Assize Court made an order prohibiting all comments in any newspaper upon the proceedings of the session till all the prisoners had been tried, considering that such comments were calculated to excite feelings of hostility towards the prisoners about to be tried. R. v. O'Dogherty, 5 Cox, C. C. 348. The House of Lords, when sitting as a Court of Law, claimed for many years the right to appoint one printer to publish their proceedings, and to order that no other person should presume to publish the same, even after the case was at an end. So, in the case of an impeachment, Lord Erskine, L.C., held, after great hesitation, that such an order must be enforced by injunction. [Such a decision would not be upheld in the present day.] Gurney v. Longman, (1807) 13 Ves. 493. And see Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 4 Burr. 2303-2417. Roper v. Streater, Skin. 234; 1 Mod. 217. The Stationers v. Patentees of Rolle's Abridgment, Carter, 89. III.-MOTION TO COMMIT. (1) Superior Courts. We have already dealt with those kinds of contemptuous words, which can be made the subject of an indictment or information, or an application for an injunction. In all such cases a Superior Court has in addition power to interfere summarily and to fine the offender or commit him to prison. This power also exists in some cases in which an indictment would not lie. (Per Lord Holt, C.J., in R. v. Rogers, 7 Mod. 29.) It may be exercised either on the application of any person aggrieved, or by the Court of its own motion. It is necessary that the Court should have power thus promptly to protect itself, and the litigants before it. "The power summarily to commit for contempt of court is considered necessary for the proper administration of justice. It is not to be used for the vindication of the judge as a person. He must resort to action for libel or criminal information. Committal for contempt of court is a weapon to be used sparingly, and always with reference to the interests of the administration of justice. It is a summary process, and should be used only from a sense of duty and under the pressure of public necessity, for there can be no landmarks pointing out the boundaries in all cases." McLeod v. St. Aubyn, (1899) A. C. at p. 561.) (Per cur. in "This is not a new-fangled jurisdiction; it is a jurisdiction as old as the common law itself, of which it forms part. It is a jurisdiction, the history, purpose, and extent of which are admirably treated in the opinion of Wilmot, C.J., then Wilmot, J., in his Opinions and Judgments (R. v. Almon, (1765) Wilmot's Opinions, 243). It is a jurisdiction, however, to be exercised with scrupulous care, to be exercised only when the case is clear and beyond reasonable doubt; because, if it is not a case beyond reasonable doubt, the Courts will and ought to leave the Attorney-General to proceed by criminal information." (Per Lord Russell, C.J., in R. v. Gray, (1900) 2 Q. B. at pp. 40, 41.) "The reason why the publication of articles like those with which we have to deal is treated as a contempt of court is because their tendency and sometimes their object is to deprive the Court of the power of doing that which is the end for which it exists-namely, to administer justice duly, impartially, and with reference solely to the facts judicially brought before it. Their tendency is to reduce the Court which has to try the case to impotence, so far as the effectual elimination of prejudice and prepossession is concerned. It is difficult to conceive an apter description of such conduct than is conveyed by the expression contempt of court."" (Per cur. in R. v. Parke, (1903) 2 K. B. at p. 436.) "Every libel on a person about to be tried is not necessarily a contempt of court; but the applicant must show that something has been published which either is clearly intended, or at least is calculated, to prejudice a trial which is pending." (Per Lord Russell, C.J., in R. v. Payne, (1896) 1 Q. B. at p. 580.) An application to commit for contempt must be made promptly. The applicant should not, before coming to the Court, invite or take part in a discussion of the matter in the public Press. Motions for committal, which are made out of anger or ill-feeling, or with a view to obtaining costs, where there is no real ground for committing anyone to prison, will be severely discouraged, although the conduct complained of may be technically a contempt (Plating Co. v. Farquharson, 17 Ch. D. 49; 50 L. J. Ch. 406; 29 W. R. 510; 44 L. T. 389; Hunt v. Clarke, 58 L. J. Q. B. 490; 37 W. R. 724; 61 L. T. 343; In re Martindale, (1894) 3 Ch. at p. 202; 64 L. J. Ch. 9; 43 W. R. 53; 71 L. T. 468; 8 R. 729; R. v. Parke, (1903) 2 K. B. 432; 72 L. J. K. B. 839; 89 L. T. 439; 19 Times L. R. 627). No attempt must be made to compromise such an application (R. v. Newton, (1903) 67 J. P. 453; 19 Times L. R. 627). Acts without words may amount to a contempt of court; e.g., where the defendant assaults an officer of the Court when serving its process or carrying out its orders; or destroys the records of the Court; or destroys documentary evidence which should be brought before it. Again, wilful disobedience to any lawful order of a Court or a judge is a contempt. But all these cases, in which the acts and not the words of the accused are impugned, are beyond the scope of this book. Illustrations. SPOKEN WORDS. Using abusive and violent language towards any officer serving the process of any Court, is a contempt, punishable by committal. Price v. Hutchison, (1869) L. R. 9 Eq. 534; 18 W. R. 204. R. v. Jones, (1719) 1 Stra. 185. So if a party on being served with a lawful order of any Court expresses in defiant and contemptuous language his intention to disregard or disobey such order. Anon., (1711) 1 Salk. 84. Mr. Long Wellesley's Case, (1831) 2 Russ. & Mylne, 639. It is a contempt of court for one committed for trial, or for any of his partisans, to address public meetings, alleging that there is a conspiracy against him, and that he will not have a fair trial. Castro, Onslow and Whalley's Case, (1873) L. R. 9 Q. B. 219; 12 Cox, Skipworth's Case, (1873) L. R. 9 Q. B. 230; 12 Cox, C. C. 371. Threats and insults addressed either to a party or a witness pending a suit, whether by word or letter, are a contempt of court. Smith v. Lakeman, (1856) 26 L. J. Ch. 305; 2 Jur. N. S. 1202; 28 Shaw v. Shaw, (1861) 31 L. J. Pr. & Matr. 35; 6 L. T. 477; 2 In re Mulock, (1864) 33 L. J. Pr. & Matr. 205; 10 Jur. N. S. 1188; So are insulting words addressed to counsel engaged in the cause, or to the opponent's solicitor while actually engaged in any duty devolving on him as solicitor in the proceedings. Lessee Sturgeon v. Douglass, 10 Ir. L. R. 128, n. In re Johnson, (1887) 20 Q. B. D. 68; 57 L. J. Q. B. 1; 36 W. R 51; 58 L. T. 160. In re Clements, (1877) 46 L. J. Ch. 375; 36 L. T. 332. A fortiori, if addressed to the judge or a master. Lechmere Charlton's Case, (1836) 2 Myl. & Cr. 316. Even the prisoner in the dock, who is always allowed great latitude, if he be defending himself, may be fined for contempt of court, if he persist in using blasphemous language and in applying offensive epithets to the presiding judge in the course of his speech to the jury. R. v. Davison, (1821) 4 B. & Ald. 329. It is a contempt of court for the brother of a prisoner just convicted to visit the foreman of the jury at his residence, accuse him of having bullied the jury into finding his brother guilty, and challenge him to mortal combat. R. v. James Martin, 5 Cox, C. C. 356. So, too, a barrister may be guilty of contempt of court if he unnecessarily insults one of the jury in the course of his address to them. In re Pater, (1864) 5 B. & S. 299; 33 L. J. M. C. 142; 10 Jur. N. S. 972; 12 W. R. 823; 10 L. T. 376. The most innocent words, if uttered in a peculiar manner and tone, may be a contempt of court. For an insult may be conveyed either by language or by manner. Carus Wilson's Case, (1845) 7 Q. B. 984, 1015. If a high sheriff proceeds to address the grand jury in open Court at the close of the judge's charge, and persists in so doing, though ordered by the judge to sit down and be quiet, he may be fined 3007. for contempt. In re The Sheriff of Surrey, (1860) 2 F. & F. 234, 237. WRITTEN OR PRINTED WORDS. It is a contempt of court and a libel, punishable by attachment, to publish a pamphlet asserting that judges have no power to issue an attachment for libels upon themselves, and denying that reflections upon individual judges are contempts of court at all. [Note that at the date when this pamphlet appeared the action which gave occasion for it was still pending.] R. v. Almon, (1765) Wilmot's Notes of Opinions and Judgments, p. 253. Any attempt to bribe a judge, or to influence his probable decision on a matter before him by any private communication, is a contempt of court. Martin's Case, (1747) 2 Russ. & Mylne, 674, n. But not every silly or impudent letter addressed to a judge about a matter which he has already decided will be treated as a contempt; R. v. Faulkner, (1835) 2 Mont. & Ayr. 321, 322; 2 C. M. & R. 525; 1 Gale, 210. Nor every inaccurate report of judicial proceedings which either party may think fit to publish. Matthews v. Smith, 3 Hare, 331. Brook v. Evans, (1860) 29 L. J. Ch. 616; 6 Jur. N. S. 1025; 8 W. R. 688. Buenos Ayres Gas Co. v. Wilde, (1880) 29 W. R. 43; 42 L. T. 657. To preach a sermon with special reference to a pending trial is a contempt of court. Mackett v. Herne Bay Commissioners, (1876) 24 W. R. 845; ante, p. 503. As to exhibiting models of the person murdered and the alleged murderer in the assize town during the assizes, see R. v. Gilham, 1 Moo. & Mal. 165. It is a contempt for a party to a suit to publish before the case has come on for hearing a copy of his brief, or even an abstract of his petition or Statement of Claim, or of the affidavits filed on either side, or any other ex parte statement tending to prepossess the minds of the public in his favour, or to calumniate his adversary. Captain Perry's Case, cited (1742) 2 Atk. 469, 472; 2 Dick. 794. Mrs. Farley's Case, Cann v. Cann, (1754) 2 Ves. senr. 520; 3 Hare, 333, n. Coleman v. West Hartlepool Harbour and Railway Co., (1860) 8 W. R. 734; 2 L. T. 766, ante, p. 503. Chesshire v. Strauss, (1896) 12 Times L. R. 291. The plaintiffs in an action delivered a Statement of Claim, charging the defendant with unfair and over-reaching conduct in his business. They subsequently, before the hearing of the action, circulated copies of this pleading amongst some of their and his business correspondents. It was held that the plaintiffs had committed a contempt of court; they were ordered to pay the costs of the motion to commit; and an injunction was granted to restrain all further circulation of the Statement of Claim. Bowden v. Russell, (1877) 46 L. J. Ch. 414; 36 L. T. 177. A local board of health sued the defendant for breach of their bye-laws. Pending the action, an election for members of the board came on. The defendant stood as a candidate, and in that capacity issued an address to all the ratepayers, attacking the former board, and referring to their "spiteful proceedings " against himself. The circular also contained a false statement as to what the judge had said on an interlocutory application. The excitement of the election was urged as an excuse; but the defendant was committed to prison for ten days, and ordered to pay the costs of the motion. Ilkley Local Board v. Lister, (1895) 11 Times L. R. 176. But where, pending a shareholders' petition, a committee of shareholders issued to their brother shareholders, for the purpose of bringing to their attention the facts on which they relied, a printed letter containing their accusations against the directors, and some extracts from the evidence, it was held that this did not amount to contempt of court. In re The London Flour Co., (1868) 16 W. R. 474; 17 L. T. 636. But see In re Sir John Moore Gold Mining Co., (1877) 37 L. T. 242. Merely to announce, "I have brought an action against A. for damages for," &c., is not a contempt of court, if such be the fact. Per Pollock, B., and Day, J., in Collins v. Primrose Club, July 30th, 1894 (not reported). Pending an action for infringing a trade mark the plaintiffs are at liberty to warn the trade by circular that they regard such an article as an infringement. But to discuss the merits of the case in any manner calculated to prejudice the fair trial of the action is a contempt. Coats v. Chadwick, (1894) 1 Ch. 347 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 328 ; 42 W. R. 328; 70 L. T. 228; 8 R. 159, ante, p. 407. R. v. Payne, (1896) 1 Q. B. 577; 65 L. J. Q. B. 426; 44 W. R. 605; 74 L. T. 351. |