I. TREASON AND TREASON-FELONY.

(i) Words merely spoken against the King or his ministers cannot amount to treason. It was resolved in Hugh Pine's Case, Cro. Car. 117 (overruling several arbitrary decisions of earlier date), "that, unless it were by some particular statute, no words will be treason."* There is no such statute; but by section 3 of the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 12, to express, utter, and declare, by open and advised speaking, certain traiterous compassings, imaginations, inventions, devices, or intentions, is made treason-felony. (The words in italics were not in the earlier statutes to the same effect; see ante, p. 454, as to their meaning.)

But words accompanying any act may always be given in evidence to explain the intention with which such act is done.

(ii) Words written or printed, but not published, cannot be treason at common law and they do not constitute an overt act of treason within the meaning of the 25 Edw. III. c. 2. The decisions to the contrary in R. v. Peacham, (1615) Cro. Car. 125, 2 Cobbett's St. Tr. 870, and R. v. Algernon Sidney, (1683) 9 St. Tr. 889, 893, were reversed by a private Act of Parliament in 1689. (See Hallam's Const. Hist. i. 467.) But by the 6 Anne, c. 7 (al. 41), s. 1, (passed in 1707, probably in consequence of a libel called "Mercurius Politicus: " see R. v. Brown, Holt, 425; 11 Mod. 86; post, p. 489), "maliciously, advisedly, and directly, by writing or printing, to maintain and affirm," that Queen Anne was not the rightful Queen, that the Pretender or any one else, except the descendants of the Electress Sophia, had any right or title to the Crown, or

• The story so frequently repeated that in the reign of Edward IV., Thomas Burdett was convicted of high treason for saying that he wished the horns of his stag were in the belly of him who had advised the King to shoot it (though it is still to be found in Blackstone, vol. iv. c. 6), has been proved by Hallam to be mythical. The charge against Burdett was of a much more serious nature; and these idle words of his are not anywhere alluded to in the indictment against him. ("Middle Ages," c. viii. ad fin.)

that an Act of Parliament could not bind the Crown, and limit the descent thereof, was made high treason; and it does not appear that any publication is requisite to complete the offence created by this statute.

(iii) But to publish a writing which imports a compassing the King's death within the meaning of 25 Edw. III. c. 2, is an overt act of treason.

Illustration.

Williams, a barrister of the Middle Temple, wrote two books, "Balaam's Ass' and the "Speculum Regale," in which he predicted that King James I. would die in the year 1621. He was indicted for high treason, convicted, and executed. R. v. Williams, (1620) 2 Rolle, R. 88.

By the 36 Geo. III. c. 7, made perpetual by the 57 Geo. III. c. 6, to compass, devise, or intend death or wounding, imprisonment, or bodily harm to the person of the Sovereign, and such compassing, device, or intention to express, utter, or declare, by publishing any printing or writing, or by any overt act or deed, is made high treason, punishable with death.

And by the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 12, s. 3, to compass, devise, and intend to depose the King, or to levy war against him in order by force or constraint to compel him to change his counsels, or to intimidate either House of Parliament, or to stir up any foreigner or stranger with force to invade any of his dominions; and such compassings, devices, or intentions, or any of them, to express, utter, or declare, by publishing any printing or writing, or by open and advised speaking, or by any overt act or deed, is made treason-felony, punishable with transportation (now penal servitude) for life.

II. SEDITION.

It is a misdemeanour, punishable by indictment or by information, to libel or to slander the Sovereign, or his administration, or the constitution of the realm, or either House of Parliament, or its members, or any judge or magistrate. It is also a high misprision or contempt; and

O.L.S.

I I

therefore the defendant may be fined to any amount, or sentenced to a term of imprisonment of any length, or both, at the discretion of the judge, as in pramunire. Formerly, banishment and pillory could also be inflicted; but these punishments are now abolished. (60 Geo. III. & 1 Geo. IV. c. 8, ss. 1, 2, 3, 4; 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. c. 73, s. 1; 7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 23.) In cases not calling for severer punishment, the offender may be required to find sureties for his good behaviour. (Ex parte Seymour v. Michael Davitt, 12 L. R. Ir. 46; 15 Cox, C. C. 242.)

The offence cannot be tried at Quarter Sessions.

(i) Words defamatory of the Sovereign himself.

It is sedition to speak or publish of the King any words which would be libellous and actionable per se, if printed and published of any other public character.

Thus, any words will be deemed seditious, which strike at the King's private life and conduct, which impute to him any corrupt or partial views, or assign bad motives for his policy, which insinuate that he is a tyrant, careless of the welfare of his subjects, or which charge him with deliberately favouring or oppressing any individual or class of men in distinction to the rest of his subjects. (R. v. Dr. Shebbeare, (1758) Holt on Libel, p. 82.) A fortiori, any words are seditious which strike at his title to the Crown, call his legitimacy in question, or are otherwise treasonable. (R. v. Clerk, (1728) 1 Barnardiston, 304, ante, p. 147.)

But to assert that the King is misled by his ministers, or that he takes an erroneous view of some great question of policy, is not seditious, if it be done with decency and moderation.

Illustrations.

The following words appeared in the Morning Chronicle for October 2nd, 1809" What a crowd of blessings rush upon one's mind that might be bestowed upon the country in the event of a total change of system! Of all monarchs, indeed, since the Revolution, the successor of George the Third will

have the finest opportunity of becoming nobly popular." On the trial of a criminal information against the proprietor and printer of the paper for libel, Lord Ellenborough told the jury that if they considered that the words meant that the King's death would be a blessing to the nation, and that the sooner it happened the better, then they should find the prisoners guilty; but that if they thought the passage could fairly be construed as an expression of regret that an erroneous view had been taken of public affairs, and of a wish for some change in the policy and system of administration under his Majesty, they might acquit them. The jury found the prisoners, Not Guilty.

R. v. Lambert & Perry, (1810) 2 Camp. 398; 31 How. St. Tr. 340. To print and publish falsely of the King that he is insane is a criminal libel, as it would be of any other person.

R. v. Harrey & Chapman, (1823) 2 B. & C. 257.

So is charging the King with a breach of his coronation oath.

Oliver St. John's Case, (1615) Noy, 105.

To insinuate that the King is a liar and a deceiver, and to assert that he has treacherously betrayed the interests of his subjects and allies, and prostituted the honour of his crown (The North Briton, No. 45), is a seditious libel. R. v. John Wilkes, (1768) 4 Burr. 2527; 19 How. St. Tr. 1075.

Many dicta in the old text-books represent the law as stricter on this point than is stated above. According to Hawkins' "Pleas of the Crown," i. c. 6 (8th ed. by Curwood, p. 66), and 4 Blackstone, 123, c. ix. ii. 3, it is a high misprision and contempt merely to speak contemptuously of the King, or curse him or wish him ill, to assert that he lacks wisdom, valour or steadiness, or, in short, to say anything" which may lessen him in the esteem of his subjects, weaken his government, or raise jealousies between him and his people.' But I can find no decision reported which supports so wide a proposition and I venture to doubt if in the present day it would be deemed a crime to call the King a coward or a fool. Mere words of vulgar abuse can hardly amount to sedition. In fact, the only distinctions that the law makes between words defamatory of the King, and of any other leading public character appear to be:

(i) That the former may be criminal when only spoken; whereas the latter must be written or printed and published;

(ii) That in the case of the former it cannot be pleaded as a defence that the words are true. (R. v. Francklin, (1731) 9 St. Tr. 255; 17 Howell's St. Tr. 626; Ex parte O'Brien, 12 L. R. Ir. 29; 15 Cox, C. C. 180.)

(ii) Words defamatory of the King's Ministers and

Government.

It is sedition to speak or publish of individual members of the Government words which would be libellous and actionable per se, if written and published of any other public character.

It is also sedition to speak or publish words defamatory of the Government collectively, or of their general administration, with intent to subvert the law, to produce public disorder, or to foment or promote rebellion.

There is no sedition in censuring the servants of the Crown, or in just criticism on the administration of the law, or in seeking redress of grievances, or in the fair discussion of all party questions." (Per Fitzgerald, J., in R. v. Sullivan, 11 Cox, C. C. 50.)

Where corrupt or malignant motives are attributed to the ministry as a whole, and no particular person is libelled, the jury must be satisfied that the author or publisher maliciously and designedly intended to subvert our laws and constitution, and to excite rebellion or disorder. There must be a criminal intent. But such an intent will be presumed, if the natural and necessary consequence of the words employed be "to excite a contempt of her Majesty's Government, to bring the administration of its laws into disrepute, and thus impair their operation, to create disaffection, or to disturb the public peace and tranquillity of the realm." (R. v. Collins, (1839) 9 C. & P. 456; R. v. Lovett, ib. 462.)

In determining whether such is a natural and necessary consequence of the words employed, the jury should consider the state of the country and of the public mind at the date of the publication: passages which in tranquil times might be comparatively innocent may be most pernicious in a time of insurrection. (Per Fitzgerald, J., 11 Cox, C. C. 50, 59.) On the other hand, the circumstances which provoked the attack may tell in the prisoner's favour.