There is no longer any censorship of the press in this country. Any man is free to speak or to write and publish whatever he chooses of another, subject only to this, that he must take the consequences, should a jury deem his words defamatory. "The liberty of the press," says Lord Mansfield, in R. v. Dean of St. Asaph, 3 T. R. 431, n., "consists in printing without any previous licence, subject to the consequences of law." Lord Ellenborough says in R. v. Cobbett, 29 Howell's St. Tr. 49: "The law of England is a law of liberty, and consistent with this liberty, we have not what is called an imprimatur; there is no such preliminary licence necessary; but if a man publish a paper, he is exposed to the penal consequences, as he is in every other act, if it be illegal." Lord Kenyon shortly puts it thus in R. v. Cuthell, 27 Howell's St. Tr. 675: "A man may publish anything which twelve of his countrymen think is not blamable." But it was by no means always so in England. It was quickly perceived that the printing-press may be as great a power for evil as for good. And whenever any large proportion of a nation is disaffected towards its Government, a free press becomes a source of danger. (i) Our English monarchs at first endeavoured to keep all the printing-presses in their own hands, and allow no one to print anything except by special Royal licence. All printing-presses were kept under the immediate supervision of the King in Council, and regulated by proclamations and decrees of the Star Chamber by virtue of the King's prerogative. In 1557 the Stationers' Company of London was formed, and the exclusive privilege of printing and publishing in the English dominions was given to ninety-seven London stationers and their successors by regular apprenticeship. The Company was also empowered to seize all publications printed by men who were not members of the guild. Later, by a decree of the Star Chamber in 1586, one printing-press was allowed to each University. This exercise of the Royal prerogative continued, in theory, at all events, till 1637. (ii) Queen Elizabeth, however, was not content with this Government monopoly of the "Art and mysterie of Printing." In 1559 she determined to have all books read over by loyal bishops and privy councillors before they were allowed to go to the official press. In 1586 the Star Chamber enacted that all books should be read over in manuscript, and licensed by either the Archbishop of Canterbury or the Bishop of London, save law books, which were to be read and licensed by the Chief Justice of either Bench or the Lord Chief Baron (a practice which continued down to the middle of the 18th century; see the prefaces to Burrows' and Douglas' Reports). Subsequently the Master of the Revels usurped the right of revising poems and plays, and the Vice-Chancellors of the Universities were allowed for convenience sake to license books to be printed at the University presses. It was soon found impossible to restrict the number of printing-presses in the country, and the Government therefore insisted all the more vehemently that no book should be published without a previous licence. By the Star Chamber decree dated July 11th, 1637, all printed books were required to be submitted to the licensers and entered upon the registers of the Stationers' Company before they could be published; if this was not done, the printer was to be fined, and for ever disabled from exercising the art of printing, and his press and all copies of the unlicensed book forfeited to the Crown. The old word Imprimatur"="let it be printed," was still used to denote the consent of the licenser to its publication. After the abolition of the Star Chamber, the Long Parliament issued two orders, March 9th, 1642, and June 14th, 1643, very similar in effect to the decree of the Star Chamber last mentioned. Against these orders Milton published his noble but ineffectual protest, the "Areopagitica (November 24th, 1644). The censorship of the press continued in England till 1695, and then its abolition was rather accidental than otherwise. (See Macaulay's" History of England," c. xix., vol. iii., pp. 399-405; 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 33; Proclamation of May 17th, 1680; 1 Jac. II. c. 17.) The only vestige remaining of such censorship is the control of the Lord Chamberlain over plays. By the Theatres Regulation Act, 1843 (6 & 7 Vict. c. 68), s. 14, it is enacted that it shall be lawful for the Lord Chamberlain for the time being, whenever he shall be of opinion that it is fitting for the preservation of good manners, decorum, or of the public peace so to do, to forbid the acting or presenting any stage play, or any act, scene, or part thereof, or any prologue or epilogue, or any part thereof, anywhere in Great Britain, or in such theatres as he shall specify, and either absolutely or for such time as he shall think tit. (iii) A third plan is to allow any book to be printed and published without any supervision or licence; but as soon as the attention of the Government is called to its harmful tendencies, to seize all the stock at the publishers and booksellers, and prevent the publisher from issuing any further copies. The Lord Lieutenant was till the year 1875 empowered to do this in Ireland, should any work appear to him seditious. Magistrates in England may deal thus with books proved to be obscene by virtue of Lord Campbell's Act (20 & 21 Vict. c. 83). The Court of Chancery and the House of Lords have occasionally by injunction forbidden the further publication of libels which they deemed contempts of Court. And the High Court of Justice has latterly asserted jurisdiction in special circumstances to restrain the further sale or distribution of any matter clearly libellous. (See Chapter XIV., post, p. 393.) (iv) Our present law permits any one to say, write, and publish what he pleases; but if he make a bad use of this liberty, he must be punished. If he unjustly attack an individual, the person defamed may sue for damages; if, on the other hand, the words be written or printed, or if treason or immorality be thereby inculcated, the offender can be tried for the misdemeanour either by information or indictment. In order that the criminal might be easily detected, it was enacted in 1712 that no person, under a penalty of 201., should sell or expose for sale any pamphlet without the name and place of abode of some known person by or for whom it was printed or published, written, or printed thereon. (10 Anne, c. 19, s. 113, repealed in 1871 by the 33 & 34 Vict. c. 99.) A similar enactment as to newspapers, 6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 76, was also repealed by the 32 & 33 Vict. c. 24. And now every paper or book which is meant to be published or dispersed must bear on it the name and address of the printer (2 & 3 Vict. c. 12, s. 2*); and the printer must for six calendar months carefully preserve at least one copy of each paper printed by him, and write thereon the name and address of the person who employed and paid him to print it. (39 Geo. III. c. 79, s. 29.*) While by the Newspaper Libel and Registration Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 60), a register of newspaper proprietors is established at Somerset House, where any one can ascertain for a shilling who is the person responsible for what has appeared in any newspaper. Newspapers were indeed formerly regarded with great jealousy by the Government, and subjected to heavy duties. Under Charles II. and James II. the London Gazette (a small sheet appearing twice a week, every Monday and Thursday) was the only paper * Both these sections continue in force, although other portions of the Acts were repealed by 32 & 53 Vict. c. 24; see Second Schedule. permitted to publish political news. Even their size was regulated by statute. The 6 Geo. IV. c. 119, first allowed newspapers to be printed on paper of any size. Moreover, till the 18 Vict. c. 27, they had to be printed on stamped paper. But in spite of all such petty restrictions, our press has been, ever since the passing of Fox's Libel Act, 32 Geo. III. c. 60, the freest in the world. A man's reputation may also be injured by the deed or action of another without his using any words; and for such an injury he has an action on the case; but such matters are not within the scope of the present treatise. Illustrations. A banker having in his hands sufficient funds belonging to his customer dishonours his cheque; the customer may recover substantial damages, without proof of any special damage; for it is clear that such an act must injure the customer's reputation for solvency. Marzetti v. Williams, 1 B. & Ad. 415. Robinson v. Marchant, 7 Q. B. 918; 15 L. J. Q. B. 134; 10 Jur. 156. Rolin and another v. Steward, P. O., 14 C. B. 595; 23 L. J. C. P. 148; 18 Jur. 576; 2 C. L. R. 759. The reputation of a manufacturer may be injured if marks resembling his trade marks are placed on inferior goods manufactured and sold by the defendant. See Manton and others v. Bales, 1 C. B. 444. The defendant caused the plaintiff's goods to be seized on an unfounded claim for debt; the neighbours consequently deemed the plaintiff insolvent. The plaintiff was held entitled to substantial damages. Brewer v. Dew and another, 11 M. & W. 625. Bracegirdle v. Orford, 2 Maule & S. 77. The defendant set up a lamp on the wall adjoining the plaintiff's dwellinghouse and kept it burning in the daytime, thereby inducing the passers-by to believe that the plaintiff's house was a brothel. This was held to be a trespass to the wall and being permanent in its nature, also a libel. Jefferies v. Duncombe, 2 Camp. 3; 11 East, 226. Spall v. Massey, 2 Stark. 559. Plunket v. Gilmore, Fortescue, 211. And so as to "riding Skimmington," "rough music," burning in effigy, and other modes of holding a man up to public obloquy without especial words of defamation. See Sir William Bolton v. Dean, cited in Austin v. Culpepper, Skin. 123; 2 Show. 313. R. v. Roberts and others, 3 Keble, 578. Mason v. Jennings, Sir T. Raym. 401. Cropp v. Tilney, 3 Salk. 226. Eyre v. Garlick, 42 J. P. 68. So too in actions of false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, the jury may award damages for the injury done to the plaintiff's reputation by the charge made against him, and by his being marched in custody through the public streets; although in the former, the gist of the action is the direct trespass to the person, and in the latter the maliciously setting the law in motion without reasonable or probable cause. On the other hand, words may cause a man damage without in any way affecting his reputation; and for such words, if written or spoken without lawful occasion, an action on the case will lie, provided it can be shown that such damage is the natural and necessary consequence of the words, or was the result which the defendant designed and intended. Illustrations. It is actionable for A. to assert falsely and maliciously that there is a flaw in B.'s title to certain freehold land, if B. is thereby prevented from selling it, although no imputation is cast on B.'s personal character. See Chapter IV., post, pp. 75–84. If A. without lawful occasion publishes a false statement of fact (as distinct from a mere expression of opinion) concerning an article which B. makes or sells, and special damage to B. results therefrom, an action lies. See Chapter IV., post, pp. 84-90. But an attack on a man's property or on the things he makes or sells may sometimes be also an indirect attack on himself. See post, p. 32. As a rule, A. cannot sue for words defamatory of B., although he may suffer loss or inconvenience therefrom. But if A. can satisfy the jury that the defendant desired and intended to injure A., and thought that his best way to do so was by publishing a libel on B., and the damage to A. was the natural and necessary consequence of that libel on B.; it is submitted that an action will lie. Ashley v. Harrison, 1 Esp. 48; Peake, 194. Brayne v. Cooper, 5 M. & W. 249. If A. and B. are rival shopkeepers, and B. spreads a false and groundless report that A.'s shopman has the scarlet fever, intending thereby to prevent the public from going to A.'s shop, and succeeds in this malicious device, A. can sue B. Per Kelly, C.B., in Riding v. Smith, 1 Ex. D. 96; 45 L. J. Ex. 281; 24 W. R. 487; 34 L. T. 500. If a man menace my tenants at will, of life and member, per quod they depart from their tenures, an action upon the case will lie against him, but the menace without their departure is no cause of action. Conesby's Case, Year Book, 9 Hen. VII., pp. 7, 8; 1 Roll. Abr. 108. If the defendant threatens the plaintiff's workmen, so that they do not dare to go on with their work, whereby the plaintiff loses the selling of his goods, an action lies. Garret v. Taylor, (1621) Cro. Jac. 567; 1 Roll. Abr. 108. Tarleton and others v. McGawley, Peake, 270. And see Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley, L. R. 6 Eq. 551; 37 L. J. |