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48 J. P. 165.) A grocer obtained a criminal information for a libel in R. v. Benfield, (1760) 2 Burr. 980; a housekeeper in R. v. Tanfield, (1878) 42 J. P. 423.

But latterly the Court has been much more chary of granting criminal informations; and in future they will, as a rule, be only granted where the applicant holds some public office or position in England and has been attacked in his official character (R. v. Labouchere, suprà); or where the libel tends to obstruct the course of justice, or to prejudice the fair trial of any accused person. (R. v. Watson and others, 2 T. R. 199; post, p. 495; R. v. Jolliffe, 4 T. R. 285; R. v. White, 1 Camp. 359, n.; Ex parte Duke of Marlborough, 5 Q. B. 955; 13 L. J. M. C. 105; 1 Dav. & Mer. 720; R. v. Gray, 10 Cox, C. C. 184.) And the mere fact that the applicant is employed by the State is not sufficient. There must be some special circumstances to entitle him to the extraordinary remedy of a criminal information. (Ex parte The Postmistress of Littleton, (1888) 52 J. P. 264.)

No information will be granted for a libel contained in a private letter never made public (Ex parte Dale, 2 C. L. R. 870); nor for any matter of mere trade dispute, even though fraud be imputed; nor in any case where no malicious intention appears (Ex parte Doveton, 7 Cox, C. C. 16; 19 J. P. 741; 26 L. T. (Old S.) 73); nor where the remedy by action or indictment is sufficient (R. v. Mead, 4 Jur. 1014; Re "Evening News," (1886) 3 Times L. R. 255).

A fortiori, no information will be granted where the words are privileged by reason of the occasion on which they were published (R. v. Bailie, (1790) Holt, N. P. 312, n.; Ex parte Hoare, 23 L. T. 83); or where they appear to be true (R. v. Draper, 3 Smith, 390).

In every case the application for a criminal information must be made promptly; any delay in making the application after knowledge of the libel has reached the prosecutor will be ground for refusing an information, unless such delay can be satisfactorily explained. No information will be granted where the libel can no longer "exercise any

prejudicial influence." (Ex parte Wm. Smith, (1869) 21 L. T. 294.) The prosecutor, too, must come to the Court in the first instance, and must not have attempted to obtain redress in other ways before applying for a criminal information. (R. v. Calthorpe, 27 J. P. 581; Ex parte Pollard, (1901) 17 Times L. R. 773.)

Illustrations.

An information was refused where the alleged libel was proved to be a true copy of a report of a Committee of the House of Commons, though it did reflect on the individual prosecutor, and though its publication was not authorised by the House.

R. v. Wright, (1799) 8 T. R. 293.

A French gentleman, D'Eon de Beaumont, published a libel on the Count de Guerchy, then French Ambassador in England. The libel chiefly referred to private disputes between D'Eon and the Count, alleging that the Count had supplanted D'Eon at the Court of Versailles by trickery; but it also reflected on the public conduct of the ambassador, and insinuated that he was not fit for his post. An information was filed and D'Eon convicted. (Lord Mansfield.)

R. v. D'Eon, (1764) 3 Burr. 1514; 1 W. Bl. 501; Dig. L. L. 88. And see R. v. Peltier, (1803) 28 Howell's St. Tr. 617; post, p. 544. Lord George Gordon was tried in 1787 and convicted upon an information charging him with libelling Marie Antoinette, Queen of France, and "her tool" the French Ambassador in London. He was fined 5007. and sentenced to two years' imprisonment, and at the expiration of that time to find sureties for his good behaviour. This he could not do, so he remained in prison till he died on November 1st, 1793. (Ashurst, J.)

R. v. Lord George Gordon, 22 Howell's St. Tr. 177.

The Courier published the following passage:-"The Emperor of Russia is rendering himself obnoxious to his subjects by various acts of tyranny, and ridiculous in the eyes of Europe by his inconsistency. He has now passed an edict prohibiting the exportation of timber, deals, and other naval stores. In consequence of this ill-timed law, upwards of 100 sail of vessels are likely to return to this country without freights." This was deemed a libel upon the Emperor Paul I. An information was granted, and the proprietor of the Courier was fined 1007., sentenced to six months' imprisonment, and to find sureties for good behaviour for five years from the expiration of that term. The printer and publisher were also sentenced to one month's imprisonment. (Lord Kenyon, C.J.)

R. v. Vint, (1799) 27 Howell's St. Tr. 627.

The publication and circulation in London of a newspaper article written in German exulting over the murder of the Emperor Nicholas of Russia and commending it as an example to revolutionists throughout the world is an incitement to murder under s. 4 of the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, although not addressed to any person in particular; and is also a criminal libel.

R. v. Most, (1881) 7 Q. B. D. 244; 50 L. J. M. C. 113; 29 W. R. 758; 44 L. T. 823; 14 Cox, C. C. 583.

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The Prince Regent obtained an information against the editor and printer of the Examiner.

R. v. Leigh and John Hunt, 3 Chit. Cr. L. 881.

So did a bishop, "dishonourable and degrading conduct" being imputed to him quả bishop.

R. v. Clouter, Cole on Cr. Inf. p. 22.

Certain justices of Leicestershire obtained a rule for a criminal information for a libel imputing that, in convicting a particular prisoner they had deliberately acted from motives of political partisanship.

Ex parte Hoskyns, (1869) 33 J. P. 68.

Ex parte Earl of Radnor, (1869) 33 J. P. 740.

Ex parte Umfreville, (1889) 5 Times L. R. 600.

R. v. Masters, (1889) 6 Times L. R. 44.

The mayor of a borough obtained a criminal information for a libel imputing to him gross misconduct in his office.

Ex parte the Mayor of Great Yarmouth, 1 Cox, C. C. 122.

Magistrates of a borough have also obtained a criminal information for a libel which imputed that they had neglected or refused to do their duty.

R. v. Brigstock, Cole on Cr. Inf. p. 23; 6 C. & P. 184.

So on two occasions did a stipendiary magistrate.

Ex parte Travis, (1868) 32 J. P. 772.

R. v. John Rea, 17 Ir. C. L. R. 584; 9 Cox, C. C. 401.

And two town-clerks.

R. v. Waite, (1743) 1 Wils. 22; ante, p. 26.

R. v. Hatfield, (1830) 4 C. & P. 244.

But where a magistrate demanded an apology and threatened an action for damages, before making his application for an information, a rule was refused. Ex parte Pollard, (1901) 17 Times L. R. 773.

So a clerk to justices who was accused of embezzling moneys paid to him for fines was left to his ordinary remedies.

Ex parte Freer, (1870) 34 J. P. 68.

A chief constable obtained a rule nisi for a libel imputing misconduct in his office. Ex parte Parry, (1877) 41 J. P. 85.

But a rule was refused to a superintendent of police.

Ex parte Little, (1865) 29 J. P. 742.

A Queen's counsel obtained a criminal information for libellous verses and for

a caricature imputing to him professional misconduct in the conduct of a case. Sir W. Garrow's Case, 3 Chit. Cr. Law, 884.

But it was held that the musical critic of the Times was not entitled to a criminal information for a libel charging him with corruption, on the ground that his was not a public office.

Ex parte Davison, 42 J. P. 727; cited 12 Q. B. D. 328. Nor a foreign duke, whose deceased father was libelled.

R. pros. Vallombrosa v. Labouchere, 12 Q. B. D. 320; 53 L. J. Q. B. 362; 32 W. R. 861; 50 L. T. 177; 15 Cox, C. C. 415; 48 J. P. 165. The solicitors to a railway company were refused a rule for a criminal information for a libel on them by the directors, imputing extortion and fraud. They were left to bring an action.

Ex parte Baxter, 28 J. P. 326.

A County Court judge illegally refused to hear a barrister who appeared before him. The barrister memorialised the Lord Chancellor. Obtaining no redress, he applied to the Court of Queen's Bench for a criminal information. This would have been granted him, had he not previously applied to the Lord Chancellor. R. v. Marshall, 4 E. & B. 475.

An Irish Q.C., in addressing the jury as counsel in a cause, made a fierce attack on the plaintiff, who was an attorney. This attack was pertinent to the issue and not malicious; at the same time, the observations were unusually harsh and irritating. The plaintiff won the action, and then wrote to the Q.C., calling on him to retract the charges he had made. The Q.C. refused; thereupon the plaintiff wrote the Q.C. a letter, couched in the most offensive language, and obviously intended to provoke a duel. The Court made the rule for a criminal information absolute; but ordered that the information should not issue without further order.

R. pros. Armstrong, Q.C. v. Kiernan, 7 Cox, C. C. 6; 5 Ir. C. L. R.

171.

R. pros. Butt, Q.C. v. Jackson, 10 Ir. L. R. 120.

Publication.

The prosecutor must prove that the defendant published the defamatory words. In civil cases it is necessary to show a publication to some third person other than the person defamed. In criminal cases this is not absolutely necessary; it is sufficient to prove a publication to the prosecutor himself, provided the obvious tendency of the words be to provoke the prosecutor and excite him to break the peace. (Hicks' Case, Hob. 215; Poph. 139; cited 6 East, 476; Clutterbuck v. Chaffers, 1 Stark. 471; R. v. Wegener, 2 Stark. 245; Phillips v. Jansen, 2 Esp. 624; R. v. Hornbrook, Selwyn's Nisi Prius, 12th ed. at p. 1065; 13th ed. at p. 1000; R. v. Brooke, 7 Cox, C. C. 251. See post, p. 670.) Nor is it essential for the prosecutor to show that his reputation has in fact been injured as he is not claiming damages for himself, but only seeking to protect the interests of the public.

Illustrations.

The defendant wrote a letter to a young lady of virtuous and modest character, soliciting her chastity. He enclosed it in an envelope properly fastened and addressed to the young lady herself. Held, that he had published a libel, for which he could be convicted at common law, for it might reasonably tend to provoke a breach of the peace.

R. v. Adams, 22 Q. B. D. 66; 58 L. J. M. C. 1; 59 L. T. 903; 53
J. P. 377; 16 Cox, C. C. 544.

By the 38 Geo. III. c. 71, s. 17 (now repealed), the proprietor of every newspaper was required to send a copy of every issue to the Stamp Office for Revenue purposes. Held, that proof of the delivery of a newspaper to the officer at the Stamp Office was sufficient evidence of the publication of a libel contained in it to render the proprietor liable; "as the officer of the Stamp Office would at all events have an opportunity of reading the libel himself." It was not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the officer had in fact read it.

R. v. Amphlit, 4 B. & C. 35; 6 D. & R. 125.

Mayne v. Fletcher, 9 B. & C. 382; 4 Man. & Ry. 312.

Merely to be in possession of a copy of a libel is no crime.

R. v. Beere, Carth. 409; 12 Mod. 219; Holt, 422; 2 Salk. 417; 1 Lord
Raym. 414.

John Lamb's Case, 9 Rep. 60; ante, p. 158.

Overruling R. v. Algernon Sidney, 9 Howell's St. Tr. 817, 867; 3
Hargrave's St. Tr. 807; 4 St. Tr. 197.

McLeod v. St. Aubyn, (1899) A. C. 549; 68 L. J. P. C. 137; 48 W. R.
173; 81 L. T. 158; 15 Times L. R. 487.

As soon as the manuscript of a libel has passed out of the defendant's possession and control, it is deemed to be published, so far as the defendant is concerned. Per Holroyd, J., in R. v. Burdett, 4 B. & Ald. 143.

A libel was printed and published; the printer produced the manuscript from which he had printed it, and this manuscript was proved to be in the handwriting of the prisoner; there was no evidence to show that he authorised or directed the printing or publishing. This is evidence of publication sufficient to go to the jury, though the prisoner may give evidence to rebut it.

R. v. Lovett, 9 C. & P. 462.

Cooper told the editor of a newspaper several good stories against the Rev. J. K., and asked him to "show Mr. K. up; " subsequently the editor published the substance of them in the newspaper; this was held to be a publication of a libel by Cooper, although the editor knew of the facts from other quarters as well.

R. v. Cooper, 8 Q. B. 533; 15 L. J. Q. B. 206.

In all other respects the law as to publication is practically identical in civil and criminal cases.

Thus, the author, printer and publisher are each and all liable to be prosecuted for a libel contained in any book or newspaper. In the latter case the proprietor of the newspaper will also be liable. Every fresh publication of a libel is a fresh crime. The sale of every separate copy of a libel is a distinct offence. (R. v. Carlile, 1 Chitty, 453.) "Not only the party who originally prints, but every party who sells, who gives, or who lends a copy of an offensive publication will be liable to be prosecuted as a publisher." Bayley, J., in R. v. Carlile, 3 B. & Ald. 169.)

(Per "The mere

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