Or that he destroyed votes at an election. Dodds v. Henry, 9 Mass. 262. To state that a head-fireman was drunk at a fire is actionable. Gottbehuet v. Hubachek, 36 Wisconsin, 515. In America it has been held actionable to charge a member of a nominating convention of a political party with having been influenced by a bribe. Hand v. Winton, 38 New Jersey (9 Vroom) 122. Dolloway v. Turrell, 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 383. Stone v. Cooper, 2 Denio (N. Y.) 293. And to charge any public officer falsely with gross ignorance of his duties is actionable per se in America. Spiering v. Andrae, 45 Wisconsin, 330. But it is not actionable without proof of special damage :— Onslow v. Horne, 3 Wils. 177; 2 W. Bl. 750. Or weakness of understanding to a candidate for Congress. Or to call such a candidate "a corrupt old Tory." Hogg v. Dorrah, 2 Post. (Alabama) 212. To say of a justice of the peace, "He is a fool, an ass, and a beetle-headed justice;" for these are but general terms of abuse and disclose no ground for removing the plaintiff from office. Bill v. Neal, 1 Lev. 52. Sir John Hollis v. Briscow et ux., Cro. Jac. 58. To say of a justice of the peace, "He is a logger-headed, a slouch-headed, bursen-bellied hound." R. v. Farre, 1 Keb. 629. To say of a justice of the peace, "He is a blood-sucker and sucketh blood: "for it cannot be intended what blood he sucketh." Sir Christopher Hilliard v. Constable, Cro. Eliz. 306; Moore, 418. To say of a superintendent of police that "he has been guilty of conduct unfit for publication" is not actionable, unless the words were spoken of him with reference to his office. James v. Brook, 9 Q. B. 7; 16 L. J. Q. B. 17; 10 Jur. 541. Clergymen and Ministers. A beneficed clergyman of the Church of England holds an office of profit: hence an action lies without proof of special damage for words which impute to him— (i) serious misconduct in the discharge of his official duties; (ii) any misconduct which, if proved against him, would be ground for degradation or deprivation; whether such misconduct occur in the course of his official duties or not (Pemberton v. Colls, 10 Q. B. 461; 16 L. J. Q. B. 403); (iii) general unfitness or incapacity for his office. A clergyman who holds any chaplaincy or paid lectureship or readership from which he can be removed, comes within the same rules as a beneficed clergyman. (Payne v. Beuwmorris, 1 Lev. 248.) But a clergyman without cure of souls or any other preferment is an honorary officer; and words which would have been actionable, if spoken of a beneficed clergyman, will not necessarily be actionable, if spoken of him. (Gallwey v. Marshall, 9 Exch. 294; 23 L. J. Ex. 78.) A dissenting minister is not, in the eye of the law, an officer at all; he is engaged by his congregation or some other body of persons, to perform certain duties. Any charge made against him which, if true, would justify his summary dismissal from his employment, is actionable per se. Illustrations. It is actionable without proof of special damage : To say of a parson that "he had two wives; " for though bigamy was not made felony until 1603, still in 1588 it was cause of deprivation." 66 Nicholson v. Lyne, Cro. Eliz. 94. To say that he is a drunkard, a whoremaster, a common swearer, a common liar, and hath preached false doctrine, and deserves to be degraded; " for "the matters charged are good cause to have him degraded, whereby he should lose his freehold." Dod v. Robinson, (1648) Aleyn, 63. Dr. Sibthorpe's Case, W. Jones, 366; 1 Roll. Abr. 76. To say, "He preacheth lyes in the pulpit: "“car ceo est bon cause de deprivation.” Drake v. Drake, (1652) 1 Roll. Abr. 58; 1 Vin. Abr. 463. [These cases clearly overrule Parret v. Carpenter, Noy, 64; Cro. Eliz. 502, wherein it was held that an action could lie only in the spiritual Court for saying of a parson :-" Parret is an adulterer, and hath had two children by the wife of J. S., and I will cause him to be deprived for it." See the remarks of Pollock, C.B., 23 L. J. Ex. 80.] To say to a parson, "Thou hast made a seditious sermon, and moved the people to sedition to-day." To say of Philips, B.D. v. Budby, (1582) cited in Bittridge's Case, 4 Rep. 19. 66 a parson, He preaches nothing but lies and malice in the pulpit;" for the words are clearly spoken of him in the way of his profession. Crauden v. Walden, 3 Lev. 17. Bishop of Sarum v. Nash, Buller's N. P. 9; Willes, 23. Musgrave v. Bovey, 2 Str. 946. To say to a clergyman, "Thou art a drunkard," is not of itself actionable; but it is submitted that to impute to a clergyman habitual drunkenness, or drunkenness whilst engaged in the discharge of his official duties, would be actionable. Anon., 1 Ohio, 83, n. Tighe v. Wicks, 33 Up. Can. Q. B. Rep. 470. Brandrick v. Johnson, 1 Vict. L. R. C. L. 306. Dod v. Robinson, Aleyn, 63. McMillan v. Birch, 1 Binn. 178. To charge a clergyman with immorality and misappropriation of the sacrament money is clearly actionable. Damages 7501. Highmore v. Earl and Countess of Harrington, 3 C. B. N. S. 142. And, of course, to charge a clergyman with having indecently assaulted a woman on the highway is actionable. Evans v. Gwyn, 5 Q. B. 844. To say of a beneficed clergyman that he drugged the wine he gave the speaker, and so fraudulently induced him to sign a bill of exchange for a large amount is actionable without proof of special damage; but it is not actionable merely to say of a beneficed clergyman, "He pigeoned me." Pemberton v. Colls, 10 Q. B. 461; 16 L. J. Q. B. 403; 11 Jur. 1011. To charge a clergyman with incontinence is not actionable, unless he hold some benefice or preferment, or some post of emolument, such as preacher, curate, chaplain, or lecturer, from which he could be dismissed for incontinence. Gallwey v. Marshall, 9 Exch. 294; 23 L. J. Ex. 78; 2 C. L. R. 399. To say of one who had been a linendraper, but at time of publication was a dissenting minister, that he had been guilty of fraud and cheating when a linendraper, is no slander of the plaintiff in his character of dissenting minister; and, therefore, is not actionable without proof of special damage. Hopwood v. Thorn, 8 C. B. 293; 19 L. J. C. P. 94; 14 Jur. 87. But to charge a dissenting minister with incontinence while a dissenting minister, insomuch that the persons frequenting the said chapel by reason of the speaking of the said words have wholly refused to permit him to preach at the said chapel," is actionable. Hartley v. Herring, 8 T. R. 130. Barristers-at-Law. It is quite clear that barristers may sue for words touching them in their profession, although their fees are honorary. Illustrations. The plaintiff was a barrister and gave counsel to divers of the king's subjects. The defendant said to J. S. (the plaintiff's father-in-law), concerning the plaintiff, He is a dunce, and will get little by the law." J. S. replied, "Others have a better opinion of him." The defendant answered, "He was never but accounted a dunce in the Middle Temple." Held, that the words were actionable, though no special damage was alleged. Damages, one hundred marks. [Here it was argued for the defendant that Duns Scotus was "a great learned man; " that though to call a man "a dunce" might, in ordinary parlance, imply that he was dull and heavy of wit, yet it did not deny him a solid judgment; and that to say "he will get little by the law" might only mean that he did not wish to practise.] Peard v. Jones, (1635) Cro. Car. 382. It is actionable without proof of special damage to say of a barrister : "Thou art no lawyer; thou canst not make a lease; thou hast that degree without desert; they are fools who come to thee for law." Bankes v. Allen, 1 Roll. Abr. 54. "He hath as much law as a Jackanapes." (N.B.-The words are not “no more law than a Jackanapes.") Palmer v. Boyer, Owen, 17; Cro. Eliz. 342, cited with approval in [And see Cawdry v. Tetley, Godb. 441, where it is said that had the "He has deceived his client, and revealed the secrets of his cause." Snag v. Gray, 1 Roll. Abr. 57; Co. Entr. 22. "He will give vexatious and ill counsel, and stir up a suit, and milk her purse, and fill his own large pockets." Anon., 3 Salk. 328. King v. Lake, (1682) 2 Ventr. 28. And see Snow v. Etty, 22 Law Journal (newspaper) 292. Solicitors and Attornies. It is actionable without proof of special damage: To say of an attorney, "He has no more law than Master Cheyny's bull," or "He has no more law than a goose." Baker v. Morfue, vel Morphew, Sid. 327; 2 Keble, 202. [According to the report in Keble, an objection was taken in this case on behalf of the defendant, that it was not averred in the declaration, "that Cheyny had a bull, sed non allocatur, for the scandal is the greater, if he had none." And the Court adds a solemn quære as to saying "He has no more law than the man in the moon.' ניי. To say of an attorney, 64 'He cannot read a declaration." Powell v. Jones, 1 Lev. 297. 66 To say of an attorney, He is a very base rogue and a cheating knave, and doth maintain himself, his wife and children, by his cheating." Anon., (1638) Cro. Car. 516. See Jenkins v. Smith, Cro. Jac. 586. To say of an attorney that "he hath the falling sickness; " for that disables him in his profession. Taylor v. Perr, (1607) 1 Rolle's Abr. 44. 66 To say of an attorney, What, does he pretend to be a lawyer? He is no more a lawyer than the devil;" or any other words imputing gross ignorance of law. Day v. Buller, 3 Wils. 59. To say of an attorney, "He is only an attorney's clerk, and a rogue; he is no attorney," or any words imputing that he is not a fully qualified practitioner. Hardwick v. Chandler, 2 Stra. 1138. To say of an attorney, "He is an ambidexter," i.e., one who being retained by one party in a cause, and having learnt all his secrets, goes over to the other side, and acts for the adversary. Such conduct was subject for a qui tam action under an old penal statute: see Rastell's Entries, p. 2, Action sur le case vers Attorney, 3. Annison v. Blofield, Carter, 214; 1 Roll. Abr. 55. Shire v. King, Yelv. 32. To impute that he will betray his clients' secrets and overthrow their cause. Martyn v. Burlings, Cro. Eliz. 589. Garr v. Selden, 6 Barb. (N. Y.) 416; 4 Comst. 91. Foot v. Brown, 8 Johns. 64. To charge an attorney with barratry, champerty, or maintenance. Boxe v. Barnaby, 1 Roll. Abr. 55; Hob. 117. Proud v. Hawes, Cro. Eliz. 171; Hob. 140. Το say to a client "Your attorney is a bribing knave, and hath taken twenty pounds of you to cozen me." Yardley v. Ellill, Hob. 8. To say of an attorney, "He stirreth up suits, and once promised me, that if he did not recover in a cause for me, he would take no charges of me;' ""because stirring up suits is barratry, and undertaking a suit, no purchase no pay, is maintenance." Smith v. Andrews, 1 Roll. Abr. 54; Hob. 117. To assert that an attorney has been guilty of professional misconduct and ought to be struck off the rolls. Byrchley's Case, 4 Rep. 16. Warton v. Gearing, 1 Vict. L. R. C. L. 122. But it is not actionable to say of an attorney, "He has defrauded his creditors and has been horsewhipped off the course at Doncaster;" for it is no part of his professional duties to attend horse-races, and his creditors are not his clients. Doyley v. Roberts, 3 Bing. N. C. 835; 5 Scott, 40; 3 Hodges, 154. cheat," rogue," or "knave;" 99 66 Nor to abuse him in general terms, such as though to say, "You cheat your clients," would be actionable. Alleston v. Moor, Het. 167. And see Bishop v. Latimer, 4 L. T. 775. And where the defendant said of a solicitor: "He has gone for thousands instead of hundreds this time," and: "It seems to be a worse job than the other was; he has lost thousands," it was held that the words were not actionable per se, as they did not reasonably convey any imputation of impropriety or misconduct on the part of the plaintiff in relation to or in connection with his profession or business, or of unfitness to carry on his profession or business in a proper or satisfactory manner. Dauncey v. Holloway, (1901) 2 K. B. 441; 70 L. J. K. B. 695; 49 Physicians, Surgeons, &c. Any words imputing to a practising medical man misconduct or incapacity in the discharge of his professional duties are actionable per se. |