justices in open Court for the issue of a summons for perjury, was held privileged by the Court of Appeal in Kimber v. The Press Association, (1893) 1 Q. B. 65; 62 L. J. Q. B. 152; 41 W. R. 17; 67 L. T. 515; 4 R. 95. A report of proceedings before a judge at chambers on an application under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 122, s. 42, to discharge a bankrupt out of custody, is privileged. Smith v. Scott, 2 C. & K. 580. The defendants presented a petition in the Croydon County Court to adjudicate the plaintiff a bankrupt; and to set aside a bill of sale which they alleged to be fraudulent. The County Court judge did not hear the case in open Court, but in his own room; the public, however, could walk in and out of the room at their pleasure during the hearing. Held, by Cockburn, C.J., at Nisi Prius, that a fair report of what took place before the County Court judge in his room was prima facie privileged. Myers v. Defries, Times, July 23rd, 1877. Proceedings held in gaol before a registrar in bankruptcy, under the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, ss. 101, 102, upon the examination of a debtor in custody, are judicial and in a public Court. A fair report, therefore, of those proceedings is protected. Ryalls v. Leader and others, L. R. 1 Ex. 296; 4 H. & C. 555; 35 L. J. Ex. 185; 12 Jur. N. S. 503; 14 W. R. 838; 14 L. T. 563. A fair report of proceedings before the General Medical Council, acting within its statutory powers, is privileged. Allbutt v. General Medical Council, 23 Q. B. D. 400; 58 L. J. Q. B. 606; 37 W. R. 771; 61 L. T. 585. A fair and accurate report of proceedings before the examiners appointed under 9 Geo. IV., c. 22, s. 7, to inquire into the sufficiency of the sureties offered on the trial of an election petition, was held privileged. Cooper v. Lawson, 8 A. & E. 746; 1 W. W. & H. 601; 2 Jur. 919; 1 P & D. 15. But Patterson, J., held that a report of what had occurred at the town-hall at Ludlow on the occasion of one of his Majesty's commissioners of inquiry going to Ludlow to inquire into the state of that corporation, was not privileged. Charlton v. Watton, 6 C. & P. 385. A conversation took place between a coroner, his officer, and the widow of the deceased in the room in which the inquest was about to be held, after reporters and the coroner had entered and taken their seats there, but before the jury had been sworn. The officer complained that the body had been impoperly removed from the hospital; the widow complained of the manner in which she had been served with the summons to the inquest. Held, per Bowen, J., that a fair report of such conversation was privileged. Sheppard v. Lloyd, Daily Chronicle, March 11th, 1882. But no privilege attaches to the report of unsworn statements made by a mere bystander at an inquest. Lynam v. Gowing, 6 L. R. Ir. 259. An accurate transcript of the records of a Court relating to any judicial proceedings is also privileged. Illustrations. A calendar of prisoners at assizes or quarter sessions or a cause list is privileged. Per Rigby, L.J., in Andrews v. Nott Bower, (1895) 1 Q. B. at p. 896. In Scotland there exists a public register of protested bills of exchange, established by statute, and the registration of such protests has by statute the effect of a "decreet," or final judgment of the Court of Session. The contents of this register being public property, the defendant published an accurate transcript thereof for the benefit of merchants. This was held privileged, as being but a list of judgments of the court. Fleming v. Newton, 1 H. L. C. 363. And so long as the words published by the defendant are a correct copy of the record of the Court, it is immaterial that the record is itself inaccurate, so long as the defendant is not aware of such inaccuracy. Annaly v. Trade Auxiliary Co., 26 L. R. Ir. 11, 394. MacCabe v. Joynt, (1901) 2 Ir. R. 115. But the words, though correctly copied from the register, may yet be published by the defendant at such a time and in such a manner as to convey a false and defamatory meaning to his readers: e.g. where the publisher of such a “Black List" left in it, as a still existing liability, a judgment which had been annulled and satisfied by payment, the Irish Court of Queen's Bench held that this inaccuracy destroyed all privilege. McNally v. Oldham, 16 Ir. C. L. R. 298; 8 L. T. 604. And see Jones v. McGovern, Ir. R. 1 C. L. 681. Cosgrave v. Trade Auxiliary Co., Ir. R. 8 C. L. 349. So in England: Williams v. Smith, 22 Q. B. D. 134; 58 L. J. Q. B. 21; 37 W. R. 93; 59 L. T. 757; 52 J. P. 823. But this difficulty may be overcome by prefixing or appending a note as was done in England in Searles v. Scarlett, (1892) 2 Q. B. 56; 61 L. J. Q. B. 573; 40 W. R. 696; 66 L. T. 837; 56 J. P. 789. And Ireland in Cosgrave v. Trade Auxiliary Co., Ir. R. 8 C. L. 349. No privilege attaches to the publication of a correct copy of an entry in any register or other official document, which does not relate to a judicial proceeding, even though such register or document is declared by act of parliament to be open to the public. Reis v. Perry, (1895) 64 L. J. Q. B. 566; 43 W. R. 648; 59 J. P. 308; 15 R. 427; 11 Times L. R. 373. There are, however, two cases in which reports of judicial proceedings, although fair and accurate, are not privileged, and are indeed illegal. (i) The first is where the Court has itself prohibited the publication, as it frequently did in former days. "Every Court has the power of preventing the publication of its proceedings pending litigation." (Per Turner, L.J., in Brook v. Evans, 29 L. J. Ch. 616; 6 Jur, N. S. 1025; 8 W. R. 688.) But such a prohibition now is rare. (And see Levy v. Lawson, E. B. & E. 560; 27 L. J. Q. B. 282.) (ii) The second is where the subject-matter of the trial is an obscene or blasphemous libel, or where for any other reason the proceedings are unfit for publication. It is not justifiable to publish even a fair and accurate report of such proceedings; such a report will be indictable as a criminal libel. (See Re "Evening News," (1886) 3 Times L. R. 255.) Illustrations. On the trial of Thistlewood and others for treason, in 1820, Abbott, C.J., announced in open Court that he prohibited the publication of any of the proceedings until the trial of all the prisoners should be concluded. In spite of this prohibition the Observer published a report of the trial of the first two prisoners tried. The proprietor of the Observer was summoned for the contempt, and failing to appear, was fined 5007. R. v. Clement, 4 B. & Ald. 218; 11 Price, 68. Richard Carlile on his trial read over to the jury the whole of Payne's "Age of Reason," for selling which he was indicted. After his conviction, his wife published a full, true, and accurate account of his trial, entitled, "The Mock Trial of Mr. Carlile," and in so doing republished the whole of the “ Age of Reason" as a part of the proceedings at the trial. Held, that the privilege usually attaching to fair reports of judicial proceedings did not extend to such a colourable reproduction of the book which the jury had found to be a blasphemous libel; and that it is unlawful to publish even a correct account of the proceedings in a Court of justice, if such an account contains matter of a scandalous, blasphemous, or indecent nature. R. v. Mary Carlile, (1819) 3 B. & Ald. 167. See also the remarks of R. v. Creevey, (1813) 1 M. & S. 281. The Protestant Electorial Union published a book, called "The Confessional Unmasked," intended to show the pernicious influence exercised by the Roman Catholic priests in the confessional over the minds and consciences of the laity. This was condemned as obscene in R. v. Hicklin, L. R. 3 Q. B. 360; 37 L. J. M. C. 89; 16 W. R. 801; 18 L. T. 395; 11 Cox, C. C. 19. The Union thereupon. issued an expurgated edition, for selling which one George Mackey was tried at the Winchester Quarter Sessions on October 19th, 1870, when the jury, being unable to agree as to the obscenity of the book, were discharged without giving any verdict. The Union thereupon published "A Report of the Trial of George Mackey," in which they set out the full text of the second edition of "The Confessional Unmasked," although it had not been read in open Court, but only taken as read, and certain passages in it referred to. A police magistrate thereupon ordered all copies of this "Report of the Trial of George Mackey" to be seized and destroyed as obscene books. Held, that this decision was correct. Steele v. Brannan, L. R. 7 C. P. 261; 41 L. J. M. C. 85; 20 W. R. 607; 26 L. T. 509. The report must be an impartial and accurate account of what really occurred at the trial; else no privilege will attach. It is the duty of the judge to exclude irrelevant evidence; if, therefore, such evidence be given in Court and appear in the report, this is not the fault of the reporter. (Ryalls v. Leader, L. R. 1 Ex. 300; 35 L. J. Ex. 185; 14 W. R. 838; 12 Jur. N. S. 503; 14 L. T. 563.) The sworn evidence of the witnesses should be relied on, rather than the speeches of advocates. Counsel are frequently instructed to open to the jury facts which they fail to prove in evidence. If such an unsubstantiated statement be reported at all, the reporter should add, "but this the plaintiff failed to prove : " but it would be better to avoid all allusion to the matter. Especial care should be taken to report accurately the summing-up of the learned judge, especially if the case be of more than transitory interest. In many cases a report has escaped the charge of partiality on the ground that it contained an accurate report of the judge's summing-up of the case to the jury. (Milissich v. Lloyds, 46 L. J. C. P. 404; 36 L. T. 423; Chalmers v. Payne, 2 C. M. & R. 156; 5 Tyrw. 766; 1 Gale, 69.) The report need not be verbatim; it may be abridged or condensed; but it must not be partial or garbled. It need not state all that occurred in extenso; but if it omit any fact which would have told in the plaintiff's favour, it will be a question for the jury whether the omission is material. Thus, the entire suppression of the evidence of one witness, may render the report unfair. (Duncan v. Thwaites, 3 B. & C. 580; Rumney v. Walter, (1892) 8 Times L. R. 256.) But a report will be privileged if it is "substantially a fair account of what took place "in Court. (Per Lord Campbell, C.J., in Andrews v. Chapman, 3 C. & K. 289.) "It is sufficient to publish a fair abstract." (Per Mellish, L.J., in Milissich v. Lloyds, 46 L. J. C. P. 406; per Byles, J., in Turner v. Sullivan and others, 6 L. T. 130.) The privilege is not confined to reports in a newspaper or law magazine. It attaches It attaches equally to fair and accurate reports issued for any lawful reason in pamphlet form or in any other fashion. Though, of course, if there be any other evidence of malice, the mode and extent of publication will be taken into consideration with such other evidence on that issue. (Milissich v. Lloyds, 46 L. J. C. P. 404; Salmon v. Isaac, 20 L. T. 885; Riddell v. Clydesdale Horse Society, 12 Ct. of Session Cases, 4th Series, 976.) Nor does it matter by whom the report is published; the privilege is the same, as a matter of law, for a private individual as for a newspaper. (Per Brett, L.J., 46 L. J. C. P. 407.) "I do not think the public press has any peculiar privilege." (Per Bramwell, L.J., 5 Ex. D. 56.) "A newspaper has no greater privilege in such a matter than any ordinary person-any person is privileged in publishing such a report if he does so merely to inform the public." (Per Hannen, J., in Salmon v. Isaac, 20 L. T. at p. 886; and see (1886) 3 Times L. R. 245.) Illustrations. In a former action for libel brought by the plaintiff, the then defendant had justified. The report of this trial set out the libel in full, and gave the evidence for the defendant on the justification, concluding, however, by stating that the plaintiff had a verdict for 301. The jury, under the direction of Lord Abinger, took the "bane" and the "antidote" together, and found a verdict for the defendant, on the ground that the report when taken altogether was not injurious to the plaintiff. And the Court refused a rule for a new trial. Chalmers v. Payne, 5 Tyrw. 766; 1 Gale, 69; 2 C. M. & R. 156. The plaintiff and M. were convicted of a conspiracy to extort money from B.; the report of the trial stated that the plaintiff had written a particular letter, which the plaintiff contended had not in fact been written by him, but by his fellow-conspirator, M. Held, that as the jury had convicted them of a common purpose, and the letter was written in furtherance of that common purpose and set out in the indictment as an overt act of the conspiracy, it made no difference which of the two wrote it; and that the error, if error it were, was immaterial. Stockdale v. Tarte and others, 4 A. & E. 1016. Alexander v. N. E. Ry. Co., 6 B. & S. 340; 34 L. J. Q. B. 152; 13 |