The Court of Exchequer Chamber thought the words "If Mrs. W. chooses to entertain the Duke of Brunswick, she does what very few will do," a libel on the Duke. Gregory v. The Queen, (No. 1) 15 Q. B. 957; 15 Jur. 74; 5 Cox, It is libellous to publish in a newspaper a story of the plaintiff calculated to make him ludicrous, though he had previously told the same story of himself. Cook v. Ward, 6 Bing. 409; 4 M. & P. 99. It is libellous to publish in a newspaper an after-dinner speech which contained good-humoured chaff of the plaintiff, pardonable in the speaker on the occasion, but not intended by him to be republished to all the world. Dolby v. Newnes, (1887) 3 Times L. R. 393. But it is not defamatory to write of another that he is "Man Friday.” For, as Lord Denman, C.J., observes in Hoare v. Silverlock, (No. 1, 1848) 12 Q. B. 626; 17 L. J. Q. B. 308: " That imputed no crime at all. The Man Friday,' we all know, was a very respectable man, although a black man, and black men have not been denounced as criminals yet." The law is otherwise in the United States. King v. Wood, 1 N. & M. (South Car.) 184. Where the defendants posted up in a public club-room the following notice: "The Rev. J. Robinson and Mr. J. K., inhabitants of this town, not being persons that the proprietors and annual subscribers think it proper to associate with, are excluded this room; this was held no libel; sed quære. Robinson v. Jermyn, 1 Price, 11. It is not libellous to publish in a newspaper that the plaintiff has sued his mother-in-law in the County Court. Cox v. Cooper, 12 W. R. 75; 9 L. T. 329. It is not libellous to send a circular to the members of a certain society, stating that the plaintiffs are not proper persons "to be proposed to be balloted for as members thereof." Goldstein v. Foss, 6 B. & C. 154; (in Ex. Ch.) 4 Bing. 489; 2 C. & P. 252; 2 Y. & J. 146; 1 M. & P. 402. It is not libellous to print and circulate a handbill, "B. Oakley, of Chillington, Game and Rabbit Destroyer, and his wife the seller of the same in country and town," unless it be averred and proved that the words imputed some illegal or improper slaughter or sale of game or rabbits. R. v. James Yates, 12 Cox, C. C. 233. It is not a libel to write and publish the words :-"We are requested to state that the honorary secretary of the Tichborne Defence Fund is not and never was a captain in the Royal Artillery as he has been erroneously described," for these words do not impute that the plaintiff had so represented himself. Hunt v. Goodlake, 43 L. J. C. P. 54; 29 L. T. 472. Defendant posted up several placards which ran thus:-"W. Gee, Solicitor, Bishop's Stortford. To be sold by auction, if not previously disposed of by private contract, a debt of the above, amounting to 3, 1977., due upon partnership and mortgage transactions." Bramwell, B., left the question to the jury, telling them that "a mere offer to sell an alleged debt did not necessarily imply inability to pay it," and that "it was not libellous to publish of another that he owed money" unless there be words implying that he cannot pay. returned a verdict of Not Guilty. R. v. Coghlan, (1865) 4 F. & F. 316. The jury McCann v. Edinburgh Roperie Co., 28 L. R. Ir. 24, post, p. 129. It is not defamatory to write and publish of the plaintiff words implying that he endeavoured to suppress dissension and discourage sedition in Ireland; for, though such words might injure him in the minds of criminals and rebels, they would not tend to lower him in the estimation of right-thinking men. Mawe v. Pigott, Ir. R. 4 C. L. 34. And see Clay v. Roberts, 9 Jur. N. S. 580; 11 W. R. 649; 8 L. T. 397. So a notice sent by a landlord to his tenants :-"Messrs. Henty and Sons hereby give notice that they will not receive in payment any cheques drawn on any of the branches of the Capital and Counties Bank," is not defamatory. Capital and Counties Bank v. Henty and Sons, 7 App. Cas. 741; 52 L. J. Q. B. 232; 31 W. R. 157; 47 L. T. 662; 47 J. P. 214. It is not libellous for the defendants to write and publish of one who had formerly been in their employment that his engagement had ceased, that "his agency has been closed by the directors," or that " his connection with the institute has ceased": for such words without more do not imply that his engagement was terminated in consequence of any misconduct on his part. Mulligan v. Cole and others, L. R. 10 Q. B. 549; 44 L. J. Q. B. 153; O'Hea v. Guardians of Cork Union, 32 L. R. Ir. 629, post, p. 129. A libel is generally "written," a word which includes any printed, painted, or any other permanent representation not transient in its nature as are spoken words. The writing may be on paper, parchment, copper, wood, stone, or any other substance; and may be made with any instrument, pen and ink, blacklead pencil (Geary v. Physic, (1826) 5 B. & C. 234), or in chalk, &c. But a libel need not necessarily be in writing or printing. A picture, statue, or effigy, or any other mark or sign exposed to view, if it conveys a defamatory meaning, may also be a libel. (5 Rep. 125.) Illustrations. A caricature or scandalous painting is a libel. Anon., 11 Mod. 99. Austin v. Culpepper, 2 Show. 313; Skin. 123. Du Bost v. Beresford, 2 Camp. 511. A statue, wax model, or effigy, may be a libel. Monson v. Tussauds, Limited, (1894) 1 Q. B. 671; 63 L. J. Q. B. 454 ; 70 L. T. 335; 58 J. P. 524; 9 R. 177. A chalk mark on a wall may be a libel, and as the wall cannot conveniently be brought into Court, secondary evidence may be given of the inscription. Mortimer v. M'Callan, 6 M. & W. 58. Tarpley v. Blaby, 7 C. & P. 395. See Spall v. Massey and others, 2 Stark. 559.* Burning a man in effigy may be a libel on him; but those who merely stand by looking on are not liable. Eyre v. Garlick, 42 J. P. 68. Fixing up a gallows or other reproachful or ignominious sign against a man's door may be a libel on him. De famosis libellis, 5 Rep. 125, b. Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown, ch. 28, 6, 8th edition, p. 542. Jefferies v. Duncombe, (1809) 11 East, 226; 2 Camp. 3, ante, p. 13. Hieroglyphics, a rebus, an anagram, or an allegory may be a libel. Ironical praise may be a libel. But in all these cases there must be a definite imputation upon a definite person; and that person must be the plaintiff. A. cannot, as a rule, sue for words defamatory only of B., although he may have suffered loss or inconvenience therefrom. But see post, p. 141. Illustrations. A brother cannot sue for slander of his sister. Subbaiyar v. Kristnaiyar and another, I. L. R., 1 Madras, 383. No one can claim damages for a libel on a dead man; but such a libel may be the subject of criminal proceedings, if its tendency be clearly to provoke the living to a breach of the peace, in vindication of the honour of the family. was R. v. Topham, 4 T. R. 126, post, p. 428. R. v. Ensor, (1887) 3 Times L. R. 366. The defendants attended the funeral ceremony of Premji Ludha, the headman of the Karad caste, and there before a large concourse of people made a violent attack on the moral and religious character of the deceased, declaring that he patit," a term of great opprobrium and reproach among Hindoos. Many of those assembled left at once in consequence, and the family of the deceased suffered great pain and annoyance, and also were much lowered in public estimation. The plaintiff sued as the heir and nearest relation of the deceased for damages. Held, no action lay. Luckumsey Rowji v. Hurbun Nursey and others, I. L. R., 5 Bom. 580. But a husband may recover, without joining his wife as a co-plaintiff, for damage caused to himself by words defamatory solely of her. Baldwin v. Flower, 3 Mod. 120. Guy v. Gregory, 9 C. & P. 584. Dengate v. Gardiner, 4 M. & W. 5; 2 Jur. 470. Wilson v. Goit, 3 Smith (17 N. Y. R.) 445. If, however, the plaintiff can satisfy the jury that the defendant desired and intended to injure him, and thought that his best way of doing so was by publishing a libel on B., and the damage to the plaintiff was the natural and necessary consequence of that libel on B., it is submitted that an action would lie. case. Ashley v. Harrison, 1 Esp. 48; Peake, 194. If the words are not reasonably susceptible of any defamatory meaning, the judge at the trial will stop the But if the words are reasonably susceptible of two constructions, the one an innocent, the other a libellous construction, then it is a question for the jury which construction is the proper one (Jenner and another v. A'Beckett, L. R. 7 Q. B. 11; 41 L. J. Q. B. 14; 20 W. R. 181; 25 L. T. 464; Linotype Co., Limited v. British Empire, &c., (1899) 81 L. T. 331; 15 Times L. R. 524); and if the judge stops the case, the Court will order a new trial. (Hart and another v. Wall, 2 C. P. D. 146; 46 L. J. C. P. 227; 25 W. R. 373; Ritchie & Co. v. Sexton, 64 L. T. 210.) The jury should always read the alleged libel through before deciding that its effect is injurious. A word at the end may alter the whole meaning. The jury must look at the context. If in one part appears something to the plaintiff's discredit, in another something to his credit," the bane," and the "antidote " should be taken together. The jury should not dwell on isolated passages, but judge of the publication as a whole. (Per Lord Ellenborough, C.J., in R. v. Lambert and Perry, 2 Camp. 398; 31 How. St. Tr. 340; per Lord Kenyon, C.J., in R. v. Reeves, Peake, Add. Cas. 84; per Fitzgerald, J., in R. v. Sullivan, 11 Cox, C. C. 58.) They must decide first what in their opinion any reasonable man would understand from the alleged libel, and then it will be easy for them to say whether it is a libel or not. Illustrations. The report of a trial for libel contained some strong observations against the plaintiff, which were indeed a necessary part of the report, as the defendant had justified. At the end it was stated that the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff for 301. Held, that the publication, taken as a whole, was not injurious to the plaintiff. Chalmers v. Payne, 2 C. M. & R. 156; 5 Tyrw. 766; 1 Gale, 69. The defendants published in a newspaper certain stories about the plaintiff, and then added:-"I do not venture to say these stories are true." Held, that in spite of this qualification the words were capable of being reasonably understood in a libellous sense, and that the question must go to the jury. Ritchie & Co. v. Sexton, (H. L.) 64 L. T. 210; 55 J. P. 389. PUBLIC OFFICES, PROFESSIONS AND TRADES. Apart from words which injure the plaintiff in his private character and reputation, an action will lie for words which injure him in his office, profession, or trade. The law will protect a man from any attack which tends to impair his means of livelihood, or to bring upon him professional or commercial discredit. Hence words may be libellous, if written of one man, who holds a public office or carries on a profession or trade, which would not be actionable if published of another, who held no such office, or did not follow such profession or trade. Public Offices. It is libellous to impute to any one holding an office that he has been guilty of improper conduct in that office, or has been actuated by wicked, corrupt, or selfish motives or is incompetent for the post which he holds. And it is not necessary (as it is in cases of slander, post, p. 51) that the person libelled should at the time still hold that office: it is actionable to impute past misconduct when in office. (Parmiter v. Coupland, 6 M. & W. 108; Boydell v. Jones, 4 M. & W. at p. 450; Warman v. Hine, 1 Jur. 820; Goodburne v. Bowman, 9 Bing. 532.) In cases of slander a distinction is drawn between offices of profit and offices of honour merely, such as that of justice of the peace; and it has been held that merely to impute incompetency or want of ability (as distinct from a want of integrity or impartiality) to a man whose office is not of profit, is not actionable, see p. 53. There is no authority, however, for supposing that an action of libel would not lie, if such words were printed and published. And see post, p. 52. Illustrations. It is libellous to write and publish of an ex-mayor and a justice of the peace that during his mayoralty he was guilty of partiality and corruption, |