Court sees that the words spoken affect the plaintiff in his office, profession, or trade, and directly tend to prejudice him therein, they ask for no further proof of damage.

Where a special kind of knowledge is essential to the proper conduct of a particular profession, denying that the plaintiff possesses such special knowledge will be actionable, if the plaintiff belongs to that particular profession, but not otherwise. For example, words may be actionable when spoken of a physician or lawyer which would not be actionable of a trader or a clerk.

But it is not the law that any words spoken to the disparagement of an officer, professional man, or trader, will ipso facto be actionable per se. Words to be actionable on this ground, “must touch the plaintiff in his office, profession, or trade:" that is, they must be shown to have been spoken of the plaintiff in relation thereto, and to be such as would prejudice him therein. They must impeach either his skill or knowledge, or attack his conduct therein. His special office or profession need not be expressly named or referred to, if the charge made be such as must necessarily affect him in it. And in determining whether the words used would necessarily so affect the plaintiff, regard must be had to the mental and moral requirements of the office he holds, or the profession or trade he carries on. Where integrity and ability are essential to the due conduct of plaintiff's office or profession, words impugning his integrity or ability are clearly actionable; for they then imply that he is unfit to continue therein. But words which merely charge the plaintiff with some misconduct outside his office, or not connected with his special profession or trade, will not be actionable. "Every authority which I have been able to find, either shows the want of some general requisite, as honesty, capacity, fidelity, &c., or connects the imputation with the plaintiff's office, trade, or business." (Per Bayley, B., in Lumby v. Allday, 1 Cr. & J. at pp. 305, 306, cited with approval by Lord Denman, C.J., in Ayre v. Craven, 2 A. & E. at p. 8, and by

Lord Herschell, L.C., in Alexander v. Jenkins, (1892) 1 Q. B. at p. 800.)

Whether or no the words were spoken of the plaintiff in the way of his office, profession, or business, is a question for the jury to determine at the trial. (Per Cockburn, C.J., in Ramsdale v. Greenacre, 1 F. & F. 61.) The jury must be satisfied that the words were so spoken, and that the plaintiff held such office, or was actively engaged in such profession or trade, at the time the words were spoken. (Moore v. Synne, 2 Rolle's Rep. 84; Collis v. Malin, Cro. Car. 282; Bellamy v. Burch, 16 M. & W. 590.) If not, proof of special damage will be required. (Hopwood v. Thorn, 8 C. B. 293; 19 L. J. C. P. 94.) There should always be an averment in the statement of claim that the words were so spoken; though, where the words are clearly of such a nature as necessarily to affect the plaintiff in his office, profession or business, the omission of such an averment will not be fatal. (Stanton v. Smith, 2 Ld. Raym. 1480; 2 Str. 762; Jones v. Littler, 7 M. & W. 423; 10 L. J. Ex. 171.)

Offices, Paid and Honorary.

An action of slander will lie without proof of special damage for words imputing dishonesty or malversation in a public office of trust, whether the office be one of profit or not, and whether there is a power of removal from the office for such conduct as is alleged, or not. An action of slander will also lie without proof of special damage, whenever there is a power of removal from the office, and the words complained of impute to the plaintiff conduct which, if true, would be good ground for his dismissal. But where the words merely impute general unfitness for (as distinct from misconduct in) an office, there no action lies if the office be honorary, as in the case of a sheriff, a justice of the peace, an alderman, town councillor, or vestryman; though it will lie, if the office be one of profit.

The office held by the plaintiff need not be one of profit; it may be honorary, as in the case of an M.P. or a justice of the peace. The gist of an action of slander is the injury to the plaintiff's reputation, and not any presumed loss of money. Although there is no emolument attached to his office, so that his removal from it

would involve no pecuniary loss, still to be dismissed from such an office would be a most serious injury to his reputation. He can recover damages, therefore, for any words which, if believed, would be ground for his removal. (See post, pp. 53-57.) A barrister may sue for any slander imputing professional misconduct, although in contemplation of law his fees are mere gratuities; for such words will injure him in his profession, and also will probably cause him pecuniary loss.

The plaintiff must always aver on the pleadings that he was carrying on the profession or trade, or holding the office, at the time the words were spoken. Sometimes this is admitted by the slander itself, and if so, evidence is of course unnecessary in proof of this averment. (Yrisarri v. Clement, 2 C. & P. 223; 3 Bing. 432.) But in other cases, unless it is admitted on the pleadings, evidence must be given at the trial of the special character in which plaintiff sues. As a rule, it is sufficient for plaintiff to prove that he was acting in the office or actively engaged in the profession or trade without proving any appointment thereto, or producing a diploma or other formal qualification. Omnia presumuntur rite esse acta. (Rutherford v. Evans, 4 C. & P. 79; 6 Bing. 451; Berryman v. Wise, 4 T. R. 366; Cannell v. Curtis, 2 Bing. N. C. 228.) That he so acted on one occasion before the one in question is evidence to go to the jury. (R. v. Murphy, 8 C. & P. 297.) But there is an exception to this rule where the very slander complained of imputes to a medical or legal practitioner that he is a quack or impostor, not legally qualified for practice: here the plaintiff must be prepared to prove his qualification strictly by producing diplomas or certificates duly sealed, signed and stamped. (Collins v. Carnegie, 3 N. & M. 703; 1 Ad. & E. 695; Moises v. Thornton, 8 T. R. 303; Wakley v. Healey and Cooke, 4 Exch. 53; 18 L. J. Ex. 426.)

"It is quite clear that as regards a man's business, or profession, or office, if it be an office of profit, the mere imputation of want of ability to discharge the duties of that office is sufficient to support an action. It is not necessary that there should be imputation of immoral or disgraceful conduct. It must be either something said of him in his office or business which may damage him in that office or business, or it must relate to some quality which would show that he is a man who, by reason of his want of ability or honesty, is unfit to hold the office. So much with regard to offices of profit; the reason being that in all those cases the law presumes such a probability of pecuniary loss from such imputation, in that office, or employment, or profession, that it will not require special

damage to be shown. But when you come to offices that are not offices of profit, the loss of which, therefore, would not involve necessarily a pecuniary loss, the law has been differently laid down, and it is quite clear that the mere imputation of want of ability or capacity, which would be actionable if made in the case of a person holding an office of profit, is not actionable in the case of a person holding an office which has been called an office of credit or an office of honour. . . . Where the imputation is an imputation, not of misconduct in an office, but of unfitness for an office, and the office for which the person is said to be unfit is not an office of profit, but one merely of what has been called honour or credit, the action will not lie, unless the conduct charged be such as would enable him to be removed from or deprived of that office." (Per Lord Herschell, L.C., in Alexander v. Jenkins, (1892) 1 Q. B. pp. 800-802.) "Words imputing want of integrity, dishonesty, or malversation to any one holding a public office of confidence or trust, whether an office of profit or not, are actionable per se. On the other hand, when the words merely impute unsuitableness for the office, incompetency, or want of ability, without ascribing any misconduct touching the office, then no action lies, where the office is honorary, without proof of special damage." (Per Lopes, L.J., in Booth v. Arnold, (1895) 1 Q. B. at p. 576.)

In both cases it is essential that the plaintiff should hold the office at the time the words were spoken. (Per De Grey, C.J., in Onslow v. Horne, 3 Wilson, 188.)

Illustrations.

The plaintiff was elected town councillor for a borough, and the defendant said of him: 66 He is never sober, and is not a fit man for the council. On the night of the election he was so drunk that he had to be carried home." Held, that without proof of special damage, no action lay.

Alexander v. Jenkins, (1892) 1 Q. B. 797; 61 L. J. Q. B. 634; 40 W. R. 546; 66 L. T. 391.

Merely to express an opinion that such a candidate is unfit for the post which he seeks, is not actionable; but whoever makes or publishes any false statement of fact in relation to the personal character or conduct of any candidate at a Parliamentary election for the purpose of affecting his return will be guilty of an illegal practice, and liable also to be restrained by injunction from any repetition of such false statement.

58 & 59 Vict. c. 40, ss. 1 and 3, and see post, p. 408.

The plaintiff was an alderman of a borough, and chairman of the Town Improvement Committee of the council. He was also managing director and chief shareholder of a company which sold some land to the town council for the purpose of town improvement. The defendant used words which bore the

construction that the plaintiff had availed himself of his position on the town council, and as chairman of the Improvement Committee, to obtain an improper advantage for himself and his company in the purchase. Held, that an action of slander lay without proof of special damage.

Booth v. Arnold, (1895) 1 Q. B. 571; 64 L. J. Q. B. 443; 43 W. R.
360; 72 L. T. 310; 11 Times L. R. 246.
It is actionable without proof of special damage :-
To say that a judge gives corrupt sentences.
Cæsar v. Curseny, Cro. Eliz. 305.

To accuse a Royal Commissioner of taking bribes.
Moor v. Foster, Cro. Jac. 65.

Purdy v. Stacey, 5 Burr. 2698.

To say of a justice of the peace, "Mr. Stuckley covereth and hideth felonies, and is not worthy to be a justice of peace; ""for it is against his oath and the office of a justice of peace, and a good cause to put him out of the commission." Stuckley v. Bulhead, 4 Rep. 16.

And see Sir John Harper v. Beamond, Cro. Jac. 56.

Sir Miles Fleetwood v. Curl, Cro. Jac. 557; Hob. 268.

To say of a justice of the peace that "he is a Jacobite and for bringing in the Prince of Wales and Popery;" for this implies that he is disaffected to the established Government and should be removed from office immediately.

How v. Prin, (1702) Holt, 652; 7 Mod. 107; 2 Ld. Raym. 812;

2 Salk. 694. Affirmed in House of Lords sub nom. Prinne v. Howe, 1 Brown's Parly. Cases, 64.

To insinuate that a justice of the peace takes bribes or "perverts justice to serve his own turn."

Caesar v. Curseny, Cro. Eliz. 305.

Carn v. Osgood, 1 Lev. 280.

Alleston v. Moor, Hetl. 167.

Masham v. Bridges, Cro. Car. 223.

Isham v. York, Cro. Car. 15.

Beamond v. Hastings, Cro. Jac. 240.

Aston v. Blagrave, 1 Str. 617; 8 Mod. 270; 2 Ld. Raym. 1369;

Fort. 206.

Lindsey v. Smith, 7 Johns. 359.

To say of the deputy of Clarencieux, king-at-arms, "He is a scrivener and no herald."

Brooke v. Clarke, Cro. Eliz. 328; 1 Vin. Abr. 464.

To say to a churchwarden, "Thou art a cheating knave and hast cheated the parish of 401."

Strode v. Holmes, (1651) Style, 338; 1 Roll. Abr. 58.

Woodruff v. Wooley, 1 Vin. Abr. 463.

Jackson v. Adams, 2 Bing. N. C. 402; 2 Scott, 599; 1 Hodges, 339. To call an escheator, attorney, or other officer of a Court of Record, an "extortioner."

Stanley v. Boswell, 1 Roll. Abr. 55.

To say of a town clerk that he hath not performed his office according to law Fowell v. Cowe, Rolle's Abr. 56.

Wright v. Moorhouse, Cro. Eliz. 358.