purchase them under Tramways Act, 1870. The Chap. II. petitioners were held to be sufficiently protected by other provisions of the Bill (n).

VII. Of Gas and Water Companies.

It was held for some time that sect. 30 of Tramways Act, 1870, provided sufficient protection for gas and water companies, and that they were not entitled to a locus standi for the purpose of obtaining further protection (0), though in one case a very limited locus standi was granted to a water company by consent (p). This doctrine has been considerably modified. Soon after the above cases a locus was granted to two water companies against a clause authorising certain widenings, on the ground that it was doubtful whether sect. 30 afforded sufficient protection in such cases (7). A locus was allowed to water and gas companies against a clause authorising cable haulage, because such a mode of propulsion was not contemplated when sect. 30 was enacted (r).

A model clause was framed by a Joint Committee in 1893 for the purpose of meeting any injury caused by the use of electrical motive power; but it has been held, in the case both of water and gas companies, that a locus standi may be allowed against clauses authorising the use of mechanical power in spite of the insertion of this model clause in the Bill, and in spite of the protection afforded by the Tramways Act (s). But no doubt the Court will consider in each case

(n) Burnley Corporation (Tramways, &c.) Bill (1898), 1 S. & A. 232. (0) Lea Bridge, Leyton and Walthamstow Tramways Bill (1881), 3 Cl. & R. 72.

(p) North London Tramways Bill (1884), 3 Cl. & R. 450.

(1) Brentford and District Tramways Bill (1885), R. & M. 6.

(r) Edinburgh Street Tramways Bill (1893), R. & S. 262; and compare Tramways Orders (No. 2) (Bristol Tramways Extension) Bill (1891), R. & S. 160.

(s) Kidderminster and Stourport Electric Tramways Bill (1896), 1 S. & A. 108 (gas); St. Helens Corporation Bill (1898), 1 S. & A. 282 (water).

Chap. II. whether the clause and Act do in fact provide sufficient protection, and, if so, a locus may be refused (t) or granted (u) accordingly. accordingly. The possibility that the powers sought by a Bill will involve an increase of the rate of speed, and consequently of vibra tion, is not sufficient to give a gas company a locus ́standi (x).

VIII. Of Telephone Companies.

A telephone company will be granted a locus against a Bill seeking authority for the use of mechanical (which may include electrical) power for the purpose of obtaining the insertion of protective clauses, if the usual model clauses have not already been inserted (y), but not, as a rule, if they have (z). In cases where the telephone company has not opposed the original authorisation of mechanical power, owing to the defective state in which scientific knowledge was at the time, they have been allowed to appear in order to obtain protective clauses in subsequent Bills dealing with the tramways in question, though such Bills merely sought extension of time, power to transfer tramways to a corporation, or power for a corporation to work tramways (a).

IX. Of Omnibus and Cab Proprietors.

It is only reasonable that omnibus proprietors should be allowed a locus standi against tramway Bills. Tram

(t) Airdrie and Coatbridge Tramways Bill (1900), 2 S. & A. 3.
(u) London United Tramways Bill (1901), 2 S. & A. 60.

(x) Dublin Southern District Tramways Bill (1898), 1 S. & A. 240.
(y) Barry Railway Bill (1893), R. & S. 242; Widnes and Runcorn
Bridge Bill (1900), 2 S. & A. 34.

(2) London United Tramways Bill (1901), 2 S. & A. 62; Worcester Tramways Bill (1901), 2 S. & A. 86.

(a) Folkestone, Sandgate and Hythe Tramways Bill (1891), R. & S. 102; Blackpool Improvement Bill (1892), R. & S. 167; Leeds Corporation (Consolidation and Improvement) Bill (1893), R. & S. 281.

ways not only introduce a serious element of competi- Chap. II.
tion against omnibuses, but obviously cause them
considerable inconvenience by occupying the choicest
portion of the roadway. The proprietors of omni-
buses, then, clearly have an interest distinct from and
not represented by any other person or authority who
uses or has power over the roadway. The Referees

have recognized their right to a locus in several cases
both before and after Tramways Act, 1870 (b). And
the same principle has now been extended and applied
to Bills for the conversion of horse tramways into
electric tramways, on the ground that competition
may be thereby increased (c). But a possible future
increase of competition due to the working of tram-
ways by a corporation has been held not to be a
ground for granting a locus standi to omnibus pro-
prietors against a Bill by which powers for such work-
ing were sought (d).

It has been held, in the only case on the subject, that cab proprietors are, unlike omnibus proprietors, not entitled to a locus standi, but the logic of this decision seems open to question, though no doubt the competition in their case is less tangible (e).

X. Of Miscellaneous Petitioners.

The trustees of a market usually held in A. Street, who had powers to station the market carts in B. Street if A. Street were not available for any reason, were allowed a locus standi against Bills for tramways along A. Street and B. Street respectively, and the salesmen who made their living by the market, and the lord of

(b) Liverpool Tramways Bill (1868), 1 Cl. & St. 120; 19 L. T. (N. S.) 55 ; London Street Tramways Bill (1870), 2 Cl. & St. 87; Edinburgh Street Tramways Bill (1871), 2 Cl. & St. 130; Woolwich and Plumstead Tramways Order Bill (1880), 2 Cl. & R. 321.

(c) London County Council Tramways (No. 1) Bill (1900), 2 S. & A. 19. (d) Birkenhead Corporation Bill (1897), 1 S. & A. 148.

(e) Woolwich and Plumstead Tramways Order Bill, ub. sup.

Chap. II. the manor, who was interested in the tolls and owned the soil of A. Street, were allowed a locus standi against the proposed tramway along A. Street, in addition to the local street authorities (ƒ). The lessee of a market abutting on the proposed route, who had a right to station market carts in the street, was given a locus standi as possessing interests of a special and exceptional kind which were substantially affected by the Bill (g).

The owners of a sea-wall which supported the proposed route were given a general locus standi in addition to the local road authority, with whom they had made an agreement for the upkeep of the wall, as having a distinct interest (h).

A householder on the line of route will not be allowed to appear against an extension of time Bill on the ground that he has been inconvenienced and his expectations have been disappointed by the noncompletion of the tramway (¿).

Under special circumstances ratepayers and traders on the route were refused a locus standi against an amalgamation Bill, but the case is of little value as a precedent, the ground of refusal being that an existing lease had already had the effect of amalgamating the tramways for all practical purposes, and the proposed Bill, therefore, did not affect the status of the petitioners (k).

With regard to dissentient shareholders, it has been decided that Standing Orders 131 and 132 (post, p. 403) must be construed as giving separate grounds of locus standi. A shareholder may appear either if he has a distinct interest or if he attends the Wharncliffe meet

(f) North Metropolitan Tramways Bill (1870), 2 Cl. & St. 90; Commercial Road East (Tramways) Bill (1871), 2 Cl. & St. 168.

(g) North Metropolitan Tramways Bill (1886), R. & M. 122. (Standing Order 135 had at that time not been amended so as to include lessees.) (h) Edinburgh Northern Tramways Bill (1884), 3 Cl. & R. 397. (i) Great Northern Railway (Ireland) Bill (1900), 2 S. & A. 10. (k) Dublin United Tramways Co. Bill (1881), 3 Cl. & R. 38.

ing and dissents, and only one of these qualifications Chap. II.
is necessary, not both (1). But the Wharncliffe meet-
ing, if dissent at it is to qualify a shareholder under
Standing Order 132, must be a proper one; it is not
enough that it is declared to be held in pursuance of
the Standing Orders, if it is not a Wharncliffe
meeting in fact (m).

In conclusion, it may be noted that the fact that a proposed tramway is intended to be only temporary does not affect the question of locus standi (n).

B. Locus Standi of Tramways.

I. Against Tramway Bills.

The Court of Referees treats the proprietors of a tramway as not merely possessing an easement over a public way, but as having acquired rights, on the faith of which they have expended money, analogous to those of a railway company, and consequently as entitled to be heard in a proper case against other persons who apply for similar or identical privileges (o). But the interest of the petitioners in the tramway, in respect of which they petition, must be already vested (p). In one case beneficial assignees of a tramway lease were given a locus as well as the lessees, though such an assignment is unknown to Tramways Act, 1870 (g). Competition is the most obvious ground for a petition, but the Court will not allow a locus unless the alleged competition is shown

(1) Liverpool Tramways Bill (1880), 2 Cl. & R. 273; South Staffordshire Tramway Bill (1899), 1 S. & A. 340.

(m) Edinburgh Corporation Bill (1897), 1 S. & A. 161.

(n) Midland Railway Bill (1880), 2 Cl. & R. 296.

(0) Tramways Orders (No. 2) (North-East Metropolitan) Bill (1880), 2 Cl. & R. 317.

(p) Liverpool Tramways Bill (1880), 2 Cl. & R. 270.

(1) Edinburgh Street Tramways Bill (1896), 1 S. & A. 84.