with the actual composer of the libel cannot compel either of his co-defendants to recoup him the damages, which he has been compelled to pay the plaintiff. (Colburn v. Patmore, 1 C. M. & R. 73; 4 Tyr. 677.) But if there be two distinct and separate publications of the same libel, a defendant who was concerned in the first publication, but wholly unconnected with the second, would not be liable for any damages which he could prove to have been the consequence of the second publication and in no way due to the first. Illustrations. "If a man receives a letter with authority from the author to publish it, the person receiving it will not be justified, if it contains libellous matter, in inserting it in the newspapers. No authority from a third person will defend a man against an action brought by a person who has suffered from an unlawful act." Per Best, CJ., in De Crespigny v. Wellesley, 5 Bing. at p. 402. If a country newspaper reproduces a libellous article from a London newspaper, the country paper makes the article its own, and is liable for all damages resulting from its publication in the country. The fact that it had previously appeared in the London paper is no defence; and, strictly, it should not even tend to mitigate the damages, though it probably will have that effect. Talbutt v. Clark, 2 M. & Rob. 312. Saunders v. Mills, 3 M. & P. 520; 6 Bing. 213. Evidence that the plaintiff had in a previous action recovered damages against the London paper for the same article was formerly held inadmissible; as in that action damages were given only for the publication of the libel in London. Creevy v. Carr, 7 C. & P. 64. And see Hunt v. Algar and others, 6 C. & P. 245. But now such evidence has been made admissible in an action against a newspaper by the Law of Libel Amendment Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 64, s. 6). Every repetition of a slander is a wilful publication of it, rendering the speaker liable to an action. "Talebearers are as bad as tale-makers."* It is no defence that the speaker did not originate the scandal, but heard it from another, even though it was a current rumour and he bonâ * MRS. CAN. But surely you would not be quite so severe on those who only repeat what they hear?" SIR PET. 66 'Yes, Madam, I would have law merchant for them too; and in all cases of slander currency whenever the drawer of the lie was not to be found, the injured parties should have a right to come on any of the indorsers.”—The School for Scandal. fide believed it to be true. (Watkin v. Hall, L. R. 3 Q. B. 396; 37 L. J. Q. B. 125; 16 W. R. 857; 18 L. T. 561.) It is no defence that the speaker at the time named the person from whom he heard the scandal. (M‘Pherson v. Daniels, 10 B. & C. 270; 5 M. & R. 251.) This proposition, it is submitted, correctly states the existing law on the point; but it would certainly not have been accepted as clear law in the 18th century. Great difficulty was presented by the fourth resolution in Lord Northampton's Case (in the Star Chamber, 1613), 12 Rep. 134, which runs as follows :-" In a private action for slander of a common person, if J. S. publish that he hath heard J. N. say that J. G. was a traitor or thief; in an action of the case, if the truth be such he may justify. But if J. S. publish that he hath heard generally without a certain author, that J. G. was a traitor or thief, there an action sur le case lieth against J. S. for this, that he hath not given to the party grieved any cause of action against any but against himself who published the words, although that in truth he might hear them; for otherwise this might tend to a great slander of an innocent; for if one who hath lasam phantasiam, or who is a drunkard, or of no estimation, speak scandalous words, if it should be lawful for a man of credit to report them generally that he had heard scandalous words, without mentioning of his author, that would give greater colour and probability that the words were true in respect of the credit of the reporter, than if the author himself should be mentioned." Now, in the first place, the reason here assigned for the distinction applies only to cases in which the originator of the scandal is of less credit than the retailer of it, and is known to be so by those to whom it is retailed. If those who hear the tale repeated know nothing of the person cited as the authority for it, it is to them precisely as if the name were omitted altogether, and it had been told as an on dit. If, on the other hand, the person named as the author of the assertion is of greater credit and respectability than the reporter, vouching his authority clearly does the plaintiff's reputation a greater injury than if no name had been given at all. And even in the case where the author of the story is well known to be a person of no credit, how does that excuse the defendant's act in repeating and circulating it? It appears to me to make it all the worse; he cannot even plead:"I had it on good authority, and reasonably believed it true." By the mere repetition of it the defendant endorses and gives credit to the tale, although he states that he heard it from A. B.; and those who hear it from him will repeat it everywhere, and cite as their authority, not A. B., but the defendant, whom we presume to be of greater respectability and credit. Again, on general principles, how can a slander by A. be any justification for a subsequent slander by B.? "Because one man does an unlawful act to any person, another is not to be permitted to do a similar act to the same person. Wrong is not to be justified, or even excused, by wrong." (Per Best, C.J., in De Crespigny v. Wellesley, 5 Bing. 404.) Moreover, the twelfth volume of Reports is a book of questionable authority; it was issued after Lord Coke's death, compiled by someone else from papers which Lord Coke had neither digested nor intended for the press. (See the remarks of Mr. Hargrave, 11 St. Tr. 301; of Holroyd, J., in Lewis v. Walter, 4 B. & Ald. 614; and of Parke, J., in M'Pherson v. Daniels, 10 B. & C. 275; 5 M. & R. 251.) The fourth resolution, as reported, appears inconsistent with the preceding resolution, the third; and also with the many decisions in the And even if it be correctly reported, it is but an obiter dictum, for the Star Chamber had no jurisdiction over private slander, and the case before them was one of scandalum magnatum, a branch of the law which was governed by special statutes of its own, now at last repealed. (See ante, p. 72.) And, moreover, the defendant in that case had not in fact named his authority at the time, but only confessed it subsequently. case. Still, so great was the weight justly given to every word of Lord Coke, that this resolution was assumed to be law in Crawford v. Middleton, (1662) 1 Lev. 82; Davis v. Lewis, (1796) 7 T. R. 17; and Woolnoth v. Meadows, (1804) 5 East, 463; 2 Smith, 28. The last two cases decided that at all events it is too late to name the author of the report for the first time in the plea of justification; he must be named at time of publication to raise any ground of defence under this resolution. In Maitland v. Goldney, (1802) 2 East, 426, Lord Ellenborough intimated that the doctrine did not apply where the reporter knew that his informant, whom he named, had retracted the charge since making it, or where for any other reason the reporter at the time of repeating the tale knew it was false, and unfounded. Next, in Lewis v. Walter, (1821) 4 B. & Ald. 615, Holroyd and Best, JJ., expressed an opinion that the rule had been laid down too largely in the Earl of Northampton's Case, and ought to be qualified by confining it to cases where there is a fair and just reason for the repetition of the slander (that is, I presume, to cases where the repetition is privileged). Then, in February, 1829, the Court of Common Pleas decided that in actions of libel there was no such rule. (De Crespigny v. Wellesley, 5 Bing. 392, in which case Best, C.J., says: "Of what use is it to send the name of the author with a libel that is to pass into a country where he is entirely unknown: the name of the author of a statement will not inform those who do not know his character, whether he is a person entitled to credit for veracity or not; whether his statement was made in earnest or by way of joke; whether it contains a charge made by a man of sound mind or the delusion of a lunatic.") And lastly, in M'Pherson v. Daniels, 10 B. & C. 263; 5 M. & R. 251 (Michaelmas, 1829), the rule in Lord Northampton's Case was directly challenged and expressly overruled; and it was held that for a defendant to prove that he said at the time that he heard the tale from A., and that A. did in fact tell it to the defendant, was no justification. It must be proved that the defendant repeated the story on a justifiable occasion, and in the bonâ fide belief in its truth [and that is a defence of privilege, see Bromage v. Prosser, 4 B. & C. 247; 6 D. & R. 296; 1 C. & P. 475, post p. 241]. This decision has been approved of and followed in Ward v. Weeks, 7 Bing. 211; 4 M. & P. 796; and in Watkin v. Hall, L. R. 3 Q. B. 396; 37 L. J. Q. B. 125; 16 W. R. 857; 18 L. T. 561; and see Bennett v. Bennett, 6 C. & P. 588. And in America the law appears to be the same. (Jarnigan v. Fleming, 43 Miss. 711; Treat v. Browning, 4 Connecticut, 408; Runkle v. Meyers, 3 Yeates (Pennsylvania), 518; Dole v. Lyon, 10 Johns. (New York), 447; Inman v. Foster, 8 Wend. 602.) Illustrations. Woor told Daniels that M'Pherson's horses had been seized from the coach on the road, that he had been arrested, and that the bailiffs were in his house. Daniels went about telling everyone, "Woor says that M'Pherson's horses have been seized from the coach on the road, that he himself has been arrested, and that the bailiffs are in his house." Held, that Daniels was liable to an action by M Pherson for the slander, although he named Woor at the time as the person from whom he had heard it; that it was no justification to prove that Woor did in fact say so: the defendant must go further and prove that what Woor said was true. M'Pherson v. Daniels, 10 B. & C. 263; 5 M. & R. 251. The defendant said to the plaintiff in the presence of others :-"Thou art a sheep-stealing rogue, and Farmer Parker told me so." Held, that an action lay. It was urged that the plaintiff ought not to have judgment, because it was not averred that Farmer Parker did not tell the defendant so; but the Court was of opinion that such an averment was unnecessary, it being quite immaterial whether Farmer Parker did or did not tell the defendant so. Gardiner v. Atwater, (1756) Sayer, 265. Lewes v. Walter, (1617) 3 Bulstr. 225; Cro. Jac. 406, 413; Rolle's Meggs v. Griffith, Cro. Eliz. 400; Moore, 408; ante, p. 140. Read's Case, Cro. Eliz. 645. The defendant said to the plaintiff, a tailor, in the presence of others :heard you were run away," scilicet, from your creditors. lay. Davis v. Lewis, 7 T. R. 17. I Held, that an action A rumour was current on the Stock Exchange that the chairman of the S. E. Ry. Co. had failed; and the shares in the company consequently fell; thereupon the defendant said, "You have heard what has caused the fall-I mean, the rumour about the South-Eastern chairman having failed?" Held, that a plea that there was in fact such a rumour was no answer to the action. Watkin v. Hall, L. R. 3 Q. B. 396; 37 L. J. Q. B. 125; 16 W. R. 857; 18 L. T. 561. See Richards v. Richards, 2 Moo. & Rob. 557. So the prior publication of a libel is no justification for its being copied and republished. If the first publication be privileged, that will not render the second publication privileged. Illustrations. Mr. and Mrs. Davies wrote a libellous letter to the Directors of the London Missionary Society, and sent a copy to the defendant, who published extracts from it in a pamphlet. The defendant stated that the letter was written by Mr. and Mrs. Davies, and at the time he wrote the pamphlet he believed all the statements made in the letter to be true. Held, no justification for his publishing it. Tidman v. Ainslie, (1854) 10 Exch. 63. And see Mills and wife v. Spencer and wife, (1817) Holt, N. P. 533. It is no excuse for the publication even of a correct copy of an entry in any register or other official document which does not relate to a judicial proceeding, that such register or document is declared by Act of Parliament to be open to the public. Reis v. Perry, (1895) 64 L. J. Q. B. 566; 43 W. R. 648; 59 J. P. 308; 15 R. 427; 11 Times L. R. 373. And here note a distinction between libel and slander. The actual publisher of a libel may be an innocent porter or messenger, a mere hand, unconscious of the nature of |