Traders. Any printed or written words are libellous which impeach the credit of any merchant or trader by imputing to him bankruptcy, insolvency, or even embarrassment, either past, present, or future, or which impute to him fraud or dishonesty or any mean or dishonourable conduct in his business, or which impugn his skill or otherwise injure him in the way of his trade or employment. "The law has always been very tender of the reputation of tradesmen, and therefore words spoken of them in the way of their trade will bear an action that will not be actionable in the case of another person, and if bare words are so, it will be stronger in the case of a libel in a public newspaper which is so diffusive." (Per curiam in Harman v. Delany, 2 Str. 898; 1 Barnard. 289; Fitz. 121.) Illustrations. The printers of a newspaper, by a mistake in setting up in type the announcements from the London Gazette, placed the name of the plaintiff's firm under the heading "First Meetings under the Bankruptcy Act" instead of under "Dissolutions of Partnership." An ample apology was inserted in the next issue: no damage was proved to have followed to the plaintiff : and there was no suggestion of any malice. In an action for libel against the proprietors of the paper, the jury awarded the plaintiff 507, dainages. Held, that the publication was libellous, and that the damages awarded were not excessive. Shepheard v. Whitaker, L. R. 10 C. P. 502; 32 L. T. 402. [N.B.-The chief clerk thought 107. sufficient in a very similar case, Stubbs v. Marsh, 15 L. T. 312.] It is libellous to write of a bank as now in liquidation" when no steps have been taken, or are in contemplation, with a view to liquidation. London and Northern Bank, Limited v. George Newnes, Limited, (1899) 16 Times L. R. 76. It is libellous to advertise that a certain optician is "a licensed hawker" and a quack in spectacle secrets." Keyzor and another v. Newcomb, 1 F. & F. 559. It is a libel on a firm of pianoforte makers to publish that they carry on a "pernicious system of sweating" at their works. Collard v. Marshall, (1892) 1 Ch. 571; 61 L. J. Ch. 268; 40 W. R. 473. It is a libel on a colliery proprietor to publish of him that he "locked his men out of their pits for six weeks, until stocks were cleared out and coal had reached a fabulous price; and then his conscience would not allow him to starve the poor miner any longer." Bayley v. Edmunds and others, (1895) 11 Times L. R. 537. It is a libel on a firm of merchants to publish of them that they "have deliberately and persistently boycotted five lightermen who were in their employ, because they are members of a trades union." Pink v. Federation of Trades Unions, 67 L. T. 258. It is actionable to put a man's name on a "black list," with the object of inducing people not to have business dealings with him, or to bring him into public odium and contempt. "Black lists are real instruments of coercion, as every man whose name is on one soon discovers to his cost." Per Lord Lindley in Quinn v. Leathem, (1901) A. C. 495; 70 L. J. P. C. 76; 50 W. R. 139; 85 L. T. 289; 65 J. P. 708. Trollope and Sons v. London Building Trades Federation, (1895) 72 It is a libel to write and publish of a licensed victualler that his licence has been refused; as it suggests that he had committed some breach of the licensing laws. Bignell v. Buzzard, 3 H. & N. 217; 27 L. J. Ex. 355. The plaintiff, who had formerly been a member of the defendant's firm of H. & Sons, was carrying on a similar business by himself under the name of H. & Co. The defendants brought an action against the plaintiff for passing himself off as a member of their firm. The judge at the trial was satisfied that no such representation had been made and dismissed the action. It appeared that such a representation had on two or three occasions been made by the plaintiff's agent without his knowledge, and the plaintiff gave an undertaking, which was inserted in the judgment, that he would never make such a representation. The defendants issued a circular relating to the litigation, stating that by the judgment the plaintiff had been ordered not to represent that his firm was, or that the defendants' firm was not, the original firm of H. & Sons, and that they had been compelled to issue such circular through finding that serious misrepresentations were in circulation to their prejudice. Held, that this was a libel on the plaintiff and that he was entitled to an injunction without proof of special damage. Hayward & Co. v. Hayward and Sons, (1886) 34 Ch. D. 198; 56 L. J. It is libellous to write and publish of the plaintiff that he regularly or purposely supplied bad and unwholesome water to ships, whereby the passengers were made ill. Solomon v. Lawson, 8 Q. B. 823; 15 L. J. Q. B. 253; 10 Jur. 796. It is libellous to write and publish of a dairyman that the milk supplied by him is "three quarts short" of the proper measure. Beamish v. Dairy Supply Co., Limited, (1897) 13 Times L. R. 484. It is libellous to write and publish of the plaintiff that he endeavours to sell the articles which he manufactures under a well-known trade name which he has no right to use. Partners Thorley's Cattle Food Co. v. Massam, 14 Ch. D. 763; 28 W. R. 295, 966; 41 L. T. 542; 42 L. T. 851. Anderson v. Liebig's Extract of Meat Co., 45 L. T. 757. Liebig's Extract of Meat Co. v. Anderson, 55 L. T. 206. Hatchard v. Mège and others, 18 Q. B. D. 771 ; 56 L. J. Q. B. 397; 35 W. R. 576; 56 L. T. 662, post, p. 35. may sue jointly for a libel defamatory of the partnership. Le Fanu v. Malcolmson, 1 H. L. C. 637; 8 Ir. L. R. 418; post, p. 550. So a company or corporation can sue even one of their own members for a libel relating to their management of their business. Williams v. Beaumont, 10 Bing. 260; 3 Moore & Sc. 705. Metropolitan Omnibus Co. v. Hawkins, 4 H. & N. 87; 28 L. J. Ex. A married woman trading under her own name may sue as a trader, without joining her husband, for a libel on her in the way of her trade. Per Brett, J., in Summers v. City Bank, L. R. 9 C. P. 583; 43 L. J. And see 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, s. 1, post, pp. 530–539. And see cases collected in Chapter V., post, p. 104. Sometimes also an attack upon a thing may be defamatory of the owner of that thing, or of others immediately connected with it. But this is only so where an attack upon the thing is also an indirect attack upon the individual. If the words do not involve any reflection upon the personal character or the professional or commercial reputation of some person they are not defamatory, and therefore are not actionable unless they fall within the rules relating to actions on the case (as to which see Chapter IV., post, p. 73). to impute, for example, that the goods which the plaintiff sells or manufactures are adulterated to his knowledge is a distinct charge against the plaintiff of fraud and dishonesty in his trade. But "While mere criticism upon a manufacture or goods is lawful, an imputation upon a man in the way of his trade is, even without special damage, properly the subject of an action. . It is quite possible to make a reflection which, by the mere form of expression, would seem to be only a criticism of goods, but nevertheless would involve a reflection upon the seller or maker. Could it be gravely argued that to say of a fishmonger that he was in the habit of selling decomposed fish would not be a libel on him in the way of his trade? And if so, would it not be a mere juggle with language. to alter the form of that allegation and to say that all the fish in A.'s shop is decomposed? Or to say of a baker that such a baker's bread is always unwholesome? In each of these cases you could adopt a form of speech which would seem only to deal with the article sold or manufactured, but in each case it would tend to, and probably would succeed in destroying the trade of the person thus referred to." (Per Lord Halsbury, L.C., in Linotype Co., Limited v. British Empire Type-setting Machine Co., Limited, (1899) 81 L. T. 331; 15 Times L. R. 524; and see the observations of Lord Esher, M.R., in South Hetton Coal Co. v. North Eastern News Association, (1894) 1 Q. B. at p. 139.) Illustrations. The defendant published an advertisement in these words :- "Whereas there was an account in the Craftsman of John Harman, gunsmith, making guns of two feet six inches to exceed any made by others of a foot longer (with whom it is supposed he is in fee), this is to advise all gentlemen to be cautious, the said gunsmith not daring to engage with any artist in town, nor ever did make such an experiment (except out of a leather gun), as any gentleman may be satisfied of at the Cross Guns in Longacre." Held, a libel on the plaintiff in the way of his trade. Verdict for the plaintiff. Damages 50l. Harman v. Delany, (1731) 2 Stra. 898; 1 Barnard. 289, 438; Fitz. 121. It is libellous to write and publish of a bookseller that he publishes and sells books of an absurd, immoral, and improper tendency and description for children. Tabart v. Tipper, (1808) 1 Camp. 350. It is a libel on a shipowner and on him in the way of his trade to write and publish that his ship is unseaworthy. "It is as bad as saying of a wine merchant that his wine is poisoned, or of a tea merchant that his tea is made green by drying it on copper." Ingram v. Lawson, (1840) 6 Bing. N. C. 212; 8 Sc. 471, 479; 4 Jur. 151; 9 C. & P. 326. A declaration alleged that the plaintiff carried on the trade of an engineer, and was the inventor of, and sold, goods called " self-acting tallow syphons or lubricators," and that the defendant published of the plaintiff in his said trade and as such inventor, as follows:-"This is to caution parties employing steam power from a person, offering what he calls self-acting tallow syphons or lubricators, stating that he is the sole inventor, manufacturer and patentee, thereby monopolising high prices at the expense of the public. R. Harlow (the defendant) takes this opportunity of saying that such a patent does not exist, and that he has to offer an improved lubricator, which dispenses with the necessity of using more than one to a steam engine, thereby constituting a saving of 50 per cent. over every other kind yet offered to the public. Those who have already adopted the lubricators against which R. H. would caution, will find that the tallow is wasted instead of being effectually employed as professed." No innuendo was put upon the words, and no special damage was alleged. Held (on demurrer), no libel on the plaintiff, either generally or in the way of his trade. Evans v. Harlow, (1844) 5 Q. B. 624 ; 13 L. J. Q. B. 120; 8 Jur. 571; In this case Patteson, J., said (at p. 633): This is not, in effect, a caution against the plaintiff as a tradesman in the habit of selling goods which he knows to be bad; if it were, it would be a libel upon him personally: but it is a caution against the goods, suggesting that the articles which the plaintiff sells do not answer their purpose; which is not actionable unless it were shown that the plaintiff, by reason of the publication, was prevented from selling his goods to a particular person.” O.L.S. D So where one tradesman wrote and published words disparaging the goods of a rival trader, and no special damage was alleged, and the innuendo did not allege any imputation defamatory of the plaintiff, either generally or in the way of his trade, it was held on demurrer that no action lay. Young and others v. Macrae, (1862) 3 B. & S. 264; 32 L. J. Q. B. 6; 11 W. R. 63; 9 Jur. N. S. 539; 7 L. T. 354. It is libellous to write and publish that the guano sold by the plaintiff is a mixture of sand, sawdust, and other worthless compounds. Salmon v. Isaac, (1869) 20 L. T. 885. It is a libel on the proprietor and publisher of a newspaper to say that the advertisement columns of the newspaper are swollen with advertisements copied from other newspapers without any order for their insertion. Latimer v. Western Morning News Co., (1871) 25 L. T. 44. And see Russell and another v. Webster, (1874) 23 W. R. 59. The plaintiffs were manufacturers of bags, and had manufactured a bag which they called the " Bag of Bags." The defendant printed and published the following words :-" As we have not seen the Bag of Bags, we cannot say that it is useful, or that it is portable, or that it is elegant. All these it may be, but the only point we can deal with is the title, which we think very silly, very slangy, and very vulgar; and which has been forced upon the notice of the public ad nauseam." Mellor and Hannen, JJ., held that these words were capable of being construed as disparaging the plaintiffs in the way of their business, and that the case must therefore go to the jury. Lush, J., dissented, as in his opinion the words were not capable of being a libel upon the plaintiffs either personally or in the way of their trade. Jenner and another v. A'Beckett, (1871) L. R. 7 Q. B. 11; 41 L. J. Where the defendant wrote and published of the plaintiffs that they were "seeking to foist upon the public an article which they pretend is the same as that manufactured by the late Joseph Thorley," it was held that this was a libel on the plaintiffs in the way of their trade. Thorley's Cattle Food Co. v. Massam, (1879) 14 Ch. D. 763; 28 W. R. 295, 966; 41 L. T. 542; 42 L. T. 851. It is a libel to write and publish of a firm which exports needles words that imply that their needles are not an honest and independent make of needles, but are a spurious imitation of those made by another and a well-known firm. Thomas v. Williams, (1880) 14 Ch. D. 864; 49 L. J. Ch. 605; 28 W. R. 983; 43 L. T. 91. In certain lawsuits the Courts had held that the words "Liebig's Extract of Meat" were only a descriptive title, and that any person in this country may make such extract according to Liebig's receipt and sell it under the above title, or as "Baron Liebig's Extract," and may use a photograph of Baron Liebig. The defendant sold extract of meat with wrappers containing the words: "This is the only genuine brand," and stating that he was the "founder and sole proprietor of Brand Baron Liebig." Held, that the plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction, as the words "only genuine" misrepresented the result of the preceding litigation, implied that the plaintiffs' goods were not genuine, and were injurious to the plaintiffs in the way of their trade. Liebig's Extract of Meat Co., Limited v. Anderson, (1886) 55 L. T. 206. |