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elements, and secondly, to ascertain and explain the laws vidual mind ?"? Surely the moment we try listinctly to underof their combination and interaction.

staud this question we realize that the cases are different. “Series

of mental phenomena” for whom? For any passer-by such as General Analysis of Mind; its Ultimate Constituents. might take stock of our biological dog ? No, obviously only for

that individual mind itself; yet that is supposed to be made up of, Consti As to the first, there is in the main substantial agree to be nothing different from, the series of phenomena. Are we, tuent

ment: the elementary facts of mind cannot, it is held, be then, (1) quoting J. S. Mill's words, “to accept the paradox that elements of mind. expressed in less than three propositions, I feel somehow, something which cx hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be

aware of itself as series ? ”3 Or (2) shall we say that the several I know something, I do something. But here at once

parts of the series are mutually phenomenal, muli as A may look there arises an important question, viz., What are we to at B, who was just now looking at A! Or (5) finally, shall we say understand by the subject of these propositions? Nobody that a large part of the so-called series, in fact evry term but one', nowadays would understand it to imply that every psychi- is phenomenal for the rest—for that one?

As to the first alternative, para lox is too mild a word for it; cal fact must be ascertained or verified by personal intro

even contradiction will hardly suffice. It is as impossible to express spection ; perhaps no modern writer ever did understand being aware of” þy one term as it is to express an equation or this; at any rate to do so is to confound the personal with any other relation by one term : what knows can no more bu identhe psychological. We are no more confined to our own

tical with what is known than a weight with what it weighs. If a immediate observations here than elsewhere; but the point what it is presented to, cannot be that series of declings, and this

Series of feelings is what is known or presented, then what knows, is that, whether seeking to analyse one's own consciousness withont regard to the point Mill mentions, viz., that the infinitely or to infer that of a lobster, whether discussing the asso greater part of the series is either past or future, The question is ciation of ideas or the expression of emotions, there is

not in the first instance one of time or substanın at all, but simply always an individual mind or self or subject in question. copt as it implies something knowing or convious of something

turns upon the firrt that knowledge or consciousness is unmeaning It is not enough to talk of feelings or volitions: what we

Put it may be topline :-(mantul that the formula for consciousness mean is that some individual, man or worm, feels, wills, is something doing something to put it generally; still, if the two acts—thus or thus. Obvious as this may seem, it has been somethings are the same when I touch myself orube linee myself, frequently either forgotten or gainsaid. It has been for- why may not agent and patient be the same when the action is

knowing or bring aware of'; why may I not know myself—in fact, gotten among details or through the assumption of a medley do I not know mysell? Certainly not ; agent and patient wever are of faculties, each treated as an individual in turn, and the same in the same act; the conceptions of self-causal, selfamong which the real individual was lost. Or it has been movel, self-known, et il genulis omur, either connot, the incompre

hensible or are abbrevia: expressions—50011, (.!!., ils touching uninsaid, because to admit that all psychological facts per

on self when one's right hand touchal one's lift. tain to a psychological subject seemed to carry with it the

And so we come to tlie second alternative: A-010 land wa-liers almission that they pertained to a particular spiritual the other, may not different memburs of the series of feelinga lu subsubstance, which was simple, indestructible, and so forth ; jet amil oljert in turn? Compare, for example, the state of mim and it was manifestly desirable to exclude such assump- the coveted you anl impatiently repiliates amples of conscience tions from psychology, i.P., from a science which aims only

or dictates of prudence) with his state when, Andled with remorse, at a scientific exposition of what can be known and verifieel he sides with conscience and condomis this former slf," – the 1. hy observation. But, however much assailed or disowned, butter sell having meanwhile locomo spreme. Here the cluster "te the conception of a mind or conscious subject is to be frontations am thuir annou intend sentimens motivies, which found implicitly or explicitly in all psychological writers only monintulily it is to lont still like

together play the role of sell in the one ti o on-on-ness, have

lor time this place whatever, —not more in Berkeley, who accepts it as a fact, of noi-solf; il mer bomo:mal einen : 1,1-potilalternthan in lume, who accepts it as a fiction.

This being so,

tion may become comple, ili nation, i- in Wi-called could We are far more likely to reach the truth eventually if we

cons jou-less" Orain, the desilo potrdil of ---11-zolls 1011-11penly acknowledge this inexpugnable assumption, if such might be lovely vibral is takin. 1. szvlopolis

1., fi:-: itintill with the it forove, instead of resorting to all sorts of devious peri- blyamatr wus distingu:i-led from i:. D'. il this, lowever phrases to hide it. Vow wherever the word Subject, or true, is besili the muk; url it is calls a tolonls mi-mer, is derivatives, Ocrurs in psychology we might substitute

though the varies of composvrhojoulul 1.1ino o velns to allow it to do, ils 1.!!.. Mr Speler for !'

pll the develop the word Eyo and analogous derivatives, dil such exist.

ment of self-con-jou-110 -5 is it will in on olulije i and But Suljert is almost always the preferable term ; its im- skjort." It is, it anything, it differentiis of oljert inil objet, ronal form is an advantage, and it realily recalls its.in

is. in pol.zine World, it is dironti11in11.!!! llation Wondern correlative Object. Morcover, Ego has two senses,

1 litlirentiu!rill prof whiili impij :-: :blution to il di-tinguished by Kant'as pure and empirical, the latter of currt which i- " el 1113-16

There wil uilis (!!11:111, 11.1...!!, !.:-1, 11:28 l... which is, of course, an object, while the former is subject spored in the spotl. S. Mil..."!. It of t..!:. always. By pure Eyo or Subjeet it is proposed to denote inta: 1.6. Mimo-01:::l'ali's '1' 1'111.11.1 the simple fact that everything mental is referred to a self.fiplines or

pilih tl:: 111.". TO ...o, ito This is ychological conception of a seli or subject, then, is in the unity or continuis of co121....

ilmi: thurut 14:-!.in !..!!! : Vill.: F... 16.19

1.1:... after all hoy no means identical with the metapılıysical sint 11 2011, med Mindor Eastlin,-)... : 10 Willor mpeptions of a soul or mind-atom, or of mini-stutt not i-porio:... Iumwith tolonly from 1!...!!!;. il mir; it may be kept as free from metaphysical implica-tandpoint !!! *hi! - tv ali... 'Bull, "listliji ilin 11-i

wilualo_11-11

il of 11!!! | Os' p0.5, 011 tons as the conception of the biological individual or

wilslund, !... individu nimi111 1'i: 1.1 i. 11.0!in uf (pianisin with which it is so intimately connected.

fullin "11" 1.1.1 p.!|!1111 :... :::::.::i. 1... 1.-!The atormpt. in lepel, hav frapuently l'11 made to resolve the

to..ili fir !... il. : !!!

!,' ; oii. 171*'in:o the latter, and so to tin.l in mind only sikh :un inilivi. trilepi ini!!' foolido!!!!!!!! by blind an wirious counterpurt in this individuis of 1!... :0111' "!!!!!!...... 101 !!! 1:: nisi, ..., what to my all an objetivo individualiis. B::t !!.

:::!

11:11i!.,.is -";!,:,
" Jupilure or all its plausibility to the fut that i: let's fins 01.01.:..:n, .:..:.:

,W::. 1
***** fusht the diferie iwiwin the lojulovical and the posilo. in 11-in !!!!!!! Yiri
Titan-lquoints. All that the loolorist means by a degisil... lo in file !!!!....:... 1;..;

am of the file hornonia which make up its corporil esistono "I a-s..! 10, 1011.xlsi:!ii!1:-1:- i::.. .:.l. 10:. In!, in.l-mu has its presentation to any one in jurticular is : By:. al): 1:11..!. Til ::.. 1. 1.;;!;. -iilije. p" of 100 importanı, the fact of presentation at all may l. brry in liit!!!! - Wmris i:. tl. fully!.-HS. Ontl. *.!! Impped out of account. Let us now turn to mind: Wholer 1:1:1, 1 1.6.1.-11.1, 1... ?**,}} ; : ..., 47301, } we not take this wond or "the worl soul' simply as 1 11.,. relat:o:1 i. !.,..,.;a:

...... i , .;,'110. In th... tale for the series of mental phenomena which make up an in-li

" I':..for 11:3!! Professor Huxley, Hume (English Men of Letters series), r. 171.

isi 1.11

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attempt, by means of phrases such as consciousness or the unity of stances, (2) that we are pleased or pained with the change, consciousness, to dispense with the recognition of a conscious and (3) that we act accordingly. We never find that subject.

feeling directly alters—i.e., without the intervention of Feeling. We might now proceed to inquire more closely into the the action to which it prompts—either our sensations or

character and relations of the three states, modes, or acts? | situation, but that regularly these latter with remarkable of this subject, which are commonly held to be the invari- promptness and certainty alter it. We have not first a able constituents of psychical life and broadly distinguished change of feeling, and then a change in our sensations, as cognitions, feelings, and conations. But we should be at perceptions, and ideas; but, these changing, change of feelonce confronted by a doctrine much in vogue at present, ing follows. In short, feeling appears frequently to be an which, strictly taken, amounts almost to a denial of this effect, which therefore cannot exist without its cause, tripartite classification of the facts of mind—the doctrine, though in different circumstances the same cause may proviz., that feeling alone is primordial, and invariably present duce a different amount or even a different state of feeling. wherever there is consciousness at all. Every living crea

Turning from what we may call the receptive phase of conture, it is said, feels, though it may never do any more ; | sciousness to the active or appetitive phase, we find in like only the higher animals, and these only after a time, learn

manner that feeling is certainly not, in such cases as we can to discriminate and identify and to act with a purpose. clearly observe, the whole of consciousness at any moment, This doctrine, as might be expected, derives its plausibility True, in common speech we talk of liking pleasure and partly from the vagueness of psychological terminology, disliking pain; but this is either tautology, equivalent to and partly from the intimate connexion that undoubtedly saying, we are pleased when we are pleased and pained exists between feeling and cognition on the one hand and when we are pained, or else it is an allowable abbreviafeeling and volition on the other. As to the meaning of tion, and means that we like pleasurable objects and dislike the term, it is plain that further definition is requisite for painful objerts, as when we say, we like feeling warm and a word that may mean (a) a touch, as feeling of roughness; dislike feeling hungry. And feeling warm or feeling () an organic sensation, as feeling of hunger; (c) an emo- hungry, we must remember, is not pure feeling in the tion, as feeling of anger ; (c7) feeling proper, as pleasure strict sense of the word. Such states admit, if not of or pain. But, even taking feeling in the last, its strict description, yet at least of identification and distinction sense, it has been maintained that all the more complex as truly as colours and sounds do. Within the limits of forms of consciousness are resolvable into, or at least have

our observation, then, we find that feeling accompanies been developed from, feelings of pleasure and pain. The

some more or less definite presentation which for the sake only proof of such position, since we cannot directly observe of it becomes the object of appetite or aversion ; in other the beginnings of conscious life, must consist of considera- worils, feeling implies a relation to a pleasurable or paintions such as the following. So far as we can judge, we ful presentation, that, as cause of feeling and end of the find feeling everywhere; but, as we work downwarıls from action to which feeling prompts, is doubly distinguished higher to lower forms of life, the possible variety and the from it. Thus the very facts that lead us to distinguish definiteness of sense-impressions both steadily diminish. feeling from cognition and conation make against the Moreover, we can directly observe in our own organic scusa- hypothesis that consciousness can ever be all feeling. tions, which seem to come nearest to the whole content

But, as already said, the plausibility of this hypothesis Feeling of infantile and molluscous experience, an almost entire is in good part due to a laxity in the use of terms. Most and absence of any assignable quale. Finally, in our sense psychologists before Kant, and English psychologists even sensition cxperience generally, we find the clement of feeling at a

to the present day, speak of pleasure and pain as sensamaximum in the lower senses and the intellectual element tions. But it is plain that pleasure and pain are not at a maximum in the higher. But the so-called intellectual simple ideas, as Locke called them, in the sense in which senses are the most used, and use we know blunts seeling touches and tastes are, that is to say, they are never like and favours intellection, as we see in chemists, who sort the these localized or projected, nor elaborated in conjunction most filthy unixtures by smell and taste without discomfort. with other sensations and movements into percepts or intuiIf, then, foeling predominates more and more as we approach tions of the external. This confusion of feeling with sensathe beginning of consciousness, may we not say that it is tions is largely consequent on the use of one word pain for the only sine qua non of consciousness? Considerations certain organic sensations and for the purely subjectivo of this kind), however impressive when exhibited at length, state. But, to say nothing of the fact that such pains are are always liable to be overturned by some apparently un- always more or less definitely localized, which of itself is important fact which may easily be overlooked. Two lines, so far cognition,—they are also distinguished as shooting, e.)., may get nearer and nearer and yet will never meet, if burning, gnawing, &c. &c., all which symptoms indicate the rate of approach is simply proportional to the distance.

a certain objective quality. Accordingly all the more A triangle may be diminished indefinitely and yet we can recent psychologists have been driven by one means or not infer that it becomes eventually all angles, though the another to recognize two “aspects” (Bain), or “properties angles get no less and the sides do. Now, before we decide (Wundt), in what they call a sensation, the one a " sensible that pleasure or pain alone may constituto a complete state or intellectual ” or “ qualitative,” the other an "affectivo" of mind, it may be well to inquire : What is the connexion

or “emotive,” aspect or property. The term "aspect " between feelings of pleasure and pain and the two remain is figurative and obviously inaccurate; even to describe ing possible constituents of consciousness, as

nsciousness, as we can pleasure and pain as properties of sensation is a matter observe them now? And this is an inyuiry which will open to much question. But the point which at present help us towards an answer to our main question, namely, concerns us is simply that when feeling is said to be the that concerning the nature and connexions of what are primordial element in consciousness more is usually incommonly regarded as the three ultimate facts of mind.

cluded under feeling than pure pleasure and pain, viz., Relation Broadly speaking, in any state of mind that we can

some characteristic or quality by which one pleasurable or of feeling directly observe, what we find is (1) that we are aware of painful sensation is distinguishable from another. No to cogni

a certain change in our sensations, thoughts, or circum- doubt, as we go downwards in the chain of life the qualition and 1 It is useless at this point attempting to decide on the comparative become less and less definite ; and at the same time organ

tative or objective elements in the so-called sensations appropriateness of these and similar terms, such as “ capacities," "functions," &c.

isms with well-developed sense-organs give place to others

conation.

without any clearly differentiated organs at all. But there and treacherous word “consciousness," or committing ouris no ground for supposing even the amoeba itself to be selves to the position that ideas are modifications of a affected in all respects the same whether by changes of certain mental substance and identical with the subject to temperature or of pressure or by changes in its internal which they are presented, we may leave all this on one fluids, albeit all of these changes will further or hinder its side, and say that ideas are objects, and the relation of life and so presumably be in some sort pleasurable or pain objects to subjects—that whereby the one is object and ful. On the whole, then, there are grounds for saying the other subject—is presentation. And it is because that the endeavour to represent all the various facts of only objects sustain this relation that they may be spoken consciousness as evolved out of feeling is due to a hasty of simply as presentations. striving after simplicity, and has been favoured by the It will be convenient here to digress for a moment to take account Senaambiguity of the term feeling itself. If by feeling we

of an objection that is sure to be urgeul, viz., that sensations at all tions not mcan a certain subjective state varying continuously in subject" and that this is a deliverance of common sense, it anything logically

events ought not to be called objects, that they are "states of the bodo. intensity and passing from time to time from its positive is. Now if by this be meant (i.) that sensations are metaphysically subjectphase (pleasure) to its negative phase (pain), then this subjective modifications in an idealistic sense, there is no need at ive. purely pathic state implies an agreeing or disagreeing this stage either to assert or deny that. But if the meaning luu (ii.)

that sensations are presentail as modes of the subject, such a position something which psychologically determines it. If, on the

is due to a confusion between the subject proper or pure Ego and other hand, we let feeling stand for both this state and the that complex presentation or objerit, the empirical, or as we might cause of it, then, perhaps, a succession of such "feelings call it the biotic, Eyo. A self-conscious subjerit may not only have a may make up a consciousness ; but then we are including sensation but may recognize it as its own, - recognize a certain contwo of our elementary facts under the name of one of them.

nexion, that is to say, between the sensation and that prestentation

of the empirical self which self-consciousness implies. But such The simplest form of psychical life, therefore, involves not only reference only renders more obvious the objective nature of a musaa suljert feeling but a subject having qualitatively distinguish- tion, in the psychological sense of the term objective. Or, again, the able presentations which are the occusion of its feeling.

ineaning may be (11.) that a subject whose presentations were all Prrenta We may now try to ascertain what is meant by cogni- and object. In this objection there is a lurking confusion between

sensations would know nothing of the dillerende betweell subject tion. tion as an essential clement in this life, or, more exactly, the standpoint of a given esporrience and the standpoint of its

what we are to understand by the term presentation. It exposition. The true way, surely, to represent the Dane filct of was an important step onwards for psychology when Locke sensation is not to attempt to reproduc an capazience as pot conintroluced that "new way of ideas” which Stillingtleet tined to sensations, but to describe sub caprience as a scientitie found alternately so amusing and so dangerous. By idea The intant who is delighted by a briglie colour does not of cours Locke tells us he meant true appearances in men's minds, concrive himself as turto face with an olsjert ; but neither does liv or "whatsoever is the immediate object of perception, conerive the colour in a subjective autortion. We are bound to thought, or understanding”; and it was so far a retro- i describe his state of mind truthfully, but that is 10 26-01 for

abandoning torms which have no counterpart in his conscioustines, grade step when Flume restricted the term to certain only when these terms are only med to depict that consciousness to us. of these appearances or objects, or rather to these appearances or objects in a certain state, viz., as reproduced ideas ! are conerired by common sense its modifications of x.lt

, wether wo or images. And, indeed, the history of psychology seems

presented or not, it may be grantul that it alqmarso at first blushi,

but not when common sense is more closely examined. The fact to show that its most important advances have been mailesi

is weare here upon what has been called "the margin of -vrhu. by those who have kept closely to this way of ideas; the lout;" where our ordinary thinking lilin into olie vir hit establishment of the laws of association and their many

Sellie has to be at great points to keep disilt. Tlcih it is fruitful applications and the whole Herbartian psychologie scientiticalls on wat rondom but otmim to the corres may suffice as instances (ree HERBART).

The truth is tlint fronding lurt of bundyvrt it is only on oil batlesin et ne

can dizingui-l the awn in thony 11:1-1, in which our tal the use of such a term is itself a mark of an important interests have now.liitone intered them. Sunil city is that on generalization, one which helps to free is from the mytho Sallation. The online conception of all cation commis, 110 logy and verbinge of the faculty-psychologists." 111

I doubt, with the itetinition given by Ilumilton and Jan-r-:-that variety of mental facts which we speak of as sensa-i borly in an animated ora 11-111": it in win odiny

*** Sunsition proper is thic con- 2011-es of crtain alliations of our tions, perceptions, images, intuitions, concepts, notions, thinking we reckon the lindy- ptt ut mett. colli to iliiui. have two characteristies in common :--(1) they ailmit of of soll-ons ils nivells. Dui, l'II nel 110k.. lwing more or less attended to, and (2) can be reproduced a methodcompul 11 to vliminato pa jojo_:. .: ilin 110111

1! online con 120ml oli -1-ll, W. 1. i'irlie!. o i anil associated together. It is here proposed to ile the

tin nicht colles Ligue11... term presentation to connote such a mental fact, and as

07-20119 ods tn Hill 11-1.11.5":;-.-:,'.
the leest Englislı equivalent for what Locke meant boy idlea .hr . of pow"ition. (nl... !... !!.,...!!
and what kant and Herbart called a Vorstellung.

thout the is :...jlis in the lon; lin!!
sol turn to

pl lis lip 11: 11!. VII. presentation has then a twofoll relation - first, vel il pol. 11:41. Illinoiu bors - 11"]. 1: 1., dirortly to the subject, and secondly, to other presentar- 1:15:10.0.1: -1:11 10:1 -:'ji. tion. By the first is meant the fact that the presentation to to thiesalojartive pulation of vjen to, this 21., 21.01.1". 11is attended to, that the subject is more or less conscious of prescitation ito.lt, we have merily to him to thu.it on th. 1. .... it: it is "in his min " or presented. Is presented to a side of the stilijet i: implier what, tror wilt op it loilor suljet a presentation might with advantage be called in

woril, may

Lucullendiri, tin:. th. dition object, or perhaps a psychical olsjert, to distingui-h it from of this torm -- it- tos incisin Wh. We

will call what are called otujeres alxart from presentation, i..., con in:21te1.tit. 1:::::::21 50 lisod will this ampt of reivel i inlopendent of any particular suljert. Ik wist --- -1) 111!!! oof is. :!..: I., as we have in, dil u call it still, to avoid fibile con la illl-less to L, !!!1 Vizive, intrul ! :-4 fusion, it may turn out best to dispuenise with the frequent

dispense tritt..." 1:9... 11 G'ille use of olijer't in this sense. But on one account, at line, ilijirt implies iili. ! 01 !imili mi ili on...: 1. is is desirable not to lose sight altogether of this which mni_hie imisel is:1... ? !! in.l.its th: 1itirmie is after all the stricter as well as the older signitivation of stations, with what it is a Hin. do 9. il.. mhjert, namely, lause it enables us to express detinitely; (ulilit von 1...!!,,:!..

fit., ill.,
without implicating any ontological theory, what we have
w far sexen reason to think is the fundamental fart in
wychology. Instead of depending mainly on that varme

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objective intensity—in that higher form of attention called | at present is the result of a gradual differentiation. It is
voluntary we are aware (1) that concentration of atten- quite impossible for us now to imagine the effects of years
tion increases or its abstraction diminishes the intensity of experience removed, or to picture the character of our
of a presentation in circumstances where physically and infantile presentations before our interests had led us
physiologically there is nothing to prevent the intensity of habitually to concentrate attention on some, and to ignore
the presentation from continuing uniform. Again, (2) in others, whose intensity thus diminished as that of the
circumstances when psychologically we are aware of no former increased. In place of the many things which we
previous change in the distribution of attention, we find can now see and hear, not merely would there then be a
the intensity of a presentation increased or diminished if confused presentation of the whole field of vision and of a
certain physical concomitants of the presentation (e.9., mass of undistinguished sounds, but even the difference
stimulus, nervous process, &c.) are increased or diminished. between sights and sounds themselves would be without
Thus, though this is a point we could hardly establish its present distinctness. Thus the further we go back
without the aid of psychophysics, we may conclude that the nearer we approach to a total presentation having the
the intensity of a presentation may be altered from two character of one general continuum in which differences
sides; that it depends, in other words, partly upon what are latent. There is, then, in psychology, as in biology,
we may perhaps call its physical intensity and partly on what may be called a principle of “progressive differen-
the amount of attention it receives.

tiation or specialization”; and this, as well as the facts of
Some further exposition of the connexion between subjective reproduction and association, forcibly suggests the con-
attention and objective intensity is perhaps desirable here, where ception of a certain objective continuum forming the
we are seeking to get a general view of the essential facts of mind backyround or basis to the several relatively distinct pre-
and their relations, rather than later on, when we shall be more
concerned with details. We are aware in ordinary life that the sentations that are elaborated out of it—the equivalent,
intensity of any given sensation depends upon certain physical in fact, of that unity and continuity of consciousness
quantities, varying directly in some proportion as these vary. which has been supposed to supersede the need for a
llence, since our habitual standpoint is the physical not the psy-
chological, we conceive sensory objects as having an intensity per se

conscious subject. apart from the attention that their presentation secures. From the There is one class of objects of special interest even in Motor physical standpoint indeed it is manifest that no other conception a general survey, viz., movements or motor presentations, presentais compatible with a scientific treatment of phenomena. Subjective These, like sensory presentations, admit of association and

tions, sources of variation are supposed to be eliminated: the general mind to which, according to the physicist's conception of a pheno- reproduction, and seem to attain to such distinctness as menon, that phenomenon is implicitly supposed to be presented is they possess in adult human experience by a gradual differa mind in which there is no feeling to produce variations of atten- entiation out of an original diffused mobility which is little tion, or to favour æsthetic combinations of objects. Attention is besides emotional expression. Of this, however, more thus assumed to be constant, and all variations in intensity to be

in intensity to be presently. It is primarily to such dependence upon feelobjectively cletermined. this

. In any given presentation there is, it must be admitted, no ing that movements owe their distinctive character, the immediate evidence that the intensity of the object is a function of possession, that is, under normal circumstances, of definite two variables,—(1) what we have called its physical or absolute and assignable psychical antecedents, in contrast to sensory intensity and (2) the intensity of attention. Still there are facts which justify this conclusion. That the intensity of the presenta presentations, which enter the field of consciousness ex tion varies with the absolute intensity of the object, attention | abrupto. We cannot psychologically explain the order in remaining constant, is a proposition not likely to be challenged. which particular sights and sounds occur ; but the moveWhat has to be shown is that the intensity of presentations varies ments that follow them, on the other hand, can be adewith the attention, all else remaining constant. Assuming that quately explained only by psychology. The twilight that voluntary and non-voluntary attention are fundamentally the same, this amounts to showing (1) that concentration of attention upon sends the hens to roost sets the fox to prowl, and the lion's some objects diminishes the intensity of presentation of others in roar which gathers the jackals scatters the sheep. Such Subjectthe same field, whether the concentration be voluntary or non diversity in the movements, although the sensory presenta-ive selecvoluntary, i.c., due to a shock; and (2) that, even though only tions are similar, is due, in fact, to what we might call the eflect on the presentation as increasing the objective intensity from principle of “subjective or hedonic selection”_that, out of the physical side. The narrowness of these limits-practically an all the manifold changes of sensory presentation which a all.important fact—is theoretically no objection. It would not be given individual experiences, only a few are the occasion clillicult psychologically to account for our inability to concentrate

of such decided feeling as to become objects of possible attention indefinitely: that we can concentrate it at all is enough to show that there is a subjective as well as an objective factor in appetite (or aversion). The representation of what inthe intensity of a presentation. Any fuller consideration of the terests us comes to be associated with the representation

connexion between attention and presentations may be deferred. of such movements as will secure its realization, so that, C'on The inter-objective relations of presentations, on which although no concentration of attention will secure the tinuity their second characteristic, that of revivability and asso requisite intensity to a pleasurable object present only in scious- ciability depends, though of the first importance in them- idea —we can by what is strangely like a concentration ness.

selves, hardly call for examination in a general analysis of attention convert the idea of a movement into the like the present. But there is one point still more funda- fact, and by means of the movement attain the coveted mental that we cannot wholly pass by: it is—in part at reality. any rate—what is commonly termed the unity or con And this has brought us round naturally to what is per- Conatinuity of consciousness. From the physical standpoint haps the easiest way of approaching the question: What tion. and in ordinary life we can talk of objects that are isolated is a conation or action ? In ordinary voluntary moreand independent and in all respects distinct individuals. ment we have first of all an idea or re-presentation of the The screech of the owl, for example, has physically nothing movement, and last of all the actual movement itself,—a to do with the brightness of the moon : either may come new presentation which may for the present be described or go without changing the order of things to which the as the filling out of the re-presentation, which thereby other belongs. But psychologically, for the individual attains that intensity, distinctness, and embodiment we percipient, they are parts of one whole : special attention call reality. How does this change come about? The to one diminishes the intensity of presentation of the attempt has often been made to explain it by a reference other and the recurrence of the one will afterwards entail

to the more uniform, and apparently simpler, case of reflex the re-presentation of the other also. Not only are they i On the connexion of presentations and re-presentations, see p. 59 still parts of one whole, but such distinctness as they have I below.

action, including under this term what are called sensori But, whereas we can only infer, and that in a very motor and ideo-motor actions. In all these the movement roundabout fashion, that our sensations are not absolutely seems to be the result of a mere transference of intensity distinct but are parts of one massive sensation, as it were, from the associated sensation or idea that sets on the we are still liable under the influence of strong emotion movement. But, when by some chance or mischance the directly to experience the corresponding continuity in the same sensory presentation excites two alternative and con case of movement. Such motor-continuum we may supflicting motor ideas, a temporary block, it is said, occurs ; pose is the psychical counterpart of that permanent readiand, when at length one of these nascent motor changes ness to act, or rather that continual nascent acting, which finally prevails and becomes real, then we have the state among the older physiologists was spoken of as “ tonic

But this assumption that sen- action"; and as this is now known to be intimately desory and motor ideas are associated before volition, and pendent on afferent excitations so is our motor consciousthat the volition begins where automatic or reflex action ness on our sensory. Still, since we cannot imagine the cnds, is due to that inveterate habit of confounding the beginning of life but only life begun, the simplest picture psychical and the physical which is the bane of modern we can form of a concrete state of mind is not one in psychology. How did these particular sensory and motor which there are movements before there are any sensations presentations ever come to be associated ? It is wholly or sensations before there are any movements, but one beside the mark to answer that they are "organically de in which change of sensation is followed by change of termined psychical changes." In one respect all psychical movement, the link between the two being a change changes alike are organically determined, inasmuch as all of feeling. alike---so far, at least, as we at all know or surmise—have Hlaving thus simplified the question, we may now ask Depemorganic concomitants. In another respect no psychical again : Ilow is this change of movement through feeling cnce of

action or changes are organically determined, inasmuch as physical | brought about? The answer, as already hinted, appears

feeling. crents and psychical events have no common factors. to be: By a change of attention. We learn from such Now the only psychological evidence we have of any very observations as psychologists describe under the head of intimate connexion between sensory and motor representa- fascination, imitation, hypnotism, dic., that the mere contions is that furnished by our acquired dexterities, i.e., by centration of attention upon a movement is often enough such movements as Hartley styled secondary automatic. to bring the movement to pass. But, of course, in such But then all these have been preceded by volition : as cases there is neither emotional experience nor volition in Mr Spencer says, "the child learning to walk wills cach question ; such facts are only cited to show the connexion movement before walking it.” Surely, then, a psycho- between attention and movements. Everybody too las logist should take this as his typical case and prefer to often observed how the execution of any but mechanical a-sume that all automatic actions that come within his movements arrests attention to thoughts or sensations, and ken at all are in this sense secondarily automatic, i.e., to nie versti. Let us suppose, then, that we have at any say that either in the experience of the individual or of his given moment a certain distribution of attention between ancestors volition, or something analogous to it, preceded sensory and motor presentations; a change in that dishabit.

tribution means a change in the intensity of some or all of But, if we are thus compelled by a sound method to these, and change of intensity in motor presentations regard sensori -motor actions as degraded or mechanical means change of movement. Such changes are, however, forms of voluntary actions, instead of regarding voluntary quite minimal in amount so long as the given presentations actions as gradually differentiated out of something physi- are not conspicuously agricable or disagreeabile. As soon cal, we have not to ask: What happens when one of two as they are, we find pleasure to lead at once to concentraalternative movements is executed ? but the more general tion of attention on the pleasurable object; so that pleasure question: What happens when any movement is made in is not at all so certainly followed by movement as we find consequence of feeling? It is obvious that on this view pain to be, savo of course when movements are themselves the simplest definitely purposive movement must have been the pleasurable objects and are executral, as we say, for prece led loy somo movement simpler still. For any dis- their own sakes. In fact, pleasure would seem rather to tinct movement purposely made presupposes the ideal pre-repress movement, exceput so far as it is coincident cither rentation, before the actual realization, of the movement. with a more economie distribution, or with a positive But such ideal presentation, being a re-presentation, equally aumentation of the available attention; and cither of presuppwes a previous actual movement of which it is the these', on the view -11ppose'l, would lead to increased but Ncalled mental residuum. There is then, it woulil seem, indefinite (1.6., playful) Inovement. lain, on the other but one way left, viz., to regard those movements which hand, is much more closely connected with morement, are immediately expressive of pleasure or pain as prim- and movement too which for obvious reasons much sooner onlial, and to read the so-called voluntary movements acquires a purposive character. In todo voluntary con a elaborated out of these. The vayne and diffusive char-centration of attention on a painful pre montation We find wter of these primitive emotionnl manifestations is really attention to such an object always involuntary: in other

point in favour of this position. For such "litfusion worils, attention is, as it wire', exrentiated. di-persil, com
is esilence of an underlying continuity of motor presenta withdrawn. Ti, therefore, the wintul pentation is a
tione parallel to that already discussed in connexion with movement, it is ..??-?"bedd: if it is it se tration, movements
sensory presentations, a continuity which, in each case, are set up which further di-tr: Hittill, ill wollen of
bomen differentiated in the course of experience into which may offert the removal of the poll courue of
mampuamtively distinct and discrete movements and send the sensation.
tions respectively.

main.uni:!... !, ! .:.:"t!":.:.:.. invari. 1 Comune Spencer's l'rinciples of Psychology, i. 190.

ably atte, is 1 ... 1 Hip of tis!,'., * It may be well to call to mind here that Dr Bun also has regardent furnish 1!. ",:... pol. 1:1. th...!!.,.:.:..:. Dotional expusion as a posible commencement of action, but only the will" ... ... .S;,,... . 1:1 illis t!... reject it in favour of his own peculiar do-trine of "spontaneity," objetion is too lat lietuility insult for nothills. T.:, wl, 1171 sch, bnwerer, is open to the objection that it makes movement variety of ins II VW?is is pokestially !!!,,!'... ...) F. pede feeling instead of following it-an ohjertion that wonlil love alway lindrosten? 1.11:1: in-it, 'tha: 11.-4.:.:.::..TI hans even if the arguments alranred to support his hypothesis were actions," to 17- Dr Dioliis 1.4i 1.12.2ce, w!.:! list; 12. cogeat as only De Bain takes them to be. Against the position. I tice suflices to ].5"...

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