1860 and 1861-and in particular sects. 1 and 5 of the Chap. II. former-did not override the general practice of Parliament on the point of a railway company's locus standi (c). (b) Where the tramways are to be worked by mechanical power.-In a case in 1877, where the Great Eastern Railway petitioned on the ground of competition, the steam clauses were withdrawn pending the conclusion of a Parliamentary inquiry on the subject, and the Referees expressly declined to decide the general question of the locus standi of railway companies against such tramways (d). Again, in a later case, the Referees once more refrained from deciding the general question on the ground that the proposed line threatened no competition, and would not have done so, even had it been a railway instead of a tramway (e). In two early cases, however, a locus standi was allowed to a railway company against the acquisition of tramways, or power to construct tramways, on the ground of competition; but the circumstances in each instance were of a very special nature (ƒ). Since these early times the subject has been frequently discussed, but owing to the inherently casual nature of locus standi proceedings the decisions of the Referees are somewhat difficult to reconcile. In 1884, however, a general locus standi was given to a railway company against a Bill for a steam tramway on the ground of competition (g). In 1893 a railway was allowed a locus stundi against the clauses and schedule of a Bill which authorised and regulated the use of electricity on certain tramways, inasmuch (c) Dublin Tramways Bill (1871), 2 Cl. & St. 142; Dublin Tramways Bill (1873), 1 Cl. & R. 13. 56. (d) North Metropolitan Tramways (New Works, &c.) Bill (1877), 2 Cl. & R. (e) Tramways Orders (Bury and District) Bill (1881), 3 Cl. & R. 101. 2 Cl. & St. 248; Great Western Railway Bill (1876), 1 Cl. & R. 223. Chap. II. as they might directly or indirectly affect the railway; but it was given no general locus on the ground of competition, since the Bill, which also included certain powers of purchase and amalgamation, was held at most to improve existing competition (h). In another case in the same year the same point was decided in much the same way, though there was an additional question as to the safety of certain bridges over the railway (i). Later on the point was taken in argument that the electrification of a tramway implies not merely improved competition, but an entirely new form of competition. No decision, however, was given, the Court considering that the competition, if any, was likely to be so small that they were not justified in granting the railway a locus standi (k). In the following year a railway company was given a locus standi against a Bill by which it was sought to remove the restrictions of speed applying to a tramway and substitute the Board of Trade standard, the Court holding that the last-mentioned case did not apply, and that the change proposed might substantially create a new form of competition. They seem, however, to have been swayed to some extent by a dislike for the tactics of the tramway company (1). And, indeed, in the next case their decision in the preceding case was regarded as depending on exceptional circumstances, and the Court reverted to the decision which they gave in the case of the Dublin Southern District Tramways Bill, 1893, and disallowed the railway's locus standi (m). In 1900 a locus standi was granted to two railway companies against proposed electric tramways on the (h) Dublin Southern District Tramways Bill (1893), R. & S. 242. 157. (1) Dublin Southern District Tramways Bill (1898), 1 S. & A. 242. ground of competition, and the Speaker's counsel Chap. II. stated that the decision must depend on the nature and extent of the tramway in each particular case (n). This case was followed later on in the same session (0), and again in 1901 (p). A locus was also granted to a railway against the construction of electric tramways which would form a junction with a light railway belonging to the promoters, on the ground of competition, though it seems dubious whether the proposed line did more than improve competition which already existed (q). The principle, then, to which we are led by the above succession of cases is no real principle at allnamely, that the Referees will consider the circumstances of each individual case; but their tendency, in so far as they have a tendency, is, as would naturally be expected, to regard a tramway of the modern type as capable of offering serious competition to a railway, and therefore they are inclined to grant a railway, if other circumstances permit it, a locus standi to oppose the modernisation of an old, or the construction of a new, system of tramways. A competitive locus has also been allowed to railway companies by Commissioners under Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1899 (r). (See post, p. 48.) (ii) ON GROUNDS OTHER THAN COMPETITION. (a) Interference.-Where under the provisions of a tramway Bill the proposed line will pass over or otherwise interfere with a railway bridge or its approaches, the railway company, although the use of the bridge (n) Airdrie and Coatbridge Tramways Bill (1900), 2 S. & A. 1. (0) Glasgow District Tramways Bill (1900), 2 S. & A. 9. (p) London County Council (Tramways and Street Widenings) Bill (1901), 2 S. & A. 57. (1) London United Tramways (Extensions) Bill (1900), 2 S. & A. 23. and Port Glasgow Tramways Extension (1902), 39 S. L. R. 880. S. C Chap. II. may have been dedicated to the public, have, as owners of the bridge, a locus standi against the Bill, limited, however, to the clauses which authorise such interference (s). And a locus standi has been allowed to an underground railway company where interference with their works was threatened by a tramway to be constructed over their tunnel (†). On the same principle the electrification of an existing tramway or the construction of an electric tramway may give a railway company a limited locus standi in respect of possible interference with the electrical appliances of the railway (u). An unsuccessful attempt was once made to obtain for a railway company a general locus standi under Standing Order 133, which provides that "where a railway Bill contains provisions for taking or using any part of the lands, railway, stations or accommodations of another company, or for running engines or carriages upon or across the same, or for granting other facilities, such company shall be entitled to be heard upon their petition against such provisions or against the preamble and clauses of such Bill" by making it apply to the case of a tramway Bill (x). Again, where a railway company were absolute owners not only of a bridge, but also of the approaches to it and the roadway across it, and were liable to keep the whole in repair, they failed to obtain an unlimited locus standi as owners whose lands were to be taken (y). Petitioners, however, to whom a limited locus standi is allowed on the ground of interference, are entitled to oppose the preamble of the Bill on the ground that (8) North London Tramways Bill (1870), 2 Cl. & St. 82; Vale of Clyde Tramways Bill (1871), 2 Cl. & St. 137; North Metropolitan Tramways (New Works, &c.) Bill (1877), 2 Cl. & R. 56; Edinburgh Corporation Tramways Bill (1893), R. & S. 256. (t) Tramways Orders (London Street) Bill (1871), 2 Cl. & St. 198. (u) Dublin Southern District Tramways Bill (1893), R. & S. 242; Edinburgh Corporation Tramways Bill, ub. sup. (a) Vale of Clyde Tramways Bill, ub. sup. (y) Brentford, Isleworth and Twickenham Tramways Bill (1879), 2 Cl. & R. 139. the proposed interference with their works will be so Chap. II. hurtful to them as to outweigh the public expediency of the tramway (2). As might be expected, a locus standi will always be allowed to the owners of a railway against a proposal to cross their lines on the level. This point has been decided both in the case of a public railway (a) and also in that of a private railway laid across the highway by permission of the road authority (6). But it may now be taken as fairly certain, in view of four decisions of Committees in the session of 1903, that permission will not be given for the crossing of railways by electric tramways on the level, except under special circumstances; as, for instance, where the traffic on the railway is particularly light or not likely to interfere with or cause danger to the traffic on the tramway (c). Reference may also be made to the cases cited on the same points in the discussion of the locus standi of tramway companies (post, pp. 40, 43). It should be observed that in all cases of interference the rights of petitioners are not affected by the fact that they have previously opposed the scheme before the Board of Trade and obtained clauses for their own protection (d). The right of a railway company to be heard against a proposed line over one of their bridges is founded on the injury threatened to the structure, and in no way depends on Standing Order 13 (see post, p. 387) (e). It is therefore necessary for the petitioners to allege such injury or the probability of it. A mere (z) North Eastern Metropolitan Tramways Bill (1871), 2 Cl. & St. 167. (a) South London Tramways Bill (1882), 3 Cl. & R. 224. (b) Tramways Orders (No. 2) (Pontypridd and Rhondda Valley) Bill (1882), 3 Cl. & R. 241. (c) Newport Corporation Bill (1903); Leigh (Lancashire) Corporation Bill (1903); Ramsbottom (Lancashire) Urban District Council Bill (1903); Wellingborough and District Tramroads Bill (1903). See, too, post, p. 405. (d) Tramways Orders (Bury and District) Bill (1881), 3 Cl. & R. 101; Tramways Orders (No. 2) (Pontypridd and Rhondda Valley) Bill, ub. sup. (e) See North London Tramways Bill (1870), 2 Cl. & St. 82. |