It is clear law, then, that no plaintiff can recover damages in actions of this kind without proof that he sustained special damage before the commencement of the action. Nor can he, it is submitted, obtain an injunction: but the latter question will be found discussed in the chapter on Injunctions (post, p. 393). Words which give rise to actions of this kind may be divided into five classes : I. Words which disparage a man's title to any property, real or personal (usually called Slander of Title). II. Words which disparage the goods manufactured or sold by another.* III. Threats of legal proceedings.* IV. Other words which injure a man in his profession or trade.* V. Other words which cause loss. I. Words which Disparage a Man's Title to any Property, Real or Personal. Such words are usually called " Slander of Title," whether they be written or spoken. "An action for slander of title is not properly an action for words spoken, or for libel written and published, but an action on the case for special damage sustained by reason of the speaking or publication of the slander of the plaintiff's title." (Per Tindal, C.J., in Malachy v. Soper, 3 Bing. N. C. p. 383; 3 Scott, 723.) Where the plaintiff possesses an estate or interest in any real or personal property, an action lies against any one who maliciously comes forward and falsely denies or impugns the plaintiff's title thereto, if any damage be thereby caused to the plaintiff. (Pater v. Baker, 3 C. B. 831; 16 L. J. C. P. 124; 11 Jur. 370.) The statement must be false; if there be such a flaw in the plaintiff's title as the defendant asserted, no action lies. And * The term Trade Libel is often applied to words which fall within Classes II., III., IV., but the phrase is misleading, as such words are not libellous in the proper sense of the term. Its use has led to confusion between words of this kind and words which are a libel on a trader in the way of his trade (see ante, p. 30). We have, therefore, thought it best to discontinue using it. So. it is for the plaintiff to prove it false, not for the defendant to prove it true. (Per Maule, J., in Pater v. Baker, 3 C. B. at p. 869.) Next, the statement must be malicious; if it be made in the bona fide assertion of the defendant's own right, real or supposed, to the property, no action lies. But whenever a man unnecessarily intermeddles with the affairs of others with which he is wholly unconcerned, such officious interference will be deemed malicious and he will be liable, if damage follow. "The jury may infer malice from the absence of probable cause; but they are not bound to do The want of probable cause does not necessarily lead to an inference of malice; neither does the existence of probable cause afford any answer to the action." (Per Maule, J., in Pater v. Baker, 3 C. B. at p. 868.) And see post, p. 89. Lastly, special damage must be proved, and shown to have arisen from the defendant's words. (Sir Thomas Gresham v. Grinsley, (1609) Yelv. 88.) And for this, where the special damage alleged is that the plaintiff has lost the sale of his property, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove that he was in the act of selling his property either by public auction or private treaty, and that the defendant by his words prevented an intending purchaser from bidding or completing. (Tasburgh v. Day, Cro. Jac. 484; Law v. Harwood, Cro. Car. 140; Sir W. Jones, 196.) So proof that plaintiff wished to let his lands and that the defendant prevented an intending tenant from taking a lease will be sufficient. But a mere apprehension that plaintiff's title might be drawn in question, or that the neighbours placed a lower value on plaintiff's lands in their own minds in consequence, the same not being offered for sale, will not be sufficient evidence of damage. "This action lieth not but by reason of the prejudice in the sale." (Per Fenner, J., in Bold v. Bacon, Cro. Eliz. 346.) The special damage must always be such as naturally or reasonably arises from the use of the words. (Haddon v. Lott, 15 C. B. 411; 24 L. J. C. P. 49; see post, Chapter XIII., p. 347.) It makes no difference whether the defendant's words be spoken or written or printed; save as affecting the amount of damages, which should be larger where the publication is more permanent or extensive, as by advertisement. (Malachy v. Soper and another, 3 Bing. N. C. 371; 3 Scott, 723.) The property may be either real or personal, corporeal or incorporeal; and the plaintiff's interest therein may be either in possession or reversion. It need not be even a vested interest, so long as it is anything that is saleable or that has a market value. The word "property" includes a patent right, copyright, the right to use a trade mark or a trade name. Illustrations. The plaintiff was a justice of the peace, seised in fee of the advowson of Sancroft, and intended to sell it towards payment of his debts. The defendant said that the plaintiff had lost the patronage and presentation, by reason of being a simonist and a recusant. Held, that no action lay, as the plaintiff had not shown "that there was any communication to sell it to any, nor that any who intended to buy it, was thereby hindered in his buying." Tasburgh v. Day, (1618) Cro. Jac. 484. Lands were settled on D. in tail, remainder to the plaintiff in fee. D. being an old man and childless, plaintiff was about to sell his remainder to A. when the defendant interfered and asserted that D. had issue. A. consequently refused to buy. Held, that the action lay. Bliss v. Stafford, Owen, 37; Moore, 188; Jenk. 247. The plaintiff's father being tenant in tail of certain lands, which he was about to sell, the purchaser offered the plaintiff a sum of money to join in the assurance so as to estop him from attempting to set aside the deed, should he ever succeed to the estate tail; but the defendant told the purchaser that the plaintiff was a bastard, wherefore he refused to give the plaintiff anything for his signature. Held, that the plaintiff had a cause of action, though he was the youngest son of his father, and his chance of succeeding was therefore remote. Vaughan v. Ellis, Cro. Jac. 213. Plaintiff succeeded to certain lands as heir-at-law; the defendant asserted that plaintiff was a bastard; plaintiff was in consequence put to great expense to defend his title. Judgment for the plaintiff. Damages 501. Elborow v. Allen, Cro. Jac. 642. To call a man a bastard while his father or other ancestor is alive may be actionable on general principles, if special damage ensue, such as the loss of a marriage, or if he be disinherited in consequence of defendant's words; but it is not the subject of an action for slander of title; for, even though heir-apparent, plaintiff has no title; but only a mere expectancy. Nelson v. Staff, (1618) Cro. Jac. 422. Humphrys v. Stanfeild, vel Stridfield, (1638) Cro. Car. 469; Godb. 451; Turner v. Sterling, (1671) 2 Vent. 26; Anon., 1 Roll. Abr. 37. Banister v. Banister, (1583) 4 Rep. 17. Poulett v. Chatto and Windus, (1887) 4 Times L. R. 35, 142. The defendant falsely represented to the bailiff of a manor that a sheep of the plaintiff was an estray, in consequence of which it was wrongfully seized. Held, that an action on the case lay against him. Newman v. Zachary, Aleyn, 3. The plaintiff was desirous to sell his lands to any one who would buy them, when the defendant said that the plaintiff had mortgaged all his lands for 1007., and that he had no power to sell or let the same. No special damage being shown, judgment was stayed. It was not proved that any one intending to buy plaintiff's lands heard defendant speak the words. Manning v. Avery, (1674) 3 Keb. 153; 1 Vin. Abr. 553. The plaintiff was possessed of tithes which he desired to sell; the defendant falsely and maliciously said, "His right and title thereunto is nought, and I have a better title than he." As special damage it was alleged that the plaintiff "was likely to sell, and was injured by the words; and that by reason of the defendant speaking the words, the plaintiff could not recover his tithes." Held, insufficient. Cane v. Golding, (1649) Style, 169, 176. Law v. Harwood, (1629) Cro. Car. 140; Sir Wm. Jones, 196; Palm. 529. The plaintiff was the assignee of a beneficial lease, which he expected would realise 1007. But the defendant, the superior landlord, came to the sale, and stated publicly, 66 The whole of the covenants of this lease are broken, and I have served notice of ejectment; the premises will cost 70l. to put them in repair." In consequence of this statement the property fetched only 35 guineas. Rolfe, B., left to the jury only one question-Was the defendant's statement true or false? and they found a verdict for the plaintiff; damages, 401. But the Court of Exchequer granted a new trial on the ground that two other questions ought to have been left to the jury as well :-Was the statement or any part of it made maliciously? and, Did the special damage arise from such malicious statement or from such part of it as was malicious? An advertisement was sent to the Wolverhampton Chronicle, in the ordinary course of business and published once on January 6th, 1868. It was as follows:"Important notice. Horsehill Estate. The public are respectfully requested not to buy any property formerly belonging to A., B., and C., without ascertaining that the title deeds of the same are correct; as the heirs are not dead nor abroad, but are still alive." This estate was at that moment advertised for sale in building lots; but this advertisement revived all previous doubts about plaintiff's title, and rendered the estate practically unsaleable. On January 13th plaintiff wrote and complained of this advertisement, and asked for the name and address of the person who sent it to the paper. This the proprietor of the paper at once furnished; but on January 30th he was served with a writ. On February 10th he inserted an apology. But the jury, under the direction of Keating, J., found for the plaintiff. Ravenhill v. Upcott, 20 L. T. 233; 33 J. P. 299. The plaintiff held 160 shares in a silver mine in Cornwall, which he said were worth 100,000. Tollervey and Hayward each filed a bill in Chancery against the plaintiff and others claiming certain shares in the mine, and praying for an account and an injunction, and for the appointment of a receiver. To these bills plaintiff demurred. Before the demurrers came on for hearing, a paragraph appeared in the defendant's newspaper to the effect that the demurrers had been overruled, that an injunction had been granted, that a receiver had been duly appointed, and had actually arrived at the mine; all of which was quite untrue. A verdict having been obtained for the plaintiff, damages 5l., the Court of Common Pleas arrested judgment on the ground that there was no sufficient allegation of special damage, and this, although the declaration contained averments to the effect that "the plaintiff is injured in his rights; and the shares so possessed by him, and in which he is interested, have been, and are, much depreciated and lessened in value; and divers persons have believed and do believe that he has little or no right to the shares, and that the mine cannot be lawfully worked or used for his benefit; and that he hath been hindered and prevented from selling or disposing of his said shares in the said mine, and from working and using the same in so ample and beneficial a manner as he otherwise would have done." Malachy v. Soper and another, 3 Bing. N. C. 371; 3 Scott, 723; 2 Hodges, 217. Where the steward of a manor had stated in writing to an intending purchaser of the interest of a copyhold tenant that a forfeiture had been declared: Held, that the copyholder was entitled, in an action against the lord, to have the cloud on his title dispersed by a declaration that there had been no forfeiture or authority to forfeit, and to be paid the costs of the action. Pawley v. Scratton, (1886) 3 Times L. R. 146. The defendants, who owned the copyright of a picture by Millais, issued a circular threatening proceedings against all persons who bought copies of the plaintiff's magazine, containing a woolwork pattern, which the defendants wrongly deemed to be an infringement of their copyright. The plaintiff brought an action for an injunction, and also for damages. He failed to prove that he had sustained any damage: wherefore the Court of Appeal refused to grant him any injunction. 66 Dicks v. Brooks, 15 Ch. D. 22; 49 L. J. Ch. 812; 29 W. R. 87; 43 The plaintiff imported and sold in England a brand of champagne known as Delmonico." Thereupon the defendants circulated the following notice: "Caution. Delmonico Champagne. Messrs. Delbeck & Co., finding that wine, stated to be Delmonico Champagne, is being advertised for sale in Great Britain, hereby give notice that such wine cannot be the wine it is represented to be, as no champagne shipped under that name can be genuine unless it has their names on their labels." They further announced that if such wines were shipped from France, they should take legal proceedings. After the close of the pleadings, and before trial, the plaintiff died. Held, that these words were a libel on the plaintiff personally, and in the way of his trade; and that the cause of action for such personal libel abated at his death. But that the words were also ground for an action of slander of title; for they imputed that the plaintiff had no right to use his trade-mark; and that this cause of action survived to the plaintiff's |