ས་ parties. This allegation may be listened to; but I can sons, Samuel and John Swanton, but subject to lega harbour no such extenuation for the fraudulent trader cies and charges. He then bequeathed £500 to each himself. One leading principle of this court should of his four daughters, Mary, Rachael, Jane, and Franbe, as far as its influence goes, to instil into trade, as ces Anne Swanton, to be paid to them respectively, its own best protection, honour and truth in its deal- on their respective days of marriage, but not before; ings, and free and full confidence in all its disclosures. provided that such of my daughters that shall marry, The perils of trade are necessarily numerous, the failure should marry with the consent and approbation of of the best founded hopes happen often without blame; their mother, my wife, Jane, but not otherwise; and but if honesty be observed, and faith kept in trade, in case of any one or more of my said daughters marthe sinking man who needs protection finds always in rying without such consent and approbation, then the misfortune forbearance and good feeling in those even sum so beqeathed to such daughter or daughters, marwho suffer most heavily by him. But when the dis. rying without such consent, shall go to such daughter closures show to the court the violations of truth and or daughters that shall marry with such consent and honesty and the breach of mercantile faith, it is then approbation; if more than one share and share alike my duty to act to the extent the law gives me power, between them, and if but one such daughter, then to and vindicate trade and commerce from the mean, the such only daughter and my will is that if any of dishonest, and the fraudulent practices attempted and my said daughters shall happen to die unmarried, or, if exposed. I therefore set aside this certificate and remarried, without such consent and approbation as mit the case to bankruptcy, the latter order not to aforesaid, then the sum so bequeathed to her or take effect for a fortnight. them respectively, so dying or marrying without such consent, shall go and be paid to the survivors or survivor of them, in equal shares, at such time or times of their marriage with such consent aforesaid." Then followed directions that immediately after testator's decease the interest on these several legacies should be paid to his wife to be applied by her for the maintenance and support of his four daughters until their respective marriages with such consent. Then followed a bequest over from the sons, in case they should marry without the consent of their mother. The testator died soon after making his will. In 1836 Mary, the eldest daughter, with the consent of her mother, married Thomas Hegarty, to whom her legacy of £500 was paid, and died the following year, Court of Appeal in Chancery. Reported by R. Ruxton Bolton, Esq., Barrister-at-law. [BEFORE THE LORD CHANCELLOR, THE LORD JUSTICE of Appeal, and MR. JUSTICE O'BRIEN.] M'BLAIN v. SWANTON-May 12. Constuction of will—Survivor or survivors read other leaving a son, John Clarke Swanton Hegarty, in or others- Vesting of legacies. ·Legacies were bequeathed to A., B., C., and D., to be paid to them on their marriage, but in case any of them married without the consent of their mother, then a gift over to the others; "and if any of them should die unmarried, or marry without such consent, then the sum so bequeathed should go and be paid to the survivors or survivor of them." A. married with consent, and dying left B., C., and D. surviving, who all died unmarried. Held, that A's personal representative was entitled to the three several legacies, and that the words survivors or survivor in the will ought to be read others or other. whose right this petition was filed by M'Blain, acting From THIS was an appeal from a decretal order made by the Lord Chancellor in December, 1863, which declared that the petitioner, Robert M'Blain, as personal representative of Mary Hegarty, deceased, was entitled to three several legacies of £500 each, bequeathed by the will of John Clarke Swanton, deceased to his daughters Rachael, Jane, and Frances A. Swanton, with interest thereon at the rate of £5 per cent. per annum, and that the said legacies and interest thereon were charged on the premises by the will of said tes-port of the decree below. The question may be nartator, devised and bequeathed to his two sons, Samuel Swanton, and the present appellant, John Swanton." John Clarke Swanton, by his will bearing date 14th Feb. 1835, devised certain hereditaments to his two The Solicitor General (with him M Blain) in sap rowed to one of construction as to this clause of the will. To give consistency to this will, the words survivor or survivors must be read other or others; the clear intention of the testator was that these lega cies should be a provision for his daughters marrying with their mother's consent; survivor means one who outlives another person, not an event; it was the event that the testator contemplated; therefore the words must be read other or others; the first clause of the will as to marriage without consent is incorporated with the next clause as to dying unmarried; there would be an anomaly in reading the words strictly, for if a daughter died unmarried under the first clause, the representatives of Mary Hegarty would take a part of the legacy, while, under the second clause it would go to the survivors only. The subsequent devises to the sons also lead to the construction for which we contend-Hawkins v. Hamerton (16 Sim. 410); Aicken v. Brooks (7 Sim. 204; 2 Jarman, 653). These legacies were vested, subject to be divested on the happening of an event-Vize v. Stoney (1 Dru. & War. 337); Hanson v. Groham (6 Ves. 239.) Brewster, Q.C. (with him Warren, Q. C., and Bagot for the appellant. The testator in this clause has expressed his intention that not one of their legacies should vest until the happening of a certain event, they were to be paid on the day of marriage, but not before; this was a contingency that might never arise, and never did arise, therefore, these legasies are not vested—Atkins v. Hiccocks (1 Atk. 500.) Warren, Q.C., on the same side. These legacies are not vested, and cannot now be vested, the contingency not having arisen-Atkins v. Hiccocks. In Vize v. Stoney it could not be contended that legacies vested, unless for the interest being given; here the interest is not necessarily given-Bolton v. Bolton (12 I. Chan. R. 233.) For the true construction of the will, the reference in the second clause to being married without consent, must be struck out as superfluous. THE LORD CHANCELLOR.-It would be inconsistent with the evident intention of this will to adopt the corstruction pressed by the appellants. To do so their counsel has to admit that a sentence of the will would have to be rejected as superfluous; but we can arrive at the meaning by another construction more in accordance with the terms of the will, and that construction must be adopted. THE LORD JUSTICE OF APPEAL.-The words "survivor or survivors" must bear their natural meaning, unless when explained by the context. From the context in this will it is plain that the words "other or others" is meant. There are two distinct clauses. In the first "other or others " is meant; the terms of the second show that there is no change in the intention, therefore, it must be read in the same way; any other construction would be a contradiction of itself. O'BRIEN, J., concurred. Order below affirmed accordingly. Court of Queen's Bench. [Reported by William Woodlock, Esq,, Barrister-at-Law.] MICHAEL MURPHY AND CHARLES HENRY JAMES, OFFICIAL ASSIGNEES, AND JAMES WHELAN, TRADE ASSIGNEE OF JOHN SKELLY, A BANKRUPT v. KEEFE.—December 17, 1863; February 17, 1864. Bankrupt-Warrant of attorney-Judgment-Stat. 3 & 4 Vict., c. 105, s. 12; Stat. 20 & 21 Vict., c. 60, s. 334. A. gives B. a warrant of attorney to confess judgment, which is not filed as required by stat. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 60, s. 34, but within twenty-one days after the execution of the warrant judgment is marked, and the judgment registered under stat. 7 & 8 Vict., c. 90. The amount of the debt having been levied by sale of A.'s goods under a writ of fi. fa. issued on the judgment so marked, and A. having subsequently become bankrupt, Held (per Hayes and O'Brien, J.J.,) that an action would not lie against B. at the suit of his assignees by reason of the sale, either in the form of trespass, trover, detinue, or money had and received; and (per Fitzgerald, J.,) that it would not lie in the form of trespass, trover, or detinue, but would lie in the form of money had and received to the use of the assignees. DEMURRER: In the first paragraph of the summons and plaint, the plaintiffs, as assignees of John Skelly, a bankrupt, complained that the defendant converted to his own use the goods of the plaintiffs as such assignees of the said John Skelly, a bankrupt, that is to say (setting out the goods), to the value of £1,000. In the second paragraph, the plaintiffs, as such assignees, complained that the defendant, before the said John Skelly became a bankrupt, converted to his own use the goods of the said John Skelly, a bankrupt, to the damage of the plaintiffs, as such assignees, of £1,000. In the third paragraph, the plaintiffs, as such assignees, complained that the defendant, before the said John Skelly became a bankrupt, seized and took the goods of the said John Skelly, a bankrupt, and carried away the same and disposed of them to his own use, to the damage of plaintiffs, as such assignees, of £1,000. In the fourth paragraph the plaintiffs, as such assignees, complained that the defendant detained the goods and chattels of the said plaintiffs as such assignees, to the damage of the plaintiffs, as such assignees, of £1,000. The fifth paragraph was for £1,000 money payable by the defendant to the plaintiffs for money received by the defendant for the use of the plaintiffs. To this the defendant by way of defence, which, to avoid prolixity, he craved might be taken as pleaded separately to each of the counts in the summons and plaint respectively, pleaded that before the commission of the said acts, or any of them complained of, and before the said John Skelly had been adjudged a bankrupt, he, the defendant, theretofore, to wit, on the 5th day of April, 1862, and in or as of Hilary Term, 1862, by the consideration and judgment of her Majesty's Court of Common Pleas in Ireland, to wit, at Dublin, recocovered against the said John Skelly a certain debt of £1,207 Os. 4d. besides £2 2s. 8d. damages by reason of the detaining of said debt, together with £1 costs of registration as by record of said Court appeared and that on the day next after the execution of the bond, the said judgment was duly entered and signed. and afterwards in pursuance of, and in conformity with the provisions of the Irish Bankrupt and Insol vent Act, 1857, duly registered within twenty one days from the entering and signing of the said judgment, in the proper, office of the registrar of judgments, which said judgment was duly entered in the said last mentioned court, and duly registered pursuant to the provisions of the Act of the 7th and 8th Vict., c. 90; and the defendant averred that after-fess judgment in a personal action executed to the dewards, and before the said John Skelly became or was adjudged bankrupt, and whilst he was in posses sion of the said goods and chattels, to wit, on the 17th day of February, 1863, he, the said defendant, in order to obtain payment of the said judgment, which was infull force and unsatisfied, sued out a certain writ of our lady the Queen, called a writ of fieri facias, directed to the sheriff of the county of the city of Dublin, whereby the said sheriff was commanded that of the goods and chattels of the said John Skelly in his bailiwick, he should cause to be levied the debt, damages, and costs aforesaid, and which said writ was afterwards, and before the delivery thereof to the sheriff, marked to levy £546 12s. 10d., certified to be due on foot of the aforesaid judgment; and the defendant averred that afterwards, and before the said John Skelly became a bankrupt, to wit, on the 17th day of February, 1863, said writ was delivered to the said sheriff to be duly executed, and thereupon, by virtue of said writ, and in due execution thereof, the said sheriff did afterwards and before the said John Skelly became a bankrupt, to wit, on the 17th day of February, 1863, in order to levy the money's by the said indorsement on the said writ directed to be levied, lawfully seize and take in execution certain goods and chattels of the said John Skelly then being and found within his bailiwick (which said goods and chattels so seized were the same and the only goods in the summons and plaint mentioned); and the defendant averred that afterwards, by virtue of said writ, and in due execution thereof, and before the return thereof, and before the filing of any petition in bankruptcy against the said John Skelly, the said sheriff sold the said goods and chattels in the said plaint mentioned, and by such sale made and levied the sum of £383 5s. 3d. towards satisfaction of the said debt, damages, and costs aforesaid, and that before or at the times of the said seizure and sale or either of them, the defendant had not notice of any prior act of bankruptcy by the said John Skelly committed; and the defendant averred that the said judgment was, at the said lastmentioned times, and still was, in full force and effect, and that the said goods and chattels so seized as aforesaid, and none others, were those mentioned and referred to in the said plaint, and that the said moneys so levied aforesaid under and by virtue of said writ, were all paid to the defendant long previous to the filing of the said petition under which the plaintiffs were so appointed assignees as aforesaid, and before the defendant had notice of any act of bankruptcy, which were the said several causes of action in the plaint complained of; and the defendant averred that save as aforesaid, and by causing the said writ of fieri facias to be so sued forth as aforesaid, and thereby causing the said goods to be so seized and sold thereunder, as he lawfully might as aforesaid, he in nowise committed the said acts so complained of in the said summons and plaint, nor did he receive any money for the use of the said plaintiffs. To this defence the plaintiffs replied, that the writ of fieri facias in the said defence mentioned was sued out upon a judgment entered up on the 5th day of April, 1862, by the said defendant against the said John Skelly upon and by virtue of a certain warrant of attorney to confendant by the said John Skelly after the passing and commencement of the statute of the 20th and 21st Vict., c. 60, to wit, on the 4th day of April, 1862; and the plaintiffs averred that the said warrant of attorney, or a true copy thereof, and of the attestation thereof, was not within twenty-one days next after the execution of the said warrant of attorney, filed together with an affidavit of the time of the execution thereof, with the proper officer in her Majesty's Court of Common Pleas in Ireland, in which Court the said judgment was entered upon the said warrant of attorney; and the plaintiffs averred that a petition of bankruptcy was duly filed against the said John Skelly in the Court of Bankruptcy and Insolvency in Ireland, upon which petition the said John Skelly was afterwards, to wit, on the 20th day of March, 1863, duly adjudged a bankrupt; and the plaintiffs averred that by reason of the premises, the said warrant of attorney was, and must be deemed and taken to be, null and void, and of no effect in law, and the said judgment so entered up under and by virtue thereof, and also the writ of fieri facias in said defence mentioned, as well as the sale thereunder, were, and must be deemed and taken to be, null and void to all intents and purposes whatsoever. To this replication the defendant demurred, on the grounds-1st. That inasmuch as the said replication admitted that the the said judgment was duly registered in pursuance of and in conformity with the provisions of the Irish Bankrupt and Insolvent Act, 1857, in the proper office of the registrar of judgments within twentyone days from the entering and signing thereof, there was no necessity that there should be an affidavit of the time of the execution of the warrant of attorney filed together with the said warrant. 2nd. That the said replication stated no facts from which it could be necessarily inferred that the said judgment which had been thereby admitted to have been as in the defence stated, in full force at the times of the seizure and sale, and the writ of fieri facias which issued thereon, or the sale so made thereunder, could be deemed or taken to have become null and void when the said John Skelly was adjudged bankrupt. 3rd. That it was in nowise averred or shewn that the said John Skelly was, at the times of entering and signing said judgment, which was so duly registered as in defence stated in accordance with the usual and well-established practice in Ireland, or the giving of the said warrant, or at any time, a trader, and subject to the operation of the laws in force in Ireland relating to bankrupts. 4th. That the said warrant of attorney had been duly acted on and exhausted, and all the v. Daniel (10 B. & Cr. 500). All the cases are colacts justified by the said defence done, and the mo- lected in Conlan v. M'Anaspie (10 Ir. L. R., 295). neys therein mentioned received, long before the ad- Bryan v. Child (5 Exch. 369), which was decided judication in the said replication mentioned. 5th. upon section 137 of the analogous English Act, 12 & That the said acts in the defence justified, and now 13 Vict. c. 106, shews that the judgment is valid admitted to have been valid and legal at the time against the trader himself, and is a strong authority when the said acts were respectively done and com- in favour of the defendant on this point. The argumitted, could in nowise be deemed to have been sub-ment on the Irish Act is even stronger, as the words sequently rendered void and wrongful by the facts in of the English Act are merely "null and void." the said replication stated and relied upon. 6th. That Those of the Irish Act are, "fraudulent, null, and as the said execution had been issued, and bona fide void." How can the transaction be fraudulent against executed and levied by seizure and sale, and the said the trader himself? Even stronger words in the 9th proceeds thereof paid to the defendaut before the filing Anne, c. 14, s. 1, have been held to prevent the inof the said petition, and the defendant had not at the dorse from suing the drawer of a bill given for a sum respective times of the issuing of the said execution, of money won by gaming.-Edwards v. Dick (4 B. or of said seizure or sale, any notice of any prior acts & Ald., 242). There is a class of cases shewing how of bankruptcy by the said Skelly committed, the said the Courts will construe statutes in ease of the public, sale and transaction were made valid and protected and will not permit a party to avoid his own contract, by the 328th section of the Irish Bankrupt and Insol- even though a statute in certain cases declares it to vent Act. 7th. That the said warrant of attorney be null and void.—Lincoln College Case (3 Co. 53 & which was given collateral with the bond of the said | 59, b.); Malins v. Freeman (4 Bingh. N. C. 395); John Skelly, was not a warrant of attorney to confess Rex v. Inhabitants of St. Nicholas in Ipswich (Burr. judgment in a personal action within the meaning of Settlement Cases, 91). In Turquand v. Armstrong the 334th section of the said Act. 8th. That even (9 Ir. C. L. R. 92), the word "void " was held to if the said judgment became void and of no effect mean "voidable " only on election; and this option when said Skelly was adjudged bankrupt, yet as no or election, when so exercised, has no relation back demand of the proceeds received by the defendant from so as to avoid the act done ab initio. It is now well the said sale had been averred or shewn, the plaintiffs established that in cases of fraudulent preference the could not now sustain this action. 9th. That the said property vests until the assignees make a demand, and replication was a departure, and that it in no way thus divest the property previously vested in the transtraversed or confessed and avoided as to each count feree, and then the title will not operate by relation, the facts stated in and relied on in the defence so but only from the time when the demand was made.— pleaded separately and distributively to the said Stephenson v. Newenham (13 C. B., 302); Morecauses of action so respectively stated in the said wood v. South Yorkshire Railway (3 H. & N., 797). counts. 10th. That by said replication plaintiffs did But even if these words are to be treated as meaning not maintain their plaint in each and every count, and "absolutely void from the commencement," the assignees also that said replication was in other respects insuf- could not maintain this action. From what and when ficient. And the defendant also noted in the demur- did their title arise? It arises from the words of the rer books that he would rely, if necessary, that the statute, and not until their appointment could they be plaint was bad for misjoinder. entitled to the property. What the assignees became entitled to, is the property at the time of the bankruptcy, qualified by the doctrine of relation in the statute. They also take the rights of action of the bankrupt-ss. 267 and 268 of 20 & 21 Vict. c. 60. there has been an antecedent act of bankruptcy, the title will relate back to it. Then assuming that the word "void" is to be read "void so as to enable the assignees to avoid the transaction if they choose," that would not enable them to succeed here, as they have neither the property, nor the right to the property. This was a transaction antecedent to the act of bankruptcy. It is expressly decided that in such a case trover will not lie. Brook v. Mitchell (8 Sc. 739); Young v. Billiter (8 H. of L. 682). If the warrant becomes void, when does it so become void? On the first of the twenty-one days, or at the end of them? The defendant submits not till the end, and that the judgment being entered up on the warrant within the twenty-one days, and the warrant being then good, the judgment itself is good also.-Banbury v. White (11W. R.785; s.c. 2 H. & C. 300). Then as to the fifth count, which is for money had and received, there are two grounds of objection to this. The first is a formal one, that this is stated to be money had and received to the use of the plaintiffs, without saying to their use as as P. Martin (with him D. C. Heron, Q.C.,) for the defendant. The contention of the assignees is founded on a misapprehension of s. 334 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. That section must be read in connection with the previous provisions of st. 3 & 4 Vic. c. 105, which is not repealed. Sections 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 105, are those which bear on the question. The object of the Legislature in passing them was to prevent a trader from appearing richer than he really was, and to force the person obtaining the judgment against him to give notice to all the world of his debt. That is effected by the entering of the judgment, and its registration in Scriven's Office. The argument on the other side must go this length, that if a person not being a trader gives a warrant to confess judgment, and judgment is entered and execution had upon it, and ten years after he becomes a trader and bankrupt, the judgment and execution are void as against his assignees if the warrant has not been filed. To support this argument it must be shown that the judgment becomes null and void, not merely as against the assignees, but as against the trader himself. That view of the statute cannot be supported; it is opposed to authority-Morris v. Mellin (6 B. & Cr. 446); Bennett If signees. Then secondly, this not being a wrongfal v. Campbell (2 Wm. Bl. 827); Notley v. Buck act as against the assignees, how can it be said that any money was received to their use? The observations of Cresswell, J., in his judgment in Billiter v. Young (6 El. & Bl. at p. 27) are important on this point; he plainly considered that if an action of trover would not lie, neither would an action for money had and received-Nicholson v. Gooch (5 El. & Bl. 999); Pennell v. Aston (14 M. & W., 415). There is a traverse of the money had and received at the end of the defence. The replication is general to the whole defence, and if it fails as to part, it is bad as to all. [O'Brien, J.—We decided in Mercer v. O'Reilly that such a replication was to be taken distributively.] Trueman v. Hurst (1 T. R 40). Meldon and Barry, Q.C., for the plaintiffs. If sec. 334 is to have any force, the warrant and judgment thereon are void against others than the assignees. Acraman v. Herniman (16 Q. B., 998), on the 136th section of the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, is identical with the present case.-Dillon v. Edwards (2 Mo. & P., 550). Billiter v. Young (o El. & Bl. 1 ; s. c. 8 H. of L., 682) is clearly in our favour. Orr v. Devin (9 Ir. C. L. R. 100) is an answer to any argument that though the warrant may be bad, the judgment may yet remain valid. R sh v. Baker (Str, 995); Somerset v. Jervis (3 Br. & Bingh. 2); Nickson v. Whitsitt (1 H. Bl. 135). On the authority of these cases, trover may be maintained. The warrant of attorney being void, the goods were the property of the bankrupt, and passed to the assignees. If pleas of conconfession were to be taken as being thesame as warrants of attorney, there would be much difficulty in our way; but there is a marked difference between them, and sections 333, 334, 335, and 336, deal with them as distinct things. Section 333, in connection with the decision in Orr v. Devin, is conclusive that trover will lie. The question is, whether entering judgment within twenty-one days after the execution of the warrant does away with the necessity of filing the warrant and affidavit. We say it does not: the words of section 334 are too strong to be overcome, and there is nothing in any of the subsequent sections to override the declaration of nullity and voidness contained in it. If the argument on the other side is correct, we might strike out s. 334 altogether from the Act. Section 336 is a general section applying to all judgments; the exception in it is introduced for the purpose of saving those who had filed their warrants properly the trouble of also registering their judgments. No authority can be cited to shew that the positive words of section 334 can be got rid of by any subtle implication from s. 336. If s. 336 is taken to give effect to all judgments entered and registered within twenty-one days after the execution of the warrant, s. 334 is waste paper. The section must be construed in the ordinary sense of the words. Grey v. Pearson (6 H. of L. 61). (8 B. & Cr. 160); and contended that the cognovits actionem mentioned in s. 335 were the same thing as the warrants of attorney mentioned in s. 334: and that an action for money had and received at the suit of the assignees lay only where it was given by statute, or where the act of bankruptcy occurred prior to the receipt of the money, or where being entitled to sue in trover they elected to sue for money had and received. (His Feb. 17.-FITZGERALD, J.-In this case, in which the assignees of John Kelly, a bankrupt, are plaintiffs, and John Keeffe is defendant, the question was argued before us on the 17th December, last, and arose on demurrer to the replication, involving the construction of the 334th section of the 20 & 21 Vic. c. 60, the Irish Bnnkrupt and Insolvent Act. Lordship then stated the pleadings, which have been already given, and continued): On these pleadings, as I bave said, the question arises on the construction of the 334th section, which, in effect, provides that every warrant of attorney to confess judgment in any personal action shall be filed according to the provisions of the statute 3 & 4 Vict., c. 105, and that in default the warrant shall be absolutely null and void to all intents and purposes. The 3 & 4 Vict. c. 105, s. 12, provides that every warrant of attorney to confess judgment shall, or a copy thereof shall, be filed, and with it an affidavit containing, amongst other particulars, a statement of the time of the execution of the warrant; and what the plaintiff relies upon is that, this judgment being on a warrant of attorney, though it was itself entered and registered within twenty-one days after the execution of the warrant, the warrant was not filed with the verifying affidavit required by the statute. The main question seems to be, whether according to the true construction of the 334th section of the Bankrupt and Insolvent Act, the warrant and judgment are null and void, in consequence of the warraut not being filed within twenty one days after the execution, though the judgment was entered on the warrant within the twenty-one days, and was duly registered under statute 7 & 8 Vic., c. 90. Mr. Martin, in an able and comprehensive argument contended, that though the words of the 334th sect. of the Bankrupt and Insolvent Act are, "shall be deemed fraudulent, null, and void to all intents and purposes whatsoever," yet that section, on its true construction, renders the transaction void only against the assignees in bankruptcy, and not against the trader himself; and in support of that branch of his argument, he relied on Bryan v. Child, Brook v. Mitchell, and Billiter v. Young. The inclination of my opinion is that Mr. Martin's argument on this subject is well-founded, to the extent that the intention of the Legislature was not to render the transaction void as against the debtor, but only to protect the interests of general creditors, who might be affected by secret warrants of attorney given to favour particular creditors. For reasons which will presently appear, it is not necessary to state the grounds which influence my judgment upon that subIt is enough to say that having regard to the statute and its various provisions, it appears to me that the object and intention of the Legislature in the Heron, Q.C., in reply, referred, in addition to the cases cited by Martin, to Aireton v Davis (9 Bingh. 741); Wilson v. Whitaker (Mood. & Malk. 8); Whitmore v. Greene (13 M. & W., 104); Ward v. Clarke (M. & M., 497); Cooper v. Chitty (1 Wm.ject. Bl. 65); Smith v. Milles (1 Term Rep. 475; Farrow v. Mayes (18 Q. B., 516); Hitchin |