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impatience, that this amounts to the monstrous absurdity | hardly perhaps implied in the mere massiveness of a sensaof making the contents of consciousness extended. The tion, but it will be convenient to include it when speaking edge of this objection will be best turned by rendering of the continuum of local signs as extensive. We have, the conception of extensity more precise. Thus, suppose then, a plurality of presentations constituting a continuum, a postage stamp pasted on the back of the hand; we have presented simultaneously as impressions and having certain in consequence a certain sensation. If another be added fixed and invariable relations to each other. Of such beside it
, the new experience would not be adequately experience the typical case is that of passive touch, though described by merely saying we have a greater quantity of the other senses exemplify it. It must be allowed that sensation, for intensity involves quantity, and increased our conception of space in like manner involves a fixed intensity is not what is meant. For a sensation of a certain continuity of positions ; but then it involves, further, the intensity, say a sensation of red, cannot be changed into possibility of movement. Now in the continuum of local one having two qualities, red and blue, leaving the inten- signs there is nothing whatever of this; we might call this sity unchanged; but with extensity this change is possible. continuum an implicit plenum. It only becomes the preFor one of the postage stamps a piece of wet cloth of the sentation of occupied space after its several local signs are same size might be substituted and the massiveness of the complicated or “associated” in an orderly way with active compound sensation remain very much the same. Inten- | touches, when in fact we have experienced the contrast sity belongs to what may be called graded quantity: it of movements with contact and movements without, i.e., admits of increment or decrement, but is not a sum of in vacuo. It is quite true that we cannot now think of parts. Extensity, on the other hand, does imply plurality: this plenum except as a space, because we cannot divest we might call it latent or merged plurality or a “ground” ourselves of these motor experiences by which we have of plurality, inasmuch as to say that a single presentation explored it. We can, however, form some idea of the has massiveness is to say that a portion of the presentation difference between the perception of space and this one continuum at the moment undifferentiated is capable of element in the perception by contrasting massive internal differentiation. Attributing this property of extensity to sensations with massive superficial ones, or the general the presentation-continuum as a whole, we may call the sensation of the body as “an animated organism” with relation of any particular sensation to this larger whole or perception of it as extended. its local sign, and can see that, so long as the extensity It must seem strange, if this conception of extensity is of a presentation admits of diminution without the pre- essential to a psychological theory of space, that it has sentation becoming nil, such presentation has two or escaped notice so long. The reason may be that in investimore local signs,—its parts, taken separately, though gations into the origin of our knowledge of space it was identical in quality and intensity, having a different rela- always the conception of space and not our concrete space tion to the whole. Such difference of relation must be perceptions that came up for examination. Now in space regarded fundamentally as a ground or possibility of as we conceive it one position is distinguishable from distinctness of sign—whether as being the ground or pos- another solely by its co-ordinates, i.e., by the magnitude sibility of different complexes or otherwise rather than as and signs of certain lines and angles, as referred to a being from the beginning such an overt difference as the certain datum position, or origin; and these elements term “local sign,” when used by Lotze, is meant to imply:1 our motor experiences scem fully to explain. But-on reFrom this point of view we may say that more partial flexion we ought, surely, to be puzzled by the question, presentations are concerned in the sensation caused by two how these coexistent positions could be known before those stamps than in that caused by one. The fact that these movements were made which constitute them different partial presentations, though identical in quality and positions. The link we thus suspect to be missing is supplied intensity, on the one hand are not wholly identical, and by the more concrete experiences we obtain from our own on the other are presented only as a quantity and not as body, in which two positions have a qualitative difference a plurality, is explained by the distinctness along with the or "local colour” independently of movement. True, such continuity of their local signs. Assuming that to every positions would not be known as spatial without movedistinguishable part of the body there corresponds a local ment; but neither would the movement be known as sign, we may allow that at any moment only a certain spatial had those positions no other difference than such portion of this continuum is definitely within the field of as arises from movement. consciousness; but no one will maintain that a part of one We may now consider the part which movement plays Movehand is ever felt as continuous with part of the other or in elaborating the presentations of this dimensionless ment. with part of the face. This we can only represent by continuum into perceptions of space. In so doing we saying that the local signs have an invariable relation to must bear in mind that this continuum implies the incoeach other : two continuous signs are not one day coin- presentability of two impressions having the same local cident and the next widely separate. This last fact is sign, but allows not only of the presentation of impressions
of varying massiveness but of several distinct impressions say, as Mill seems to do, “that the idea of space is at bottom one of time” (p. 276), we must admit the inadequacy of our experience of
at the same time. As regards the motor element itself, movement to explain the origin of it.
the first point of importance is the incopresentability and 1 To illustrate what is meant by different complexes it will be invariability of a series of auxilio-motor presentations, enough to refer to the psychological implications of the fact that ? 1,P!,,P3P4. P, cannot be presented along with P2, and scarcely two portions of the sensitive surface of the human body are anatomically alike. Not only in the distribution and character of the
from P, it is impossible to reach P, again save through 13 nerve-endings but in the variety of the underlying parts—in one place and P2 Such a series, taken alone, could afford us, it bono, in another fatty tissue, in others tendons or inuscles variously is evident, nothing but the knowledge of an invariable arranged —wo find ample ground for diversity in the local colour- sequence of impressions which it was in our own power to ing” of sensations. such diversity has been developed as external impressions and the produce. Its psychological interest would lie solely in the answering movements have gradually differentiated an organism origin- fact that, whereas other impressions depend on an objectally almost homogeneous and symmetrical. Between one point and ive initiative, these depend on a subjective. But in the another on the surface of a sphere there is no ground of difference; but course of the movements necessary to the exploration of this is no longer true if the sphere revolves round a fixed axis, still less if it also runs in one direction along its axis.
obviously no real contradiction to this ; on the contrary, such facts are 2 The improvements in the sensibility of our "spatial sense all in favour of making extensity a distinct factor in our space experisequent on its variations under practice, the action of drugs, &c., are ence and one more fundamental than that of movement.
the body-probably our earliest lesson in spatial perception | But in the evolution of our spatial experience impressions and —these auxilio-motor presentations receive a new signifi- positions are not thus presented apart. "We can have, or at least cance from the active and passive touches that accompany localized ; Put it it is localized this means that a more complex
we can suppose, an impression which is recognized without being them, just as they impart to these last a significance they presentation is formed by the addition of new
elements, not that a could never have alone.
second distinct object is presented and some indescribable connexion It is only in the resulting complex that we have the established between the impression and it, still less that the impresentations of position and of spatial magnitude. For pression is referred to something not strictly presented at all. The space, though conceived as a coexistent continuum, excludes
truth is that the body as extended is from the psychological point
of view not perceived at all apart from localized impressions. In the notion of omnipresence or ubiquity; two positions la like manner impressions projected (or the absence of impressions and l, must coexist, but they are not strictly distinct projected) constitute all that is perceived as the occupied (or unpositions so long as we conceive ourselves present in the occupied) space beyond. It is not till a much later stage, after same sense in both. But, if Fa and F, are, e.g., two
many varying experiences of different impressions similarly local
ized or projected, that even the mere materials are present for the impressions produced by compass-points touching two formation of such an abstract conception of space as "spatial different spots as I and 1, on the hand or arm, and we place reference” implies. Psychologists, being themselves at this later a finger upon le and move it to le, experiencing thereby stage, are apt to commit the oversight of introducing it into the the series P, PPP, this series constitutes le and I, into carlier stage which they have to expound. positions and also invests Fa and F, with a relation not
In a complex presentation, such as that of an orange or Intuition of mere distinctness but of definite distance. The resulting concerning which psychology may be expected to give an
a piece of wax, may be distinguished the following points of things. complex perhaps admits of symbolization as follows :. . Fq Fo F, F1F, F, F, F7 Fr .
account :-(a) its reality, (() its solidity or occupation of Τ ιιι
space, () its permanence, or rather its continuity in time, P1P2P3P4
(cl) its unity and complexity, and (c) its substantiality and Here the first line represents a portion of the tactual the connexion of its attributes and powers. Though, in continuum, F and F, being distinct "feels,” if we may so fact, these items are most intimately blended, our exposisay, or passive touches presented along with the faintertion will be clearer if we consider each for a moment apart. sensations of the continuum as a whole; T stands for the («) The terms actuality and reality have cach more Actualactive touch of the exploring finger and P, for the corre than one meaning. Thus what is real, in the sense of ity or
reality. sponding auxilio-motor object; the rest of the succession, material, is opposed to what is mental; as the existent or as not actually present at this stage but capable of re actual it is opposed to the non-existent; and again, what is vival from past explorations, is symbolized by the itt and actual is distinguished from what is possible or necessary. PPP! When the series of movements is accompanied But here both terms, with a certain shade of difference, in ly active touches without passive there arises the distinc so far as actual is more appropriate to movements and tion between one's own body and foreign bodies; when the events, are ilsed, in antithesis to whatever is ideal or repreinftial movement of a series is accompanied by both active sented, for what is sense-viven or presented. This seems and passive touches, the final movement hy active touches at least their primary psychological meaning; and it is only, and the intermediate movements are unaccompanied the one most in vogue in English philosophy at any rate, hy either, we get the further presentation of empty space over-tinged as that is with psychology. Any examination lying between us and them, —but only when hy frequent of this characteristic will lie best deferred till we come to experience of contacts along with those intermediate move deal with ideation generally (see p. 58 below). Meanwhile ments we have come to know all movement as not only it may suffice to remark that reality or actuality is not a stireession but change of position. Thus active touche's single distinct element added to the others which enter come at length to he projected, passive touches alone being into the complex presentation we call a things, as colour localized in the stricter sense. But in actual fact, of course, or solidity may be. Neither is it a special relation among the localization of one impression is not perfected before these elements, like that of substance and attribute, for that of another is begun, and we must take care lest our example. In these respects the real and the ideal, the neprily meagre exposition give rise to the mistaken actual and the possibile, are alike; all the clements or notion that localizing an impression consists wholly and qualities within the comples, and all the relations of those lely in performing or imaging the particular movements elements to cach other, are the same in the rose repilenecessary to ailel active touches to a group of passive im- sented as in the presented rose. The dillerince turns not pressions. That this cannot suflice is evident merely from pon what these elements are', regreded as qualities or the consideration that a single position out of relation to relations presenteel or representoul, but upon whatever it is all other positions is a contradiction. Localization, though that distinguishes the presentation from the representation it depends on many special experiences of the kind die- of any given qualities or relations. Now this, its we shall rilerl, is not like an artificial product which is completed sce, turns partly upon the relation of -11ch complex preapart at a time, but is essentially a growth, its several sentation to other presentations in consciou-nens with it, Ronstituent localizations advancing together in definiteness partly upon its relation as a presentation to the wuloject anul interinnexion. So far has this development advanceel whose poresentation it is. In this reare We find a litterthat we do not even imagine the special movements which ence, not only but were the simple qualities, .-uch it's cold, the lwalization of an impression implies, that is to say, they harı, real, and wert in strawberry ice, 1.!!., ils presented are no longer distinctly represented as they would be if we and an intel, but al., though I, - riminously, in lutinitely intended to make them the past experiences are the spatial, and we the temparul, risuhih inter ** retaineel," but tow much blended in the mere perception into our intuition is li-tined from our imsition of it. to the appropriately spoken of as remembered or imaged. Where no such difference Hit Wibute | seal levond Spangun of the almost instinctive character of even our curlient
il quiproqutions it will lw appropriate to animadvert on a min 1 THI. , "ibit . : 3.11n: impli: stron in the current use of such tornis 3x "lowalization," pornola, is Heal 1.119) pollo.li " proper*f**na,"" }rlily riforince," "wputial reference, "and the likes pleasure' : fuis lietus, in tit. 1'!!111.
pe Thinutog Ti impilation is that external spee, or the bly an extended, in than what it has seer...", F. , ii. 3". 2. Ji Bichelis! "The 17 -"}}* sint presentel or supposed apurt from the localization, iileis imp: 1:.'. 1.:) 1!.!. pr. list!: A1:1.V.T.N...nl Sun of women of impressions to such crore. That it may 157.18 : 21.1., toplin :!.imacini::o', ! i1
anul contulit. Tu To .PL" Ty t'lil. TITION:!.. 'i '#, the bowl, and (2) distinct and apart from it, the place on the shelf
. I which they copy or reprenese"Protarul h....., part i. 333,.
the distinction of percept and image to the higher level of ness. The first step in this process has been the simultaneconception and thought. So, then, reality or actuality is ous projection into the same occupied space of the several not strictly an item by itself, but a characteristic of all impressions which we thus come to regard as the qualities of the items that follow.
the body filling it. Yet such simultaneous and coincident Impene (6) Here our properly motor presentations or "feelings projection would avail but little unless the constituent imtrability. of effort or innervation” come specially into play. They pressions were again and again repeated in like order so as
are not entirely absent in those movements of exploration to prompt anew the same grouping, and unless, further, by which we attain a knowledge of space; but it is when this constancy in the one group was present along with these movements are definitely resisted, or are only pos- changes in other groups and in the general field. There sible by increased effort, that we reach the full meaning of is nothing in its first experience to tell the infant that the body as that which occupies space. Heat and cold, light song of the bird does not inhere in the hawthorn whence and sound, the natural man regards as real, and by and by the notes proceed, but that the fragrance of the may-flower perhaps as due to the powers of things known or unknown, does. It is only where a group, as a whole, has been but not as themselves things. At the outset things are all found to change its position relatively to other groups, and corporeal like his own body, the first and archetypal thing, -apart from causal relations—to be independent of changes that is to say: things are intuited only when touch is of position among them, that such complexes can become accompanied by pressure; and, though at a later stage pass- distinct unities and yield a world of things. Again, beive touch without pressure may suflice, this is only because cause things are so often a world within themselves, their pressures depending on a subjective initiative, i.e., on several parts or members not only having distinguishing voluntary muscular exertion, have been previously experi- qualities but moving and changing with more or less indeenced. It is of more than psychological interest to reinark pendence of the rest, it comes about that what is from how the primordial factor in materiality is thus due to the one point of view one thing becomes from another point projection of a subjectively determined reaction to that of view several,—like a tree with its separable branches action of a not-self on which sense-impressions depend, — and fruits, for example. Wherein, then, more precisely, , an action of the not-self which, of course, is not known does the unity of a thing consist? This question, so far as such till this projection of the subjective reaction has as it here admits of answer, carries us over to temporal taken place. Still we must remember that accompany- continuity. ing sense-impressions are a condition of its projection : (cl) Amidst all the change above described there is one Tempomuscular effort without simultaneous sensations of contact thing comparatively fixed : our own body is both constant ral conwould not yield the distinct presentation of the resistant as a group and a constant item in every field of groups;
tinuity. occupying the space into which we have moved and would and not only so, but it is beyond all other things an object move again. Ñay more, it is in the highest degree an of constant and peculiar interest, inasmuch as our earliest essential circumstance in this experience that muscular pleasures and pains depend solely upon it and what affects effort, though subjectively initiated, is still only possible it. The body becomes, in fact, the earliest form of self, when there is contact with something that, as it seems, is the first datum for our later conceptions of permanence making an effort the counterpart of our own. But this and individuality. A continuity like that of self is then something is so far no more than thing-stuff; without transferred to other bodies which resemble our own, so the elements next to be considered our psychological in- far as our direct
far as our direct experience goes, in passing continuously dividual would fall short of the completo intuition of dis- from place to place and undergoing only partial and tinct things.
gradual changes of form and quality. As we have exUnity (c) The remaining important factors in the psychologi- isted—or, more exactly, as the body has been continuously and com- cal constitution of things might be described in general presented —during the interval between two encounters plexity.
terms as the time-relations of their components. Such with some other recognized body, so this is regarded as relations are themselves in no way psychologically deter- having continuously existed during its absence from us. mined ; impressions recur with a certain order or want of llowever permanent we suppose the conscious subject to order quite independently of the subject's interest or of be, it is hard to see how, without the continuous presentaany psychological principles of synthesis or association tion to it of such a group as the bodily self, we should whatever. It is essential that impressions should recur, ever be prompted to resolve the discontinuous presentaand recur as they have previously occurred, if knowledye tions of external things into a continuity of existence. It is ever to begin ; out of a continual chaos of sensation, all might be said : “Since the second presentation of a parmatter and 110 form, such as some philosophers describe, ticular group would, by the mere workings of psychical nothing but chaos could result. But a flux of impressions laws, coalesce or become identical with the image of the having this real or sense-given order will not suffice; there first, this coalescence suflices to generate the conception must be also attention to and retention of the order, and of continued existence.” But such assimilation is only the these indispensable processes at least are psychological. ground of an intellectual identification and furnishes no Still they need not be further emphasized here, nor would motive, one way or the other, for resolving two like things it have been necessary at this point to call them to mind at into the same thing: between a second presentation of A all had not British empirical philosophers brought psycho- and the presentation at different times of two A's there logy into disrepute by overlooking them altogether. is so far no difference. Real identity no more involves
But for its familiarity we should marvel at the fact that exact similarity than exact similarity involves sameness of out of the variety of impressions simultaneously presented things; on the contrary, we are wont to find the same thing we do not instantly group together all the sounds and all alter with time, so that exact similarity after an interval, so the colours, all the touches and all the smells, but, divid- far from suggesting one thing, is often the surest proof that ing what is given together, single out a certain sound or there are two concerned. Of such real identity, then, it smell as belonging with a certain colour and feel, similarly would seem we must have direct experience ; and we have singled out from the rest, to what we call one thing. We it in the continuous presentation of the bodily self; apart might wonder, too—those at least who have made so much from this it could not be “ generated” by association of association by similarity ought to wonder—that, say, the among changing presentations. Other bodies being in white of snow calls up directly, not other shades of white or the first instance personified, that then is regarded as one other colours, but the expectation of cold or of powdery soft- I thing—from whatever point of view we look at it, whether
as part of a larger thing or as itself compounded of such pressions. "That idea of red,” says Hume, “which we parts—which has had one beginning in time. But what form in the dark and that impression which strikes our is it that has thus a beginning and continues indefinitely? eyes in the sunshine differ only in degree, not in nature."3 This leads to our last point.
But what he seems to overlook is that, whereas there can Substan. (e) So far we have been concerned only with the com be a mere sensation red—and such a presentation may tiality. bination of sensory and motor presentations into groups for present purposes be regarded as simple--we can only
and with the differentiation of group from group; the have an image or representation of a red thing or a red relations to each other of the constituents of each group form, i.e., of red in some way ideally projected or intuited. still for the most part remain. To these relations in the In other words, there are no ideas answering to simple main must be referred the correlative conceptions of sub or isolated impressions : what are revived in memory and stance and attribute, the distinction in substances of imagination are percepts, not unlocalized sensations and qualities and powers, of primary qualities and secondary, movements. It is not only that we cannot now directly and the like.1
observe such representations,— because, for that matter, Of all the constituents of things only one is universally we can no longer directly observe even the original prepresent, that above described as physical solidity, which sentations as merely clementary impressions ; the point presents itself according to circumstances as impenetrability, rather is that ideas as such are from the first complex, resistance, or weight. Things differing in temperature, and do not begin to appear in consciousness apart from colour, taste, and smell agree in resisting compression, in the impressions which they are said to reproduce till after filling space. Because of this quality we regard the wind these impressions have been frequently attended to together, as a thing, though it has neither shape nor colour, while and have been more or less firmly synthesized into percepts a shadow, though it has both but not resistance, is the or intuitions. very type of nothingness. This constituent is invariable, The effects of even the earliest of these syntheses or "associations" while other qualities are either absent or change,—form of impressions must of course in some way persist, or progress in altering, colour disappearing with light, sound and smells perception would be impossible. On this account it has been usual intermitting. Many of the other qualities—colour, tem
to say that “perception" implies both "memory” and imagina.
tion"; but such a statement can be allowed only so long as these perature, sound, smell—increase in intensity until we reach terms are vaguely used. The dog's mouth waters only at the sight and touch a body occupying space; with the same move of food, but the gourmand's mouth will also water at the thought
of it. nuent too its visual magnitude varies. At the moment of
We recognize the smell of violets as certainly as we recogcontact an unvarying tactual magnitude is ascertained, persons, if any, can recall the scent when the flower has gone,
nize the colour when the spring brings them round again ; but few while the other qualities and the visual magnitude reach so as to say with Shelleya fixed maximum ; then first it becomes possible by effort
"(clours, when sweet violets sicken, to change or attempt to change the position and form of
Live within the selse they quirken"what we apprehend. This tangible plenum we thence though most can recall the colour with tolerable clearness. In forth regard as the seat and source of all the qualities we
like manner everybody can perform innumerable complex voluntary
movements which only a few can mentally rehearse or describe: project into it. In other words, that which occupies space without the prompting of actual execution. And not ouly dors is psychologically the substantial; the other real consti- such reproduction is sütlices for perception fall short of that intuents are but its properties or attributes, the marks or volved in reminiscence or memory in the narrower s01154', but the manifestutions which lead us to expect its presence.
manner in which the constituentilements in a pulcromotion are com
binee differs materially from what is strictly to be called the assoImagination or Ideation.
ciation of ideas. To realize this liflerence We need only to observo
first how the sight of a suit of polisleal armour, för camile', Before tho intuition of things has reached a stage so instantly reinstates and steadlily maintains all that we detail of complete and definite as that just describeıl, imagination former sensations of its banduess and smoothness and colles, or ideation as distinct from perception has well beyun. and then to observe how this same sight gadually calls lipides In paving to the consideration of this higher form of changing im.wory of romance. Though the piept is complex,
110W of tournaments, now of (usados, and so though all the mental life we have to note the distinction between im- it is but a single whole, and the act of plcption is single toon; pressions and images or ideas, to which Ilume first gave but, where, it is the cause in memory and imagination, attention general currency. Humo did not think it “necessary to pussies, whether voluntarily or non-voluntarily, from one tipes employ many words in explaining this distinction. Every attention are still litince ituned that it is die in un conub.
sentation to another, it is obvious that the seal olijer to of one of himself will readily perceive the difference
.; | The term "otion " Sellis only a 'polonial in the luttirTo though it is not impossible but in particular instances, the comision of this will presentations in a complex, wortez they may very nearly approach to each other. Thus in ?Terption or idea, it would buluttir topply the form omplir assleep, in a fever, in madness, or in any very violent emotions tion;" which was used in this ment, and is luruso
11-e'd by many padolovints since. When we po prvive all alone of wul, our ideas may approach to our impressions; ax, ly sight we inny s. 11t it 1.1-te o to, is deprecantool. Wh con the other hand, it sometimes happens our impressions i Live in loy come li min lih. In sler -15 th its cool in are o faint and low that wo cannot distinguish them from 1?*el, mink ibie Winslow cook in the 1.1-2 !!** stir ide...". In most cases, no doubt, the obvious differ-'Siliciently for our !!! "il
We might also own tijoles of Hellsil! Etice in intensity, or, as llume puts it, "in the force or
the idea of ill villii livril Lilly the intensillitisto livelineat with which they strike upon the mind," is a 'siznity that liile de lit 2011-111 1.1111 in Two suficient characteristic, but we must examine a good deal Wwwe links, thell, in oliere is lily lilisi il. Jou further and quy more attention to his uncertain cases it loy which il.: patio irril... 11.10.11 JUI
liens citlir inno;1.4.1' from the prince no l. Wir trinn this important distinction is ever to be in any sense states and maini illis dili1... " !... !!! Hi, Behalegically explaineil."
tlust li?! live in this wi.. in.: 1..! To lesin with, it is very questionable whether lume sentation or impoz+vina Ws right in applying Luke's distinction of simple and The mult in which lite tilsio porr. in 11.01:011compile's to joleas in the narrower sense as well as to im- tion of the preleejit cilll only partially ruin the video, itined
neles so far is too lalo lin Willibog Thomania The listintia lufwerin the thing and its properties, like all 11:0 fupra dottines, is one that might le nuore fully treated under the
mere se'ntional riminalis On the coolirulli Ho f1.cdth... Leal of Th--ught and Conception." Still, inasmuch as the material in "con-tructive imaxination" w hindi tali ini: 11 wataal for these concepts is contained noon or less implicitly in our requisito in cities in distinto the propuli - 118.dtibacicudine repente, se maideration of it is in place here'. * Troutier of Human Nature, bork i. quart i. $ 1.
plexes as a preliminary to new combinations. But it is psychological continuity. The impressions entering condoubtful whether the results of such an analysis are ever sciousness at any one moment are psychologically indethe ultimate elements of the percept, that is, merely isolated pendent of each other; they are equally independent of impressions in a fainter form. We may now try to ascertain the impressions and images presented the moment before further the characteristic marks which distinguish what is independent, i.e., as regards their order and character, imaged from what is perceived.
not, of course, as regards the share of attention they secure. Charac The most obvious, if not the most invariable, difference Attention to be concentrated in one direction must be teristics is that which, as we have seen, Hume calls the superior withdrawn from another, and images may absorb it to the of ideas. force or liveliness of primary presentations as compared exclusion of impressions as readily as a first impression to
with secondary presentations. But what exactly are we the exclusion of a second. But, when attention is secured, to understand by this somewhat figurative language? A a faint impression has a fixity and definiteness lacking in simple difference of intensity cannot be all that is meant, the case of even vivid ideas. One ground for this definitefor, though we may be momentarily confused, we can per- ness and independence lies in the localization or projecfectly well distinguish the faintest impression from an tion which accompanies all perception. But why, if so, image, and yet can hardly suppose the faintest impression it might be asked, do we not confound percept and image to be intenser than the most lively image. Moreover, we when what we imagine is imagined as definitely localized can reproduce such faintest impressions in idea, so that, if and projected ? Because we have a contrary percept to everything depended on intensity, we should be committed give the image the lie; where this fails, as in dreams, or to the gratuitous supposition that secondary presentations where, as in hallucination, the image obtains in other can secure attention with a less intensity than is required ways the fixity characteristic of impressions, such confor primary presentations. The whole subject of the in- fusion does in fact result. But in normal waking life we tensity of representations awaits investigation. Between have the whole presentation-continuum, as it were, occumoonlight and sunlight or between midday and dawn we pied and in operation: we are distinctly conscious of being could discriminate many grades of intensity; but it does embodied and having our senses about us. not appear that there is any corresponding variation of This contrariety between impression and image suggests, intensity between them when they are not seen but ima- however, a deeper question : we may ask, not how it is gined. Many persons suppose they can imagine a waxing resolved, but how it is possible. With eyes wide open, or a waning sound or the gradual abatement of an intense and while clearly aware of the actual field of sight and its pain; but what really happens in such cases is probably filling, one can recall or imagine a wholly different scene : not a rise and fall in the intensity of a single representa- lying warm in bed one can imagine oneself out walking tion, but a change in the complex represented. In the in the cold. It is useless to say the terms are different, primary presentation there has been a change of quality that what is perceived is present and what is imaged is along with change of intensity, and not only so, but most past or future.1 The images, it is true, have certain frequently a change in the muscular adaptations of the temporal marks—of which more presently—by which they sense-organs too, to say nothing of organic sensations may be referred to past or future; but as imaged they are accompanying these changes. A representation of some present, and, as we have just observed, are regarded as or all of these attendants is perhaps what takes place when both actual and present in the absence of correcting imvariations of intensity are supposed to be reproduced. pressions. We cannot at once see the sky red and blue; Again, hallucinations are often described as abnormally how is it we can imagine it the one while perceiving it to intense images which simply, by reason of their intensity, be the other? When we attempt to make the field of are mistaken for percepts. But such statement, though sight at once red and blue, as in looking through red glass supported by very high authority, is almost certainly false, with one eye and through blue glass with the other, either and would probably never have been made if physiological the colours merge and we see a purple sky or we see the and epistemological considerations had been excluded as sky first of the one colour and then of the other in irregular they ought to have been. Hallucinations, when carefully alternation. That this does not happen between impresexamined, seem just as much as percepts to contain among sion and image shows that, whatever their connexion, their constituents some primary presentation-either a so- images altogether are distinct from the presentation-concalled subjective sensation of sight and hearing or some tinuum and cannot with strict propriety be spoken of as organic sensation due to deranged circulation or secretion. revived or reproduced impressions. This difference is Now we have noticed already incidentally in a preced- manifest in another respect, viz., when we compare the ing paragraph that primary presentations reinstate and effects of diffusion in the two cases. An increase in the maintain the representational constituents of a percept in a intensity of a sensation of touch entails an increase in the manner very different from that in which what are unmis- extensity; an increase of muscular innervation entails takably ideas reproduce each other. The intensity and irradiation to adjacent muscles; but when a particular steadiness of the impressional elements are, as it were, idea becomes clearer and more distinct there rises into shared by the ideational elements in a complex containing consciousness an associated idea qualitatively related probboth. Intensity alone, then, will not suffice to discrimi- ably to impressions of quito another class, as when the nate, neither will extremes of intensity alone lead us to smell of tar calls up memories of the sea-beach and fishconfuse, impressions and images.
ing-boats. Since images are thus distinct from impresThe superior steadiness just mentioned is perhaps a sions, and yet so far continuous with each other as to form more constant and not less striking characteristic of per a train in itself unbroken, we should be justified, if it were cepts. Ideas are not only in a continual flux, but even convenient, in speaking of images as changes in a reprewhen we attempt forcibly to detain one it varies continu- sentation- or memory-continuum; and later on we may see ally in clearness and completeness, reminding one of that this is convenient, nothing so much as of the illuminated devices made of Impressions, then, have no associates to whose presence gas jets, common at fêtes, when the wind sweeps across their own is accommodated and on whose intensity their them, momentarily obliterating one part and at the same own depends. Each bids independently for attention, so time intensifying another. There is not this perpetual
1 Moreover, as we shall sec, the distin flow and flicker in what we perceive ; for this, unlike the
veen present and past
or future psychologically presupposes the contrast of impression and train of ideas, has at the outset neither a logical nor a image.