the Bill, the Protestant influence might count on securing about onesixth of the Legislative Council; the territorial influence might secure another sixth. And not more than two-thirds (or about thirty-two) would be secured by the Catholic and Nationalist influence. A British House of Commons, of 567 members, need not be thrown into panic at such an addition to its body. Such a modification of the Bill would much simplify its working, both from the Irish and from the British point of view. But it would be a Conservative amendment, and could not fail to meet with Radical and Nationalist opposition.

It is mere waste of ingenuity now to inveigh against the “ anomalies" of the Bill, or, indeed, to justify them. Anomalies there must be under the impracticable conditions imposed by the competing interests. Anomalies there are in all constitutions, and such there are likely to be in any formal constitution. The most stupendous "anomaly" in the whole range of public law is the British Constitution. The position of the (so-called) Sovereign, the privileges of the House of Lords, the legal functions of the Privy Council, of the Cabinet, of the Premier, with his foreign title and indefinite authority-these and twenty other cardinal features in our system are huge abnormal incomprehensibilities to the eye of scientific jurisprudence. Publicists, journalists, and orators, might produce volumes in ridicule of any one of them, if they stood as clauses in a Bill. You might drive a coach-and-six through any written Constitution in the world. "Anomalies matter little in practice, where there is an honest determination to give a constitutional reform an honest

trial.

FREDERIC HARRISON.

II. THE MUTUAL SAFEGUARDS.

TH

HE secret is out at last, and the first and most natural thought of most people will, I think, be, why was it made a secret at all? If the main features of Mr. Gladstone's second Home Rule Bill had been before the electors last July, the majority in the House of Commons would not to-day be oppressed by the shadow of the House of Lords, which cast its gloom over all the debate upon the first reading. As we see the Bill now, its moderation from an English, and its comparative thoroughness from an Irish point of view, it is difficult to believe that a knowledge of its leading provisions could have diminished the Liberal polls. It is, however, a useless task to speculate now upon this matter. The second Home Rule Bill has been kept a secret; the secret is now out, and though it is safe to assume that the measure will pass triumphantly through all its stages in the House of Commons, it is, I fear, equally certain that, at any rate at the first time of asking, the House of Lords, with its permanent Tory majority of several hundreds, will give it short shrift, and condemn it to speedy execution. What will follow upon that rejection by the House of Lords no one can say, and it is idle to speculate. For the moment our hands are full. Our immediate business is to discuss, amend, and pass the Bill through the House of Commons. The task is a difficult one, requiring a spirit of moderation and compromise, but also demanding an equally strong spirit of perseverance and determination.

It is too soon yet to attempt a full or careful examination of the new measure. There are portions of it, and those the least satisfactory-such, for example, as the financial clauses-which cannot be criticised lightly after a casual perusal of the print, but which will require much thought, much inquiry, and much deliberation before a

sound judgment can be passed upon them. But there are other portions of the Bill in which the leading principles of the Home Rule policy are to be found, which create certain broad effects capable of instant recognition and acknowledgment. In homely phrase it may be said that the object of the measure is to enable the Irish people to manage their own affairs free from the ignorant and mischievous interference of England. This is an object that no one can quarrel with. The true test of the success of the new Home Rule Bill will be found in the answer to the question, does it, in conceding this right to Ireland, provide, on the one hand, adequate safeguards against rash, unjust, and oppressive action by the Irish Legislature ; and, on the other hand, adequate safeguards against wanton and capricious interference in Irish local affairs by the Imperial Parliament and the Imperial authority? If the safeguards are satisfactory to Great Britain and to Ireland then the measure is a success. If they are not it is a failure. What are the safeguards against rash, unjust, or oppressive action by the Irish Parliament? They are of the most sweeping and complete character. First take the question of physical force. No change is made in the present position. The army, the navy, and even the police for a term of years, remain under the Imperial authority. Ireland will not possess a soldier or a ship of war. A certain class of Englishmen are fond of saying Ireland is now held by force. Well, that force will remain, while the force of disaffection must necessarily be weakened, if not destroyed. Take next the power of Parliament. After Home Rule, as before, it will remain supreme and inalienable. Irishmen have for nearly a century now disputed the validity of the Act of Union; by accepting such a scheme as Mr. Gladstone proposes they will at last surrender this cherished relic of the past which they have long hugged with pathetic devotion through generations of despair and defeat. The Irish Nationalist, from being a somewhat perverse and impracticable dreamer, will, at one step, become a practical politician. The supremacy of Parliament is a fact, and he will no longer seek to question it. That supremacy will enable the Imperial Parliament to prevent oppressive legislation should it ever be attempted by the Irish Legislature. But it never will be attempted. Mr. Parnell said on a memorable occasion that once an Irish Legislature was established all Irishmen would recognise that every rash act or violent proceeding by that Legislature would be so many nails driven into the coffin of the constitution which had been won for the country, and which it would be the highest interest of all Irishmen to preserve. The supremacy of Parliament would be as a sword which often is most powerful while sheathed. The supremacy which created our Constitution would remain to take it away again if abused, and the power to legislate for Ireland delegated to the new

Legislature would remain in existence as an additional safeguard against tyrannical or oppressive proceedings.

Similarly with the Veto. No Home Rule Bill, and certainly not this Bill, can destroy the Veto of the Crown. Unjust and oppressive legislation becomes an absolute impossibility in view of the fact that as a last resort the Veto of the Crown can at any time be interposed. Beyond this there remains the tribunal which is to be invested with the power of deciding, on the initiative of either the Lord Lieutenant, or the Home Secretary, or of any aggrieved subject of the Queen, on what is called in America the "constitutionality" of any Act of the Irish Legislature. Any Act in excess of the powers granted to the Irish Parliament will be void, and the Judicial Committee of the English Privy Council, upon which Ireland is to be directly represented by at least one of her judges, is the tribunal to decide upon these questions.

Behind all these safeguards there is still another. The existence of the Second Chamber will render rash legislation an utter impossibility. It has been said that if the Lower Chamber representing the people are determined upon any Act the Second Chamber does not impose an impassable barrier. That is true. If it did its existence would be intolerable and utterly indefensible in logic or reason. What it does is this: it may postpone the particular legislation for two years, or until after a dissolution of Parliament, and even then its power does not end, for before the Bill in question can pass it must be proved to have the overwhelming sense of the people at its back by commanding a majority of both Chambers in a joint sitting. Any Bill which commands sufficient popular support to fulfil these conditions ought to pass; but then no such Bill could by any possibility be open to the charge of being rash or hasty. These, then, are the safeguards against any rash, violent, or oppressive proceedings by the Irish Legislature. The physical force of England undiminished and reinforced by a moral force she never had on her side. before, the continued and unimpaired supremacy of Parliament, the Veto of the Crown, the constitutional tribunal to decide questions of ultra vires, and the existence of the Second Chamber; to which may also be added the express reservation from the Irish Legislature of power to deal with certain questions affecting religion and kindred

matters.

Now, upon the other side, what safeguards are there for Ireland that under this measure she will be permitted, in Mr. Gladstone's words, "a practically separate and independent management of her own internal affairs?" Ireland has been told that this Home Rule is a degradation to her, and that, aspiring to be a nation, as she undoubtedly is, she ought to spurn this gift. From whom does this generous and sympathetic advice come? From men who deny Ireland

any of the attributes of nationhood; who speak of her as "an arbitrarily selected area," and who despise her people and deride their aspirations. Ireland surely upon this matter is entitled to judge and speak for herself. Mr. Gladstone spoke, on the introduction of the Bill, of the word "finality," as being "a somewhat discredited word." No man has more reason to discredit it than he has; no country has more reason to disregard it than Ireland. No man can without rashness and presumption speak of any settlement as final. No generation can bind its successors, or predict what their circumstances and needs will be. Therefore the less said in this matter of Home Rule about finality the better. For my part, I believe the day is coming when Federalism will be established as the system of government in England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland alike. Home Rule for Ireland is but a beginning, and in view of this probability, not to consider other contingencies, it would be the utmost folly to speak of the proposed arrangement as final, With this reservation, I think Ireland will find in the present Home Rule Bill some not unsatisfactory safeguards against unwarrantable interference in her domestic affairs by the Imperial authority. As to the Veto, it is expressly provided in the Bill that it is to be exercised on the advice of the Irish Cabinet. This establishes the practice, and, for my part, I am of opinion that the exercise of the over-riding Veto by the Crown to defeat measures having the support of the Irish Government and of both the Irish Legislative Chambers, would be so serious a matter, so far-reaching and violent in its consequences, not only in Ireland but in the Imperial Parliament, with its eighty Irish members, that it is beyond the bounds of possibility that it could often occur. To take the Irish Constitution away again, even by the sword, as Mr. Chamberlain contemplated, would in my view be a simpler and more sensible proceeding than the constant exercise of this power. Mr. Balfour's threats deceive no one. If an Irish Constitution be once set up, no English Party will be in a hurry to destroy it again. Of course, some great emergency might arise which would justify the use of this over-riding Veto, but I do not fear its use in such imaginary circumstances, and I am satisfied that in the every-day life of our

Parliament the Veto of the Crown will be exercised, as provided in the Bill, on the advice of the Irish Cabinet responsible to the popular Assembly. As to the right of concurrent legislation, which would continue to reside in the Imperial Parliament, I am in favour of inserting a declaration in the Bill that, while the Irish Legislature is in existence, that power will not be used in reference to those particular Irish affairs committed to its charge. Manifestly this is the intention. Manifestly, also, no such declaration can bind successive Parliaments; but I think, in view of the retention of Irish members, we ought to impose every moral obligation we can upon