to a particular individual could be thus perceived, the publication is a libel on him, however general its language may be. "Whether a man is called by one name, or whether he is called by another, or whether he is described by a pretended description of a class to which he is known to belong, if those who look on know well who is aimed at, the very same injury is inflicted, the very same thing is in fact done, as would be done if his name and Christian name were ten times repeated." (Per Lord Campbell, C.J., in Le Fanu and another v. Malcolmson, 1 H. L. C. 668.) Where the libel consists of an effigy, picture, or caricature, care should be taken to show by proper innuendoes and averments the libellous nature of the representation, and its especial reference to the plaintiff. It is often in such cases difficult for the plaintiff to prove that he is the person caricatured. Illustrations. Where plaintiff's house has been insured and burnt down, and the insurance company at first demurred to pay, but ultimately did pay, the insurance money, and defendant subsequently, in the course of a quarrel with the plaintiff, said, in the presence of others, "I never set my premises on fire," and "I was never accused of setting my premises on fire," this was held to be a slander on the plaintiff. Cutler v. Cutler, 10 J. P. 169. And see Snell v. Webling, 2 Lev. 150. Words complained of: We would exhort the medical officers to avoid the traps set for them by desperate adventurers (innuendo, thereby meaning the plaintiff among others), who, participating in their efforts, would inevitably cover them with ridicule and disrepute." The jury found that the words were intended to apply to the plaintiff. Judgment accordingly for the plaintiff. Wakley v. Healey, 7 C. B. 591; 18 L. J. C. P. 241. A newspaper article imputed that "in some of the Irish factories" cruelties were practised upon the workpeople. Innuendo, "in the factory of the plaintiffs," who were manufacturers. The jury were satisfied that the newspaper was referring especially to the plaintiff's factory, and found a verdict for the plaintiffs, and the House of Lords held the declaration good. Le Fanu and another v. Malcolmson, 1 H. L. C. 637; 13 L. T. (Old S.) 61; 8 Ir. L. R. 418. A label reflected on all kinds of "Food for Children," except Vance's. The defendant (an agent for Vance) affixed this label to the bottles of the plaintiff's Food for Children, which he sold. Held, that he thus sufficiently pointed the general terms of the label to the plaintiff's preparation in particular. White V. Mellin, (1895) A. C. 154; 64 L. J. Ch. 308; 43 W. R. 353; 72 L. T. 334; 11 Times L. R. 236. Words complained of:-"I have no doubt they (i.e. certain letters) were O.L.S. L embezzled at the post office at F." The postmaster at F. can sue, if proper averments connecting him with the loss of the letters be pleaded and proved. Taylor v. Kneeland, 1 Douglass, (Michigan) 67. A libel was published on "a certain newspaper of limited circulation, published in a town remote from Guildford." Held, that the plaintiff could call evidence to show that the libel was intended to apply, and was understood to apply, to his paper. Latimer v. Western Morning News Co., 25 L. T. 44. Plaintiff had been in defendant's employment as a gardener, and was dismissed by him and entered Mr. Pierce's service. Defendant wrote to Mr. Pierce that he had dismissed plaintiff for dishonesty, adding, "I have reason to suppose that many of the flowers of which I have been robbed are growing upon your premises." An innuendo, "thereby meaning that the plaintiff was guilty of larceny, and had stolen defendant's flowers and had disposed of them unlawfully to Mr. Pierce, &c," was held good. Williams v. Gardiner, 1 M. & W. 245; 1 Tyr. & Gr. 578; 2. C. M. & "There is strong reason for believing that a considerable sum of money was transferred by power of attorney obtained by undue influence;" an innuendo "meaning as a fact that the plaintiff had by undue influence procured the money to be transferred" was held not too wide; for such would be the meaning conveyed to readers by the defendant's insinuation. Turner v. Meryweather, 7 C. B. 251; 18 L. J. C. P. 155; 13 Jur. 683; 19 L. J. C. P. 10. If asterisks be put instead of the name of the party libelled, it is sufficient that those who know the plaintiff should be able to gather from the libel that he is the person meant; it is not necessary that all the world should understand it, so long as the meaning of the paragraph is clear to the plaintiff's acquaintances. Bourke v. Warren, 2 C. & P. 307. Some libellous verses were written about "L -y, the Bum;" the Court was satisfied in spite of the finding of the jury that the words related to the plaintiff, a sheriff's officer. Levi v. Milne, 4 Bing. 195; 12 Moore, 418. "All the libellers of the kingdom know now that printing initial letters will not serve the turn, for that objection has been long got over." Per Lord Hardwicke in Roach v. Garvan, Re Read and Huggonson, (1742) 2 Atk. 470; 2 "His name was O'B." (meaning thereby the plaintiff). This was held sufficient in O'Brien v. Clement, 16 M. & W. 159; 16 L. J. Ex. 77. To say, "I have seen women steal yarn before" may amount to a charge of larceny against some particular woman now; provided there be proper averments in the pleadings and sufficient evidence of the surrounding circumstances at the trial. To say, Hart v. Coy, 40 Ind. 553. "I believe that will to be a rank forgery" may be a slander on the solicitor who prepared it and attested the signature. Seaman v. Netherclift, 1 C. P. D. 540; 45 L. J. C. P. 798; 24 W. R. 884; 34 L. T. 878. There appeared in Mist's Weekly Journal an account professedly of certain intrigues, &c., at the Persian Court, really, at the English. King George I. was described under the name of "Merewits," George II. appeared as "" Esreff," the Queen as "Sultana," while a most engaging portrait was drawn of the Pretender under the name of "Sophi." It was objected on behalf of the prisoner that there was no evidence that the author intended his seemingly harmless tale to be thus interpreted and applied; but the Court held that they must give it the same meaning as the generality of readers would undoubtedly put upon it. R. v. Clerk, (1728) 1 Barnard. 304. But if the character had been purely imaginary, a creature of fancy, then, although it turns out that the plaintiff bears the name of the fictitious character, it would not be a libel at all.” No person can say that a character in a novel bearing his name applies to himself. Per Lush, J., in Harrison v. Smith and others, 20 L. T. at p. 715. The defendant published a libel upon the directors of a certain Bank. The prosecutors proved that they were de facto the directors of that Bank, and acted in that capacity in the matters referred to in the libel. Held, that it was unnecessary for them to go further and prove that they were de jure directors, and properly appointed as such. R. v. Boaler, 67 L. T. 354; 56 J. P. 792; 17 Cox, C. C. 569. A placard ran as follows: Subscriptions for A. and B., who have been ruined in their business and their living taken away by the animosity of one man." This is a libel on the plaintiff, if he can satisfy the jury that the placard was understood by those who read it to refer to himself. Hird v. Wood, 38 Sol. J. 234. A. said to B., " One of us two is perjured," B. answered, "It is not I," and A. replied, "I am sure it is not I." B. can sue A. for charging him with perjury. Coe v. Chambers, 1 Roll. Abr. 75; Vin. Abr. c. b. 4. Where the defendant said to his companion B., "He that goeth before thee is perjured," the plaintiff can sue, if he aver and prove that he was the person who was at that moment walking before B. Aish v. Gerish, (1633) 1 Roll. Abr. 81. A libel was published on a "diabolical character," who, "like Polyphemus, the man-eater, has but one eye, and is well-known to all persons acquainted with the name of a certain noble circumnavigator." The plaintiff had but one eye, and his name was l'Anson; so it was clear that he was the person referred to. l'Anson v. Stuart, 1 T. R. 748; 2 Smith's L. Cas. (6th ed.), 57, [omitted in 7th and 8th eds.]. Fleetwood v. Curl, Cro. Jac. 557; Hob. 268. Defendant wrote and published of plaintiff a bookseller: "The man at the sign of the Bible is no slouch at swearing to an old story." The sign over plaintiff's shop was a book, lettered "Bible," and he had recently given evidence against defendant in another action. Held, that he could recover. Steele v. Southwick, 9 Johns. (New York) 214. In another case the libel did not name the person alluded to; but described him as a man of high descent, who has been regarded as a man not only of refined tastes and studious habits, but as an artist of somewhat more than ordinary ability." The relator swore that he believed that the libel was intended to refer to himself. The Duke of Sutherland and others of his friends considered that it would be generally understood as applying to him; and a rule was granted. But upon the argument of the rule, the publisher and the author of the libel both swore positively that the relator was not the person referred to, and that they were not in fact aware that he was either a man of refined tastes and studious habits, or an artist of somewhat more than ordinary ability. And the rule was therefore discharged. R. v. Barnard, Ex parte Lord R. Gower, 43 J. P. 127. Words defamatory of A. may in some cases be also indirectly defamatory of B. Illustrations. Where a married man was called "cuckold" in the City of London, his wife could sue; for it was tantamount to calling her "whore." Vicars v. Worth, 1 Stra. 471. Hodgkins et ux. v. Corbet et ux., 1 Stra. 545. To say that a child is a bastard may, with proper averments, amount to a charge of adultery or unchastity against its mother. Maxwell and wife v. Allison, 11 S. & R. (Pennsylvania Sup. Ct.) 343. Where a new firm has taken over a business, statements made by a rival firm which would have been true enough, if clearly limited to the old firm, may be actionable, if the statements are in such terms as will lead the public to apply them to the new firm. Coulson v. Coulson, (1887) 3 Times L. R. 846. So where there are two companies with very similar names, one solvent and the other insolvent, an advertisement which would have been perfectly legitimate if properly worded, will be a libel on the solvent company, if persons reading it would understand it to refer to the solvent company and to impute that it is insolvent. Briton Life Association, Limited v. Roberts, (1886) 2 Times L. R. 319. Slander addressed to plaintiff's wife:-"You are a nuisance to live beside of. You are a bawd; and your house is no better than a bawdy-house." Held, that the plaintiff could maintain the action without joining his wife, and without proving special damage; because if in fact his wife did keep a bawdy-house, the plaintiff could be indicted for it. Huckle v. Reynolds, (1859) 7 C. B. N. S. 114. Where the words prima facie apply only to a thing, and not to a person, still if the owner of the thing can show that the words substantially reflect upon him, he may sue without giving proof of special damage and without proving malice. Illustration. To write and publish that plaintiff's ship is unseaworthy and has been sold to the Jews to carry convicts, is a libel upon the plaintiff in the way of his business, as well as upon his ship. Ingram v. Lawson, (1840) 6 Bing. N. C. 212; 4 Jur. 151; 9 C. & P. 326; 8 Scott, 471. Solomon v. Lawson, (1846) 8 Q. B. 823; 15 L. J. Q. B. 253; 10 Jur. 796. And see ante, pp. 32, 36. |