CROWN LANDS.

Disputes between the Commissioners of Woods and Forests and other persons touching the boundaries or extent of Crown lands, or as to rights or easements over or claimed in respect of such lands, may be referred to arbitration (10 Geo. IV. c. 50, s. 94). By the Crown Lands Act, 1866 (29 & 30 Vict. c. 62), ss. 7 and 8, the powers of the Commissioners of Woods and Forests with regard to foreshore are transferred to the Board of Trade, and the provisions of 10 Geo. IV. c. 50, as to arbitration, are made applicable to the foreshore under the management of the Board of Trade. Ss. 26-29 contain provisions as to the proceedings in any arbitration under either Act of Parliament.

DEFENCE, RANGES, AND MILITARY LANDS ACTS.

Under the Ranges Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 54), s. 11, where any land is acquired either under the Defence Act, 1842 (5 & 6 Vict. c. 94), and the Acts amending the same, or for military purposes under any Act with which the Lands Clauses Acts are incorporated, the person or authority acquiring the land may require that the compensation to be paid for the land be settled by arbitration and not by reference to a jury, and thereupon the provisions of the Lands Clauses Act with reference to compensation apply.

The Military Lands Act, 1892 (55 & 56 Vict. c. 43), contains (s. 20) similar provisions with regard to lands taken under that Act, and further provides (s. 21) that any dispute as to the compensation to be paid to the owner of land for damage caused in the erection or repair of "alignment marks" shall be determined by arbitration under the Arbitration Act, 1889.

By the Defence Act, 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 67), s. 1, as amended by the Ordnance Board Transfer Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 117), the Secretary of State for War may avail himself of the powers of the Lands Clauses Act, 1845, for the purpose of extinguishing any rights. of common over any lands the soil of which may have been taken under the Defence Act, 1842 (5 & 6 Vict. c. 94). Compensation for extinguishing such rights may therefore become the subject of arbitration.

MILITARY MANOEUVRES ACT.

By the Military Manoeuvres Act, 1897 (60 & 61 Vict. c. 43), s. 6, where an Order in Council authorises the execution of military manœuvres, compensation is to be paid for any damage to person or property arising from putting in force any of the provisions of the Act, and the amount of such compensation, if not settled by agreement, is to be referred to arbitration.

The notice of claim for compensation is to be treated as a submission under the Arbitration Act, and that Act is to apply accordingly.

ENFRANCHISEMENT OF COPYHOLDS.

Under the Copyhold Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 46), s. 5, the amount of compensation for the enfranchisement of copyhold land may be determined by the valuation of valuers appointed for the purpose (not by arbitration).

OTHER STATUTES.

The following statutes also contain provisions for references to arbitration:

The Telegraph Acts, 1863 (26 & 27 Vict. c. 112), ss. 16, 22-34; 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. 110), ss. 8 (7), 9; 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 73), ss. 10, 12; 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 76), ss. 3-6, 13; 1908 (8 Edw. VII. c. 33), ss. 1, 3, 5 ; and 1909 (9 Edw. VII. c. 20).

The Tramways Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 78), s. 33. See Norwich Corporation v. Norwich Electric Tramways Co., [1906] 2 K. B. 119. The Metalliferous Mines Regulation Act, 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 77), s. 21.

The Allotments and Cottage Gardens (Compensation for Crops) Act, 1887 (50 & 51 Vict. c. 26).

The Housing of the Working Classes Acts, 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 70), s. 21, and 1909 (9 Edw. VII. c. 44), s. 29.

The Industrial and Provident Societies Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 39), s. 49.

The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906 (6 Edw. VII. c. 58).

The Small Holdings and Allotments Acts, 1908 and 1910 (8 Edw. VII. c. 36; 10 Edw. VII. and 1 Geo. V. c. 34).

The Agricultural Holdings Acts, 1908 (8 Edw. VII. c. 28), and 1914 (4 & 5 Geo. V. c. 7).

The Coal Mines Act, 1911 (1 & 2 Geo. V. c. 50), ss. 116-118.

The Munitions of War Acts, 1915 and 1916 (5 & 6 Geo. V. cc. 54 and 99).

The Defence of the Realm (Acquisition of Land) Act, 1916 (6 & 7 Geo. V. c. 63), s. 8.

Every person who has a right of which he can dispose is competent to submit questions affecting that right to arbitration, and any disabilities that affect the right of disposal will equally affect his right of submission (Com. Dig. Arb. D 2; Bac. Ab. Arb. C).

MARRIED WOMEN.

Thus

At common law married women, in general, had no right of contracting at all and hence had no power of submitting disputes to arbitration. Equity, however, recognised their right to hold and contract with regard to property given to them for their separate use, and to the common law rule there were certain exceptions. women who were married in fact were treated by the common law as being and having all the rights of unmarried women if their husbands were civiliter mortui, e.g. because they were banished or exiled (Countess of Portland v. Prodgers (1689), 2 Vern. 104), or were suffering transportation (Newsome v. Bowyer (1729), 3 P. W. 37; Sparrow v. Carruthers (1800), 2 Black. W. 1197), or were alien enemies (Deerly v. Duchess of Mazarine (1696), 1 Salk. 116), or had abjured the realm, or were members of some religious order (see Co. Litt. 1 Inst. 133 a). The absence of the husband from the country must, however, be involuntary in order to place his wife in the position of a feme sole (Marsh v. Hutchinson (1800), 2 Bos. & Pul. 226, distinguishing Sparrow v. Carruthers, supra; Barden v. De Keverberg (1836), 2 M. & W. 61).

Another exception was that women trading under the custom of the City of London had, even though they were married, full rights of contract, and consequently of submitting disputes with regard to matters arising out of such trade to arbitration. And where a married woman has obtained a protection order under the Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. 85), s. 21, or a judicial separation under s. 26 of the same Act, she is to be considered as a feme sole for the purposes of contract, wrongs, injuries, or being sued or

suing in any civil proceeding, and is therefore capable of submitting disputes to arbitration as freely as if she were unmarried.

With these exceptions, however, married women, under the old law, were not competent to bind themselves contractually, and so could not submit to arbitration, nor would the Court of Chancery, as it did in the case of infants, permit a reference to the Master to decide whether a submission would be for the benefit of the married woman (Davis v. Page (1804), 9 Ves. 350; Strachan v. Dougall (1851), 7 Moo. P. C. 365). Nor could a married woman effectually consent to be bound by an award already made (Evans v. Cogan (1727), 2 P. W. 450), and the marriage of a female party to a submission formerly sufficed to revoke the authority of the arbitrator to make an award (Charnley v. Winstanley (1804), 5 East, 266; M'Can v. O'Ferrall (1840), 8 Cl. & F. 30).

Now, however, by virtue of the Married Women's Property Acts, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 75) and 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 63), a married woman can by contract, and so by a submission to arbitration, bind her separate property whether in possession or subsequently acquired, which is not subject to a restraint on anticipation, as freely as a feme sole. But property which she is restrained from anticipating is not bound by her contracts by the operation of these Acts. "It appears clear upon the true construction of the proviso to s. 1 of the Married Women's Property Act, 1893, that the Legislature intended that a contract entered into by a married woman should not bind property as to which she was restrained from anticipation, and that such property should stand entirely clear from any liabilities or engagements contracted by her during coverture" (per Mathew, L.J., in Brown v. Dimbleby, [1904] 1 K. B. 28. See also Barnett v. Howard, [1900] 2 Q. B. 784).

Under the old law a husband could submit to arbitration any disputes respecting personalty which he had in the right of his wife, for he could dispose of it (Bac. Ab. Arb. C; Anon. (1641), March, 77; Smith v. Ward (1652), Styles, 351), and an award in favour of the husband upon such a reference operated in case of a chose in action to reduce it into his possession, and so defeated the wife's right by survivorship (Oglander v. Baston (1686), 1 Vern. 396). Questions of this kind, however, could only now arise in cases where the marriage took place, and the title to the property accrued, before the passing of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882 (see above).

INFANTS.

At common law, generally speaking, a contract made by an infant was voidable by him, and hence, as a general rule, a submission to arbitration by an infant was not binding upon him (Bac. Ab. Arb. C; Com. Dig. Arb. D 2; 1 Rolle, Ab. Arb. A 268; Rudston v. Yates

(1641), March, N. C. 111, 141). To this general rule there were exceptions in the case of reasonable contracts for necessaries, reasonable contracts of service, and contracts plainly for the benefit of the infant himself, by all of which he was bound, and it would seem that a submission by an infant in respect of any of these matters was equally binding (see Rudston v. Yates, supra; Clements v. London & North Western Rail. Co., [1894] 2 Q. B. 482).

An infant, by ratifying a voidable contract when he came of age, could render it binding upon him, and if he did not repudiate the contract within a reasonable time after majority, he would be treated as having affirmed it (Edwards v. Carter, [1893] A. C. 360). But it is now provided by the Infants' Relief Act, 1874 (37 & 38 Vict. c. 62), s. 2, that no action shall be brought to charge any person upon any ratification, made after full age, of any promise or contract made during infancy, whether there shall or shall not be any new consideration for such promise or ratification after full age. The result, therefore, seems to be that a submission to arbitration by an infant is voidable by him and cannot effectively be ratified, except when it relates to the supply of necessaries, a reasonable contract of service, or a contract plainly for the infant's benefit, and then it is binding upon him even during infancy, and quite apart from any question of ratification.

It is quite competent for persons of full age to bind themselves for performance by infants of awards, either alone or jointly with the infants. Thus, a father or guardian may bind himself that an infant son or ward shall perform an award (Gill v. Russell (1672), Freem. 62, 139; Roberts v. Newbold (1695), Comb. 318; Bowyer v. Blorksidge (1681), 3 Lev. 17; In re Hurley (1832), 1 Hay. & Jo. 160). If a man of full age is jointly bound with the infant, the obligation will bind the former (Com. Dig. Arb. D 9; Bean v. Newbury (1664), 1 Lev. 139). But if the award direct that, on payment by defendant of a sum of money, the infant shall execute a release, though the submission to which he is a party may be good, as it may be for his benefit, yet the award will be void, as an infant cannot execute a binding release; and the father will be unable to enforce the arbitration bond against the defendant (Knight v. Stone (1628), W. Jones, Rep. 164; S. C. Stone v. Knight, Latch, 207;. Noy, 93).

Under Order XVI., r. 21, in all causes or matters to which any infant is a party "any consent as to the mode of taking evidence or as to any other procedure" will, "if given with the consent of the Court or a judge by the next friend, guardian, or other person acting on behalf of the infant, have the same force and effect as if the infant were under no disability and had given such consent." Probably under this rule the Court or a judge would sanction the reference of a cause or matter to which an infant was a party, if of opinion that the reference was for the benefit of the infant.