intention of the legislature could be carried out, unless the Courts of Common Law assumed the power of granting these injunctions, which are mandatory in effect. Thus, if a wall is being built, which obstructs an ancient light, an injunction would be granted to restrain the further building of such wall; but the ancient light might still be obstructed by the part already built; and, in such case, it is apprehended, that, to prevent the continuance of the injury, the Court would grant an injunction to restrain the defendant from permitting such part of the wall to remain on the ground. Cases of this kind will probably be rare, and the Courts will, no doubt, exercise great caution in granting such injunctions. It must, lastly, be observed with regard to these injunctions, that where such an injunction is sought for as a means of enforcing a contract, the specific performance of which the Court would not directly compel, it seems that it would be refused, as being an indirect means of obtaining such specific performance (k). The distinction appears somewhat fine, but may be illustrated by the case of Lumley v. Wagner, where there was an affirmative covenant by Mdlle. Wagner to sing at the plaintiff's theatre, which the Court could not specifically enforce. An injunction, therefore, would not have been granted to restrain her from continuing not to sing at the plaintiff's theatre, as this would have been in (k) See Hooper v. Brodrick, 11 Sim. 47; Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De Gex, Mac. & G. 604; 21 L. J,, Chanc., 898, S. C.; and see post, Alphabet, tit. Agreement. directly to enforce by injunction a covenant, of which specific performance could not be enforced. But there was also a negative covenant on her part, that she would not sing at any other theatre than the plaintiff's, and the Court restrained her by injunction from a breach of this negative covenant; which had the fortunate effect, as the Lord Chancellor observed, of bearing upon another subject, which he could not directly touch. tion over Per &c. 2. Under this head also of jurisdiction, it may be 2. Jurisdicwell to remark, in the second place, that, in one sonal Wrongs. point of view, the jurisdiction of the Courts of Law under this act may, perhaps, be held to be more extensive than that of Courts of Equity; inasmuch as the latter Courts have, except in the case of infants, lunatics, &c., no jurisdiction over persons, but only in respect of property. They would not interfere in respect of merely personal wrongs, such as to restrain the repetition of a libel, or the continuance of any other act merely affecting personal character(). It may be a question, whether the power of the Common Law Courts will not be more extensive; but we apprehend that such question must be answered in the negative, as it would seem, from the use of the words "property or right" in the latter part of sect. 79, that such extension was not contemplated; and, further, in most cases where personal character is affected by libel, or otherwise, it would probably be considered that damages would be a sufficient compensation, and (1) See Clark v. Freeman, 12 Jur. 149; 11 Beav. 112, S. C.; and Attorney-General v. Sheffield Gas Company, 17 Jur. 677, per Turner, Lord Justice. 3. Injunctions to keep Property in statu quo, gation. that, therefore, the Courts of Common Law, acting upon the principle laid down in Equity, would not interfere by injunction. 3. On the other hand, in one important respect, the jurisdiction of Courts of Equity may be held pending Liti- to be more extensive than that conferred upon the Courts of Common Law. Courts of Equity will grant injunctions to restrain the defendant from doing anything which may prevent the property from remaining in statu quo during the pendency of the suit; that is, the Court will not allow the defendant so to deal with the subject-matter in dispute as to embarrass the plaintiff should he ultimately succeed. Thus, in one case, a railway company was restrained by Lord Cottenham, C., from entering into an agreement for the sale of their railway to another company, and from doing or omitting to do anything repugnant to or inconsistent with an agreement which they had previously entered into with the plaintiff's company (m). So, where the plaintiff, the purchaser, was seeking to enforce a specific performance of a contract for the sale of the next presentation, the defendant, the vendor, was restrained from presenting, and (m) Great Western Railway Company v. Birmingham and Oxford Junction Railway Company, 2 Phill. 597; 17 L. J., Chanc., 243, S. C. This case was commented upon and disapproved of by Lord Cranworth, V. C.; but the principle was not disputed, though it was doubted, whether, upon the facts, and looking to the inconvenience of such a course being adopted, an injunction should have been granted. See Shrewsbury and Chester Railway Company v. Shrewsbury and Birmingham Railway Company, 20 L. J., Chanc., 574; and see Story, Eq. Jur. § 908. the bishop was restrained from instituting any person to the living, pending the suit (n). Upon examination of these, and the like cases, it will be seen that the Courts grant these injunctions when the plaintiff seeks to get the property in specie, either by an application for specific performance or otherwise: upon the principle that the defendant shall not be allowed to decide the question in his own favour, by making away with the property, the right to which is the question in dispute. Looking, then, to the fact that these injunctions are granted in support of, and to give full effect to, applications of a kind which cannot be brought before Courts of Law, inasmuch as these Courts have no power to grant specific performance; and looking also to the words of the Act, "or the committal of any breach of contract, or injury of a like kind arising out of the same contract, or relating to the same property or right," it is questionable whether Courts of Law will entertain applications for injunctions of this kind (o). (n) Nicholson v. Knapp, 9 Sim. 326. (0) By sect. 78, the Courts are enabled to enforce a specific delivery of chattels; but the application to the Court to exercise this power is a distinct one, and to be made after the trial. It does not therefore resemble the proceedings in Equity for a specific performance. granting In III. PRINCIPLES AND RULES BY WHICH COURTS Principle in HAVING made these few observations upon the junctions; jurisdiction of Courts of Equity in granting injunctions, we will now consider the principles and rules which guide those Courts in the exercise of that jurisdiction. Damages at The main principle on which Equity grants relief by injunction is, that damages at Law would not be a perfect compensation for the wrong complained of. This principle governs all the cases; and all the rules by which the discretion of the Court is guided, and which will be discussed hereafter, are subject to this great principle. It will be found to apply equally to cases of breaches of contract and to torts. 1. As regards Contracts. In a very recent case, where a manufacturer was in the habit, at the close of each season, of selling off his stock, on the terms that the same should not be resold in England, for fear of competing with his new stock for the ensuing season, the Lords Justices held, that it was not a case for an injunction, as the measure of damages could be adequately ascertained, and would be |