surprise, or of some material fact having come to the knowledge of the party since the case was before the law officer. The sealing of a patent was opposed on the ground of previous public user of the invention, in reply to which the applicant made the case that such user was obtained by fraud on him, so as to bring the case within 15 and 16 Vict. c. 83, s. 10. Held, that such a case ought to be tried before a jury, and that the patent ought to be sealed that such trial might not be precluded. (Re Vincent's Patent, 30th Jan., 1867, L. R. 2 Chan. 344.)

PATENT-Sealing-Objections (15 & 16 Vict. c. 83, ss. 12, 13, 14). A party who has not opposed the sealing of a patent before the law officer of the Crown under 15 & 16 Vict. c. 83, s. 12, will not be allowed to oppose before the Lord Chancellor. (Re Mitchell's Patent, 38th Jan., 1867, L. R. Chanc. 343.)

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Ratification of act of agent-Public Company-Liability of promoters for advances obtained on account of the undertaking. The following case shows what liability the promoters of a company may incur on a contract, notwithstanding the ratification of the contract by the subsequently formed company: One J., acting as the solicitor and secretary of a projected railway company, by the authority of the promoters, and by means of a cheque signed by two of them, obtained from the plaintiff an advance of £500, to be applied in payment of parliamentary fees, upon an agreement expressing that it was "to be repaid out of the calls on shares." An Act authorising the construction of the railway passed, the promoters being named therein as the first directors, and at a meeting subsequently held the directors passed a resolution that the acts of J. should be adopted and confirmed; no shares were allotted or calls made, and the undertaking was not proceeded with : Held, that the advance was made upon the personal responsibility of those who signed the cheque, and that the subsequent adoption of their acts by the directors did not alter their position. (Scott v. Lord Ebury, 14th Jan., 1867, L. R. 2 C. P. 255.)

PUBLIC COMPANY-Railway company-General managerAuthority to bind company to pay for surgical attendance on injured person. The general manager of a railway company has, as incidental to his employment, authority to bind the company to pay for surgical attendance bestowed at his request, on a servant of the company injured by an accident on their railway. Cox v. Midland Counties Railway Company (3 Ex. 268) considered. (Walker v. The Great Western Railway Co., 18th April, 1867, L. R. 2 Ex. 228.)

PUBLIC COMPANY-Contributory — Purchase of shares by broker Laches.-A person allowing his name to remain for a length of time on the list of contributories of a company without making any objection does not raise an equity against his applying to have it removed where no loss is sustained by the estate, which

would have been avoided if the application had been made earlier. Whether, even in the case of such loss being sustained, any such equity would arise, quære. Order of the Master of the Rolls reversed. (Re Mexican and South American Company, 7th March, 1867, L. R. 2 Chanc. 387.)

SHIP AND SHIPPING -Bill of lading-Perils of navigationRats. Goods were shipped under a bill of lading containing the usual exceptions of "the act of God, the Queen's enemies, fire, and all and every other dangers and accidents of the sea, rivers, and navigation, of what kind and nature soever." The goods were injured during the voyage by rats, though the shipowner had taken all possible precaution to prevent it. Held, that the cause of injury did not come within the exception, and that the shipowner was liable. (Kay v. Wheeler, 4th Feb., 1867, L. R. 2 C. P. 302.)

STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.-Jurisdiction-Equity-Purchaser's ship.-A bill in equity will lie to enforce a right of stoppage in transitu. Goods were shipped by a vendor on board a ship be longing to the purchaser, but employed as a general trader; four bills of lading were made, under which the goods were deliverable to the purchaser or assigns; three of the bills were kept by the vendor and one by the master of the ship. Held, that the delivery on board the purchaser's ship was delivery to the purchaser, so as to preclude stoppage in transitu before the delivery of the goods at the port of consignment. Decree of the Master of the Rolls reversed. (Schotsmans v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company, 28th Jan., 1867, L. R. 2 Chanc. 332.)

VOLUNTARY DEEDS-Gift of personal estate - Promissory notes, not indorsed over, whether they pass-Declaration of trust.— The rule laid down in Kekewich v. Manning (1 De Gex M. & &. 176), the decision in which was supported by reference to exparte Pye (18 Ves. 140) was not confined merely to this, that a person, who being entitled to a reversionary interest, or to stock standing in another's name, assigns it by a voluntary deed thereby passes it, notwithstanding that he does not in formal terms declare himself to be trustee of the property, but it amounts to this, that an instrument executed as a present and complete assignment (not being a mere covenant to assign on a future day) is equivalent to a declaration of trust. It is impossible to read the argument in that case, and the judgment of Lord Justice Knight Bruce, without seeing that his mind was directed to Meek v. Kettlewell (1 Hare, 464), and that class of cases where it had been held (such was the nicety upon which the decisions turned) that an actual assignment is nothing more than an agreement to assign an equity, because it merely passes such equitable interest as the assignor may have, and some further step must be taken by the assignee to acquire the legal interest. That further step being necessary, the assignment was

held to be, in truth, nothing but an agreement to assign, and being so was not enforceable in equity, the Court having often decided that it will not enforce a mere voluntary agreement. The distinction undoubtedly is very fine between that and a declaration of trust; and the good sense of the decision in Kekewich v. Manning (1 D. M. & G. 176) lies in this, that the real distinction should be made between an agreement to do something when called upon-something distinctly expressed to be future in the instrument, and an instrument which affects to pass everything, independently of the legal estate. It was held in Kekewich v. Manning that such an instrument operates as an out and out assignment, disposing of the whole of the assignor's equitable interest, and that such a declaration of trust is as good a form as any that can be devised. The expres sion used by the Lords Justices is this:- "A declaration of trust is not confined to any express form of words, but may be indicated by the character of the instrument." In that case reference was made in the argument principally to the case of exparte Pye (18 Ves. 140), which was a decision of Lord Eldon to the same effect. Reliance is often placed on the circumstauce that the assignor has done all he can, that there is nothing remaining for him to do; and it is contended that he must, in that case only, be taken to have made a complete and effectual assignment. But that is not the sound doctrine on which the case rests, for if there be an actual declaration of trust, although the assignor has not done all that he could dofor example, although he has not given notice to the assignee, yet the interest is held to have effectually passed as between the donor and donee. The difference must be rested simply on this, aye or no, has he constituted himself a trustee? This was the reasoning on which the decision in the following case was grounded: E., by a voluntary deed, in 1858, assigned certain specific property, and "all other the personal estate, whatsoever and wheresoever," of her, the said E. to R. absolutely; and she thereby appointed R. his executors, administrators, and assigns, her attorney and attorneys in her name, but for the sole benefit of R., to sue for and recover the thereby assigned premises and every part thereof, and to do and execute all such acts and deeds as should be necessary for deriving the full benefit of the assignment thereby made. At the date of the assignment E. was possessed of (amongst other property) certain promissory notes, given to her to secure the repayment of advances made by her. These were not specifically mentioned in the deed. Upon R.'s death, in 1864, these notes were found in his possession, but not endorsed to him. There was no evidence as to any delivery of the notes by E. to R. Held that the property in the notes passed by the deed to R. on the principle that the deed of assignment operated as a complete declaration of trust by E. of all her property in favour of R. (Richardson v. Richardson, 26th Feb., 1867, L. R. 3 Eq. 686.)

WILLS-Existing will revoked by later will not existing-Parol evidence of contents of later will.-A will was found after a testator's death, but parol evidence was given that he had executed a subsequent will which contained a clause of revocation, and which remained in his custody until his death, and could not then be found, and that he had declared an intention to destroy it. The Court pronounced for an intestacy. (Wood v. Wood, 11th Jan., 1867, L. R. 1 P. & D. 309.)

WILLS Invalid will-Duty of executor as to revocation of probate Citation of legatees to propound.—An executor who has proved a will in common form cannot, as such executor, take proceedings to call in question the validity of that will. He has no right, therefore, to cite the persons interested under it to propound it in solemn form, or show cause why the probate in common form should not be revoked. The executor of an executor is in the same position in this respect as the original executor. (Re Chamberlain, 5th March, 1867, L. R. 1 P. & D. 316.)

WILLS-Probate-Limited to real estate-Appointment of executor-Equitable conversion.—A will limited to the disposition of real property only is not entitled to probate, although it contains the appointment of an executor, and the real estate is given to such an executor, with directions to convert the same into personal estate. (Re Barden, 22nd March, 1867, L. R. 1 P. & D. 325.)

WILL Cons'ruction - General words followed by particular description-Imperfect enumeration. Testatrix, a markswoman, made a will shortly before her death, in which the only bequest was a gift of her "personal property, consisting of money and clothes." She was possessed at her death of property, besides cash in hand and clothes, consisting of money out on n:ortgage, money secured on a promissory note, and a reversionary interest in a sum of cash : Held that the words "consisting of money and clothes," did not cut down the generality of the gift of "personal property," being only an imperfect enumeration of the particulars of which the personal estate consisted; and that the whole of her personal estate passed by her will. (Dean v. Gibson, 26th Feb., 1867, L. R. 3 Eq. 713.)

WILL.-Disputing-Costs of unsuccessful opposition to will-Plea of undue influence.-Notwithstanding what is stated ante p. 76, on the authority of Ireland v. Rendall, it is not an invariable rule that the unsuccessful opponent of a will, who has pleaded undue influence, will be condemned in costs. The Court refused to condemn a next of kin in costs, although he had pleaded undue influence, being of opinion that, under the circumstances of the case, the plea was not an unreasonable one. (Smith v. Smith, 6th Nov., 1866, L. R. 1 P. & D. 239.)

DIGEST OF THE INTERMEDIATE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON BOOK-KEEPING.

BY JOHN H. TATTERSALL, OF BLackburn.

Ir will have been observed that all the questions which have been asked on book-keeping at recent intermediate examinations are repetitions of those which have been recently submitted to candidates. This fact has induced me to prepare the following digest, and if, through inadvertence on my part, any errors have been committed in it, I throw myself upon the indulgence of students for the pardon of them, and hope that, notwithstanding its imperfections, it may be found to supply that desideratum which has so long been felt by articled clerks.

I. What is the object sought in keeping books of account? ANS. It is to exhibit in a clear, concise, and intelligible manner the primary, progressive, and present state of a man's pecuniary affairs.

II. Give the proper headings of the books required to be kept by a merchant or tradesman in keeping accounts by single entry.

ANS. Day book, invoice book, cash book, bill book, stock book, and ledger.

III. Describe the respective purposes of the day book, invoice book, and bill book.

ANS. The day book contains a record of all goods sOLD on credit, the invoice book of all goods BOUGHT on credit, and the bill book of all bills receivable and payable.

IV. Describe a cash book, petty-cash book, and a banker's passbook. What correspondence ought there to be between them? What does the balance of the cash-book (where banker's account is kept), and balance of petty-cash book represent?

ANS. The cash book is simply a statement of the receipts and payments of money. All receipts are entered in the left, and all payments in the right-hand column. A petty-cash book contains the various small sums received and paid daily. A banker's passbook is the customer's account with his banker. At the time of balancing the cash book it is usual to compare the sums received 'from and paid into the bank with the banker's pass-books, to ascertain whether the respective items correspond. The balance of the cash book represents the sum of money in the hands of the trader, including the money deposited in the bank. The balance of