part cases of railway companies, dock companies, or other like companies which carry on their business for their own profit, although incidentally for the advantage of the public. In this class of cases it is right that the Court should jealously watch the exercise of these powers, and guard against their unnecessary or unreasonable exercise to the public disadvantage. But when the Court is called upon to consider the by-laws of public representative bodies clothed with the ample authority which I have described, and exercising that authority, accompanied by the checks and safeguards which have been mentioned, I think the consideration of such bylaws ought to be approached from a different standpoint. They ought to be supported if possible. They ought to be, as has been said, 'benevolently' interpreted, and credit ought to be given to those who have to administer them that they will be reasonably administered. This involves the introduction of no new canon of construction. . . . I think courts of justice ought to be slow to condemn as invalid any bylaw so made under such conditions, on the ground of supposed unreasonableness. Notwithstanding what Cockburn, C.J., said in Bailey v. Williamson, L.R. 8, Q.B. 118, an analogous case, I do not mean to say that there may not be cases in which it would be the duty of the court to condemn bylaws made under such authority as these were made as invalid because unreasonable. But unreasonable in what sense? If, for instance, they were found to be partial and unequal in their operation as between different classes; if they were manifestly unjust; if they disclosed bad faith; if they involved such oppressive and gratuitous interference with the rights of those subject to them as could find no justification in the minds of reasonable men, the court might well say, 'Parliament, never intended to give authority to make such rules; they are unreasonable and ultra vires.' A by-law

is not unreasonable merely because particular judges may think it goes further than is prudent or necessary or convenient, or because it is not accompanied by a qualification or exception which some judges may think ought to be there.

"

3. BY-LAWS MUST BE CERTAIN. There must be no ambiguity; they must contain adequate information concerning the duties of those who are to obey them. Where a by-law imposed a penalty of £5 or less, at the discretion of the Corporation, for breaches thereof it was invalid (Piper v. Chappell, 14, M. & W. 624). On the other hand, a by-law which imposed a penalty not exceeding £5, as a Court of Summary Jurisdiction should determine, would

not be illegal. At first sight, there may appear to be no substance in this distinction, but on examination it will be observed that there is the intervention of a judicial body-the justices-between the offender and the authority making the by-law.

4. BY-LAWS MUST NOT BE REPUGNANT TO THE GENERAL LAW. By-laws are designed to supplement and not to vary or supersede the express provisions of the statute law. Channell, J., in Gentel v. Rapps (1902), 1 K.B. 160, said—

"A by-law is not repugnant to the general law merely because it creates a new offence, and says that something shall be unlawful which the law does not say is unlawful. It is repugnant if it makes unlawful that which the general law says is lawful. . . . A by-law is repugnant if it adds something inconsistent with the provisions of a statute creating the same offence; but if it adds something not inconsistent, that is not sufficient to make the by-law bad as repugnant."

Any by-law made by a sanitary authority inconsistent with the provisions of the Public Health Act, 1875, was by Section 315 of that Act repealed.

How to Prove By-Laws in Court.

If you require to give evidence in Court that a particular by-law has been made, the original sealed copy should be produced, for the law usually requires the best or primary evidence. But some statutes enable copies of the by-laws to be tendered-e.g. under the Public Health Act, 1875, Section 186, a copy of any by-laws made by a local authority under the Act (except the Council of a Borough) signed and certified by the Clerk to be a true copy, and to have been duly confirmed, is to be evidence in all legal proceedings, until the contrary is proved of the due making, confirmation, and existence of such by-laws. By Section 24 of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882, the production of a written (which includes printed) copy of a by-law of the Council of a Borough made under that Act if authenticated

by the corporate seal shall, until the contrary is proved, be sufficient evidence.

In preparing by-laws it should first be ascertained. whether any Government department has issued model by-laws on the particular matter to be regulated; if so, such model should be referred to in order to see what kind of by-law is likely to receive confirmation if local conditions warrant. Confirmation by a Minister of State does not make a by-law unimpeachable.

The formalities as to (1) advertising locally the Council's intention to apply for confirmation of their proposed by-laws and (2) depositing copies in the offices of the local authority for inspection by ratepayers must be strictly observed (Section 184 of the Public Health Act, 1875; Section 23 of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882).

SECTION II

CHAPTER IV

Corporate Bodies

THE object of Local Government Law is to invest popularly elected bodies styled Corporations or Councils with legal powers to promote the health and well-being of the people within the areas over which they have jurisdiction.

In English law there is a fiction, a pretence, a false assumption that there can be an artificial person—a corporation-which can exist independently of the continued existence of the same individuals of which it is composed. It is, however, an extremely useful conception. Suppose thirty-two gentlemen were appointed to manage the affairs of a town and to hold the town's property. If there were no corporate capacity, then, on the death of one of them, it would be necessary, unless the land were held in joint tenancy, to have someone specially appointed in his place or to allow his executors or administrators to act in his stead, also to have his share of the property conveyed to some other person by way of substitution. If it were necessary to enter into a contract, the thirty-two members would have to sign, seal, and deliver the document. Even if they decided to give an authority to some one of their members to act on their behalf, they would in the first instance have to seal a document of appointment. And it could only be for special acts, else they would be delegating generally all their powers to some individual, and this would not be what was intended when the thirty-two members were appointed. Moreover, if creditors had to sue, they would have to proceed against thirty-two persons, and even if it were deemed that they could be made joint defendants, difficulties might arise as to enforcement of the creditors' demands. Again, on the foregoing supposition,

it would be necessary for all the thirty-two to agree before they could do any and every legal act. Well now, if you say that thirty-two gentlemen shall be deemed one person, and that provided the majority of them agree they may evidence their agreement by the affixing of a common seal and act as one person, then you overcome the inconveniences above enumerated. This is what English law has done. Starting with a fiction that there can be an artificial person, separate from and independent of those thirty-two persons or any other number of persons who succeed them, we pass to the conception of a corporate personality which is as real in the eye of the law as the personality of a natural individual, though subject to minor differences, e.g. a corporate body as such cannot be imprisoned (see Chapter II, p. 16).

Jenks, in his Outline of Local Government, after tracing in lucid manner the history and development of the borough, says―

"and even after mayor, aldermen, and burgesses had made their appearance, there yet remained one most important step to be taken before the borough organization could be considered complete. This was the recognition of the borough as a legal personality, a corporation, or as the lawyers called it, persona ficta. Until this point was established there would be endless difficulties about power to hold lands, power to make by-laws, power to use a seal, power to sue and be sued— about those ordinary business acts which an individual can do without question. Suppose, for example, a dying citizen left part of his land 'to the good town of X,' who would be legally entitled to enforce performance of the will? The existing burgesses? Suppose one of them died, what about his heirs? Again, according to legal theory, if land belongs to several persons jointly, none of them can commit trespass upon it. In this way a handful of citizens might appropriate the whole benefit of the gift. It was not until the existence of the fictitious person, or corporation, comprising all the burgesses for the time being and yet in the eye of the law different from all of them, not until the legal personality was recognized, that the position of the borough could be deemed really safe. And we cannot put this consummation before the close of the fifteenth century."