and, therefore, she relied upon her title as mortgagee of the several lands and premises comprised in the indenture of mortgage, and as purchaser thereof for valuable consideration without notice of the said claims or any of them. By an order of the Court of Bankruptcy, bearing date the 13th of February, 1863, it was ordered by the Honorable Judge Berwick that the charge of Elizabeth Olden was well proved for the sum of £1,247 ds., with further interest on the ber, 1861, made between Frederick Olden and An- charges on the said premises charged therewith as drew William Olden, the bankrupts in this matter, of aforesaid, and prior and paramount to the interest of the one part, and Sarah Lunham, the appellant in the the bankrupts in the same premises, and to the inpresent appeal, of the other part, after reciting a lease terest of all persons claiming from or deriving from dated the 14th of April, 1845, by Mary and Anne or through the said bankrupts. And the chargeants O'Leary to Frederick Olden, his heirs and assigns, submitted that they were entitled to have the said for three lives, at the yearly rent of £28, and two premises given by the will of Robert Olden as aforeconveyances dated respectively the 21st of March said sold by order of the Court of Bankruptcy, and and 26th of May, 1859, to Frederick Olden, his the proceeds of such sale applied in payment of the heirs and assigns; and also another lease dated the costs and expenses of such sale, and in satisfaction 27th of July, 1850, by Denis O'Connor to Frederick and discharge in their aforesaid priority of the said Olden, his executors. administrators, and assigns, for chargeants' annuity, principal sums, and interest. On thirty-one years, at the yearly rent of £8, the in- the 15th of January, 1863, Sarah Lunham filed a denture continued in the following words: "And discharge to the last-mentioned charge, alleging that whereas the several parcels of ground, tenements, and she was ignorant of the several matters stated in the hereditaments, granted and demised by the several said charge, and stating moreover that at the time of indentures of lease and conveyances herein before the execution of the mortgage of the 18th of April, recited, together with certain other ground and build-1861, she was not aware, and had no notice whatever ings demised by Henry Leader, of Mount Leader, in of the alleged claims of Elizabeth Olden, Anne Olden, the County of Cork, esquire, to Robert Olden, de- | Adelaide Ölden, or Louisa Olden, or of any of them, ceased, for a term of years, whereof more than 100 years are unexpired, at a yearly rent of £31 10s. sterling, and which said last-mentioned premises ad join those comprised in the herein-before recited in dentures, and are now vested in the said Frederick Olden and Andrew William Olden, or one of them, for the residue of the term of years thereof granted by the said Henry Leader to Robert Olden, deceased, are held by the said Frederick Olden and Andrew William Olden as partnership property for the pur-principal sum until paid. By another order of the poses of their said trade or business of chandlers and soap manufacturers." And after reciting an agreement for a loan by the said Sarah Lunham to the said Frederick and Andrew William Olden of a sum of £2,000, for the purposes of their said trade or business, the premises comprised in the lease of the 20th of December, 825, were, by the said indenture of mortgage, conveyed to the appellant, Sarah Lunham, her executors, administrators, and assigns, Babject to the said rent by the following description:and all that and those the premises comprised in and demised by the indenture of lease herein-before mentioned to have been executed by Henry Leader to Robert Olden, with their appurtenances," to hold to the said Sarah Lunham by way of mortgage, to secure re payment of the said sum of £2,000 sterling, with interest for the same at the rate of £5 per cent. per annum. A petition of bankruptcy having been filed against Frederick and Andrew William Olden, and an adjudication of bankruptcy having been made, Sarah Lunham, on the 3rd of November, 1862, filed a charge in the matter of the bankruptcy, setting forth the facts relative to the above mortgage, and stating further that there was due to her on foot of the said mortgage the sum of £2,000 for principal, and the sum of £50 for one-half year's interest thereon up to the 18th of September, 1862, and charging that she was entitled to an order of the Court of Bankruptcy for a sale of the mortgaged premises. On the 15th of December, 1862, a charge was filed in the Court of Bankruptcy by Elizabeth Olden, widow, Anne Olden, Adelaide Olden, and Louisa Olden, putting forward all the facts herein-before stated, and claiming that the annuity, principal sums, and interest bereiu-before mentioned, should be held the first Court in this matter, dated the 1st of May, 1863, it was declared that the charge of Elizabeth Olden, filed on the 19th of December, 1862, was well charged on the premises in the said charge mentioned in priority to the mortgage of the said Sarah Lunham. From this order of the Court of Bankruptcy Sarah Lunham now appealed. The Solicitor-General (with whom was Brewster, Q.C., and Jones) for the appellant.-Sarah Lunham had no notice of the charges created by the will of Henry Leader, and being a purchaser for value without notice, the mortgage executed to her is entitled to priority over the claims of the respondent, Elizabeth Olden, on foot of the annuity. Jones v. Smith (1 Hare, 43) is an express authority on this point. The whole tendency of modern decisions too, is to contract rather than extend the doctrine of constructive notice. The legal estate and interest in the mortgaged premises demised by Henry Leader to Robert Olden is now vested in the appellant, and became vested at a time when she had no notice, actual or constructive, of the claims of the annuitants. The legal estate became vested by the will of Robert Olden in Frederick Olden as one of the executors and as he was a granting party to the deed of mortgage, the legal estate is now in Sarah Lunham. Heron, Q.C., (with him William M. Johnson) for the respondents.-The mortgagee was bound to examine more closely into the title before taking a mortgage of the premises, and mere negligence in not investigating the title will not put the mortgagee in a position to set up the plea of being a purchaser for valuable consideration without notice. At the time of the execution of the mortgage, the bankrupts, it is true, were in possession of the premises, but mere pos session is not in itself even prima facie evidence of title.-Dryden v. Frost (3 Myl. & Cr., 670); Moor v. Bennett (1 Eq. Ca. Abr., 33); Jackson v. Rowe (2 Sim. & St., 472); Sugden's Vendors and Purchasers, p. 790; Worthington v. Morgan (16 Sim., 547); Buckley v. Lanauze (Ll. & Gool. 327); Car ter v. Carter (3 K. & J., 639). In Hiern v. Mill (13 Ves., 119), the Lord Chancellor remarks, "There is a marked distinction in this respect between a real estate and a personal chattel. The latter is held by possession—a real estate by title. Possession of an estate is not even prima facie title. It may be by lease, or only from year to year. The cases have gone upon that distinction. Is there any instance of a purchase upon mere possession?" This was clearly wilful blindness on the part of the mortgagee. She was furnished with an abstract of title, it appears, which showed no legal title at all. The lease of 1825 was not her title deed; the will of Robert Olden was her title deed, and if she had examined it, the prior charges would have been known. mises is vested in Frederick Olden and Andrew Wil- THE LORD JUSTICE OF APPEAL.-I also concur with the judgment of the Lord Chancellor that the order of the Court of Bankruptcy must be affirmed. The W. M. Johnson on the same side, cited Jones v. Smith (1 Phill. 244): Neeson v. Clarkson (2 Hare, 163); Jones v. Williams (24 Beav. 47); Dart's Vendors and Purchasers, 3rd edition, p. 559; Gur-conduct of the appellant on the occasion of taking the ney v. Oranmore (5 Ir. Ch. Rep., 436). mortgage from the bankrupts appears deservedly to Brewster, Q.C., in reply.-The case of Jones v. merit the imputation of the grossest degree of negliSmith (1 Hare, 43), has always been recognised as a gence. Here is a person entitled to an annuity charged leading case on the subject of constructive notice, and on the interest in a long term of years which, subject was affirmed by Lord. Lyndhurst on appeal (1 Phill., to a number of other charges, is devised to the bank244); Hewitt v. Loosemore (9 Hare, 449); Attor- rupts, Frederick and Andrew William Olden. The ney-General v. Stephens (6 De G. M'N. & G., 147); executors of the will are trustees for this annuity. Ware v. Lord Egmont (4 De G. M·N. & G., 460), One of the trustees, who is at the same time a devilay down the true principles upon which a purchaser see, with a third party professes to convey to a purwill be considered to be affected with notice. The chaser for valuable consideration the interest in this question is not whether the purchaser might with lease of December, 1825; the purchaser never insists prudent caution and careful investigation have ob- on the production of the title deeds, and takes a contained the knowledge, but whether the not obtaining veyance upon which no legal title is shown. Under it is an act of gross and culpable negligence. Such such circumstances I do not think the mortgagee is is the tenor of Lord Cranworth's judgment in Ware entitled to set up the plea of being a purchaser for v. Lord Egmont (loc. cit.). The case of Dawson v. value without notice, having acted with manifest carePrince (2 De G. & J., 41), is even stronger. Ste-lessness and negligence in not investigating the title. phenson v. Royce 5 Ir. Ch. Rep., 401,) is also an authority. As to Carter v. Carter (loc. cit.), cited on the other side, it is not reconcileable with the current of deci-ions, and can hardly be considered as law. THE LORD CHANCELLOR.—I confess that when I first read this case the doctrine of constructive notice, upon which the respondent relies, appeared to me to be carried very far. Now, however, that the case has been fully discussed I am clearly of opinion that the order of the judge of the Court below was right, and that the charge of Mrs. Olden is entitled to priority over the mortgage executed by the bankrupts to the appellant, Mrs. Lunham. With respect to the These charges, and all information respecting them, might have come to the knowledge of the appellant if ordinary caution and care had been employed. Order below affirmed, with costs. Court of Chancery. [Reported by Oliver J. Burke, Esq., Barrister.at-Law.] M CARTHY V. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL. tion of Trusts. cases which have been cited in support of the appel- Chancery Regulation Act, s. 15-Will-Construclant's case, in every one of them, it seems, a clear legal title was conveyed by the deed or instrument, and was apparent on the face of the document; and the question was, whether the holder of that legal title should be considered to be fixed with notice of prior equ'ties affecting the estate conveyed. Here, however, the instrument under which the mortgagee claims does not appear to convey any title at all. All that is said is that the interest in the mortgaged pre A. K., by will bearing date the 12th February, 1862, bequeathed F. M'C., and E., his wife, all her property, "trusting to their charitable and pious recollection of the spiritual wants of me and mine." On behalf of the Crown it was contended that this was a valid disposition of the property for charitable purposes, and that a scheme should be settled by the Court for that purpose. By the next of kin it was insisted that the trust was uncertain and void. Held, that the trust was void for uncertainty, and that the next of kin was entitled thereto. THIS was a cause petition presented by Mr. Florence M'Carthy under the fifteenth section of the Chancery Regulation Act, 1850, for the administration of the assets of Anne Kenny, deceased, and praying that a scheme might be settled and approved of for the administration of any charitable dispositions contained in the said will, bearing date 12th February, 1862, which is as follows: "I, Jane Kenny, late of Ballymona, in the county of Wexford, do make and publish this my last will and testament; first, I devise and bequeath all my property of every kind to Denis Florence M'Carthy, Esq., of Summerfield, Dalkey, and Elizabeth, his wife, for their sole use and benefit, trusting to their charitable and pious recollection of the spiritual wants of me and mine; I direct that Mr. Simon Brazil shall be permitted to pay the debt he owes me by instalments (to be applied for charitable purposes), and I appoint Denis Florence M'Carthy and Elizabeth his wife the executor and executrix of this my will." Testatrix died on the 13th of February, 1862. The petition stated that it was alleged by one Bridget Agnes Burke, that the property of the said Anne Kenny was, by her said will of 12th February, 1862, bequeathed to petitioner and his wife, upon a trust either uncertain or otherwise void, and that there was, therefore, an intestacy, of which she, the said Bridget Agnes Burke, as the sole next of kin of the said Anne Kenny, should have the benefit; that, on the other Hand, the Attorney-General put forward a claim insisting that there was a valid disposition of the property for charitable purposes, and that a scheme should be settled by the Court for that purpose; and on behalf of petitioner it was submitted to the Court that he did not desire to reap any personal benefit from the dispositions contained in said will, and that he was willing to declare a trust for charitable or pious purposes, and to have a scheme settled by the Court. Frederick Walsh, Q. C., (with John O'Hagan) appeared for the petitioners. John Edward Walsh, Q.C., (with J. C. Armstsong) were counsel for Bridget Agnes Burke, the next of kin. George Waters for the Attorney-General. Feb. 1, 1864.-MASTER LITTON delivered judgment as follows:- In this case the testatrix, Anne Kenny (who died on the 13th July, 1862), on the day before her decease, made her will, and thereby bequeathed to the petitioner, Mr. Denis Florence M'Carthy, and Elizabeth, his wife, all her property, adding the following words, "trusting to their charitable and pious recollection of the spiritual wants of me and mine." It appears that Anne Kenny was in her lifetime a Roman Catholic, and died professing the Roman Catholic religion, and further, that the members of her family, her brothers and sisters, were all in their lifetimes persons holding the same views, and belonging to the same Church, and the question which the Court, under the above circumstances, is called on to determine, is, whether the foregoing bequest, as it is ex pressed in the will, is such as the Court can give effect to, or whether the next of kin are entitled' to the fund, on the ground that the trust is of "such a nature," or "has been so expressed as regards certainty that the object fails," and accordingly that Anne Kenny must, in respect of the fund, be deemed to have died intestate. It is admitted in the argument by the next of kin that it is the duty, and should be the object of every court of justice, to effectuate, if possible, the intention of the testator or testatrix. But it is conceded that though a general charitable purpose is indicated by the bequest, in respect to the particular objects of that bequest, it may be void. Charity, in its general sense, includes all acts of benevolence, but when a Court of Equity comes to deal with a charitable use, the meaning is much restricted-vid. the case of Jones v. Williams (Ambler, Rep., p. 600), which defines a charity to be "a gift to a general use, which extends to the poor as well as to the rich." Generally speaking, in order to ascertain what are charitable purposes, reference is had to the objects enumerated in the statute of Elizabeth, and it has been held that the statute embraces not alone the specified objects, but also all cases coming within its spirit and intendment. It will be found, therefore, upon the authorities (and they are not a few), that a charitable purpose within the meaning of or in analogy to that statute, must have some public object in view, and must not be confined to the benefit of a particular family, person, or single purpose. On this branch of the case, I will content myself with referring to the report of Gilley v Hey (1 Hare, 580), where a trust "to distribute the rents and profits of an estate, on certain days amongst certain specified families, according to their circumstances, as in the opinion of the trustees they might need such assistance, was held not to be void as a devise for charitable purposes," nor, I may add, void on the ground of uncertainty, for the reason that the families indicated were specially pointed out and named. The latter ground of this decision is of importance in dealing hereafter with the question whether in the present case the trust has been sufficiently expressed. Now, as regards what are called "superstitious uses," (and I think the present bequest is to be referred rather to this class,) there is no statute making such uses void generally: it is so stated by Sir William Grant in Casey v. Abbot (7 Vesey, Jun., 494), but such uses are, nevertheless, void in England by the general policy of the law, and the current of authorities, so that, in England, though charity be not the object of the bequest, yet if the design be to secure a benefit to the testator himself, as, for instance, masses for his soul, in such case the fund would be disposed of just as if there had been no such bequest or gift. In the present case, having regard to the religion of the testatrix, it. cannot be doubted that the general intention was the benefit of her soul, and of the souls of those connected with her, according to the well-known tenets of the Roman Catholic Church, and although, if I presided in a Court of Equity in England, I should be bound to declare such a trust or bequest, even though adequately expressed, to be void, yet in Ireland it is equally clear that such a bequest may be valid. Some years since, this question excited considerable atten tion, but I consider that it has been set at rest by the decision of Lord St. Leonards in the case of Reade v. Hodgens (7th Ir. Eq. Rep); the same point was decided by Lord Manners in the case of The Charitable Commissioners v. Walsh, referred to in Mr. O'Leary's work on Charitable Bequests, page 65. Mr. Blackburne, also, when Master of the Rolls, decided that same point, and now the very serious questions arise, has a trust been impressed upon the bequest by the testatrix? and if so- -2ndly, has it been expressed with sufficient certainty? is the language sufficiently definite and free from ambiguity, to enable the Court to give effect to it? The Court shall decide this second question in the negative. The next of kin will become entitled, for the bequest does not confer on Mr. M'Carthy a discretion so wide and so large as to relieve the gift from being a trust, and, therefore, Mr. M'Carthy could not successfully contend, and does not contend, that he is beneficially entitled. Now, in the case of Briggs v. Newry (3 Macn. & Gordon, 546) Lord Truro lays down the rule arrived at from a full consideration of the previous authorities, in the correctness of which rule I fully concur. At page 554, he thus speaks, "I conceive the rule of construction to be, that words accompanying a gift or bequest expressive of confidence, or belief, or desire, or hope, that a particular application will be made of such bequest, will be deemed to import a trust upon three conditions-firstly, that they are to be used, as to exclude all option or discretion in the party who is to act, as to his acting according to them or not; 2udly, the subject must be certain; and thirdly, the objects expressed must not be too vague or indefinite to be enforced. If the trustee named cannot act according to the trust, on the ground that the gift is uncertain, the trust fails, and the next of kin must take. Regarding, then, the language of this will, the question is not what the testatrix might have expressed, but what she has expressed, and here I conceive that nothing can be more uncertain, indefinite, and ambiguous; her confidence is placed upon the recollection of Mr. M'Carthy to have certain things done, but does not direct or point out which is to be done to secure the welfare she had in view. There are not any words directing the application of the fund, or any part of it, to her welfare. Who can say Practice-Compromise—Altering venue Reseali kin. If she had said, "of the souls," &c., it would be more certain. In my opinion, it is impossible to give a certain meaning to the language used, and accordingly the third condition laid down by Lord Truro in Briggs v. Renny has not been complied with, viz., the objects expressed must not be too vague or indefinite to be enforced. The case of Ommaney v. Butcher (1 Turner & Russel, 270,) says that when a charitable purpose is general and indefinite, and when there is no trustee named by the will, the disposition is in the Crown by sign manual, that where there is a trustee, and the trust is such as the Court can exe, cute, it will take upon itself the execution of the trust, but if the trust has not been effectually created, or fails, the next of kin take. It has been urged in argument that Mr. M'Carthy might now declare a trust. The case of The Attorney General v. Dillon (13 Ir. Ch. Rep.,) has been referred to, but this course is not open, where the testatrix has taken upon herself to express her intentions in her will. In such case the result must be arrived at by reference to the will itself. It has also been argued that evidence of the special intentions might be given to explain the words of the bequest. If the ambiguity was latent, as, for instance, if the bequest was to build a "chapel," evidence might be given of the religious opinions of the testatrix to explain whether it was to be a Roman Catholic chapel, or a dissenting chapel; but the ambiguity in this will is of a different kind-it arises from the failure clearly to declare the wishes and objects of the testatrix. I have looked into, and considered the numerous authorities that have been cited; I need not refer to them here. I think they are all consistent with the opinion I have arrived at, and, however I may regret that the intentions of the testatrix should be disappointed, I have no option but to declare the next of kin entitled, costs of all parties to be costs in the matter. that the testatrix did not mean the recollection of the deceased by Mr. M'Carthy in his own prayers? who can say whether she adverted to prayers, alms-givings, or other acts, which, according to the tenets of the Roman Catholic religion, might be considered to conduce to her spiritual welfare? so that, in this respect, there is room for the widest option or discretion on the part of the trustees.-See the case of Ellis v. Selby (1 Myl. & Craig, 298), where Lord Cottenham, referring to the case of Williams v. Kenshaw, decides that the words used by the testatrix created a trust, but a trust of so indefinite a nature, that it could not be carried into effect; the trust, therefore, failed, and the fund fell into the residue. Lord Cottenham, in that case, declares that the direction is not as large as to relieve the gift from being a trust, but that it is too indefinite to be carried into effect. Again, are the words, "the spiritual welfare of me and mine," to apply to the living next of kin, or to the dead next of 1 Court of Queen's Bench. [Reported by William Woodlock, Esq., Barrister-at-law.] HANBURY V. JONES.-Nov. 3, 1863. writ-Misprision. Circumstances held to amount only to a negotiation pending, and not to a compromise. Where a summons and plaint in ejectment was issued, the venue in the margin not being the county where the lands lay, and which was stated in the body of the writ; and on the same day the mistake was corrected without order of the Court and the writ resealed. Held—that the error amounted to a mere misprision, and that the correction of it without order did not vitiate the further proceedings in the action. THIS was a motion on behalf of the defendant that the judgment in this cause and any habere issued thereon should be set aside, upon the grounds that said judgment was marked irregularly, in breach of good faith and by surprise; and also upon the ground of irregularity, inasmuch as after the original writ of 5th August, but refused as too late; judgment was A notice had been sent on the summons and plaint in the cause had issued, and marked on the 6th. passed the seal of the Court, the writ was altered 5th apprising plaintiff's attorney of the supposed irand the venue therein erased, and another venue sub-regularity in the change of venue, which had been stituted and written on said erasure without having discovered by defendant's attorney when he went to obtained any order for liberty to change the venue or file his defence, but this notice did not reach plaintiff's amend the writ; and also upon the ground that no attorney until after the judgment marked. There was rule to proceed compromise off was entered before some conflict of testimony as to whether the writ had the making of said judgment. This motion was by been re-sealed on the 10th July; but on production of way of appeal from an order of Judge Hayes made the book from the office it appeared that such was on the 2nd October, by which he refused a motion the case. similar in its terms to the present. The action was Dowse, Q.C. and O'Neill in support of the motion. one of ejectment on the title to recover certain lands-There was a compromise pending here- O'Gorman described in the body of the writ of summons and v. Mahon (1 H. & J. 259). Then the officer had no plaint as "All that and those part of the lands of right to re-seal the writ without the order of the Rathfarnham, containing twenty perches statute mea- Court. The venue should not have been altered— sure, be the same more or less, which said premises Freeman v. Kellett (8 Ir. C. L. Rep. 92); Common form part of the premises now called Rose Villa, Law Procedure Act, 1853, ss. 16 & 44; 40th G. O. and are situate near Roundtown, in the parish of Sidney, Q.C., contra, was not called cn. Rathfarnham, in the barony of Rathdown, in the county of Dublin." The writ was issued on the 10th of July, the venue in the margin being then stated to be county of the city of Dublın.” On discovering the mistake, the clerk of the plaintiff's attorney, on the same day and within a short time after he had issued the writ, and before the same left his possession or was in any way acted upon, changed the venue to the county of Dublin, and got the officer to reseal the writ. The writ was served upon the defendant on the 17th July, the last day to plead to it being the 31st of the same month. Shortly after the issuing of the writ the defendant procured Mr. Molloy, of the firm of Molloy & Watson, to call upon the plaintiff's attorney to make terms; and on the 30th of July plaintiff's attorney wrote as follows to Molloy and Watson: "My client called since I had the pleasure of seeing you, and I mentioned what occurred; and he desires me to say if £2 10s. be paid for the costs, and 30s. towards the rent, he will take the stones for the balance; or he will take £4 for rent, provided the costs are paid. He is under the impression your client can pay all." Towards the close of the month the defendant called upon the plaintiff's attorney and explained to him that he had an agreement for a lease, and that the proceeding was groundless, whereupon the plaintiff's attorney stated he would see the plaintiff on the subject, and would not do anything further until Tuesday, the 4th August. On the 3rd August the defendant had another interview with the plaintiff's attorney, when certain terms were offered to the defendant and refused. The defendant then again procured Mr. Molloy to speak on his behalf to the plaintiff's attorney, which having been done, the plaintiff's attorney, on the 5th August, wrote to Molloy and Watson in the following terms:-"I have written to the plaintiff to get him to make an abatement in his rent, so as to have this case settled and to save your client further expense; so I have succeeded in getting his consent to take £2 10s. in lieu of rent, and £2 10s. costs; so will you communicate with your client, and let me know in the course of to-morrow if he will settle on those terms." After the interview of the 3rd August defendant employed his present attorney to prepare a defence for him. The d.fence was prepared and handed to the officer on the LEFROY, C.J.-In this case, which is an appeal from my brother Hayes, several grounds of objection It is said that at the are advanced to his decision. 66 'comprotime the judgment was marked there was a mise-a negotiation-pending, and that it was contrary to good faith to take any proceedings under those circumstances. Another distinct ground of objection is, that the writ under which the party proceeded was sealed by the officer contrary to law, and without authority. The first objection is founded upon a mistake of the meaning of the term "compromise." There was no compromise here: there was merely a negotiation. Then with respect to the effect of the negotiation, the letter of the 5th of August shews the other party had during the whole of the next day to say would he accede to the compromise; and that shews it was only matter of negotiation and not a compromise. But before twelve o'clock the next day he served a notice which put an end to the negotiation altogether and put the parties at arms' length. Therefore there was neither compromise pending nor breach of good faith; that then reduces the case to the other objection. The other objection, I think, has been rested upon in forgetfulness of the doctrine of common law as to misprision. By the common law, the clerk who issued the writ had a right, while it was within his power, to correct misprisionsmistakes-on the face of the writ, although he had sealed it, if after the correction he had resealed it, because then he had made it a legal document. Now, in this case the writ as it was issued-and I will take it as it was sealed-was a perfect nullity; for it was a writ of summons and plaint in ejectment, the venue being in the margin of the writ laid in one county, while in the body of the writ the lands were stated to be in another. That was an illegal document-a nullity; and it was the duty of the officer, in compliance with the paramount duty of every officer, not He had a right to allow such a document to issue. when he discovered the mistake to correct that document, which was a nullity on the face of it, and to set it right by the authority which the common law gave to every clerk of court to correct a mistake which appeared on the face of the writ, sealing it after the correction; so that the writ, when it went forth from the office should be according to law. |