3000 a year out of the rents, in part liquidation of the monies so lent upon mortgage, with a proviso for redemption, and also that S. should be at liberty to sell the lands, and that E. should concur in such sales, provided that the proceeds of such sales should be applicable to the payment of the monies thereby secured, or be otherwise invested, in the joint names of E and S., in lands, Government Stocks, real securities, or in shares or debentures of any company, paying a dividend or interest of 51. per cent., such securities to stand charged with the payment of the monies secured by the mortgage: this deed was duly registered. In July, 1855, B. agreed to advane 95,000% to S., upon a mortgage of all the lands belonging to S., with a covant against incumbrances, which, having been executed on the 2nd of August, 1855, B. paid 70,000l. to S. Upon proceeding to register this mortgage deed, E.'s mortgage was discovered; but upon S. promising to obtain a release of it, B. handed the remaining 25,000l. to S. S. thereupon wrote to E., proposing under the proviso of the deed of Oct., 1854, to substitute for the lands mortgaged therein shares, paying 5 per cent. in the Royal Swedish Railway Co., and other securities, producing as S. alleged, 5,000. per annum. E. having consulted with his solicitor, agreed to the proposal, and, on the 13th of October, 1855, executed a re-conveyance of the lauds comprised in the deed of October, 1854, to S.; and S. executed articles of agreement of same date, transferring the substituted securities to E., handing him also the railway shares and coupons. S. died insolvent in February, 1856. The railway shares and other securities assigned to E., proved to be forgeries, and the lands comprised in the deeds of August, 1855, having been sold in the Incumbered Estates Court, E. claimed priority to B. B.'s claim having been allowed, E. now appealed-Held (affirming the raling of the court below), that B, not having notice or knowledge of any fraud in the dealings of S. with E., and having given a valuable consideration for the covenant against incumbrances, was entitled to priority over E. In re Burmester, Ex parte Eyre, 5 Ir. Jur., N. S., 369, C. of Ap. Interest on, see MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT. INCUMBRANCER. Possession of], see LIMITATIONS (Statute of). INDEMNITY. To maker of lost note], see BANK-NOTE INFANT, See MINOR. INFORMATION. At an election of town councillor for the R. Ward of the borough of D., the place of abode of T.V.. one of the candidates), was stated in the voting papers to be 9, Lower Bridgestreet, though he slept and his family lived at Blackrock House, in the Co. of D., R.J.D. (the other candidate) discovered the mistake and informed T.V. of it, and the presiding alderman, by a written notice before the close of the poll. T. V. was declared duly elected. Upon motion of R. J. D. the court granted an information in the nature of a quo warranto against T. V. Reg. v. Vance, 5 Ir. Jur., N.S., 801, Q.B. INJUNCTION. In a lease for lives renewable for ever, the interest of the lessee became vested in W.T., that of the lessor in G. A. W.T. mortgaged the lands demised to G. H R., who instituted a suit to foreclose. W. T. having died, the suit was revived against his infant heir-at-law; a reference to the Master was made in the suit to inquire if a renewal should be taken. The Master having reported in favour of the renewal, an arrangement was made that the renewal should be executed to G. H. R., who had no beneficial interest in the lands, as trustee for all parties interested therein. A draft renewal was thereupon sent to G. A., containing the ordinary covenants from R., for payment of the rent, and keeping the premises in repair, but with a proviso at the end of the draft, that nothing therein contained should affect the real or personal estate of G. H. R. G. A. returned the draft with a memorandum in the fold, which was in these words "If I give up the covenant for payment of the rent by G. H. R., it is only that I do not like to throw obstacles in the way of the parties." The renewal was then executed. G. A. subsequently sued G. H. R. upon the covenant for the rent, who, being advised that the proviso could not, at law, control the prior express covenants, filed a cause petition against G. A. for an injunction, or to have the deed reformed by striking out the covenants. Held-(affirming a decree of Lord Chancellor Brady), that G. H. R. was entitled to a perpetual injunction to restrain proceedings at law upon the covenant. Reade v. Armstrong, 3 Ir. Jur. N.S., 305; s. c. 7 Ir. Chan R. 266, C. Ib. 375, Reports, temp. Napier, by Drury, 55, C. of Ap. INSURANCE. To an action on a policy of insurance, the defendants pleaded the statute of limitations. Replication-That before six years elapsed, J. B., filed a canse petition in the Court of Chancery to enforce payment of his demand; the defence to which was, that before the commencement of the suit, the policies had lapsed by non-payment of premiums, and that the court had directed this action to be brought to try that question. Ön demurrer: held, that the pendency of the suit was a good equitable answer to the plea of the statute. Supple v. Cann, 9 Ir C. L.R, 1, C.P. The plaintiff by his summons and plaint admitted the nonpayment of premiums within the prescribed period, and relied on their receipt by the agent of the company of the premiums as a waiver of the lapse. The company pleaded a special con dition contained in the policy, providing the means by which the policy should be set up. On demurrer, held, that the condition did not preclude the plaintiff from relying on any other mode of waiver. Ib. If a life insurance be effected by A. for the security of a debt due by B, the question is one of contract between the parties, and not of indemnity. The matter for consideration is whether the premiums have been paid by the debtor or by the creditor out of his own means. Gaggin v. Upton, Reports temp. Napier, by Drury, 427, C. See observations of court on Humphrey v. Arabin, Lloyd v. Goold, temp. Plunket, 318, and Bell v. Ahearn, 12 Ir. Eq. R., 576. Payment of Premium], see HUSBAND AND WIFE. INTEREST. By settlement it was agreed that the trustees should hold a sum of 5,000l. on trust to pay the interest to B. for life, and after his death to C., his wife, for life, and on the death of C., to their children. The bond only realized 3,230, and that sum was invested during the lifetime of C. in the purchase of leaseholds which expired, the rents of which were received by C. during her life. Upon the hearing of a suit brought by the children of B and C. against R., the personal representative of the surviving trustees, it was held, that C. could be only called upon to refund so much of the rents and profits of the leascholds as would be equal to the difference between the annnal amount of the rents and profits received by her, and of the interest which the trust fund would have produced if properly invested. Bentley v. Robinson, 5 Ir. Jur., N.S, 7. For more than six years], see LIMITATIONS (STATUTE of), Interest on charge for younger child], see DEED. On promissory Note], see BILL OF EXCHANGE. INTERPLEADER. An interpleader order was granted to a coroner, notwithstanding the acceptance of an indemnity from an execution creditor. Quinton v. Butt, 5 Ir. Jur., N.S., 130, Ex. The court will not refuse an interpleader order unless on the facts of the case it be plainly evident that there is no question to be tried. Ib. When, after a Fi. Fa. has been executed, and a return made thereon, but before the money has been paid over to the execution-creditor, the landlord of the debtor served a notice, claiming a year's rent. Held, that the sheriff, under the circumstances, is entitled to call on the execution-creditor and the landlord to interplead Dixon v. Wills, 9 Ir. C.L.R., 467; s. c. 4 Ir. Jur., N.S., 242, C.P. Held, that the landlord was entitled to the rent; but the sum in the hands of the sheriff being insufficient to discharge the year's rent, the court gave liberty to the sheriff to amend his return by converting in that of nulla bona. Ib. In the year 1851, B. obtained a judgment against A, and in 1855 a decree on consent was made in an administration suit declaring A. trustee for himself and his brothers and sisters, as to certain lands in which he had the legal estate. In 1856, A. acquired a further interest in the same lands, and subsequently in the same year, the judgment creditor registered his judgment as a mortgage (13 & 14 Vic. c. 29) against those lands. Held, that the registration of the judgment affected that portion of the lands only in which A. had a beneficial interest. M'Auley v. Clarendon, Reports temp. Napier, by Drury, 453; s.c., 8 Ir. Ch. R. 568, C. of App. Held, that the registration of a judgment as a mortgage under the 13 & 14 Vic., c. 29, operates in equity to pass the beneficial interest of the debtor only. Ib. Held, if the debtor has a legal estate, it is transferred to the creditor, subject to the same equities to which it was liable in the hands of the judgmsnt debtor at the time of the registration. Ib. In 1846, A and B being partners, to secure a debt due from them to C, gave C their joint and several bond and warrant of attorney, upon which Centered up a joint judgment in 1849. The partnership was dissolved, and from that time A alone carried on the business. In 1858 A became bankrupt. Held, that C could not prove for the amount secured by the bond upon A's estate, the several as well as the joint bond and warrant having been merged in the joint judgment. The principle of Ex parte Christie, Mont. & Bl., 352; s.c., 2 D. & Ch., In re John Gallie, ex parte Quære-As to the rule to inspect the record on on a notice served under the 68th G. O., 1856, is for two or four days. Ib. In 1840 a judgment was recovered against F., which be-154, applies to and rules this case came vested in A.; in 1856 B. recovered a judgment against James Butler Gallie, 9 Ir. Ch. R., 188. F., for 8941., and 21. 2s. 8d. costs, and registered the same as a Nul tiel record]. In an action of debt upon a judgment, mortgage, in the affidavit,-describing F. as late of the the plaintiff was described as of "No. 35, High-street, BelTown of Galway, but now of the county of Dublin," and the grave-road, Pimlico, England, Jeweller," The defence was nul amount of the judgment debt to be 8947. and 31. 28. 8d. costs. tiel record. The record, when produced, showed plaintiff to be F. died in 1857, and subsequent to his death A. re-registered then described as "late of Dawson-street, Dublin, but now of his judgment. B. filed a supplemental affidavit in 1859, de- Bury-street, St. James, London, Jeweller." Held, to be a fatal scribing F. as "late of the Town of Galway, but now of variance. Gordon v Hassard, 9 Ir. C. L. R. 195; s.c. 4 Ir. Jur. George's-place, in the City of Dublin. F.'s estate was sold in N.S., 239, C.P. the Landed Estates Court. A.'s judgment being placed first on the schedule of incumbrances, B. claimed priority as a mortgagee. The judge in that court ruled that B.'s supplemental affidavit was void, because it had been filed subsequent to the death of the conuzor, but that B. was entitled to priority, his original affidavit of registration being correct. Upon appeal by A., held, that B.'s affidavit of registration was defective-First, because the title of the cause in which the judgment was obtained was not stated; secondly, that the last known place of abode of the person whose estate was intended to be effected thereby, was not stated; thirdly, that the amount of the judgment debt and costs recovered or ordered to be paid, was not stated—the addition of the registration fee of Il. to the costs appearing on the record, being a variance Estate of Fitzgerald, 5 Ir. Jur., N.S., 204, C. of Ap. An affidavit under the 13th & 14 of Vict. c. 29, entitled A. B. plaintiff, and C. D. defendant, contained the averment, "That on the day of a judgment in this cause was entered up at suit of deponent against said defendant in the court of in a cause of which the title is A. B. of plaintiff, and C. D. of defendant. Held, not to be a sufficient averment of the defendant whose estate was intended to be affected by the registration of the affidavit, as required by the 13th and 14 Vic., c. 29, sec. 6. Estate of J. Ferrall, 5 Ir. Jur., N.S., 275, L. E. C. In an action of ejectment on the title, the defendant for the purpose of showing the legal estate, outstanding in A., a judgment mortgagee, gave in evidence a copy of a judgment obtained by A. in the Court of Exchequer, against the plaintiff, and also an office copy of the affidavit of that judgment, registered in the office of the registry of deeds. The copy of the affidavit was not certified, but had the signature, "John E. Chapman, A.R.," at the foot, and it was stated that this was the usual and only way in which the officer was accustomed to authenticate these documents. Held, that sufficient proof was not given that the legal estate was vested in the judgment mortgagee, inasmuch as no evidence was given that the document produced at the trial was a correct copy of the affidavit filed in the Court of Exchequer. Duncan v. Brady, 5 Ir. Jur., N.S., 320, Q.B. Semble that a copy of an affidavit of a judgment registered in the office for registerising deeds, nder 13 & 14 Vict., c. 29, s. 6, is inadmissible in evidence, unless certified by the proper officer. Ib. Revivor]. In an action by an administrator, by writ of revivor, to recover a sum of money due on foot of a judgment, the defendant pleaded, first a payment, the endorsement of which was that, by the allocation schedule of the Incumbered Estates Commissioners, the entire amount due on foot of the judgment was allocated to the plaintiff. It appeared that the allocation was to the personal representative of A. G. No personal representative of A. G. was in existence at the time, nor for seven months afterwards, and before an application was made for payment by the party entitled, the money, by mistake, was paid out to other parties who were personal representatives of another A. G. Held, that the fact of the allocation was not to be considered as a payment. Garstin v. Keogh, 4 Ir. Jur., N.S. 53; s.c., 9 Ir. C. L. R, 72, C.P. Held also, that there was no equitable satisfaction of the judgment. Ib. Held also, that the laches on the part of the party who took out administration to A. G., the true owner of the judgment, was not such as to create any equitable bar to the revival of the judgment. Ib. A writ of revivor against the heir and terre-tenants of the deceased conuzor of a judgment, must allege the seisin of the conuzor, at the time of his decease, of the lands in respect of which execution is sought. Bradley v. Lidwell, 9 I. C. L. R., 457, C.P. Satisfaction of. Satisfaction of a judgment was ordered to be entered on the record; the satisfaction piece having been executed in Australia, and the affidavit of the witness to the execution having been made before a police magistrate, and not before a Master Extraordinary. Donelan v. Donelan, 9 Ir. C. L. R., App. ix., Q.B. The court will not allow satisfaction to be entered upon the judgment-roll, if the judgment be given as a collateral security, and where the rights of third parties may intervene, unless the conusee of the judgment be represented Morgan v. Sir W. Somerville, 9 Ir. C. L. R., App. xv. Priority of], see INCUMBRANOF. Marking of, see PRACTICE, LAW, tit. SECURITY FOR COSTS. Charging order on], see CHARGIng Order. GRAND JURY, See GRAND JURY. Special, in political cases], see PRACTICE (LAW) Special under old system]. see PRACTICE (LAW). Committal of unatic by], see LUNATIC. Jurisdiction f, vndler Fishery Act, 11 & 12 Vict. c. 48, s. 41]. see FISHERY JUSTICE OF PEACE, See SUMMARY JURISDICTION ACT. G.P. was convicted at the Petty Sessions for wilful and malicious trespass, on the respective complaints of the Marquis of A. and of H-H. and his father, who were Justices of the Peace, and joint agents of the Marquis of A, sat upon the bench during the hearing of the case, having made an audible and distinct declaration at the sitting of the court that they did not intend to take any part in the proceedings. Held, that the presence of these magistrates on the bench did not invalidate the proceedings, and a motion for a certiorari was therefore refused. Reg. v. Justices of Peace of Tyrone, 5 Ir. Jur., N.S., 281. JUSTICES PROTECTION ACT (12 Vict. c. 16). Embarrassing defence under], see PLEADING, tit. SETTING ASIDE. LACHES, See ACQUIESCENCE, RENEWAL LANDED ESTATES COURT. makes, in the year 1819, a lease for the same term, with a LEGACY. Assent to]. A bequest was made of lands held for years, with a toties covenant for renewal to the four sons of the testator, to be equally divided between them, and legacies given to his daughters. The testator appointed his wife executrix. She proved the will, and with J. C., one of the sons, in 1833, went into possession. The widow died in 1847, whereupon J. C. took out administration de bonis non, with the will of his father annexed, remained in possession, and converved the profits to his own use. In 1850 a perpetuity was granted jo One of the sons died J. C. as administrator of the testator. in the lifetime of the testator; another, William, resident in America, died their in 1856; on cause petition by his personal representatives for an administration of the assets of the testator and William-Held, that the grant of the perpetuity rebutted any assent by the administrator to the beM'Connell v. quests contained in the will of the testator. Crowthers, 9 Ir. Ch. R., 217., R. Duty on] By a settlement executed in 1836 on marriage of W. B. junior (settlor) with A. M., certain fee-simple estates were conveyed to trustees to use of W. B., junior (settlor), for life, with remainder to the first and other sons of W. B, Junior, and said A. M. in tail male, with remainder in fee to W. B., junior; and a sum of 15,000%, secured by bonds, was assigned by W. B., junior, to the trustees in trust, after marriage, to pay the interest of said sum to W. B., junior, for life; after his death to pay an annuity out of the interest of said money to said A. M. (wife) for life; and if no child of said marriage, or, if any, if they all should die under 21 years Jurisdiction of, over decree of Court of Chancery], see DÊ- of age, or unmarried or without issue, then to pay the residue CREE. Charging order on funds in], see CHARGING ORder, LANDLORD AND TENANT, See SUBLETTING ACT. LEASE. Before the adoption of the Gregorian Calendar in the British dominions, A. being seised in fee of the lands of Gurtroche and Castleblagh, by indenture of the 30th October, 1731 (not registered), demised to B the lands of Gurtroche, and thereby agreed that "the lessee, his heirs and assigns, should constantly have liberty of lime-stone for the lands of Gurtroche on the lands of Castleblagh; and by indenture of tho 26th of January, 1731 (duly registered), A. demised to C. part of the lands of Castleblagh, called Courtney's lot, for lives renewable for ever, "alone excepting and reserving out of that demise to the said A., his heirs and assigns. all royalties, with all mines and minerals, coals, coalpits, with liberty to search for, dig, and carry the same.' This lease also excepted and reserved right of sporting, with liberty to certain persons to cnt and carry away turf, with liberty to the inhabitants of the manor of B. to dig and carry away limestone for their own use only." Held, that the assignee of the lease of the 30th of October, 1731, was not entitled to enter and take limestone for the lands of Gurtroche from that part of the lands of Castleblagh called Courtney's lot, which was demised by the lease of the 26th of January, 1731. The word "royalties" generally applies to incorporeal matters. A "mine" usually imports a cavern or subterraneous place containing metals or minerals, and not a quarry. The word "minerals" ordinarily means means metallic fossil bodies, and not limestone. Words in a deed are to be understood in their natural and usual meaning, unless there be a clear indication of intention that, in a particular case, they are to have a more or less extended signification The Countess of Listowel v. R. E. Gibbings, 9 Ir. C. L. R, 223. A. possessed of a term of years, with a toties quoties covenant for renewal, under an unregistered lease from B., who held under a like lease, and unregistered, from Trinity Collee of the interest to the personal representative of W. B., junior; and it was further provided that, after the death of the survivor of the said W. B. junior, and A. M, if there was only one son, the principal of said sum of 15,0007, should go to said son and his issue, and if there was an eldést and only son, and one or more young children, or no son, but one or more daughters, then in trust to pay 5000l. amongst younger children as said W. B. junior, should appoint, and in default of appointment equally among them as tenants in common, the shares of sons to be transferred to them at the age of twenty-one, and of daughters at that age or marriage; in case such ages or marriages should not occur until after the death of said W.B., junior, and A. M., but if in their lifetime, payment to be postponed until after death of survivor; provided that, if any of the children died before twenty-one or marriage, their shares should go to survivors in equal shares, and be considered as vested as original shares, residue of said sum of 15,000l. to be invested, after decease of survivor, in the purchase of real estate, to be settled to the same uses as the real estate before mentioned therein; if there was no issue of said marriage, or, being such, they should all die before taking a vested interest in the 5,000% and in the residue of said 15,0001. then the whole sum should go, after decease of survivor, to the use of said W. B., junior, his executors, administrators, and assigns. There were three children of said marriage, viz., A. B., W C. B., & J. S. B. W. B, junior (settlor), died intestate in 1840, and without having executed the power of appointment, and administration was granted to his brother, C. B. S.; all the three children died intestate, unmarried, and A. M. (wife) died in 1857, under the ages of twenty-one. and by her will bequeathed her property, of every description, to her brother M. (defendant), and appointed him executor, and probate was granted to him, and he entered into receipt and possession of the property. He became administrator de bonis non of the father, and also represented the mother and three children. C. B. S. (brother of settlor) died in 1858, and administration de bonis non to W. B., junior, vas then granted to defendant in 1858, and he also obtained administration to the three children. The wife had never taken out any administration to any of the children, or paid duty on any of the estates. Held, that the defendant M., re¡ re | against them within twenty years (3 & 4 Wm. 4, . 27, and Wm. 4, and 1 Vict., c. 28), and In re the Estate of Lord Muskerry and R. B. Chinnery, 9 Ir. Ch. R, 94, C. of Ap. Payment of interest, through a receiver appointed under the Mortgage Act (12 Geo. 3, c. 10), is a payment within the 7 Wm. 4, and 1 Vict., c. 28. Ib. senting the several estates of the said W. B., junior (settlor), A. M. (wife), and of the three children, was liable-under the pro isions of the "Legacy Duty Act,” 5 & 6 Vic., cap. 52— to pay legacy duty, chargeable in the same manner and to the same amount as if each of the three children had been entitled to receive, and had received, its original share, and the survivor or survivors of the three children, together with the mother, had in like manner been entitled to receive, and had received each successive augmented share, and as if the mother, who survived the three children, had been entitled to receive, and had received, finally, the whole fund. Attorney-proceeds of the sale being insufficient to pay the mortgage, an General v. Maxwell, 5 Ir. Jur., N. S., 150. Ex. When charged on realty], see WILL. Time of vesting], see WILL. LICENSE To sell spirituous liquors, see EXCISE. Attorney acting in court, must have], see ATTORNEY. For carriages (16 & 17 Vict., c. 112)], see SUMMARY JURIS DICTION ACT. To enter theatre, equity to enforce], see THEATRE. LIEN For Freight], see ADMIRALTY (Court of). LIMESTONE, see LEASE. LIMITATIONS, see HUSBAND AND WIFE. LIMITATIONS (STATUTE OF). A. devised his real and personal estate to R., upon trust, to pay his "just debts." A., at the time of making his will, was liable for a breach of trust committed by himself. Held, that those words charged the breach of trust upon his real estate, and that the breach of trust, therefore, was not barred by the limit of six years. Bentley v. Robinson, 5 Ir. Jur., N. S., 7. C. of Ap. In the year 1776 M. mortgaged the lands of A., B., and C., to F., for the sum of 8,000l. In 1790 X. became the purchaser of B., with notice of the mortgage, and bought up several incumbrances, amongst others an elegit under which possession had been taken of B., and caused them to be assigned to a trustee, to protect B. In 1792 X. purchased C., without notice of any prior incumbrance. A receiver was obtained by F., the mortgagee, over A. in 1784, and was continued down to the present. A petition for sale of all the above lands included in the mortgage, having been filed in the Incumbered Estates Court, by the representatives of F.; on a reference to ascertain the amount due on foot of the mortgage, it was decided that the principal sum was due, together with 40 years' interest thereon, accumulated by reason of the deficiency of the rents of A. On appeal from that order, Held, that the assignment of the elegit, under which a creditor had gone into possession, to the trustee for X., to protect his estate, constituted such trustee a pior incumbrancer in possession, within the meaning of the saving clause in the 42nd section of the 3 & 4 Will. 4th, cap. 27, and that, therefore, more than six years' interest was recoverable. In re Chinnery, 5 Ir. Jur., N. S., 27, C. of Ap. Covenant against the assignee of the lessee. The covenant in the original lease was to keep and maintain all houses which then were or should thereafter be re-erected on said premises in good and substantial repair, &c. Defence traversing the breach save as regards certain alterations prior to 1838, and which were as follows: That there was an old and ruinous house on the premises at the time defendant became assignee (which was taken down and removed, and on its site an iron foundry erected), and as to said alterations the defence of the Statute of Limitations. Held, on demurrer, that the defence was an answer to the action. Maddock v. Mallett, 5 Ir. Jur, N. S, 189, Q. B. A mortgage affected several denominations of land, a portion of which the mortgagor sells for value without obtaining the concurrence of the mortgagee, the interest due upon the mortgage debt is regularly paid out of the unsold lands. Held, that the lands sold are not, after 20 years, discharged from the mortgage, although no proceedings have been taken Two judgments of 1797 were obtained against one who was seised of the lands of B. and S., the lands of B. were sold in the Incumbered Estates Court, on a petition by a mortgagee of the lands of B., the mortgage bearing date in 1845. The issue was directed by that court to try whether the judgment had been paid, and a verdict was found that they were not. The mortgagee was, thereupon, directed by the said court to pay the sun due on the judgment, and they were assigned to a trustee for her. A cause petition being filed by the trustee to raise these judgments out of the lands of S., the master, by his decretal order, held that the judgments were charges affecting the lands of S., and not barred by the Statute of Limitations. Morris v. Herbert, 9 Ir. Ch. R., 327, R. 66 A., being seised in fee of some estates, and for life of other estates called the paternal estates, devised those which he was seised of to R. M., his nephew, his heirs and assigns, not entertaining the least doubt but that he would in due time take care to have the devised and the paternal estates settled in such manner that same might continue in the male line of our family, and in our name and blood, and go to the several branches of it in succession, one after another, according to their priority of birth and seniority of age, and in the usual course of limitation in family settlement." A. died in 1776, leaving R. M. his heir-at-law. R. M. went into possession of both estates, treated them as his own property, never made a settlement, and died in 1816 intestate, and without issue, leaving his sisters, H. and C., his co-heiresses at law, and also the coheiresses of A. At the death of R. M., R. M., the grandson of A, filed his bill to carry out the trusts of the will of A., and claiming under the will a life estate, with remainder to his first and other sons in tail male. H. and C. disputed the claim, but a compromise was made which was carried out by a deed of 1st June, 1820. By this deed, which recited that R. M., the plaintiff in the suit, was the only surviving male descendant entitled under the will of A., and that he would be entitled (if at all) to an estate for life, with remainder to his first and other sons in tail male, leaving the reversion in fee to H. and C. The said H. and C. conveyed the paternal as well as the acquired to M. for life, remainder to his first and other sons in tail male, remainder to R. M. in fee, and R. M. granted certain annuities to H. and C., and undertook to indemnify them against certain debts. R. M. died without issue male in 1834, having devised the lands to the respondents. The petitioner in the present cause claimed to be entitled under the limitations in the will of H., to an estate tail on the lands devised. Held, that the claim was barred by the Statute of Limitations. Malone v. O'Connor, 9 Ir. Ch. R., 459; s. c., Reports temp. Napier, by Drury, 626. In 1767, D, seised of an undivided fourth of estates held in fee-simple and for lives renewable, demised her one-fourth to L for a term of 999 years, subject to a rent. L was at the time owner of another undivided one-fourth of the same lands. L's interest in the lands became vested in S, who also became entitled to the remaining two-fourths, C having become en titled to D's interest in the reversion. The rent was paid to her by S up to 1828, when C died, having devised her interest to the petitioner. On C's death, S denied the petitioner's title, and refused to pay him the rent, and asserted a title to retain the rent for her own benefit. This claim appeared to have been made under a bona fide belief that the title had devolved upon S. S died, leaving the respondent entitled to her interest, who, in 1835, obtained a renewal of the leasehold lands. In 1857 the petitioner filed a petition to have the renewal declared a trust for him. Held, that he was barred by the lapse of time from 1828. A petitioner may read as his evidence a portion of a respondent's affidavit without making the whole his evidence. Coram, the Lord Chan cellor, Lord Justice of Appeal, and Mr. Justice Crampton. Archbold v. Scully, 9 Ir. Ch. R., 152; s. c., Reports temp. Napier, by Drury, 330. Lands were conveyed, upon trust, to secure certain sums of money with interest, and subject thereto for A., his heirs and assigns. The owners of the sums of money are not precluded. by the 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 27, s. 42, from recovering more than fix years' interest. Giles v. Giles, 9 Ir. Ch. R., 135; s. c., Reports temp. Napier, by Drury, 257. In an action of ejectment for non-payment of rent, reserved upon a demise under seal, the defendant pleaded, that as to so much of the rent as accrued due within six years before the commencement of the action, same was not in arrear, but was paid and satisfied before the commencement of the action, for that, as part of the consideration for the lease in the plaint mentioned, J D advanced 1,000, at five per cent, to C L (the lessor), with the proviso that J D should have the interest upon this security by deducting same out of the profit rent thereby reserved, so as to continue for fourteen years, and after the expiration thereof J D was to be paid the principal sum of 1,000, and the interest, by retaining the whole of the profit rent until he should be fully paid; and afterwards, that JD should be subject to the full rent. JD assigned to the defendant both the lease and the security for the 1,000, who, since the year 1851, when the fourteen years expired, had retained the whole of the profit rent towards the repayment of the 1,000l. and the interest, the entire of which was not paid at the time of the bringing of the action; and as to the residue of the rent claimed in the plaint, that same did not accrue within six years before action brought. The plaintiffs replied to so much of the defence as alleged that the rent accrued more than six years next before the commencement of the action; that the lease in the plaint mentioned was, by an indenture duly executed under the hands and seals of the parties, with a covenant for the payment of the profit rent, and therefore they could not be barred of the action; to this replication the defendant demurred. Held (per O'Brien and Perrin, JJ.), that in an action of ejectment for non-payment of rent, as authorised by the Common Law Procedure Act, 1853, not more than six years' arrears can be recovered. Lefroy, C.J., and Crampton, J., dissentiente. Percival v. Dunne 9 Ir. C. L. R., 422; s. c. 4 Ir. Jur., N.S., 107, Q.B. 16. Held (per O'Brien and Perrin, JJ.), that by the form of the replication, the plaintiffs are precluded from relying upon an objection to the defendants retaining the profit rent in satisfaction of the 1,000l., as the original lessee might have done. Held (per O'Brien and Perrin, JJ.), that before Pigot's Act conventional rents were within the 3rd and 4th Wm. 4, c. 27, s. 42, and not more than six years' arrears could be recovered in an action of debt or covenant upon an indenture under seal. Ib. Held (per Lefroy, C.J., and Crampton, J.), that the action of ejectment for non-payment of rent is not comprised within the 42nd section of the 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 27. Ib. Held, that the action of ejectment is not a personal action within the meaning of the 20th section of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1853. Ib. Semble, a right of entry accrues with every successive gale of rent, under a lease. (Spratt v. Sherlock, 3 I. C. L. R., 69, observed upon). Ib. Quære, whether the defendant, the assignee of the above lease and charge, could not retain the profit rent to pay himself, in the same way as the original lessee might have done. Ib. Equitable replication to], see INSURANCE, PLEADING (deFENCE OF). Demurrer to defence of], see PLEADING tit. DEMURRER. Petition of revivor, may be barred by], see PRACTICE, EQUITY, tit. REVIVOR. LIVES, See LEASE. Renewal of], see RENEWAL. LODGING HOUSE ACT. A conditional order directed the Guardians of the M. Union to show cause why they should not levy a rate to pay the salary of G W W, an inspector of common lodging houses in the district of C, who had been duly appointed to that office by the justices of that district under the Acts for the better regulation of common lodging houses. The guardians alleged, as cause, that the said Acts do not apply to Ireland. Upon argument, the cause shewn was allowed. Reg. v. Guardians of Mallow Union, 5 Ir. Jur. N. S., 161, Q.B. LOST NOTE. Indemnity for], see BANK NOTE LUNATIC. To warrant the committal of a person as a dangerous lunatic, by justices of the peace, the informations must strictly comply with the provisions of statutes 1 & 2 Vict., c. 27, and 8 & 9 Vict., c. 107, s. 10. Where an application is made for a certiorari, as auxiliary to a habeas corpus, to quash the proceedings under which a party is in custody, the certiorari will not be granted unless it appear necessary for the purposes of the habeas corpus. The proper remedy is by the latter writ, upon the return to which all the proceedings will appear before the court. The father of a person committed to gaol as a dangerous lunatic, by justices of the peace, has no locus standi in this court, so as to entitle him to apply for a certiorari to quash the proceedings by the justices, unless it be applied for as auxiliary to a habeas corpus, and it appear to be necessary for the purposes of the latter writ. To entitle & party to a writ of certiorari, it must appear that due diligence has been used in bringing the matter before the court. court will make delay a ground of refusal. In matter of Fetherston, a lunatic, 5 Ir. Jur, N.S., 118 Q. B. This A return was made into the Queen's Bench to a writ of habeas corpus, and the body of the Rev. M. C. was brought into court. Upon reading a medical certificate that M. C. was insane, and upon the undertaking of his relatives to obtain a commission of lunacy, the judge refused to discharge him from custody, and enlarged the time for making the return (which had not been filed), until the second day of the next term, in order that the commission of lunacy might have time to ascertain by the verdict of a jury, whether, as a matter of fact, M. C. was a lunatic. In re Rev. M. Cody, 5 Ir. Jur., N.S., 175, C. C. J. G. Crosbie had been found a lunatic in August, 1859, and a traverse of that finding having been applied for by petition to the Lord Chancellor. The person who originally presented the petition for the commission declining to incur any further expense, and the committee of the lunatic being unwilling to interfere without the order of the court, on an application by petition that the committee should be directed to appear by councel at the expense of the estate of the lunatic. It was ordered that the committee by removed, and that a Master (A. Lyle, Esq.) of the court be appointed in the place of the retiring committee, and that the general solicitor for minors should act, under his directions, and that he should be entitled to all costs out of the estate of the lunatic. In re J. G. Crosbie, 5 Ir. Jur., N.S, 257, C. MAGISTRATE, See JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, SUMMARY JU- MANDAMUS, see BVRGESS. A chaplain of the N. Union required the guardians to supply him with a "suitable altar, vestments, and such other appendages of an altar as are necessary for the due celebr..tion of religious service." The guardians refused. The Poor Law Commissioners, by a special sealed order, directed them to purchase the articles, but did not specify what articles. The guardians refused to obey the order. On an application by the Poor Law Commissioners for a writ of mandamus, to enforce obedience to their sealed order. Held, that the uncertainty of the sealed order cannot be cured by the introduction of a specification contained in the affidavits filed in support of the application. Poor Law Commissioners v. Guardians of Newtownards Union, 5 Ir. Jur., N.S,, 142, Q.B. Per Lefroy, C.J., and Hayes, J.-That obedience to an order, which, when it was issued, was ambiguous, cannot be enforced by writ of mandamus. Ib. Per O'Brien, J.-That the order, so far as it is free from ambiguity, may be enforced by a writ of mandamus. Ib. Per O'Brien, J.-That section 15 of the 10 & 11 Vict. c. 90, must be construed as if the words "in express terms" immediately preceded "directed to and affect more than one union," in the definition of a general rule. Ib. Per Hayes, J.-That a sealed order of the Foor Law Com |