an "act done" within jurisdiction, within the meaning of the former Order XI. r. 1. Bree v. Marescaux, 7 Q. B. D. 434; 50 L. J. Q. B. 676; 29 W. R. But see Tozier and wife v. Hawkins, 15 Q. B. D. 650, 680; 55 L. J. 9. Master and Servant-Principal and Agent. If a servant or apprentice be libelled or slandered he can of course sue in his own right. In some cases his master also can sue in an action on the case, if the words have directly caused him pecuniary loss; e.g., if the servant has been arrested and the master deprived of his services in consequence of the defendant's words; or if in any other way the natural consequence of the words has been to injure the master in the way of his profession or trade. And this appears to be the law whether the words be actionable per se or not. (See Riding v. Smith, ante, p. 101.) If any agent or servant be in any way concerned in writing, printing, publishing, or selling a libel, he will be both civilly and criminally liable. If a clerk or servant copy a libel and deliver the copy he has made to a third person, he will be liable as a publisher. That his master or employer ordered him to do so, will be no defence. (Per Wood, B., in Maloney v. Bartley, 3 Camp. 210.) "For the warrant of no man, not even of the king himself, can excuse the doing of an illegal act; for although the commanders are trespassers, so are also the persons who did the fact." (Per cur. in Sands, qui tam, &c. v. Child and others, (1693) 3 Lev. 352.) The agent or servant cannot recover any contribution from his employer (Merryweather v. Nixan, 2 Sm. L. Cases (9th edn.) 569; 8 T. R. 186); and any previous promise to indemnify him against the consequences of the publication, or against the costs of an action brought for the libel, will be void. (Shackell v. Rosier, 2 Bing. N. C. 634; 3 Scott, 59.) But it will be a defence if the agent or servant can satisfy the jury that he never read the paper he delivered, O.L.S. NN and was wholly unaware that it was a libel; e.g., where a postman or messenger carries a sealed letter, of the contents of which he is ignorant. So, too, a servant will be liable for any slander uttered on his master's behalf and by his master's orders: but here he cannot set up as a defence that he did not know his master's orders were illegal; for he must be conscious of what he himself is saying. Illustrations. A compositor was once held criminally liable for setting up the type of a libel; so was a man whose business it was merely "to clap down the press." R. v. Knell, (1728) 1 Barnard. 305. R. v. Clerk, (1728) 1 Barnard. 304. A porter who, in the course of business, delivers parcels containing libellous handbills, is not liable in an action of libel, if shown to be ignorant of the contents of the parcel. Day v. Bream, (1837) 2 M. & Rob., 54. A master or principal will be liable to an action, if false defamatory words be spoken or published by his servant or agent with his authority and consent. The mere fact that the actual publisher was the servant or agent of the defendant is not alone sufficient; for authority to commit an unlawful act will not in general be presumed. It must be further proved that the servant or agent had instructions from the defendant to speak or publish the words. complained of, or else that in so doing he was acting within the general scope of his employment. In Citizens' Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. Brown, (1904) A. C. 423 ; 73 L. J. P. C. 102; 90 L. T. 739; 20 Times L. R. 497, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that the scope of a servant's authority is the same thing as the scope of his employment. The instructions may be either express or implied. The proprietor of a newspaper is both civilly and criminally responsible for whatever appears in its columns, although the publication may have been made without his knowledge and in his absence. For he must be taken to have ordered his servants to print and publish whatever the editor might send them for that purpose. The proprietor trusts to the discretion of the editor to exclude all that is libellous; if the editor fails in this duty, still the paper and all its contents will be printed and published by the proprietor's servants by virtue of his general orders. So, if a master-printer has contracted to print a magazine, he will be liable for any libel that may appear in any number printed at his office. So, every bookseller must be taken to have told his shopmen to sell whatever books or pamphlets are in his shop for sale; if any one contain libellous matter, the bookseller is (primâ facie at all events) liable for its publication by his servant by reason of such general instructions. But where a master employs a clerk or manager to conduct his general business correspondence, and he thinks it is to the interest of his master to insert libellous words in his master's letters, the master will be liable. (Citizens' Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. Brown, (1904) A. C. 423; 73 L.J.P.C. 102; 90 L. T. 739; 20 Times L. R. 497.) Although the master has not authorised the act of the servant, still if it was done for his benefit and on his behalf, he may subsequently ratify it. Omnis ratihabitio priori mandato æquiparatur. æquiparatur. But "in order But in order that there may be a valid ratification, there must be both a knowledge of the fact to be ratified and an intention to ratify it." (Per Keating, J., in Edwards v. London & N. W. Ry. Co., L. R. 5 C. P. 449.) The master must do something more than merely stand by and let the servant act. Nonintervention is not ratification. (Moon v. Towers, (1860) 8 C. B. N. S. 611; Weston v. Beeman and another, (1857) 27 L. J. Ex. 57.) Illustrations. At a meeting of a board of guardians, at which reporters were present, the chairman made a statement reflecting on the plaintiff, and added, "I am glad gentlemen of the Press are in the room and I hope they will take notice of it; publicity should be given to the matter." A report accordingly appeared in two local papers. Held, by the majority of the Exchequer Chamber (three judges against two) that there was some evidence to go to the jury that the defendant had expressly authorised the publication of the alleged libel in the newspapers. Parkes v. Prescott and another, L. R. 4 Ex. 169; 38 L. J. Ex. 105; 17 W. R. 773; 20 L. T. 537. See also Clay v. People, 865 Ill. 147. Tarpley v. Blabey, 2 Bing. N. C. 437; 2 Scott, 642; 1 Hodges, 414; 7 C. & P. 395. The defendant's daughter, a minor, was authorised to make out his bills and write his general business letters; she chose to insert libellous matter in one letter. The father was held not liable for the wrongful act of his daughter, in the absence of any direct instructions. Harding v. Greening, (1817) 8 Taunt. 42; 1 Moore, 477; Holt, N. P. 531. But it may be doubted whether this case would be upheld at the present day. See Citizens' Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. Brown, (1904) A. C. 423; 73 L. J. P. C. 102; 90 L. T. 739; 20 Times L. R. 497. Moyes regularly printed Fraser's Magazine; but had nothing to do with preparing the illustrations. One number contained a libellous lithographic picture. Moyes was held liable for this picture (though he had never seen it) because it was referred to in a part of the accompanying letterpress, which had been printed by his servants. The editor was of course liable also. Watts v. Fraser and Moyes, 7 C. & P. 369; 7 A. & E. 223; 1 Jur. 671; 1 M. & Rob. 449; 2 N. & P. 157; W. W. & D. 451. The proprietor of a newspaper will be held liable for an accidental slip made by his printer's man in setting up the type. Shepheard v. Whitaker, L. R. 10 C. P. 502; 32 L. T. 402. And for a libellous advertisement inserted by the editor without his knowledge. Harrison v. Pearce, 1 F. & F. 567; 32 L. T. (Old S.) 298. Morrison v. Ritchie & Co., (1902) 4 F. 645 (Ct. of Sess.), ante, p. 7. The proprietor of a newspaper in America on going away for a holiday expressly instructed his acting editor to publish nothing exceptional, personal or abusive, and warned him especially to scan very particularly any article brought in by B., who was known to be a "smart" writer. The editor permitted an article of B.'s to appear which contained libellous matter. The proprietor was held liable, though the publication was made in his absence and without his knowledge. Dunn v. Hall, 1 Carter (Indiana), 345; 1 Smith, 288. Huff v. Bennett, 4 Sand. (New York) 120. Curtis v. Mussey, 6 Gray (72 Mass.), 261. Andres v. Wells, 7 Johns. (New York) 260. A master or principal is criminally liable for any libel published by his servant or agent with his authority or consent. At common law he was criminally liable for such libel, even although he had no knowledge of it, if his servant was acting in pursuance of general orders. Whenever an employer was civilly liable for a libel published by his servants, he was, before Lord Campbell's Act, criminally liable also. But now by sect. 7 of that Act (6 & 7 Vict. c. 96), it is enacted "that whensoever, upon the trial of any indictment or information for the publication of a libel, under the plea of Not Guilty,' evidence shall have been given which shall establish a presumptive case of publication against the defendant by the act of any other person by his authority, it shall be competent to such defendant to prove that such publication was made without his authority, consent, or knowledge, and that the said publication did not arise from want of due care or caution on his part." Hence the proprietor of a newspaper is no longer criminally liable for a libel which has appeared in it without his knowledge. or consent, merely because he has given the editor a general authority to insert what he thinks fit therein. (R. v. Holbrook and others, 3 Q. B. D. 60; 47 L. J. Q. B. 35; 4 Q. B. D. 42; 48 L. J. Q. B. 113.) Illustrations. The defendant kept a pamphlet shop; she was sick and upstairs in bed: a libel was brought into the shop without her knowledge, and subsequently sold by her servant on her account. She was held criminally liable for the act of her servant, on the ground that "the law presumes that the master is acquainted with what his servant does in the course of his business." R. v. Dodd, 2 Sess. Cas. 33. Nutt's Case, Fitzg. 47; 1 Barnard. K. B. 306. [But I doubt if later judges would have been quite so strict: the sickness upstairs would surely have been held an excuse, even before the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 7, became law. See R. v. Almon, 5 Burr. 2686.] A libel was published in a London newspaper, The Morning Journal. At the time of publication, Mr. Gutch, one of the proprietors, was away ill in Worcestershire, in no way interfering with the conduct of the paper, which was managed entirely by Alexander. Lord Tenterden directed the jury to find Gutch guilty, on the ground that it was with his capital that the paper was carried on, that he derived profit from its sale, and that he had selected the editor who had actually inserted the libel. Lord Tenterden the next day admitted (p. 438) that some possible case might occur in which the proprietor of a newspaper might be held not criminally answerable for a libel which had appeared in it. Gutch was convicted, but subsequently discharged on his own recognizances. R. v. Gutch, Fisher, and Alexander, Moo. & Mal. 433. R. v. Walter, 3 Esp. 21. And see Attorney-General v. Siddon, 1 Cr. & J. 220. The defendant told the editor of a newspaper several good stories against the Rev. J. K., and asked him to "Show Mr. K. up; " and the editor subsequently published the substance of them in the paper, and the defendant read it and expressed his approval; this was held a publication by the defendant, although the editor knew of the facts from other quarters as well. R. v. Cooper, 8 Q. B. 533; 15 L. J. Q. B. 206. The defendants were the proprietors of the Portsmouth Times and Naval Gazette : each of them managed a different department of the newspaper, but the duty of |