of the suitors, if there were any, could hardly have escaped the plaintiff's memory. Barnes v. Prudlin, vel Bruddel, 1 Sid. 396; 1 Ventr. 4; 1 Lev. 261; 2 Keb. 451. See also, Hunt v. Jones, Cro. Jac. 499. Davies and wife v. Solomon, L. R. 7 Q. B. 112; 41 L. J. Q. B. 10; 20 The defendant spoke words not slanderous per se of a dissenting minister, who averred that his congregation diminished in consequence. Held, too general an averment to constitute special damage, the names of the absentees not being given. Hopwood v. Thorn, 8 C. B. 293; 19 L. J. C. P. 94; 14 Jur. 87. Such an averment would have been sufficient, had the words been spoken of the plaintiff in the way of his office, and so actionable per se. Hurtley v. Herring, 8 T. R. 130. "Suppose a biscuit baker in Regent Street is slandered by a man saying his biscuits are poisoned, and in consequence no one enters his shop. He cannot complain of the loss of any particular customers, for he does not know them, and how hard and unjust it would be if he could not prove the fact of the loss under a general allegation of loss of custom." Per Martin, B., in Evans v. Harries, 26 L. J. Ex. 32. And see Weiss v. Whittemore, 38 Michigan, 366. The defendant printed and published in his newspaper that the plaintiff had given up business, and that his firm had ceased to exist. These words were not actionable per se; but they were clearly calculated to injure, and had in fact injured, the plaintiff's business, and the defendant must have known that in all reasonable probability they would injure the plaintiff's business. The plaintiff proved that his business had fallen off, and that his profits had diminished since the publication of the words; but gave no specific evidence of the loss of any particular customer or order. Held, that such evidence was in the special circumstances of the case sufficient to sustain the action. Ratcliffe v. Evans, (1892) 2 Q. B. 524; 61 L. J. Q. B. 535; 40 W. R. 578; 66 L. T. 794; 56 J. P. 837. In an action of slander of the plaintiff's title to an advowson, it was alleged that by reason of the defendant's words the plaintiff "was hindered in the sale of his advowson." It was not alleged that any one was in actual treaty to purchase it, or that any one who intended to buy it was in communication with the plaintiff. Held, that no action lay, for want of special damage. Tasburgh v. Day, (1618) Cro. Jac. 484. 66 But where the defendant slandered the plaintiff's title in the auction-room while the sale was proceeding, and thereupon the bidding immediately ceased, divers persons who would have purchased left the room, and the estate remained unsold," the objection that the names of the persons who would have purchased should have been specified, was "easily answered" thus: of this transaction it was impossible to specify names. of is that the bidding was thereby prevented and stopt. would have bid, and who would not. The auction ceased; and everybody went away. It could not be known who would have been bidders or purchasers, if it had not been thus put an end to." that in the nature The injury complained No one can tell who Hargrave v. Le Breton, (1769) 4 Burr. at p. 2424. The law is the same in America. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant's words had "injured her in her good name, and caused her relatives and friends to slight and shun her." This was held to disclose no special damage. Bassell v. Elmore, 48 N. Y. R. 563; 65 Barb. 627. Geisler v. Brown, 6 Neb. 254. So where the allegation was merely that by reason of the defendant's words the plaintiff had been slighted, neglected, and misused by the neighbours and her former associates, and turned out of doors." Pettibone v. Simpson, 66 Barb. 492. A general allegation that by reason of the defendant's acts, the plaintiff had been compelled to pay a large sum of money, without showing how, was held insufficient. Cook v. Cook, 100 Mass. 194. Pollard v. Lyon, 1 Otto (91 U. S.), 225. So in Australia. To say to the keeper of a restaurant, "You are an infernal rogue and swindler," was held, in the Supreme Court of Victoria, not actionable without proof of special damage, as not affecting plaintiff in his trade. But the plaintiff having alleged that, by reason of the words, people who used to frequent his restaurant ceased to deal with him, it was held the special damage made the words actionable, and that the special damage was sufficiently alleged, that the cases of frequenters of theatres, members of congregations, and travellers using an inn, were exceptions to the rule requiring the names of the customers lost to be set forth. Brady v. Youlden, Kerferd & Box's Digest of Victoria Cases, 709; Special damage must be strictly proved at the trial. Where the words are not actionable per se, the plaintiff will be confined to the special damage laid; he must prove that, or fail as there are no general damages to which he can have recourse. And when special damage is proved, the jury should strictly find a verdict for the amount of such special damage merely. They ought not to compensate the plaintiff for pain, mental anxiety, or a general loss of reputation, but should confine their assessment to the actual pecuniary loss that has been alleged and proved. (Dixon v. Smith, 5 H. & N. 450; 29 L. J. Ex. 125.) This rule, however, is frequently neglected in practice; and as soon as any special damage is proved, the words are treated as though they were actionable per se. It is still not clear whether a second action will lie for fresh special damage, in cases where special damage is part of the cause of action. (See Darley Main Colliery Co. v. Mitchell, 11 App. Cas. 127; 55 L. J. Q. B. 529; 54 L. T. 882; Crumbie v. Wallsend Local Board, (1891) 1 Q. B. 503; 60 L. J. Q. B. 392; 64 L. T. 490.) Illustrations. Dawes intended to employ the plaintiff, a surgeon and accoucheur, at his wife's approaching confinement; but the defendant told Dawes that the plaintiff's female servant had had a child by the plaintiff : Dawes consequently decided not to employ the plaintiff: Dawes told his mother and his wife's sister what the defendant had said; and consequently the plaintiff's practice fell off considerably among Dawes' friends and acquaintances and others. The fee for one confinement was a guinea. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to more than the one guinea; the jury should give him such a sum as they considered Dawes' custom was worth to him; but that the plaintiff clearly could not recover anything for the general decline of his business, which was caused by the gossip of Dawes' mother and sister-in-law. Dixon v. Smith, 5 H. & N. 450; 29 L. J. Ex. 125. The plaintiff invented a new portable camera, and offered it to A., who was willing to sell it to the public; but the defendant falsely stated to A. that it was an infringement of his patent. A.'s negotiations with the plaintiff were consequently broken off. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover; that the proper measure of damages was the profits which the plaintiff would have derived from the proposed contract, if it had been carried out, during such period as the defendant's threats still operated to deter A. from dealing with the plaintiff; but that the plaintiff could not claim in respect of any profits which might have been earned under the contract after the litigation was over, and when all apprehension of interference by the defendant was removed. Skinner & Co. v. Shew & Co. or Perry, (1894) 2 Ch. 581; 63 III. SPECIAL DAMAGE WHERE THE WORDS ARE ACTIONABLE per se. Where special damage is not essential to the action, it may still of course be proved at the trial to increase the amount of the damages, if it has been properly pleaded. The same particularity is required whether the words be actionable per se or not. So, too, the plaintiff must still prove that the special damage alleged is the direct result of the defendant's words, and not of any repetition of them by others. (Tunnicliffe v. Moss, 3 C. & K. 83; Hirst v. Goodwin, 3 F. & F. 257.) But in other respects the law is not quite so strict as to what constitutes special damage in the first case as in the second. Thus, where the words are not actionable per se, we have seen that mental distress, illness, expulsion from a religious society, &c., do not constitute special damage. But where the words are actionable per se, the jury may take such matters into their consideration in according damages. "Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone; though where a material damage occurs, and is connected with it, it is impossible a jury, in estimating it, should altogether overlook the feelings of the party interested." (Per Lord Wensleydale, in Lynch v. Knight and wife, 9 H. L. C. 598. See also Haythorn v. Lawson, 3 C. & P. 196; Le Fanu v. Malcolmson, 8 Ir. L. R. 418.) Again, where words are spoken of the plaintiff in the way of his profession or trade, so as to be actionable per se, the plaintiff may allege and prove a general diminution. of profits or decline of trade, without naming particular customers or proving why they have ceased to deal with. him. (Ingram v. Lawson, 6 Bing. N. C. 212; 8 Scott, 471; 4 Jur. 151; 9 C. & P. 326; Harrison v. Pearce, 1 F. & F. 569; 32 L. T. (Old S.) 298; and per Cresswell, J., in Rose v. Groves, 5 M. & Gr. 618, 619.) If, however, the plaintiff wishes to rely on the loss of particular customers, he must plead such loss specially (either in addition to, or without, the allegation of a general loss of business); and in that case he must call the customers named as witnesses at the trial. Still, if the customers are not called at the trial, or if for any other reason the proof of the special damage fails, the plaintiff may still recover on the general damage. (Cook v. Field, 3 Esp. 133; Evans v. Harries, 1 H. & N. 251 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 31.) The law already presumes that the plaintiff is injured in his business by the defendant's words; evidence as to the nature of the plaintiff's business before and after publication is admissible to show the extent of such injury. Lastly, where it is clear that the action lies without proof of any special damage, any loss or injury which the plaintiff has sustained in consequence of the defendant's words, even after action brought, may be proved to support the legal presumption, and to show from what has actually occurred how injurious and mischievous those words were. Illustrations. Where the defendant advertised in Hue and Cry that the plaintiff had been guilty of fraud, and offered a reward for his apprehension, and the plaintiff immediately sued on the libel, and after action brought was twice arrested in consequence of it: he was allowed to give evidence of these two arrests at the trial, not indeed as special damage, for they happened after action brought, but in order to show the injurious nature of the libel, and that the plaintiff was at time of action brought in serious danger of being arrested. Goslin v. Where the defendant published in a newspaper that a certain ship of the plaintiff's was unseaworthy, and had been purchased by the Jews to carry convicts, evidence as to the average profits of a voyage was admitted, and also evidence that upon the first voyage after the libel appeared the profits were nearly 1,5007. below the average, and this although the action was brought immediately after the libel appeared, and before the last-mentioned voyage was commenced. The jury, however, awarded the plaintiff only 9007. damages. Ingram v. Lawson, 6 Bing. N. C. 212: 8 Scott, 471. Where a declaration alleged that the defendant spoke words of the plaintiff, a dissenting minister, in the way of his office and profession, and his congregation rapidly diminished, and he was compelled for a time to give up preaching altogether, and lost profits thereby; it was held that this was a sufficient allegation of special damage, although the members of his congregation were not named. Hartley v. Herring, 8 T. R. 130. Hopwood v. Thorn, 8 C. B. 293; 19 L. J. C. P. 94; 14 Jur. 87. In an action of libel, the plaintiff in his Statement of Claim alleged that he had been injured in his credit and business. He was allowed under this allegation to give general evidence of a decline of business, presumably due to the publication of the libel. He also tendered evidence of the loss of particular customers. But this had not been pleaded. Held, that the judge rightly rejected such evidence at the trial. Bluck v. Lovering, (1885) 1 Times L. R. 497. Where words actionable per se are spoken of an innkeeper in the way of his trade, openly in his inn in the presence of his customers, evidence may be given of a general loss of custom and decline in his business. Evans v. Harries, 1 H. & N. 251; 26 L. J. Ex. 31. But where the defendant charged the plaintiff with larceny in the hearing of |