor boy, arraigned for murder by a mad mob, because, he is of another colour than theirs, and they will wreak on him the wrath of centuries? Or is it some child of luxury, born in the purple, who has smiles and honours, and gold for her minions? He does his best, be it for the one or for the other; ferrets out conspiracy; seizes truth, though truth be hiding her face in tears; and compels the tribunal to decide rightly! The moment that the American lawyer abandons this position, the moment that he sells justice, or the 93 934 share of justice that his services can command, to the highest bidder; the moment he says that the ring which can spend millions shall have millions' worth, while the beggar with a penny shall have penny's worth,-in such words of blasphemy he shows he has no knowledge of what justice is. He abandons the position of one who deals with infinite realities. He has left as one unfit, the ranks of a liberal calling. He makes himself a mere craftsman, dealing with things alone, and to be recompensed with things alone. Leave him to the company he deserves!"-From Old and New for October.



93) 93 931



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113 112 112


India Stock, 1871
India Stock, 5 Cent.
India 4 C. Oct. 1888 103 103 103 103 103 1033
Jan. 7, 1870

India Bonds (10001.)...
Do. (under 10001.)
Ex. Bills,10001...


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[NOTE.-The reports of the Estate Exchange are officially supplied in the following list. Auctioneers whose names are registered there will oblige by reports of their own sales.]

Thursday, Nov. 23.

By Mr. H. E. MARSH, at Guildhall Tavern.

-sold for 9107.


THE office of Chancellor for the county Palatine of Durham having become vacant through the death of Christopher Temple, Esq., which event took place last year, Her Majesty has been pleased, by her royal warrant, to confer the said office on James Fleming, Esq., one of her counsellors learned in the law, and of whose fitness and qualifications for the appointment Her Majesty is well satisfied. Mr. Fleming arrived in this city a few days ago, and on Monday morning last, fat the annual sitting, took his seat for the first time in the Court of Chancery, Exchequer-buildings, in this city, when sincere hopes were expressed, both by his Honour and E. J. Meynell, Esq., barrister

Camberwell, Nos. 159 and 161, Southampton-street, freehold
Nos. 40 and 42, Peckham-grove, freehold--sold for 8701.
No. 5, Camden-terrace, freehold --sold for 4601.
No. 182, High-street, freehold-sold for 9007.
Two cottages in Batten's-yard, freehold-sold for 4007,
Five freehold cottages, in same yard-sold for 16207.
Hill-street. Nos. 46 and 18, term 17 years-sold for 2307.
head. No. 7, Nunhead-grove, terin 78 years-sold for
Notting-hill. No. 133, Portobello-road, and No. 12, Vernon-at-law-the latter gentleman representing the bar-
mews, term 80 years-sold for $0.

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No. 25, Quadrant-grove, term 79 years-sold for 1407.
Islington. No. 48, Gibson-square, term 56 years-sold for
Euston-square, No. 61, George-street, with workshop, term
39 years-sold for Sol.
No. 39, University-street, term years-sold for 5307.
Paddington. A leasehold ground-rent of 8, per annum,
amply secured-sold for 1807.
A ditto, of 107.-sold for 1607.
A ditto, of 127.-sold for 1837.
A ditto, of 6.-sold for 1007.
A ditto, of 67, sold for 857.

A leasehold improved ground-rent of 157 158., on the Bedford
Paddington. On the Bishop of London's Estate, a leasehold

Estate-sold for 1402.

ground-rent of 767. 108. per annum-sold for 13007. A ditto, of 917, per annum-sold for 15607. A ditto, of 587, per annum-sold for 11157. Hyde-park. A leasehold improved ground-rent of 177. per annum-old for 305. A dito, of 16. per annum-sold for 2901.

INVESTORS IN THE FIVE PER CENT. FUNDED LOAN OF THE UNITED STATES may have their bonds registered in the purchasers' names at the banking-house of Jay Cooke, McCulloch, and Co., 41, Lombard-street; and dividend warrants will be mailed quarterly, from the United States Treasury direct to the holders' address.

risters and attorneys of the county-that this court, whose jurisdiction extends between the Tyne and the Tees, and which has almost ceased to exist for upwards of twenty years, might be revived, and become again one of the law courts of the palatinate. It may not be generally known that this ancient court has very extensive powers, and has concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court of Chancery, and the Court of Exchequer at Westminster, and also with the County Court, in equitable matters, but it is of course confined only to such as arise within the county. In this Durham Court of Chancery creditors can seek payment of debts out of the estate of the deceased person, and may obtain the relief they require; so may a legatee of the estate of a deceased person seek an appropriation in this court; persons wishing to obtain payment of mortgage may obtain foreclosure or a bill of sale; a specific performance of any agreement for the sale of any property may be also enforced; partners may appeal for an account of the dealings and transactions of a partnership already dissolved; new trustees, in certain cases, may be appointed. These, and many other services may be obtained through the agency of this court. The late Hon. Christopher Temple, issued in June 1853, a code of rules, setting forth the various claims that could be taken to the Durham Court of Chancery. Amongst the gentlemen of the legal profession who met in the court on Monday morn ing to give a welcome to the new Judge were:-Mr. J. Watson, registrar of the court, and Mr. T. Watson, deputy registrar; E. J. Meynell, Esq.. barrister-at-law; Mr. J. W. Hays, Mr. J. G. Har



DEC. 2, 1871.]

greaves, Mr. J. Patrick, Mr. W. Brignall, jun., Mr. G. Salkeld, Mr. W. Lisle, and Mr. J. P. Dolphin, of Wolsingham. The Rev. William Greenwell was also present. His HONOUR, on entering the court, said: In taking my seat for the first time, I beg to express my sincere hope that the former business of the court may be restored to it. This is the anicent, and I think I may add, the natural, court of equity for this large and important county. I shall be ready to attend at all times when my presence can be required, and to adjourn the court from time to time as may be found necessary, and also to transact such business as may be lawfully transacted in London. Although I cannot hope to equal the eminence of some of my very distinguished predecessors, I trust that in the desire to promote the interests of the suitors in the anxiety to do full justice, and in the wish to consult in every manner the convenience of the practitioners in the court, I shall not be found behind any of them. E. J. Meynell then rose and said I have been deputed by the legal gentlemen of this city to offer you their congratulations on your taking your seat for the first time in this honourable court, and to express their very great satisfaction that a gentleman of such learning and eminence, and whose name is so well known in the legal profession, has been appointed judge of this ancient court, which at one time held an eminent place in the diocese, and it is to be hoped that it will again revive, as your honour has said just now. I do hope that you will not find it such a sinecure as your predecessor did. I now move, on behalf of the official trustees of Spearman's Charity, that the accounts, vouchers, and receipts relating to such charity, be filed in this court.

His HONOUR.-I may remark, in passing these accounts, that by an order the charity is entirely confined to persons resident within the county of Durham, but I understand there are persons recipients of the charity who are non-resident. I do not think it would be within my duty to remove such persons who are now in receipt of it, but I hope that hereafter no person who is a nonresident in the county of Durham will receive it.

As there was no other business, the court was adjourned sine die.


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NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. MORTVENDOR AND PURCHASER-TITLE GAGE BY HUSBAND AND WIFE-A married woman concurred with her husband in mortgaging property belonging to him, and on which she had a rentcharge. The mortgage deed recited that the advance was agreed upon in consideration of the wife joining in the mortgage, and that she thereby conveyed for the purpose of absolutely releasing and extinguishing" her rentcharge. Subsequently part of the property was reconveyed to the husband, who again mortgaged it to a mortgagee who sold under a power of sale. Held, that the wife's interest in the equity of redemption still attached to the property: (Re Belton's Trusts, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 404. V.C. W.) LANDLORD AND TENANT-TITLE OF TENANT




STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.—Predecessors through
whom the plaintiffs claimed, being seised in fee of
D. yard, which then abutted on to the outer side of
arc, or bend, shaped by the course of the
Thames, made an oral agreement for a building
lease with A. A., from whom the defendants de-
duced title. A. Á. began to build on the land, and
articles of agreement, dated 23rd June 1769, were
afterwards executed, whereby the freeholders
covenanted with A. A. that they would, when cer
tain messuages agreed to be built on the said
ground should be tiled in, demise to them D. yard
from Lady-day 1768, for ninety-nine years, at a
yearly rent; and A. A. covenanted to tile in so
many houses as would secure the rent. The latter
contemplated the making of an embankment from
end to end of the arc, forming a chord thereto, in
order to win from the river the land inside the
hollow of the bend. They therefore united with
others who had an interest in the neighbouring pro-
perty, and obtained an Act (11 Geo. 3, c. 34), which,
after reciting that the promoters had valuable
freehold and leasehold interests in D. yard, &c.,
next adjoining the river, and were willing to
make the embankment in front of their respective
properties at their own expense, authorised them
to do so, and enacted (sect. 2) that the soil of the
river so to be enclosed, in front of each respective
house, &c., should vest, and the same was thereby
vested in the owner or owners, proprietor or pro-
prietors of such adjoining house, &c., respectively,
according to his or their respective estates, trusts,
or interests. A. A. erected the required number
of houses on D. yard, and duly received leases of
the same; the embankment having been made,
they also built on the land reclaimed. No lease


was ever granted of the last-mentioned land, but
they held it without interruption or acknowledg-
ment until the present time, when the plaintiffs
brought ejectment for such reclaimed land. Held,
that the fee simple thereof vested in the plain-
tiffs' predecessors, under the 11 Geo. 3, c. 34, s. 2,
subject to the right in equity of A. A., to demand
leases for ninety-nine years from 1868, and that,
as the latter were cestui que trusts in possession,
the Statute of Limitations (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27)
did not operate as a bar to the plaintiffs, who
were therefore entitled to recover: (Drummond v.
Sant, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 419. Q.B.)
vised his N. and S. estates to the petitioners, and
his W. estate to the respondent. Subsequently
he made an equitable mortgage of his N. estate to
his bankers to secure advances on his current
account, and afterwards made a similar charge on
his S. and W. estates to secure further advances.
On his death there was owing on the securities
to the bankers the sum of 18.8861. 118. 1d., of
which 17,4501. 10s. 5d. was incurred up to the date
of the first mortgage, and the remainder between
that date and the time of his death. A foreclosure
suit was instituted by the bankers, and a decree
was made under which the N. estate was sold, and
with the purchase money, and a portion of the
rents of it and the S. estate, the whole of the debt
due to the bankers was discharged. On a petition
by the devisees of the N. estate, seeking to have
the whole of the debt apportioned amongst the
three estates, according to their relative values:
Held, that the N. estate was primarily liable
for the first and larger advance, and that the two
other estates were liable rateably according to
their respective values for the second and smaller
advance: (De Rochefort v. Dawes, 25 L. T. Rep.
N. S. 456. V.C. W.)


NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. WINDING-UP-TRANSFER OF SHARES.-Where in a company in which the directors had power to refuse a transfer of shares, a transferor and transferee concurred in misrepresenting the real circumstances of a transfer: Held (in the course of liquidation), that such transfer could not stand as against the company: (Argus's Case, 25 L. T. Rep. N.S. 406. V. C. W.)

RAILWAY-AGREEMENT.-Specific performance of an agreement, whereby a railway company agreed to construct and maintain a siding on the plaintiff's land was decreed, although the plaintiff had previously entered into negotiations with the company for compensation in respect of the breach of the agreement: (Greene v. The West Cheshire CONTRIBUTORY - POWER OF Railway, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 409. V. C. B.) WINDING-UP— DIRECTORS TO REFUSE TRANSFER OF SHARESAMALGAMATION-EXCHANGE GF SHARES.-The deed of settlement of company A. provided that a shareholder who wished to transfer his shares, should in writing propose his intended transferee as a shareholder, that the directors should certify to the shareholder their acceptance or rejection of the proposal, and that if they rejected the proposed transferee, and did not within fourteen days find some one else to take the shares at the market price of the day, the proposed transferee should be entitled to a transfer of the shares. In July 1865 the company entered into an agreement for amalgamation with company M., who were to take over the business assets and liabilities, and shares in the company M. were to be given to the shareholders in company A., in exchange for their shares in that company. All the shareholders in company A. assented to this arrangement, and exchanged their shares accordingly, but company A. was not wound-up or dissolved, though the deed of settlement contained provisions for a dissolution. In Oct. 1866, the winding-up of company M. commenced. Shortly before this company M. had entered into an agreement with the persons who had been directors of company A. at the date of the amalgamation, and who proposed still to act on behalf of company A., for the retransfer to that company of the business formerly carried on by them, and the resumption of business by them. On the 23rd Oct. 1866, the former directors of company A. held a board meeting, at which they approved a transfer of 2145 shares which had been executed by C., the former solicitor of the company. In March 1868, company A. resolved upon a voluntary liquidation. Held, by James, L.J. (affirming a decision of the Master of the Rolls), that C. was liable as a contributory in respect of the 2145 shares. But, held by Mellish, L.J., that C. was not liable as a contributory. Per James, L.J.-The agreement for amalgamation of company A. with company M. amounted to a virtual dissolution of company A.; the shares in company A. ceased to exist, and were incapable of being transferred, and the attempted resuscitation

of the company, being a mere sham and contrivance of the directors, to which C. was a party, could have no effect whatever. Per Mellish, L.J.-Until company A had been dissolved under the provisions of their deed of settlement, or wound-up, the shareholders had a right to transfer their shares. The directors were not entitled to resume the business without the consent of all the shareholders, but the business might have been legally resumed if the shareholders who wished to resume it had bought all the shares of the other shareholders. By the deed of settlement the directors had no power absolutely to reject a proposed transferee of shares, but only if they could find a substitute to take the shares: (ChapPERSONAL CONCEALMENT PROSPECTUS pel's Case, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 438. L.JJ.)

LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS-ESTATE OF DECEASED DIRECTOR.-Where directors by a prospectus, in within their knowledge on which fact it is prowhich they suppress all mention of a material fact bable that the success of their scheme may depend, induce persons to take shares in a company, which shares he would not have taken had he been aware of the concealed fact, they are, in equity, personally liable to make good the loss occasioned by the concealment, notwithstanding the fact that they honestly believed in the probable success of the company, that the undertaking has turned out equally injurious to them and to the shareholders, and that they believed the concealment would be beneficial to the persons thereby induced to take shares. In such a case the estate of a deceased director is equally liable with the surviving directors. A person who has been induced by such a prospectus to take shares in a company must file his bill before the company is ordered to be wound-up, in order to obtain the cancellation of his shares and the return of his deposit, and though there is not he must take proceedings to render the direotors the same technical rule as to the time within which personally liable, yet the burden of proof lies on him to show that it was not the mere failure of the company that caused him to take such proceedings: Semble, that a transferee of shares can have no other relief against the directors than the original allottee of the shares was entitled to, and that if the original allottee of shares was cognisant of a matter concealed in the prospectus, his transferee can have no relief against the directors in respect of such concealment: (Peek v. Gurney, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 446. M. R.) WINDING-UP-CONTRIBUTORY-LIABILITY OF PAST MEMBERS TO CONTRIBUTION.-Each contributory on the B list is liable to contribute to the assets of the company (to the extent of the assets remaining unpaid on his shares) rateably with the other B contributories who are liable to pay the same debts of the company to the extent of the balance remaining at the commencement of the winding-up unpaid of those debts of the comhis shares, as reduced by the dividends paid in the pany which were contracted before he transferred course of the winding-up by means of the assets of the company and the contributions of the contributories upon the A list. The contributions of each B contributory are to be applied exclusively were contracted before he ceased to be a member in payment of those debts of the company which But a B contributory has no of the company. right to say that those B contributories who ceased to be members of the company after himself shall be exhausted before he is called upon to contribute anything. The winding-up of the O. Company commenced in June 1866. On the 25th Nov. 1865 M. had was 8001. unpaid upon the fifty shares. At the transferred fifty shares to P. At this time there commencement of the winding-up, there remained unpaid the sum of 6421. in respect of debts contracted by the company before M. ceased to be a member. P. was placed on the A list of contributories, but he became insolvent, and paid nothing in respect of the calls made upon him. were paid by the liquidator upon all the debts of Dividends to the amount of 15s. in the pound the company, by means of the assets and the contributions received from the contributories upon the A list. In this way the 6421. became reduced to 160. 10s. The A list having been exhausted, as to the extent of their liability. The case of M. the liquidator desired to make a call upon the was selected as a representative one: Held (varycontributories on the B list, and a question arose to contribute to the payment of the 160l. 10s., ing a decision of Bacon, V.C.) that M. was liable B list, who ceased to be members of the company after the 6421. became due by the company: rateably with the other contributories on the (Morriss's case, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 443. L. JJ.)

EPPS'S CHOCOLATE.-"Nous n'avons en France qu'une matériel et un personnel aussi considérables que ceux seule usine où la préparation du Caeno emploie un que nous avons vus dans l'usine de Messieurs Epps C'est une véritable curiosité dans son geure que cette (the Imperialist immense fabrique."-La Situation organ). The wrapper of each cake of Chocolate is labelled "JAMES EPPS & Co., Homeopathic Chemists, London." Also, makers of Epps's Milky Chocolate (Chocolate and Condensed Milk).

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