nearest port, the farthest seemed to have been chosen, and the troops were sent to Lisbon. They are there employed in compelling the French to evacuate Portugal, who could not have held it if Buonaparte could not conquer Spain, and who must get possession of it if he does; and afterwards remain there for two months before they march to join the Spaniards. The moment was urgent, the occasion was pressing, every thing depended upon promptitude of action, and taking advantage of a small portion of time; and yet two months pass away before the army is even put in march to join the Spanish troops; and the general who commanded in chief, in giving an account of his conduct, says, that no arrangement was determined upon for putting the army in march. The transports which ought to have conveyed our troops are used to convey the troops of the enemy; and our army, com pelled to make a long march over land, are too late for any effective purpose, and the enemy triumphs in the capital of Spain before even a British musket is fired. The Spanish people may truly reproach us, "You promised us protection and assistance; you induced us to engage in the dangerous warfare of pitched battles, quitting our more desultory mode of warfare, but more secure to ourselves and more harrassing to the enemy; and now the oppressor lords it in our capital, plunders our property, and puts to death our nobles, whilst not a single British musket has yet been fired." Most unfortunate is it that our army should be placed in such a situation which must necessarily give rise to apprehension. The di

lemma stated by my noble friend (Lord Sidmouth,) most aptly applies to ministers upon this subjecte either they did or they did not know that a British army, sent into the interior of Spain, would have to encounter the whole disposable force of France. If they did know it, by what infatuation could they have been induced to place an army in a situation in which no rational men would ever have thought of placing it? If they did not know it, then they must confess that they were wholly ignorant of the resources of France

that they were wholly ignorant that the ruler of France had the resources of the greater part of Europe at his command that they were wholly ignorant that France had a large army which could be brought to bear upon any given point. With this view of the subject, it is, of course, impossible that I can concur in applauding the past measures adopted by ministers with respect to Spain; nor can I concur in supporting the system proposed to be adopted for increasing the army, with the view of sending more troops to Spain, for this must be the object, or the expression means nothing; although I do not mean to deny, that with the evils with which we are now surrounded, the increase of our regular force is a necessary measure. From the approbation, however, which is implied of their conduct, and their wise and vigorous system, I must decidedly dissent, contending, as I do, that there has been neither wisdom nor vigour in their measures.

Lord Grenville said, that there was one most important topic which he thought it his duty to press on the attention of their lordships,

though

though no notice was taken of it either in the speech or in the address; he meant the present state of our relations with the United States of America-So also did many of the speakers, in opposition to ministry, in both Houses, on various occasions. But into their discussions on this subject, on such occasions, when the subject was not formally before the Houses, it would be both endless and idle to enter. It is remarkable that the debates were more than ordinarily keen, on the side of opposition, when the subject related either to America or to Ireland.

The Earl of Liverpool said, that with regard to the affairs of Spain, the address only proposed to give his Majesty a general assurance of support in maintaining the cause of the Spaniards as long as that nation proved true to themselves. In what way this support had been given, or how it was in future to be administered, would be a subject of distinct and detailed consideration: nor would the House, by now agreeing to the address, pledge themselves to approve of those particular engagements which had been contracted. All that they were now called upon to do, was, to record a public avowal of their determination not to desert that cause which the government and the country had espoused, and in which it was, in consequence of reverses, even become a more sacred duty to persevere. Those who inferred that the cause was desperate, from those disasters which had already happened, reasoned upon a most imperfect view of the relative situation of the parties engaged in the contest. And he entreated those who were in

clined to despond, to consult the records of history, and to review those instances of nations who had been compelled to struggle for their independence in circumstances similar to those in which the Spaniards were now placed. There it would be found that nations, after maintaining struggles for ten or twenty years, in the course of which they had been almost uni" mly worsted in battle, had eventually succeeded, in spite of the triumphs of their adversaries, in securing the object for, which they contended. It was difficult to conceive any situation which would better warrant hopes of ultimate success, than that of Spain at this day. It appeared a little extraordinary to Lord Liverpool, that Lord Grenville should have objected to the policy of the expedition to Portugal, which was almost the only point of the coast which was, at the time, in the possession of the enemy. A large force had been prepared with unexampled expedition, and in its application ministers had taken the advice, not only of military men of high reputation, but had consulted the Spaniards themselves, who, both in the north and south, had recommended the reduction of General Junot's army, as the most acceptable service, that it was in our power to perform. The consideration due to an ancient and faithful ally, he admitted to have had considerable influence with his Majesty's ministers, in undertaking the deliverance of Portugal. He requested also the noble lord to bear in mind, that at the time when our expedition sailed, and which he seemed to think might have acted with greater advantage in the

north

North of Spain, the passage from Paris to Madrid was as open as it is now; and that the French army was in possession, not only of the passes of the Pyrennees, but of a large district in the South of Spain. In consequence of the evacuation of Portugal, the Spaniards had been delivered from a large force which, by acting in their rear, might have embarrassed and impeded all their future operations. Lord Liverpool also defended the equipment of the expedition to Portugal, which, in every respect, and specifically in the proportion of cavalry and artillery with which it was accompanied, was perfectly competent to execute the service on which it was sent. Neither, he contended, had there been one moment's unnecessary delay in the march of our army from Portugal. If it did not proceed to Spain immediately after the conclusion of the convention, it was because no central government had then been established, and it was impossible to arrange any plan of operations with the provincial Juntas.

The Earl of Moira disapproved of many paragraphs in the address, but would still refrain from moving any amendment. He particularly in sisted on that which referred to the armistice and convention, concluded in Portugal, and took occasion to explain the opinion which he had delivered upon it as a member of the Court of Inquiry. He concurred, indeed, with his colleagues in saying, that no further military proceeding should be had in that matter: and he had emphatically made use of the word military, on the occasion. As far as the officers, who took a part in the transaction, were engaged, he would reVOL. LI.

peat it, that they had behaved with unquestionable zeal and firm ness. They might have perhaps imputed to them an error in judg ment; but, circumstanced as they were, their error was not such as fell within any infraction of the ar ticles of war; it was rather an error imputable to his Majesty's mi nisters, and to the manner in which they had prepared and sent out the expedition. The address also al luded to further aid to be afforded to Sweden. Should it not be inquired how that aid was to be applied? Was the further assistance, to be hereafter granted to Sweden, to be applied in the manner in which we had hitherto afforded that support? What, in fact, had been done for Sweden, that in the least contributed to give her any material assistance? From her adherence to our alliance, she had already lost almost half of her territory, and was now exposed to the severest fate. We were as much bound therefore to attend to Sweden as to Spain. Looking to the unfortunate peninsula, where our principal exertions were said to have been directed, what was the situation of affairs there? Did the address at all indicate the feelings of this House, or of any man in the kingdom on that weighty subject? The noble earl had said, that the Spaniards would not accept our proffered assistance. Was the fit application made to them? Where was the question asked? At the extremity of the kingdom farthest removed from the scene of danger. Supposing an enemy were to enter Scotland; would an ally, anxious for our protection, take an army to Penzance, and inquire of a council there, if he D

could

could give the inhabitants of that remote quarter protection? But, he was warranted from the evidence before the Court of Inquiry to say, the aid was applied for, not for Gallicia, but for the Pyrenean frontiers. What was the situation of the French at that time? Buonaparte, in the plenitude of selfconfidence, had imprudently distributed his forces in small divisions all over the kingdom. The natives rising throughout the provinces, indignant at the perfidy of their enemy, were competent to the utter destruction of these scattered legions. What was then our duty? It was to interpose 50,000 men between Spain and France, which would be increased to 150,000 by the zeal of the natives. This immense army, organized and disciplined as it would have been, blended with British regulars, would take possession of the passes, and the consequence would have been, that not a Frenchman could have entered or quitted Spain, unless he had cut his way through this prodigious force. It was not enough to drive the French out of Spain, not a subject of Napoleon should have passed the frontiers, unless exchanged as a prisoner. Then would have been the moment to have called on Austria, and to have told her, that her existence depended upon immediate hostility against France-to have informed her, that the British forces, supported by their ally, were hovering, like a dark storm, on the summits of the mountains, and would pour onward in a torrent, to spread devastation in the plains beneath, the moment she should declare her purpose. All these golden oppor

tunities had been lost by the gross mismanagement of his Majesty's ministers. Nor could he concur in the address in what respected the Convention of Cintra. The speech of the commissioners was designed to screen from accusation the real culprits. He had said, in common with his colleagues, that there was no ground for any further military inquiry; but this was not saying that there was no ground for inquiry at all.

The Earl of Buckinghamshire, while he approved of the exertions made by ministers in favour of the Spanish Patriots, could not refrain from expressing his disapprobation of the manner in which our gal lant troops had been employed.The address was agreed to; and the Earl of Liverpool gave notice that, on Monday, he should move the thanks of the House to Sir Arthur Wellesley, and the other officers and troops for the victory of Vimiera.

On the same day an address to his Majesty, in answer to the lords commissioners speech, was moved in the House of Commons, after a number of prefatory observations on the different subjects touched on, or alluded to, in the speech by the Honourable Frederick Robinson.-This motion was seconded by Mr. S. B. Lushing ton. Among other remarks Mr. Lushington observed, that the faith of Great Britain, solemnly pledged to Spain and Sweden, ought to be religiously observed, and that the preservation of that faith, in all cases of difficulty and trial, was the surest tower of safety to this country, and the best hope of deliverance to the rest of the world. If we should desert the cause

of

of Spain even whilst the Spaniards continued true to themselves, with what confidence could we hope for our own safety? With nations, as with individuals, punishments followed fast upon the footsteps of dishonour.

Mr. Ponsonby rose, not to oppose the address, but, in the present awful circumstances, to make some observations, and offer some opinions, which he conceived to be of importance to the honour and security of the country. His Majesty last year concluded a treaty, by which it was stipulated, that if the King of Sweden should be attacked by his neighbours, this country should concert with that sovereign, as to sending out an auxiliary force to his aid.-How far there had been any thing of concert-How far there had been any thing of council-How far there had been any mutual communication, or common understanding, between the government of this country and his Swedish Majesty, in conformity with the treaty, we might form some judgment by the expedition of Sir John Moore and his army sent out in the course of the last summer. What was the result of that expedition? Was it because Sir John Moore was kept in ignorance of the mutual counsel and concert of the two governments: or was it because there did not exist in the councils of his Majesty's ministers either method, system, or design, that that officer, without a single musket being fired, or one battalion of it being formed in order of battle before an enemy, was compelled actually to make his escape from Stockholm in disguise? Mr. Ponsonby proceeded to arraign the attack on

Copenhagen.-If that rash and inglorious expedition had not taken place, the Danish navy would now consist of ships of war blocked up in the ports of Denmark, instead of being converted, as it now was, into a more active and successful means of hostility against our commerce, than the navy of any power in Europe. Had the assault on the navy of Denmark deprived it of the services of a single sailor? No. Ministers contented themselves with taking away, their ships of War. Had their marine continued safe, it would have absorbed those exertions of their numerous seamen which were employed in a predatory warfare against our commerce. This was another instance, besides that of the expedition to Sweden, of that ministerial vi gour which was to characterize the government of those now entrusted with the confidence of the

crown.

After these transactions in the north of Europe, Mr. Ponsonby proceeded, the affairs of Spain next engrossed the attention of the world. The government of France having made its iniquitous attempt upon the Spanish nation, an opportunity of ardent hope to this country, and of probable deliverance to Europe, presented itself, such as we had not witnessed since the revolution of France in 1789. This was an event of the greatest importance, an event big with the greatest consequences, and which demanded the greatest attention of the King's ministers: they, and they only, were capable of forming a just opinion concerning it. It was impossible to conceive that such a country as Great Britain could view such passing events D2

with