Bridge case (6). Again, a thoroughfare has been held Chap. II. to be a "street" within the meaning of the Standing Order, though there were houses on one side only (e); and, finally, the Court held that the Standing Order must be no longer regarded as confined to streets in towns, but applied it to twelve houses situate on a country road (d). The question, generally, is illustrated by the decisions on the meaning of the word "street" in Public Health Act, 1875, ss. 4, 150, 157, and in sect. 156 of the same Act, now repealed and replaced by Public Health (Building in Streets) Act, 1888, s. 3. In Robinson v. Barton-Eccles Local Board (1883), 8 A. C. 798; 53 L. J. Ch. 226, Lord Selborne, L. C., thought there should be buildings on each side of a thoroughfare if it were to be regarded as a "street." See also Vestry of St. Giles, Camberwell v. Crystal Palace Co., (1892) 2 Q. B. 33; 61 L. J. Q. B. 802 (C. A.); Davis v. Greenwich District Board of Works, [1895] 2 Q. B. 219; 64 L. J. M. C. 257 (C. A.); and Attorney-General v. Rufford, [1899] 1 Ch. 537; 68 L. J. Ch. 179. It was argued unsuccessfully in two early cases (e) that the Standing Order was not intended to protect persons who were bare owners of property on the proposed route, and that they must be treated as they would be in the case of a railway-that is to say, be granted a locus if any of their land was taken, but not otherwise. It seems clear, however, from the words of the Standing Order, that persons who merely receive the rack-rent are within it, provided that they are injuriously affected in the use or enjoyment of (b) Tramways Orders (No. 3) (London South District) Bill (1882), 3 Cl. & R. 242. (c) Edinburgh Northern Tramways Bill (1884), 3 Cl. & R. 397; compare Simmonds v. Fulham Vestry, (1900) 2 Q. B. 188; 69 L. J. Q. B. 360. (d) Tramways Orders (No. 2) (Somerton, Keinton-Mandeville and Castle Cary) Bill (1893), R. & S. 310. (e) London Street Tramways Bill (1870), 2 Cl. & St. 85; Tramways Orders (No. 3) (Bury and District) Bill (1881), 3 Cl. & R. 101. Chap. II. their premises, for instance, in the amount of rent they may be able to obtain. But the words of the Standing Order, as was pointed out in the latter of the cases above cited, are "house, shop or warehouse," and, in the case of a bare owner, the Court would probably be inclined to construe the words more strictly than in the case of an occupier. The word "lessees" now appears in the Standing Order, and the controversy is therefore closed as to whether non-resident lessees are entitled to a locus standi. It would be difficult, however, for a lessee who had sub-let the property for the whole of his term to make out his claim to be heard (ƒ). The admission of frontagers to a locus standi against extension of time Bills is reasonable in principle, and will be granted where the extension of time threatens any increase of injurious affection (g). In the former of these cases a limited locus standi was allowed to frontagers against clauses authorising new works (such as construction of sidings and crossingplaces), and also against clauses authorising the use of steam locomotive power. The right of frontagers to be heard against the introduction of steam on an existing line was admitted by the promoters in one case and granted by the Court in another (h). A railway company has been refused a locus under the Standing Order against a Bill to authorise the use of electric power on an existing tramway, on the ground that the Standing Order "contemplates something to be done at the inception of a tramway, not some improvement of it after it has been constructed" (i). But doubt is thrown on this decision by recent cases where the locus standi of frontagers has (ƒ) Tramways Orders (London Street) Bill (1874), 1 Cl. & R. 118. (g) Edinburgh Street Tramways Bill (1873), 1 Cl. & R. 16; North Metropolitan Tramways Bill (1874), 1 Cl. & R. 111. (h) North Metropolitan Tramways Bill (1874), ub. sup. ; South Devon Railway Bill (1874), 1 Cl. & R. 115. (i) Dublin Southern District Tramways Bill (1893), R. & S. 242, been granted or admitted under similar circum- Chap. II. stances (k), and it is consonant with reason that frontagers should be heard on a Bill proposing a change which obviously may affect the value or convenience of their property very considerably. By the words of the Standing Order the frontager's locus standi is expressly limited to his allegations, and his allegations are confined to the personal injury threatened to him in respect of his premises or business. With such a limited locus the petitioner is not, as a rule, at liberty to raise general objections to the policy of allowing tramways in streets. He is not, however, confined to the actual injury-by obstruction or what not-likely to arise immediately opposite his own premises, but he is free to deal with every annoyance or damage inflicted upon him by the presence of a tramway in his street, whether such annoyance or danger arises immediately opposite his own premises or not (1). But it will be for the Committee to determine in each case how much of their petition the petitioning frontagers will be allowed to bring forward (m). The Standing Order confers a locus as of right upon those who come within its provisions. Frontagers, therefore, are not estopped from opposing a Tramways Orders Bill by the fact that they have assented (k) Greenock and Port Glasgow Tramways Bill (1899), 1 S. &. A. 324 ; London County Council Tramways (No. 1) Bill (1900), 2 S. & A. 21. (1) North Metropolitan Tramways (New Works, &c.) Bill (1877), 2 Cl. & R. 56; King's Cross and City Tramways Bill (1878), 2 Cl. & R. 106; Southwark and Deptford Tramways Bill (1879), 2 Cl. & R. 225; London Street Tramways Extensions Bill (1882), 3 Cl. & R. 185; London Tramways (Extensions) Bill (1889), R. & M. 268. London Street Tramways (Kensington, Westminster and City Lines) Bill (1871), 2 Cl. & St. 188, must be regarded as no longer valid on this point; and North Metropolitan Tramways Bill (1871), 2 Cl. & St. 175, where a general locus was allowed, was disapproved of in Paddington, St. John's Wood and Holborn Street Tramways Bill (1871), 2 Cl. & St. 193. (m) London County Council (Tramways and Street Widenings) Bill (1901), 2 S. & A. 59, Chap. II. to the scheme before the Board of Trade (n); nor will the Court take into consideration that provisions have been inserted by the Board of Trade for the petitioners' protection (o). On the same principle it is immaterial that the petitioners have previously petitioned the promoters in favour of the scheme (p). Again, it should be observed that the rights of frontagers, unlike those of "inhabitants" (see next page), exist independently of the action or abstention of the local authorities (q). The Court will select from a number of petitioners those who are entitled to be heard under the Standing Order and grant them a locus (r). The allegations inserted in a petition under this Standing Order must be of sufficient particularity to give the petitioner a title to a locus standi (s), but it is not necessary to use the precise terms of the Standing Order so long as the effect is sufficiently stated (t) and such interference is alleged as will justify a locus standi under the Standing Order (u). The locus standi of a petitioner has been disallowed because hethough in fact a frontager in respect of certain property-alleged injurious affection, not of this property, but of other property in respect to which he was not a frontager (2); and also where the petitioners did not allege that they would themselves be affected individually or collectively in the conduct of their trade (n) Tramways Orders (No. 2) (North-East Metropolitan) Bill (1880), 2 Cl. & R. 316. (o) Tramways Orders (City of London and Metropolitan) Bill (1881), 3 Cl. & R. 105. (p) Tramways Orders (London Street) Bill (1874), 1 Cl. & R. 118. (q) Edinburgh Street Tramways Bill (1873), 1 Cl. & R. 16; Tramways Orders (North-East Metropolitan) Bill, ub. sup. (r) Bexhill and St. Leonards Tramroads Bill (1899), 1 S. & A. 303. (8) North Metropolitan Tramways Bill (1870), 2 Cl. & St. 89; London Street Tramways Bill (1871), 2 Cl. & St. 181. (t) Paddington, St. John's Wood and Holborn Street Tramways Bill (1871), 2 Cl. & St. 193. (u) North Metropolitan Tramways Bill (1871), 2 Cl. & St. 175. or business, or that they lived and carried on business Chap. II. in any street through which the tramways would run (y). The Court will permit the amendment of verbal errors in a petition (z). IV. Of Inhabitants. By Standing Order 134, "It shall be competent to the referees on private Bills to admit the petitioners, being the municipal or other authority having the local management of the metropolis or of any town, or the inhabitants of any town or district alleged to be injuriously affected by a Bill, to be heard against such Bill, if they shall think fit." Cases of petitions by inhabitants, as such, against tramway Bills are not very common. It is the practice of the Referees to read the Standing Order distributively as between the local authorities and the inhabitants, so that if the former appear the latter are not allowed a locus standi (a). In a case before the passing of Tramways Act, 1870, 13,679 petitioners, who were ratepayers in the district through which tramways were proposed, and in many cases frontagers, and who all had a right to use the public streets over which the tramways were to run, were allowed a general locus standi (b). There is no special magic in the words "town or district" in the Standing Order, but a locus will only be granted to persons who inhabit the area affected by the proposed tramways. Such area may be regarded as extending beyond the termini of the tramways if there is, in fact, injurious affection (c). The fact that a tramway (y) Tramways Orders (No. 1) (Pontypridd Urban District Council) Bill (1901), 2 S. & A. 84. (z) King's Cross and City Tramways Bill (1878), 2 Cl. & R. 108. (a) Edinburgh Street Tramways Bill (1873), 1 Cl. & R. 16. (b) Liverpool Tramways Bill (1868), 1 Cl. & St. 142; 19 L. T. (N. S.) 55. (c) London Tramways (Extensions) Bill (1889), R. & M. 268. |