a figure much higher than that contended for by the Crown. This figure was inserted in the award by a clerical error in the referee's office, and the referee signed the award without reading it with sufficient care. On the mistake being pointed out to him the referee issued a second award in which the assessment was greatly reduced. Scrutton, J., in allowing an appeal by the subject to vary the award, said: "A referee, having once issued his award, cannot issue another without the consent of both parties" (Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Hunter, [1914] 3 K. B. 423). 5. An arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction, and it was contended that this was an accidental slip or omission which the arbitrator could correct. Channell, J., doubted whether this was such an error as came within s. 7 (c), and in an action on the award he gave judgment for the defendant on the ground that the arbitrator had exceeded his jurisdiction (Pedler v. Hardy (1902), 18 T. L. R. 591). SECTION 8. WITNESSES MAY BE SUMMONED BY SUBPOENA. 8. Any party to a submission may sue out a writ of subpoena ad testificandum, or a writ of subpœna duces tecum, but no person shall be compelled under any such writ to produce any document which he could not be compelled to produce on the trial of an action. There are no rules of the Supreme Court, with reference to the suing out or service of writs of subpoena, to require the attendance of witnesses, or as to the procedure in case of disobedience to such writs in the case of references by consent out of Court. Order XXXVII., r. 20, gives such power to any party in any cause or matter, but a reference by consent out of Court is not a cause or matter" (Re Shaw and Ronaldson, [1892] 1 Q. B. 91). Rules 26 to 28, and apparently all the other rules of this Order, apply only to actions. in the High Court. Where the witness is within the jurisdiction of the Court, i.e. is in England or Wales, the writ is issued at the Writ Department of the Central Office as of course, without any order of the Court; but if the witness is elsewhere in the United Kingdom it is necessary to obtain. an order of the Court under s. 18 of the Act. Wilful disobedience to the writ by a person within the jurisdiction is a contempt of Court, rendering him liable to committal, but only if a reasonable sum is tendered for conduct money and expenses (In re Batson, Ex parte Hastie (1894), 70 L. T. 382). S. 40 of the Act of 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, which was repealed by the Arbitration Act, provided that disobedience to any rule or order commanding the attendance of a witness under that section should be deemed a contempt of Court, if, in addition to the service of the rule or order, an appointment of the time and place of attendance, signed by one of the arbitrators or the umpire before whom the attendance was required, should also be served together with or after the service of the rule or order provided always that every person whose attendance was so required should be entitled to the like conduct money, and payment of expenses and for loss of time, as for and upon attendance at any trial. No similar or corresponding provisions are contained in the Arbitration Act. The word "submission" cannot, in s. 8, receive the full meaning of the definition given in s. 27 of the Arbitration Act. It cannot, for example, include an agreement to refer future differences to arbitration. It would seem that to entitle a party to sue out a writ under the section there must be a submission in the sense in which that phrase was used before the Act, viz. there must be a dispute and an agreement to refer that dispute to a named arbitrator. The word "submission" has received a similar limited interpretation under s. 1 (Re Smith and Nelson's Arbitration (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 550). Further, it would seem that the arbitrator must either have entered on the reference, or have been called on to act by notice in writing from a party to the submission, and have agreed to do so. SECTION 9. POWER OF COURT TO ENLARGE TIME FOR MAKING AWARD. Previous law. Cases in which the power may be exercised. Statutory references. Enlargement after the making of the award. Enlargement after time for making award has expired. "Award" includes the award of an umpire. Discretion of Court. Period of enlargement. 9. The time for making an award may from time to time be enlarged by order of the Court or a judge, whether the time for making the award has expired or not. Previous law. Without the consent of the parties the Court had no power at common law to grant any enlargement when the time for making the award fixed in the agreement to refer had expired; the authority of the arbitrator was gone, and all the proceedings already taken became abortive. Illustration. A cause was referred to arbitration by order of a judge with the consent of both parties. The arbitrator was to make his award by the first day of Trinity Term, 1826, with power to enlarge the time. Subsequently the judge, without the consent of the defendant, made further orders enlarging the time for making the award-first to 21st June and then to 1st July. Before the 1st July the award was made in favour of the plaintiff, and the defendant refused to perform it. Held that the award was bad, since the enlargement of time had not been made by the judge with the consent of both parties, and since it had not been made by the arbitrator in accordance with the agreement to refer (Halden v. Glasscock (1826), 5 B. & C. 390; 8 D. & R. 151. See also Teasdale v. Atkins (1780), referred to in Tidd's Practice, 9th ed., at p. 826). It was provided by s. 39 of the 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42 (repealed by the Arbitration Act), in reference to any submission by rule of Court, or by judge's order or order of nisi prius, in any action, or any submission containing an agreement that it should be made a rule of Court, that "the Court or any judge thereof may from time to time enlarge the term for any such arbitrator making his award." S. 15 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, similarly provided: "It shall be lawful for the superior Court of which such submission, document, or order is or may be made a rule or order, or for any judge thereof, for good cause to be stated in the rule or order for the enlargement, from time to time to enlarge the time for making the award." In Hall v. Rouse (1838), 4 M. & W. 24, Parke, B., at p. 26, expressed the opinion that the time for making an award might be enlarged on application to the Court under 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, s. 39, although the time for making the award had expired. In the case of a sale of property at a price to be ascertained by valuation by a specified date, the time for making the valuation may be extended in equity, and specific performance be decreed, if it was owing to the misconduct of one of the parties that the valuation was not made in due time. Illustration. Parties entered into a contract by which the defendant agreed to sell the plaintiff certain property at a valuation to be made by a specified date. The valuation was not made within the time agreed, but the delay was caused by the misconduct of the defendant, who prevented the valuers from going upon the land. The Court decreed that the defendant should permit the valuation to be made according to the contract as if the time for so doing had not passed, and that, this having been done, a supplemental bill should be filed for specific performance upon the terms of the valuation (Morse v. Merest (1821), 6 Madd. 26. See also Dimsdale v. Robertson (1844), 2 Jo. & Lat. 58; Smith v. Peters (1875), L. R. 20 Eq. 511). Cases in which the power may be exercised. The power conferred on the Court by the section of enlarging the time for making the award can be exercised: 1. When the submission excludes the provisions of clause (c) or (e)of the First Schedule to the Act and does not give the arbitrators or umpire power to enlarge; or 2. When the arbitrators or umpire fail to exercise their powers to enlarge within the period specified in the submission, or within the time within which they must enlarge under clause (c) or (e) of the First Schedule, as the case may be. The fact that the parties in the submission have put a limit on the time for making the award or for enlarging the time for so doing does not preclude the Court from ordering an enlargement. Lush, J., referring to s. 15 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, and citing Lord v. Lee (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 404, said: "No limit of time is given, within which the judge may enlarge the time. He is not limited to the time within which the arbitrator himself could enlarge it, even although it be said in the submission that the arbitrator shall make his award on or before a certain day" (Knowles & Sons, Ltd. v. Bolton Corporation, [1900] 2 Q. B., at p. 257). Illustrations. 1. An agreement to refer provided that the award should be made within a certain time, with power to the arbitrator to make a limited enlargement. The arbitrator having enlarged the time so far as he had power, it was held that a judge might further extend the time for making the award to a day later than the last day named in the agreement to refer (Parkes v. Smith (1850), 15 Q. B. 297). 2. An agreement to refer certain disputes to arbitration provided that the arbitrator "shall make his award [on or before a certain date] or on or before any other day (not exceeding three months from the date of this agreement) to which the arbitrator shall . . . enlarge the time for making his award." The award was not made within the three months. An application was subsequently made to the Court for an order enlarging the time for making the award. Held that the Court had power to grant such an order although the parties in the agreement to refer had put a limit to the time of enlargement and an arbitrator could not have enlarged the time himself (Denton v. Strong (1874), L. R.. 9 Q. B. 117). 3. An agreement to refer provided that the award should be made within one month after the date thereof. There was no clause in the agreement as to the extension, either by the arbitrators or otherwise, of the time for making the award. The award was not made within the specified period. On cross-motions to set aside the award and to enlarge the time for making it: held that, despite the fact that the parties had fixed a definite period for the making of the award, the Court, under s. 15 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, had power, after the making of the award, to enlarge the time for so doing (In re May and Harcourt (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 688). It may, however, be contended that the parties may effectively agree that, unless the award is made within a certain time, it shall not be binding or of any effect, thus making time of the essence of the contract. Though the Court might enlarge the arbitrator's time for making his award in the exercise of its discretion, it would seem that it would not do so unless there was an existing agreement capable of being carried into effect, and as an enlargement of the time, in such a case, if it is to be binding on the parties, would be to compel them to enter into a new agreement, it is thought that the Court would not so exercise its discretion. Mellish, L.J., in Randell v. Thompson (1876), 1 Q. B. D., at p. 758, said: “Field, J., appears to have thought that it did not signify that the three months had elapsed and that the timefor making the award might be enlarged at any time; but after the submission had been revoked, the power of the judge to enlarge the time is gone and the power of enlargement can only refer to an agreement capable of being performed." See post, p. 159. Though the power of revoking a submission is taken away by s. 1 of the Arbitration Act, there seems to be nothing to prevent the parties. from making contracts limiting the time within which the award shall be made in order to be effective, and agreeing that in the event of an award not being made within the time so limited, the submission shall be at an end. There is no revocation in such a case, but the submission comes to an end by agreement between the parties. Statutory references. The Court also has power to enlarge the time where a limit is. placed upon the time for making an award in certain arbitrations by statute. Illustrations. 1. An award having been remitted to an umpire acting in arbitration proceedings in respect of lands acquired by a railway company under the Lands Clauses Act, 1845, nothing was done in regard to the arbitration for nearly four months after the time limited in the Act for the arbitrator to make his award. The landowner having then expressed |